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This thesis is a structured dialogue between the theological and social concerns of the early 
Franciscan movement and the insights of the contemporary cultural theorist, René Girard. 
Acknowledging from the outset different historical contexts, different methodologies and 
different core commitments the thesis, nevertheless, indicates a fertile range of shared 
perspectives amounting to a new reading of the early Franciscan movement. This dialogue 
has a twofold purpose: to interpret the spiritual and social novelty of the early Franciscan 
movement from a new perspective, outside the hitherto dominant categories of medieval 
scholasticism, or indeed, the categories of mystical and ascetical theology, medieval 
hagiography and later, romanticism. A mimetic reading of the early Franciscan movement is 
helpful in transcending the limits of traditional interpretations, particularly the culturally 
dominant romantic interpretation. This thesis indicates  how romantic and neo-romantic 
interpretations of Francis of Assisi and the early friars continue to obscure, more than they 
explain, both the founder and the movement. Secondly this thesis grounds Girard’s mimetic 
theory in an historical moment within a concrete social and political reality. Mimetic theory, 
frequently criticized as an abstraction, at least with respect to any positive political 
expression, is here theoretically clothed in the garb of the early Franciscan friars. A social and 
political grounding of mimetic theory benefits Girard’s theory even as his theory breathes 
new life into the narrative of early Franciscanism. A Girardian reading of the early Franciscan 
movement is by no means definitive in its scope. In the style of Girard it serves, rather, to 
draw together into new perspectives elements of an old story. In doing so it offers an 
established tradition of Catholic ecclesial life a voice on contemporary questions of desire, 
peace-making, violence and belonging. 
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In his reflections on Christian eschatology, Christian Life and Hope: Raids on the Inarticulate, 
Rowan Greer deliberately engages with ‘precritical’ Christian theology, in part, because ‘the 
thought remains uncluttered by critical preoccupations with historicity and with how to affirm  
religious claims in the context of purely empirical worldviews’.1 Greer admits the impossibility 
of simply returning to pre-critical worldviews but argues that, ‘as we move into a post-critical 
phase of Christian theology, our thinking can be informed by traditional approaches’.2 
 
The postcritical Christian theology Greer alludes to requires a series of novel 
conceptual bridges and hitherto unacquainted dialogue partners. In this dissertation the pre-
critical writings of Francis of Assisi (1182-1226), and the sources of early Franciscan thought 
and practice, are put into dialogue with the insights of cultural theorist René Girard (1923-
2015). The dialogue partners I have chosen occupy different historical contexts, however, 
they share several core theological intuitions. These core intuitions are clarified and distilled 
in the course of this dialogue. A characteristic concern of both dialogue partners is the search 
for new categories and a conceptual language capable of escaping dominant (sacrificial) 
systems of thought and action.3  The insights of cultural theorist René Girard transcend many 
of the critical preoccupations of modernity. Girard’s mimetic theory is a hypothesis in search 
of its own proper idiom and its own specific categories, categories that would transcend the 
limits of rigid critical methodologies and siloed academic disciplines. 
 
Girard’s work, having recognizably modern and postmodern characteristics, has 
attempted to transcend both the critical limits of modernity and the limitless critiques of 
postmodernity. Where mimetic theory sometimes struggles to avoid contradiction within the 
 
1 Rowan Greer, Christian Life and Christian Hope: Raids on the Inarticulate (New York: Crossroad Publishing, 
2001), p. 7. 
2 Ibid. 
3  What I refer to here as sacrificial systems are all cultural systems rooted in the ‘archaic sacred’, i.e., the 
largely unconscious processes whereby human violence is contained and social order is imposed by greater 
violence, resulting in victimage or scapegoating. In chapter two I will explore Girard’s concept of the sacred 
which he has defined as ‘the sum of human assumptions resulting from collective transferences  focused on a 
reconciliatory victim at the conclusion of a mimetic crisis’. Cf. René Girard, Things Hidden Since the Foundation 
of the World, with Jean-Michel Oughourlian and Guy Lefort, translated by Stephen Bann and Michael Metter 
(California: Stanford University Press, 1987) p. 42. 
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categories of modernity and postmodernity, it can demonstrate its specific explanatory 
power when placed in dialogue with precritical traditions and texts. 
 
The shared concerns which invite exploration include: the Gospel as the revelation of 
the non-violence of God, the nature of desire and the role of desire in conflict, the role of 
mimetic conversion in Christian life and asceticism, and the sacrificial nature of social 
structures. Girard’s mimetic theory is fundamentally a specific approach to texts. Girard 
considered himself primarily a ‘reader of texts’ and repeatedly ‘expressed a preference for 
literature over both humanities and philosophy’.4 In the course of his career he explored both 
the modern European novel and a variety of classical (predominantly Western) mythic and 
philosophical texts. Each text was probed for indications of what Girard termed ‘mimetic 
realism’. It is his assertion that many foundational (mythical) texts of the Western canon 
disclose, upon close reading, references (textual traces) to a prior violent mimetic conflict. 
For Girard, founding myths refer to a prior, historical, founding violence.  Each real, historical 
crisis, being a mimetic phenomenon, is experienced primarily as a loss of social differentiation 
and a rapid escalation and contagion of violence.  It is typically resolved, at its highest pitch, 
by an act of generative violence: the violent expulsion of a marginal member/members (the 
scapegoat) by the whole group. According to Girard ‘scapegoating’ is best understood as 
something unthought, a ‘mechanism’. Mimetic conflict appears in the texts considered under 
a variety of motifs which indicate undifferentiation (rivalrous twins, the ‘monstrous doubles’ 
of myth) and sudden, terrifying phenomena such as plagues, pestilence, floods and fires. For 
Girard, representations of the mimetic crisis are invariably misrepresentations and 
misunderstandings of the crisis itself. The mimetic principle which provokes and fuels each 
crisis is not recognised or understood. What is represented in the text are the effects of each 
crisis, the innumerable conflicts which were provoked and diffused by mimesis.  
 
Associated with the early Franciscan movement, and especially Saint Francis of Assisi, 
are a body of texts – historical narratives, biographies or legendae, poems, Rules – and a 
considerable body of work which represent the authentic writings of the Saint. It is my 
contention that these historical texts invite a Girardian reading. Indeed, the texts associated 
 
4 G. Vanheeswijck, cited in Michael Kirwan S.J., Girard and Theology (London: T&T Clark, 2009) p. 7.  
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with the early Franciscan movement achieve a certain clarity and coherence when 
approached through the lens of mimetic theory. A Girardian reading of the early Franciscan 
movement serves to clarify the historical concerns and theological values which brought the 
movement into being and determined its evolution. It is my contention that core theological 
and social concerns of the early Franciscan movement are helpfully retrieved and 
foregrounded by means of a Girardian reading. This is achieved, in part, by bracketing the 
dominant romantic and hagiographical interpretations of the early Franciscan sources, 
interpretations which tend to obscure these same core concerns. Though I will draw on 
historical sources this thesis is not a work of historical theology. Using the sources with 
discretion I aim to avoid unjustifiable and anachronistic assertions. My purpose is to argue 
that a Girardian reading of the texts offers the early Franciscan movement a fresh theological 
coherence and indicates a continuing relevance for Franciscan theology in the early twenty-
first century. The retrieval of Saint Francis and the early Franciscan movement from narrowly 
hagiographic or romantic representations, and their translation into the categories of mimetic 
theory, afford a movement of the early thirteenth century an uncanny relevance in the early 
twenty first century.   
 
The Terms and limits of a Girardian Reading of early Franciscan Texts  
 
Chapters four to seven of this thesis will draw on numerous historical texts relating to the 
early Franciscan Order. As I have stated above, it is not my intention to construct from these 
texts an alternative historical account of the early Franciscans. Rather, I propose on the basis 
of recent critical histories, one possible reading. It is a Girardian reading of historical and 
critical sources and may be compared to ‘Liberationist’ or ‘Feminist’ readings of an earlier 
theological tradition. A Girardian reading is justified on the basis that the relevant historical 
texts acquire a compelling coherence and are seen to be, in important ways, structurally 
comparable to Girard’s own work. The Franciscan tradition is a living tradition. This thesis is 
an effort to translate foundational elements of the early Franciscan movement into a 
contemporary (theological) theory, concerned with the questions of desire and 
transcendence, peacemaking and conflict, culture and identity, inclusion and exclusion.  
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A critical historical approach is outside the competence of this thesis. Although the 
second part of this thesis will explore historical texts and historical movements in some detail, 
it does so as constructive theology. It may be objected that reading the theological concerns 
of the early Franciscan movement through the lens of Girard’s mimetic theory is improperly 
contrived and artificial. In the course of his engagement with literary theory and cultural 
anthropology, Girard was charged with a ‘brutalization’ of certain texts and ethnological 
evidence.5 Girard insisted that his use of the texts and evidence was justified since, overall, 
mimetic theory continued to advance coherent explanations for a variety of (seemingly 
unconnected) cultural phenomena. This thesis, while drawing on much historical research, is 
concerned to demonstrate the possibilities for contemporary Franciscan theology. It is not an 
exercise in ‘brutalizing’ the sources, but in reading the sources through one possible lens, and 
in so doing, proposing a credible and compelling theological narrative. 
 
Arguments and Aims of this Thesis 
 
A Girardian reading of the early Franciscan movement not only serves to retrieve and 
reframe a specific tradition, it also contests a criticism of mimetic theory, i.e., that it lacks a 
positive, social, political and historical expression. This criticism has been levelled by 
theologian John Milbank who has viewed Girard’s project in the problematic succession of 
19th century sociologists of religion. Milbank maximises Girard’s foundations in the post-
Enlightenment social sciences and minimises his later theological and biblical work. In 
Milbank’s view, Girard as a post-Enlightenment social scientist offends by attempting a 
diachronic-scientific explanation of sacrifice and religion.6 In Milbank’s view Girard, and his 
19th century antecedents, have transgressed the boundaries of their disciplines.7 A second 
major criticism of Girard’s project is Milbank’s assertion that Girard, whilst fascinated by 
sacrifice, has not articulated what a non-sacrificial world would look like. Milbank criticises 
Girard’s theory which emphasises the exemplary role of Jesus in refusing violence and thereby 
 
5 Cf. Kirwan, Girard and Theology, p. 18. 
6 Cf. John Milbank, ‘Stories of Sacrifice’ Modern Theology, 12, 1, (January 1996).  
7 In taking the view that the social sciences are rightly limited to ‘descriptive synchrony’ and when scientists 
venture upon ‘diachronically causal explanation or ontological claims’ they ‘transgress’ their limits, (‘Stories of 
Sacrifice, p. 41) Milbank is insisting upon a distinction which continues to impede the dialogue of faith and 
science, i.e., that science must be concerned only with efficient causes and must eschew all claims to a telos.    
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ultimately exposing the scapegoat mechanism. In organizing his theoretical claims around this 
exemplarism Girard has declined to develop a plausible theory of what a non-violent, non-
sacrificial community would look like when it takes ‘a collective, political form’.8  
 
I will argue that a Girardian reading of the early Franciscan texts goes some way 
towards describing the beginning of a non-sacrificial social reality in its historical context. If, 
as Millbank rightly insists, we require more than a mere ‘idea’ of non-rivalistic imitation, we 
are compelled to seek its concrete historical patterns in Gospel and in Church. In Millbank’s 
view the lack of such social patterns reduces Girard’s theory to something like Anselm’s Cur 
Deus Homo. Both arguments represent for Millbank an ‘extrinsicist’, theoretical approach; a 
‘compelling conceit’ which may in fact add to the devotional life of the Church, but seems 
ultimately suspended from any necessary grounding in the Gospel narratives.9 Fergus Kerr 
argues that Girard does, in fact, make efforts to ground his theory in the biblical narratives 
and in the exemplary practice of Jesus, though not to Millbank’s satisfaction.10 Girard is 
charged by Millbank with offering no more than ‘the story of one city’, ‘the civitas terrena of 
self-perpetuating violence’ and ‘its final rejection by a unique individual’.11 However, in 
applying the interpretative lens of mimetic theory to the Franciscan tradition, I argue that 
Girard’s work maps onto a specific, historical, ‘collective, political form’. The core theological 
and ascetical commitment of the early Franciscan Order, i.e., the conscious leave-taking of 
social, political and ecclesial structures of power, is indicative of a deep intuition of mimetic 
desire and its role in conflict. The social and ecclesial structures the early Franciscan 
movement sought to exit I will characterise as sacrificial, in the Girardian sense, i.e., they 
require the expulsion of surrogate victims (scapegoats) in order to function. These same social 
realities make the effective Christian proclamation of peace frequently ambiguous if not null 
and void. In the process of escaping social and economic sacrificial systems, Saint Francis of 
Assisi and the early Franciscan community formed an ‘asceticism-for-peace’. The early 
Franciscan community adopted a stance towards ecclesial and social systems and the 
emerging urban economy of their day which was decidedly non-confrontational, consciously 
 
8 John Milbank, Theology and Social Theory: Beyond Secular Reason (Oxford: Blackwell Publishing, 1990) p. 
395. 
9 Cf. Fergus Kerr, ‘Rescuing Girard’s Argument?’, Modern Theology, 8, 4, (1992), 385-99 (pp. 397-98). 
10 Ibid, p. 398. 
11 Cf. Ibid, p. 396. 
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non-sacrificial, and directed towards non-rivalrous and peaceful social relations. In the early 
Franciscan movement, we observe the beginnings of patterns of desire which are consciously 
non-rivalrous and non-confrontational, taking a ‘collective, political form’.  
 
The Girardian and early Franciscan projects amount to what Walter Wink has termed 
‘a long laborious exodus out of the world of violence, an exodus plagued by repeated 
reversals.’12  For both the Franciscan and the Girardian projects the crucial question is – how 
to escape sacrificial systems without creating new sacred boundaries and being absorbed 
back into sacrificial systems? In Girard’s long and fruitful collaboration with Christian 
theologians certain concepts and terms from Christian theology which were initially 
abandoned were later reintroduced in forms which had been nuanced, ‘dematerialized’, 
‘sublimated’, ‘interiorized’ and ‘deepened’13. This process allowed for a more significant 
engagement with classical Christian theology, (welcomed by Dennis King Keenan, Louis-Marie 
Chauvet and Robert Daly SJ) but also marked an opening to an as yet ‘sacralised’ Christian 
tradition. An exodus from the world of violence suggests not a complete abandonment of the 
‘sacred’, but a long and sustained withdrawal; one frequently marked by idolatrous lapses 
back into the sacrificial economy. Both mimetic theory and early Franciscan practice indicate 
the necessity of a holistic pedagogy, i.e., mere insight into the dynamics of desire is not 
enough; insight must be accompanied by an askesis.14  
 
An exodus from the world of sacred violence depends on conversion, as Girard argues 
on a conceptual level, and early Franciscanism demonstrates historically. To undertake an 
exodus from the world of sacred violence without explicit reference to the category of graced 
(mimetic) conversion risks a disastrous retreat into even more virulent and disguised forms 
of sacred violence. The Franciscan charism and mimetic theory are defined in terms of a 
 
12 Walter Wink, The Powers That Be: Theology for a New Millennium (New York: Doubleday, 1998) p. 84. 
Wink’s comment relates to Girard’s assessment of the Hebrew scriptures. 
13 Robert Daly S.J., Sacrifice Unveiled, The True Meaning of Christian Sacrifice (London: T&T Clark International, 
2009) p. 7. 
14 The ‘sacred’ in the terms of mimetic theory represents an attitude towards violence, specifically, the choice 
of an orderly or ‘justified’ violence to displace what is perceived to be a ‘disorderly’ or ‘illegitimate’ violence. 
The ‘sacred’ is not, therefore, synonymous with the ‘holy’ since it produces a ‘deviated’ or ‘false’ 
transcendence. Naïve attempts to abandon the ‘sacred’, or a ‘sacrifice of sacrifice’ can lead unwittingly to 
concealed and pernicious forms of sacrificial thinking and action. Cf. Dennis King Keenan, The Question of 
Sacrifice (Bloomington and Indianapolis: Indiana University Press, 2005) pp. 10-32.  
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(personal, existential, as well as intellectual) collapse of faith in all ‘archaic’ sacrificial 
systems.  The category of conversion occurs in Girard’s early work and reappears in more 
explicitly theological forms throughout his career. In the early Franciscan tradition, the 
conversion experiences of Saint Francis are foundational. I will argue that Saint Francis’s 
conversion may be understood as a mimetic conversion and argue that it produced in Francis 
and the early friars a shared conversion intelligence, comparable to what James Alison has 
described as the ‘intelligence of the victim’.15 The specific social and political forms of early 
Franciscan life may be coherently described as social expressions of this conversion 
intelligence. Indeed, as Giovanni Micoli notes, among the numerous episodes and diverse 
conversion experiences recorded of Saint Francis, the conversion experience Francis chose to 
emphasise in his Testament was ‘the experience he lived through among the lepers’.16 
Francis’s conversion and the specific ‘intelligence’ associated with it produced social and 
political forms distinct from the dominant social, political, and economic systems of his time, 
for whom, Théophile Desbonnets notes, the leper represented ‘the element that was alien, 
irretrievable and repugnant, the physical projection, so to speak, of all the ills that society 
wanted to push away from itself’.17   
 
The early Franciscan forma vitae,18 and the work of René Girard may be read together 
as a dialogue between a pre-critical theological tradition and a postmodern theological-
anthropology. An intuition about human desire and the possibility of overcoming rivalrous, 
violent conflict marks the common ground upon which both projects meet. Applying a 
 
15 The term is used originally by James Alison in Knowing Jesus (London: SPCK, 2012), and in his subsequent 
work. According to Alison, the ‘intelligence of the victim’ is not ‘a peculiar sort of intellectual brilliance’, or ‘an 
increase in intelligence quotient’. It is not a piece of arcane knowledge passed by a teacher to a group of 
initiates. Rather, it denotes an awareness that our consciousness ‘has been formed in rivalry and the 
techniques of survival by exclusion of the other’. This ‘intelligence’ was always in Jesus of Nazareth and the 
particular way in which the Gospels are written (from the perspective of the innocent victim) indicate that, 
post-Resurrection, the disciples too shared this transformed consciousness. The intelligence of the victim 
produces specific forms of life and an idiom sensitive to our collective role in creating social order through 
victimizing. Cf. James Alison, The Joy of Being Wrong, Original Sin through Easter Eyes (New York: Crossroad 
Publishing company, 1998), pp. 79-83.  It equates to what I term ‘conversion intelligence’ in the early 
Franciscan movement. 
16 Cf. Giovanni Micoli in Théophile Desbonnets, From Intuition to Institution: The Franciscans (Chicago: 
Franciscan Herald Press, 1988) p. 11. 
17 Ibid.  
18 The term Forma Vitae, or ‘form of life’ (sometimes forma vita, but typically rendered in the genitive) appears 
in the writings of Saint Francis. It points to the specific commitments of the early Franciscan movement, such 
as, a creative living of fraternity/sorority, an orientation towards peace-making and voluntary poverty, a 
commitment to evangelism and the modelling of non-rivalrous social reciprocity.  
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Girardian lens to the Franciscan forma vitae provides a credible account of the original 
motivation and institutional novelty of the early Franciscan movement, its rapid expansion as 
a cultural force in the thirteenth century, and its ultimate failure to remain outside the 
sacrificial systems of wider society. If the historical ‘triumph’ of medieval Franciscanism 
signalled its return to the sacrificial systems of Church and society, it may yet be argued, that 
the Vita Minorum, the founding ‘intelligence’, continued to find some (obscured) expression 
within these same systems. 
 
Tripartite Structure of the Thesis  
 
Attempts have been made to describe Girard’s expansive theoretical project in terms of a few 
core ideas or key questions. For example, Stephen Finamore proposed a five-fold division of 
Girard’s project.19 Michael Kirwan has described Girard’s entire theoretical project more 
succinctly as an engagement with three simple questions: ‘What causes social groups to come 
together and cohere successfully? What causes those groups to disintegrate? What is the 
function of religion in these two processes?’20 Kirwan has furthermore indicated how these 
core concerns can be schematized and structured so as to explain the evolution of mimetic 
theory. Thus, the most common schematization of Girard’s theory is tripartite, linking three 
core insights of mimetic theory with three major works of Girard:21 
 
(1) Mimetic desire leading to rivalry and conflict (Mensonge Romantique et Verité 
Romanesque, 1961).22 
(2) The scapegoating mechanism as a source of group cohesion and social order (La 
Violence et la Sacré, 1972).23 
 
19 Cf. Stephen Finamore, God, Order and Chaos: René Girard and the Apocalypse (Milton Keynes, Paternoster 
Biblical Monographs, 2009) p. 93. 
20 Michael Kirwan, Girard and Theology, p. 20. 
21 Cf. Michael Kirwan, Girard and Theology, p. 20. Scott Cowdell adopted the tripartite schematization in René 
Girard and Secular Modernity: Christ, Culture and Crisis (Notre Dame University, Indiana: Notre Dame 
University Press, 2013). 
22 René Girard, Mensonge Romantique et Verité Romanesque (Paris: Éditions Bernard Grasset, 1961) in English 
translation: Deceit, Desire and the Novel: Self and Other in Literary Structure, translated by Yvonne Freccero 
(Baltimore: Johns Hopkins Press, 1976). 
23 René Girard, La Violence et le Sacre (Paris: Éditions Bernard Grasset, 1972), in English translation: Violence 
and the Sacred, translated by Patrick Gregory (New York: Bloomsbury Academic, 2013)  
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(3) The power of the Judeo-Christian revelation as a vehicle of enlightenment concerning 
(1) and (2) (Des Choses Cachées depuis la Foundation du Monde, 1978).24 
 
The tripartite schematization is helpful, with the caveat that the themes of Girard’s early work 
reoccur in his later work, and developed themes of his later work occur in embryo in his early 
work. Scott Cowdell is sensitive to the limits of linking the stages of mimetic theory to Girard’s 
three major works.25 I propose, like Cowdell, to adapt the tripartite scheme to allow for a 
deeper exploration of Girard’s work. Chapters one to three of this dissertation will broadly 
follow Kirwan’s tripartite schematization of mimetic theory. However, to facilitate a fuller 
account of mimetic desire in chapter one, I will not limit myself to Girard’s early work Deceit, 
Desire and the Novel.  
 
My schematization of Girard’s project is tripartite, organized under the categories 
‘literary’, ‘phenomenological/anthropological’ and ‘theological’ Girard. In chapter one, 
therefore, I treat mimesis and rivalry as an aspect of Girard’s literary work, referring not 
merely to an early work such as Deceit, Desire and the Novel, but also to Girard’s mature work, 
A Theatre of Envy.26 It may be observed in passing that, for some, ‘literary Girard’ is not a 
category of description or a mere stage in the development of mimetic theory, rather, it 
describes Girard’s entire  project, i.e., mimetic theory is fundamentally a literary theory.27 
Nevertheless, it is an obvious category through which to explore Girard’s theory of mimesis. 
The three categories of my scheme broadly map onto the categories of ‘early’, ‘middle’ and 
‘later’ Girard, but they allow for a unitary voice, even as the theory is explored in different 
registers and disciplines. The first three chapters, therefore, will explore Girard’s work on the 
mimetic nature of desire, his theory of culture, and his engagement with the Gospels and 
Christian theology.   
 
 
24 René Girard, Des Choses Cachées depuis la Fondation du Monde: recherches avec J.-M. Oughourlian et Guy 
Lefort (Paris: Éditions Bernard Grasset, 1978) in English translation: Things Hidden Since the Foundation of the 
World, with Jean-Michel Oughourlian and Guy Lefort, translated by Stephen Bann and Michael Metter 
(California: Stanford University Press, 1987).  
25 In René Girard and the Nonviolent God (Notre Dame Indiana: University of Notre Dame Press, 2018) Cowdell 
shifts from a schematization linking the core ideas with Girard’s principle works to a more fluid ‘early’, ‘middle’ 
and ‘later Girard’ schematization. 
26 René Girard, A Theatre of Envy (Herefordshire: Gracewing, 2000). 
27 Cf. Kerr, p. 399.  
 18 
In Part Two of this thesis (chapters four to six), this same tripartite scheme will 
function as a heuristic device, clarifying the core values and concerns of the early Franciscan 
movement, in dialogue with mimetic theory. The tripartite schematization of Girard’s work 
provides a helpful structure both to explore the core principles of mimetic theory, and to 
extend this exploration into a dialogue with the early Franciscan movement. The dialogue will 
proceed thus: 
 
(1) Having explored Girard’s critique of romantic notions of the autonomous self in 
literature (chapter one), I will attempt a critique of the ‘romantic’ interpretations of 
Saint Francis of Assisi, and the early Franciscan movement (chapter three). The 
critique of romanticism is an essential prerequisite to a genuine mimetic reading of 
the life of Saint Francis and the early Franciscan movement. The romantic (‘heroic’) 
interpretations of Francis have dominated popular cultural representations of the 
saint and the movement he founded since the nineteenth century. The romantic 
(‘heroic’) Francis is still, perhaps, the dominant popular representation of the saint, 
having overshadowed earlier hagiographic representations. I will argue that the role 
of conversion (a core category of both mimetic theory and the early Franciscan 
movement) helps to rescue Francis and his movement from the limits of a romantic 
interpretation.   
 
(2)  In recent decades a new interpretation of Francis has emerged, particularly in certain 
critical and academic literature. In the work of Kenneth Baxter Wolf and Brian 
Hamilton, Francis is presented as a type of ‘anti-hero’. Superficially a departure from 
nineteenth-century romantic interpretations, the ‘hero’ and the ‘anti-hero’ are both, 
from a Girardian perspective, romantic inventions. Both interpretations serve to 
minimize and obscure the mimetic characteristics of early Franciscan life.  
 
Girard’s second phase (phenomenological/anthropological) was an engagement with 
the origins of culture and the role of violence in societies. Drawing on Girard’s cultural 
theory will enable me to deconstruct the neo-romantic figure of Francis; Francis the 
‘anti-hero’. Chapter five, therefore, will ground Saint Francis and the early Franciscan 
movement in the historical/social and cultural context of the late Middle Ages. I will 
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explore the context of late-feudal societies of northern Italy, specifically how the 
economic, political and ecclesial structures functioned as ‘sacred’ or excluding social 
realities, entangled in rivalrous conflicts and reciprocal violence. By foregrounding the 
questions of mimetic violence and peace-making, I will argue (against Baxter Wolf and 
Hamilton) that early Franciscan voluntary poverty was chiefly a strategy for peace-
making and non-rivalrous social relations. Franciscan voluntary poverty, understood 
through the lens of mimetic theory, is a social and political expression of a prior 
mimetic conversion, i.e., the ‘intelligence of the victim’, taking a social and political 
form.  
(3) In the third phase of Girard’s work, the Hebrew and Christian scriptures (and especially 
the Gospels) are presented as the hermeneutical key which reveal what is consistently  
hidden in culture and especially in myth: the collective role of the community in 
excluding/murdering the innocent victim. Simultaneously, the Gospels reveal the 
absolute non-violence of God. In chapter six I will explore how early Franciscan 
asceticism can be understood as spiritual strategies which function to interrupt the 
early stages of mimetic conflict and foster a non-rivalrous social order. In this chapter 
I will explore the Gospel category of skandalon, and suggest that this concept provides 
a bridge between Girardian theory and early Franciscan practice.   
 
In adopting this tripartite schematization, I hope to facilitate a mutually enlightening dialogue 
between a pre-critical social, religious and theological tradition, and a (theological) post-
critical theory of origins. The tripartite division is methodological, not organic or essential. 
Rather, it serves to group themes and core concerns which are shared in both mimetic theory 
and in the early Franciscan tradition. It will become obvious that any treatment of Girard’s 
mature work requires a return to themes and motifs which were introduced and examined in 
earlier stages of his work (hence my reluctance to limit the sweep of Girard’s theory to specific 
moments or stages). Girard’s literary method of ‘shuttling back and forth’ between author 
and text and between complementary motifs and themes gives the impression of a slow 
crescendo. Sandor Goodhart has observed, for example, Girard’s career-long return to and 
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application of the Oedipus myth in each stage of his work.28 I will argue that the dialogue 
facilitates a more robust, radical, and coherent reading of the early Franciscan movement 
(and the role of the founder, Francis of Assisi). In a mutually beneficial dialogue, the dynamics 
of early Franciscan thought and action are re-presented in terms of a contemporary (and 
influential) theory of culture. Simultaneously, Girard’s insights, frequently criticized as 
ahistorical abstractions, are given an historical embodiment.  
 
The first six chapters form a double ‘triptych’, structuring the dialogue. In chapter 
seven, to advance my argument that the early Franciscan movement was attempting a 
deliberate withdrawal from the dominant sacrificial economies of their day, I will engage with 
the work of Franciscan scholar, David Flood OFM, Jacques Le Goff and others. Flood, 
especially, has argued that the early Franciscan movement was a complex religious, social and 
economic movement in search of its own idiom and praxis. For Flood, the early Franciscans 
attempted an exodus from violent and excluding structures through a unique understanding 
of labour. In chapter seven I will argue that Flood’s theory of early Franciscan labour supports 
my reading of the early Franciscan movement as a non-rivalrous, peace-making community, 
with its own shared (mimetic) ‘conversion intelligence’. The Franciscan manner of working 
becomes a locus of this ‘conversion intelligence’ and allows us to describe how it functioned 
in the context of the late medieval economy. I agree with Flood that the early Franciscan 
movement did not successfully complete its ‘exodus’ and is, therefore, historically a negative 
as well as a positive example of non-competitive, non-violent social and political life.  
 
Finally, I will conclude by evaluating the merits of a Girardian reading of the early 
Franciscan movement and consider the benefits of such a dialogue for a contemporary, 
postcritical Christian theology.  
  
 
28 Cf. Sandor Goodhart ‘Oedipus and Greek Tragedy’ in The Palgrave Handbook of Mimetic Theory and 
Religion, J. Alison and W. Palaver, editors (New York: Palgrave MacMillan, 2017) pp. 151-6. The Oedipus myth 
is used by Girard to explore mimesis in literature in the ‘first phase’ of his work. Girard’s theory of culture 
(‘second phase’) explores Oedipus, by way of contrast to its use in Freud’s psychoanalysis and Levi-Strauss’s 
cultural anthropology. Finally, Girard explored the Oedipus myth in his theological, ‘third phase’; exploring the 








The aim of this chapter is to introduce René Girard’s work, specifically, his exploration of the 
mimetic nature of desire in literature. Girard’s theory of mimetic desire is frequently 
associated with his early work, Deceit, Desire and the Novel. While drawing on this 
foundational work, my purpose in this chapter is to offer a more complete, less historically 
limited, account of Girard’s theory of mimetic desire, principally in a literary register. My 
scheme is, like the two possible schemes mentioned in the General Introduction, basically 
chronological. However, it honours a characteristic mark of Girard’s entire project; that, as 
Girard maintained: 
 
[e]verything came to me at once in 1959. I felt that there was a sort of mass that I’ve 
penetrated into little by little. Everything was there at the beginning, all together. That’s 
why I don’t have any doubts. There’s no “Girardian System”. I’m teasing out a single, 
extremely dense insight.29  
 
Even in his early work, elements associated with the ‘middle’ and ‘later’ stages of mimetic 
theory are taking shape. As Cynthia Haven has observed: 
 
If his words are to be taken at face value – why shouldn’t they be, really? – he had the 
glimmerings of all the future phases of his work, from imitative behaviour, to the nature 
of desire, to scapegoating, to lynching, to war, and ultimately, to the ends of the world, 
all in this intense period of several months.30   
 
This chapter is divided into four parts:  
1. The first part of this chapter introduces Girard in the context of a variety of mid-
twentieth century concerns frequently considered influences on his work. 
 
29 René Girard, When These Things Begin: Conversations with Michel Treguer, trans. Trevor Cribben Merrill 
(Michigan: Michigan State university Press, 2014) p. 129. 
30 Cynthia Haven, Evolution of Desire: A Life of René Girard (Michigan: Michigan State University Press, 2018) p. 
112. Haven’s brief summary indicates how, in mimetic theory, desire is frequently associated various forms of 
violence and exclusion.  
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2. The second part of this chapter is an exploration of the meaning(s) of mimesis and the 
role of mimesis in Girard’s theory. Operating at both the phenomenological (genetic) 
level and at the level of literary representation, mimesis is, for Girard, the most 
significant determining principle of social and cultural processes. As I will indicate, 
Girard’s treatment of this principle emphasises the relationship between mimetic 
desire and conflict. 
3. Treating Girard’s critique of the ‘romantic’ concept of spontaneous desire, I suggest 
the outlines of a helpful methodology for chapter four: a mimetic deconstruction of 
‘romantic’ narratives of Francis of Assisi. Other important elements of mimetic theory, 
some of which are characteristic of the anthropological and theological stages of 
Girard’s work will be introduced. Themes characteristic of Girard’s mature work (e.g., 
how mimetic desire leads to scapegoating, the relationship between desire and 
reason and desire in relation to social boundaries) merit reference in relation to his 
literary work.  
4. The chapter concludes with an exploration of the literary category of ‘conversion’. A 
theme in Girard’s early and literary work, I argue that the category of conversion 
ensures that Girard’s project is not fundamentally a negative one, rather, Girard 
conceived of mimetic desire as an openness not only to what is human, but also to the 
divine.31 Conversion situates mimetic theory against a theological horizon and 
provides another helpful bridge towards Francis and the early Franciscan movement.    
 
René Girard: Background and Influences 
 
René Girard (1925- 2015) began his distinguished academic career as an historian. He studied 
at the École des Chartes in Paris 1943-1947, specializing in medieval history and 
palaeography. Girard’s first doctoral thesis, La Vie privée á Avignon dans la seconde moitié du 
XVe siècle (1947) was followed by a doctoral thesis entitled American Opinion on France 1940-
1943 (University of Indiana, 1953).32 His intellectual formation at the École des Chartes was 
contemporaneous with, among others, Michel Foucault, Gilles Deleuze and historian 
 
31 Cf. René Girard, I See Satan Fall like Lightening (New York, Maryknoll: Orbis 2001), p. 13. 
32 René Girard, Evolution and Conversion: Dialogues on the Origins of Culture, with Pierpaolo Antonello and 
João Cezar de Castro Rocha (London: Bloomsbury, 2017), p. 191. 
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Emmanuel Le Roy Laduire. At this time Pierre Bourdieu, Jacques Le Goff and Jean-François 
Lyotard were students at the Lyceé Louis Le Grande. 
 
The wider social context of the Second World War, the humiliating defeat of France 
to Germany, and episodes of violent post-war scapegoating provided an epic historical 
background to some of Girard’s central intellectual themes. Cynthia Haven has drawn 
attention to the national mood in post-war France, analysed by Jean-Paul Sartre in 1945. 
Sartre explored the ‘bad conscience’ of the Parisians whose wartime association with the 
occupying Nazi authorities became a source of unspeakable shame after the war. Haven notes 
that the rush to punish collaborators after the liberation of France in 1944 led to public rituals 
and violent acts of social exclusion, directed specifically towards vulnerable social groups. In 
the immediate aftermath of the war more than 20,000 women in France had their heads 
shaved by avenging tondeurs.33  
 
Girard’s work has been shaped, to some extent, by the great ideological struggles of 
the twentieth century, as well as personal experiences of exclusion.34 His early experiences of 
belonging and exclusion  are set against what Paul Fletcher describes as ‘a pessimistic heritage 
of twentieth century French anti-humanism that has witnessed the emptiness and despair 
resulting from the failure of utopian projects in both political and intellectual contexts’.35 
Girard’s work on sacrifice has tended to emphasise the ‘darker side of human nature’ and has 
been understood to parallel, to some extent, post-war ‘death of God’ theologies.36   
 
Given Girard’s typically negative treatment of human desire, and his interest in the 
role of violence in creating social order, it is inevitable that mimetic theory has been 
 
33 Haven cites Anthony Beevor’s ‘An Ugly Carnival’, (The Guardian, June 4th 2009): women in France ‘were 
among the first targets as they offered the easiest and most vulnerable scapegoats, particularly for men who 
had joined the resistance at the last moment […] Revenge on women represented a form of expiation for the 
frustrations and sense of impotence among males humiliated by their country’s occupation’. Haven, p. 54.   
34 In the early chapters of Cynthia Haven’s Evolution of Desire biographical details of Girard’s formative years 
are provided, indicating experiences of personal exclusion against a background of wider social violence. 
During his schooling in Paris Girard’s accent and manners marked him out as a ‘Southerner’ and he was 
treated as an outsider. Girard described his years at the École des Chartes (1943-47) as ‘the worst experience 
of my life’. p. 28. 
35 Paul Fletcher, The Broken Body and the Fragmented Self: Theological Anthropology after Girard, (Doctoral 
Thesis, Durham University, 1999. Durham E-Theses Online: <http://etheses.dur.ac.uk/1527/> p. 97. 
36 Cf. Ian Bradley, The Power of Sacrifice (London: Darton, Longman and Todd, 1995) pp. 215-16. 
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considered a largely pessimistic response to mid-twentieth century conflicts. While Girard 
allowed that an emotional response to various forms of exclusionary violence was necessarily 
a component of his work, it was so, ‘quite indirectly’. He insisted that the central role of 
generative violence (what he would describe as ‘scapegoating’) in his mature work was rooted 
not in emotion, ‘but in a certain attitude towards textual interpretation’.37 His interest in the 
study of violence was intellectual rather than moral or existential; violence in relation to 
mimetic desire served to explain and connect a variety of seemingly disparate phenomena, 
within a single scientific theory.38 Efforts to explain (or reduce) mimetic theory to a post-war 
pessimism about human nature, or to Girard’s personal experiences of exclusion, tend to 
obscure what Haven has termed the ‘intuitive genius’ appreciable in his early work Deceit, 
Desire and the Novel. Here, and in his later work, he demonstrates the capacity to integrate 
a variety of observations, insights and research into robust and fertile argument.39 Mimetic 
theory, according to Girard, emerged from a unique approach to the text. He insisted, in what 
was at that time an unfashionable assertion, that the text can have a real relation to cultural 
dynamics and historical events. 
 
French academic culture during the mid to late 1940s has been described as an 
‘intellectual environment still dominated by, yet emerging from, the shadow of Sartre’s 
humanist existentialism’.40 Robert Doran has explored the influence of Sartre on the early 
work of Girard.41 Both Girard and Sartre are drawn to questions of desire and authenticity, 
but, whereas Sartre uses the categories of existence and essence, Girard’s work is defined by 
the concepts of Self and Other. Thus, Girard gives priority to the concept of alterity over that 
of being.42 As Girard developed his ideas of how social order is determined by group violence 
 
37 Rebecca Adams and René Girard, ‘Violence, Difference and Sacrifice: A Conversation with René Girard’ in 
Religion & Literature, 25, 2 (1993), 9-33 (p.13) <http://www.jstor.org/stable/40059554> Accessed: 20-12-
2018. 
38 Cf. René Girard, The Ideas of René Girard: An Anthropology of Violence and Religion, edited by David Cayley 
(Wrocław: Amazon Fulfillment Poland, 2019) p. 101.  
39 Cf. Haven, p. 64. Haven explores Girard’s experience of living in the segregated American South in the 1950s, 
where racially motivated mob violence was not uncommon. Girard rejected the suggestion that his scapegoat 
theory developed primarily from his experiences in the segregated South. Cf. René Girard, The One by Whom 
Scandal Comes, trans. By M. B. DeBevoise (Michigan: Michigan State University Press, 2014) p. 128.  
40 Fletcher, p. 88. 
41 Robert Doran, ‘René Girard’s Concept of Conversion and the “Via Negativa”: Revisiting “Deceit, Desire and 
the Novel”’ in Religion & Literature, 43, (2011), 170-79.  
42 Ibid, p. 176. Privileging alterity over being is characteristic of a postmodern approach. 
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against an innocent victim(s) he came to disassociate himself from Sartre’s political views, 
specifically Sartre’s dream of the ‘mobilized crowd’.43 
 
Girard’s academic formation in France was influenced by Alexandre Kojéve’s lectures 
on the philosophy of Georg W. F. Hegel, particularly Hegel’s understanding of consciousness 
and desire in Phenomenology of Spirit.44 In Hegel, desire is both intentional and reflexive, 
always directed to the object or to the Other, and at the same time, it is a mode or process in 
which the subject is discovered and articulated. Hegel’s conception of the subject has been 
compared to the fictional Don Quixote: ‘an impossible identity who pursues reality in 
systematically mistaken ways.’45 Judith Butler argues that Hegel’s philosophy (for Kojéve) 
provided a context for enquiry into certain questions relevant to post-war society in Europe, 
specifically, a way to discern reason in the negative, that is, to derive the transformative 
principle from every experience of defeat. The destruction of institutions and ways of life, the 
mass annihilation and sacrifice of human life, revealed the contingency of existence in brutal 
and indisputable terms. Hence, for Butler, the mid-twentieth century turn to Hegel among 
many French intellectuals can be seen as an effort to excise ambiguity from the experience of 
negation.46  
 
In Deceit, Desire and the Novel, antecedent influences, such as Sartre and Hegel are 
present, but important concepts are already reinterpreted. Whereas Hegel sacralises 
violence, placing it at the centre of the structure of desire, Girard avoids this, leaving open 
the possibility of desire without violence.47 The Master/Slave dialectic is apparent in Girard’s 
presentation of mimetic desire, but Hegel’s concept of desire as the desire to be 
desired/recognised is replaced by the principle of triangular desire. Sartre’s ontological 
terminology is evident throughout Deceit, Desire and the Novel, but Girard’s work is not 
pursuing Sartre’s dialectic between existence and essence (between the ‘for-itself’ and the 
 
43 Girard, Evolution and Conversion, p. 17. Haven notes that Sartre ‘valorizes “Terror against the traitor” and 
“the practical bond of love between the lynchers”. According to Haven, Sartre ‘reflects the same dynamic that 
had dismayed Girard, but he celebrates it, rather than renounces it’. Haven, p. 74.   
44 Cf. George Erving, ‘René Girard and the Legacy of Alexander Kojeve’, Contagion: Journal of Violence, Mimesis 
and Culture, 10 (2003), 111-125. 
45 Judith Butler, Subjects of Desire, Hegelian Reflections in Twentieth Century France (New York: Columbia 
University Press, 1999) p. 23. 
46 Cf. Butler, p. 62. 
47 Cf. Michael Kirwan, Discovering Girard, (London: Darton, Longman and Todd, 2004), p. 33. 
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‘in-itself’). Sartre’s ontological interpretation of Self-Other relations relegates alterity to ‘a 
secondary and contingent status’, whereas, for Girard alterity is primordial.48  
 
Mimesis: A Theory of Human Desire 
 
Introducing Mimetic Desire 
 
Girard’s theory of desire breaks with the traditional understanding that our desires 
respond/are drawn to the inherent value which radiates from an intrinsically desirable object, 
a view held at least since Plato. Alternatively, desire has been understood as something 
innate; ‘immaculately conceived’ in the mind of the desiring subject. This is a view associated 
particularly with Romanticism. In his classic work of literary criticism, Mensonge Romantique 
et Vérité Romanesque, Girard, as the title suggests, distinguishes between the ‘novelistic 
truth’ of ‘borrowed’ or mediated desire, and the ‘romantic lie’ of spontaneous desire.49 Girard 
asserts that both the ‘objective and subjective fallacies’ of desire depend ‘directly or indirectly 
on the lie of spontaneous desire’ and the illusion of subjective autonomy.50 The true nature 
of desire is ‘triangular’, having a subject, an object, and a model, who mediates desire. The 
‘lie’ of spontaneous desire may be observed in the relatively uncomplicated interactions of 
children in a nursery. One child’s initial interest in a particular toy frequently excites the 
interest of another child. The initial interest hardens into desire as each child unintentionally 
confirms for the other the value of the toy.  Attempts to appropriate the desired object 
provoke reciprocal gestures of violence, further confirming the value of the desired object. 
Among children mimetic rivalries are usually ended by the intervention of an adult (familiar 
proxy of the law) who attempts to separate the rivals from one another and from the toy. Not 
uncommonly the adult may adopt a loud, reproving tone of voice, ‘ensuring that a certain 
violence will attach to the empirical apprenticeship of possession’.51  This is the essence of 
‘triangular desire’: ‘The mediator’s prestige is imparted to the object of desire and confers 
upon it an illusory value. Triangular desire is the desire which transfigures its object’.52 Girard 
 
48 Doran, p. 176. 
49 Cf. Girard, Deceit, note on pp. 16-17 for Girard’s treatment of the terms romantic and Romanesque. 
50 Girard, Things Hidden, p. 16. 
51 Cf. Gil Bailie, Violence Unveiled: Humanity at the Crossroads, (New York: Crossroads Publishing Company, 
1995) pp. 116-17. 
52 Girard, Deceit, p. 17. 
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consistently ranks all literature according to its success in exposing the lie of spontaneous 
desire and simultaneously revealing the role of the mediator: ‘Only the great artists attribute 
to the mediator the position usurped by the object; only they reverse the commonly accepted 
hierarchy’.53  
 
Mimetic theory has its proper ‘grammar’, which is somewhat fluid.54 The mediation of 
desire is ‘external’ if the subject and model occupy different worlds (i.e., do not share physical 
and psychological proximity) and are unlikely to come into close contact with each other, or 
the desired object. Contrariwise, ‘internal’ mimesis indicates a greater risk of conflict, since 
the subject and the model inhabit the same world and their reciprocal gestures tend to 
accelerate into acquisitive desire (mimesis of appropriation).55 When desire is acquisitive the 
rivalry becomes acute. As mimesis drives desire the desired object may drop entirely from 
view or may be destroyed as ‘each rival becomes for his counterpart the worshipped and 
despised model and obstacle, the one who must be at once beaten and assimilated.’56  Such 
rivals are typically termed ‘twins’ since from the point of view of the antagonism, nothing or 
next to nothing distinguishes them: ‘Each looks on the other as an atrociously cruel 
persecutor. All the relationships are symmetrical; the two partners believe themselves 
separated by a bottomless abyss but there is nothing we can say of one which is not equally 
true of the other’.57  Acquisitive mimesis divides two or more individuals by inciting 
competition for the desired object. Conflictual desire has the effect of uniting two or more 
individuals, forming alliances against a marginal individual or group, whose violent expulsion 
has the result of reconciling the community and restoring social differentiation.58  
 
Our desires and our sense of self are inextricably linked. Through desire, our sense of 
self is continuously borrowed from, or mediated through, the social Other (model or rival). 
While romantic literature maintains the illusion of spontaneous desire and of a quasi-divine 
 
53 Ibid, p. 14. 
54 Girard tended to speak of ‘metaphysical desire’ more in his earlier work. ‘Imitative desire’ and ‘mimetic 
desire’ are used interchangeably.  
55 Cf. Girard, Things Hidden, pp. 8-19 
56 Ibid, p. 25. 
57 Girard, Deceit, p. 100. 
58 Girard, Things Hidden, pp. 26-27. 
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autonomy, the social ‘other’ is in fact what constitutes my sense of self. 59 The social Other 
‘reproduces itself effectively in us as highly malleable participants’, largely unnoticed and 
unacknowledged.60 ‘Desire according to another, as opposed to desire according to oneself’ 
constitutes the subject.61 One’s subjective sense of independence from the model depends 
on an unconscious ‘unknowing’ or ‘forgetfulness’. Following Girard, James Alison asserts that 
without this forgetfulness, ‘the “me” formed by desire could not come into existence’.62 The 
nonrecognition of the Other’s role in my genesis is unproblematic if the Other is taken as 
model and not as rival. However, if the other is taken as a rival, not as a model, ‘this 
“unknowing” becomes a self-deception, something pathogenic. It becomes an insistence on 
the radicality of the “me” as being the origin of its desire […] the “me” tries to identify itself 
over against others, in reaction to whom it is constituted’.63  The idea of a ‘borrowed’ sense 
of self, which is still a true or authentic self, is analogous to the concept of autonomy in 
creation. In his work on the doctrine of creation, Simon Oliver writes, ‘creation is autonomous 
because it is not God, but that is no autonomy at all because creation’s “otherness” is always 
received from God in his act of creating ex nihilo. God “holds back” creation from himself in 
order that creation can be itself’.64 Just as, in an absolute sense, the only autonomy possible 
in creation is the autonomy we participate in through God’s gift, so too, the only self we can 
lay claim to is the self we have ‘borrowed’ from the Other. 
 
For Girard, triangular or mediated desire bears upon, but does not void our freedom. 
Indeed, the ability to describe and distinguish mimetic desire, to sift through the debris of 
human conflict and discover rivalrous tendencies and the evidence of borrowed desire, as the 
great writers do, indicates that the desire which shapes my sense of self is not identical with 
the self. If the mimetic mechanism is a closed, natural system, as Girard argues, then our 
freedom to step outside this system requires an intervention from outside the system, a 
 
59 Cf. Ibid, pp. 28-9. 
60 James Alison, Palgrave, p. 2. 
61 Cf. Girard, Deceit, p. 4. 
62 Alison, The Joy of Being Wrong, p. 32. 
63 Ibid. 
64 Simon Oliver, Creation, A Guide for the Perplexed (London: T&T Clark, 2017) p. 146. The analogy only goes so 
far: God is absolutely different from what God creates, whereas the human self is a contingent self, mediated 
through other contingent selves.  
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supernatural revelation.65 Even so, within the exigencies of mimetic desire, and assisted by 
supernatural grace, Girard asserts that there is a real human freedom.66 It is not clear how a 
person adopts her mimetic model and how the chain of mimetic desiring begins.67 Girard 
stated that, 
 
People influence one another and, when they’re together, they have a tendency to desire 
the same things, primarily not because those things are rare but because, contrary to what 
most philosophers think, imitation also bears on desire. Humans essentially try to base 
their being, their profound nature and essence, on the desire of their peers.68 
 
An awareness of the ‘other’, and with that, some awareness of one’s own ontological lack 
gives birth to desire.69 Whereas our appetites automatically suggest their own object, our 
desires have no immediate object, therefore, the subject looks to the ‘other’ to ‘inform him 
of what he should desire in order to acquire […] being’.70  Mimetic desire, which 
‘unthematically aims at being’ has been translated by later Girard (and Girardians) into the 
quest for transcendence, an explicitly theological category.71 When Girard wrote of 
‘metaphysical desire’ he used the term in a partly ironic way. His aim was not to discount 
metaphysics in a deconstructionist manner; however, he was convinced that appeals to 
‘metaphysics’ frequently masked or misread, a real, prior, mimetic conditioning. When 
metaphysical desire is unshackled from a proper anthropological grounding, it invariably 
creates the illusory autonomous self of romance.72 Despite a tendency to emphasise the 
conflictual nature of mimetic desire in his early literary work, Girard increasingly understood 
mimetic desire to be the necessary condition for a relationship with God.73 In terms of human 
 
65 Cf. Things Hidden, p. 435. Paisley Livingston accepts that ‘the mimetic figures Girard has described amount 
to a fundamental discovery because they indeed model important features of patterns of social interaction.’ 
However, unlike Girard, he insists that the mimetic mechanism need not be a closed system, but rather a ‘self-
organizing system’, allowing for the mimetic patterns Girard described, but capable of change on account of 
‘diverse processes and factors in human existence’. Cf. Violence and Truth, pp. 125-28.  
66 Cf. Girard and Adams, p. 23.  
67 Cf. Loughlin, ‘René Girard’, p. 97. 
68 Girard, When These Things Begin, p. 11. 
69 Cf. Girard, Violence and the Sacred, p. 164. 
70 Ibid. 
71 Cf. Petra Steinmair-Pösel, ‘Original Sin, Grace, and Positive Mimesis’ in Contagion, 14 (2007), 1-12 (p. 4). 
72 Cf. Erving, pp. 117-18. 
73 Cf. Alison, The Joy of Being Wrong, pp. 22-33. A capacity for transcendence, i.e., the conditions for 
‘ontogenesis’ in humans is based in our prior capacity for sociogenesis and psychogenesis, both possible only 
through repetition or mimesis in space and time. Therefore, mimesis makes possible an openness to the 
concept of being, and openness to God. Cf. Girard, I See Satan Fall, p. 13. 
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relations, the desire for the model is typically mistaken for the desired object, an object whose 
value increases the more it is withheld: 
 
Once he has entered upon this vicious circle, the subject rapidly begins to credit himself 
with a radical inadequacy that the model has brought to light, which justifies the model’s 
attitude to him. The model being closely identified with the object he jealously keeps for 
himself, possesses – so it would seem – a self-sufficiency and omniscience that the subject 
can only dream of acquiring. The object is now more desired than ever. Since the model 
obstinately bars access to it, the possession of this object must make all the difference 
between the self-sufficiency of the model and the imitator’s lack of sufficiency, the 
model’s fullness of being and the imitator’s nothingness.74 
 
According to Girard, in the later novels of Dostoyevsky, a painful existential void makes the 
hero dream of absorbing and assimilating the mediator’s being: ‘He imagines a perfect 
synthesis of his mediator’s strength with his own “intelligence”. He wants to become the 
Other and still be himself […] the wish to be absorbed into the substance of the Other implies 
an insuperable revulsion for one’s own substance’.75 The ‘traces’ of desire are within the 
social realities which our desires are continuously manufacturing and replicating.76 The 
linguistic and cultural realities our desires create (and recreate) encourage our ‘forgetfulness’, 
providing the subject with an endless supply of apparently ‘authentic’ identities, over against 
other opposing or less authentic identities. Mimetic desire moves unseen through the cultural 
realities it produces, as Paul Griffiths has stated:  
 
A world is learned as the house of language is entered and its taxonomies (this is a dog, 
that is a sunset, here you fall on your knees, there you curse, this is disgusting, that is 
beautiful) spins the child’s cognitive and affective web with threads so strong that they 
seem given rather than made, natural, rather than a matter of technique or artifice. 
Culture thus brings, experimentally, the very order of things into being and shapes the 
individual’s desires to harmonize with that order.77 
 
The Meanings of Mimesis 
 
 
74 Girard, Things Hidden, p. 296. 
75 Girard, Deceit, p. 54. 
76 Cf. Andrew McKenna, ‘The Ends of Violence. Girard and Derrida’, Lebenswelt, 1, (2001), 112-126 
<https://www.researchgate.net/publication/279489919_The_ends_of_violence_Girard_and_Derrida> 
77 Paul Griffiths, cited by Grant Kaplan, ‘Saint Versus Hero: Girard’s Undoing of Romantic Hagiology’ in The 
Postmodern Saints of France: Refiguring the ‘Holy’ in Contemporary French Philosophy (London: Bloomsbury, 
2013) pp. 153-163 (pp. 154-55). 
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Mimesis as a Genetic Principle 
 
Mimesis, has a variety of meanings and has been described as ‘having the body of an eel’.78 
For Girard, the mimetic principle is not an exclusively human phenomenon.79 Girard’s use of 
the term mimesis is particular and even ‘idiosyncratic’, embracing the observable forms of 
imitation across a variety of species of biological life, and the aesthetic and the social 
expressions of representational mimesis in human beings.80 At the biological level Finamore 
observes that, 
 
when a harmless insect evolves the colours of a stinging insect in order to discourage 
predators, using its new colouring to deceive them by representing itself as something 
else, the process involved is mimetic. The lie, the false representation, is responsible, to 
some extent at least, for the insect’s improved prospects of survival and thus for its 
improved performance as a species.81  
 
At this elementary, purely biological level, imitation misrepresents reality and functions 
competitively, as a strategy of species survival. The fundamental drive toward imitation or 
mimesis is a characteristic of many animal species. This imitative drive achieves exceptional 
results in humans, far beyond the elementary forms of mimicry observed in other species. 
Girard has noted that ‘there is nothing, or next to nothing in human behaviour that is not 
learned and all learning is based on imitation. If human beings ceased imitating all forms of 
culture would disappear’.82 The anecdotal and observed instances of mimesis in human 
behaviour have received significant confirmation from recent research in neuroscience.83  
Grant Kaplan cites Scott Garrels’s conclusion on this research: ‘Human infants are thought to 
be immersed in a rich social matrix of self-other reciprocity and intersubjective experience 
 
78 Graham Ward, ‘Mimesis: The Measure of Mark’s Christology’, Literature and Theology, 8, 1 (1994), pp. 1-29. 
(p. 3) <https://www.jstor.org/stable/23924717>  
79 Girard, Diacritics, p. 32. 
80 Cf. Finamore pp. 59-83. Girard’s sense of the term mimesis exceeds its normal use in literary criticism 
(representational mimesis). Indeed, for Girard, representational mimesis is but one category of the wider 
phenomenon of mimesis. 
81 Finamore, p. 62. Finamore notes that Girard sees mimesis as a tool for survival functioning somewhat 
differently in human societies: ‘we use mimetic phenomena to protect ourselves from our proclivity to 
violence’. Ibid.  
82 Girard, Things Hidden, p. 9. 
83 Cf. Scott Garrels, ‘Scientific Evidence for the Foundational Role of Psychological Mimesis’ in Palgrave, pp. 
430-38. 
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from the very beginning of life.’84 Kaplan states that humans ‘do not learn to imitate as an act 
of departure from an earlier, more spontaneous autonomy; imitating itself is innate to human 
nature, as Girard had argued before this ground-breaking research’.85 Girard’s theories have 
benefitted from corroborating evidence in developmental psychology, neurobiology and 
evolutionary theory.86 At the end of his career, Girard continued to insist that scientific 
discoveries aligned with and supported the philosophical and theological claims of mimetic 
theory.87 If Hegel considered desire to be ‘the “engine” of world history’,88 Girard insists that 
the ‘engine of history’ is ‘fuelled’ by the genetic datum of mimesis: ‘imitation is the initial and 
essential means of learning; it is not something acquired later on. We can only escape 
mimetism by understanding the laws that govern it’.89  
 
Since mimetic theory has as its object a genetic principle accessible to scientific study, 
Girard claims his theory of desire avoids the ‘metaphysical postulate of absolute human 
specificity, still present in Marx and Freud, without espousing the simplistic assimilation of 
man and animal practiced by the ethnologists’.90 Mimetic theory is not, however, reductive 
in the sense of ‘explaining away’ the human capacity for transcendence.91 Perhaps Girard’s 
most controversial move was to insist that a close reading of the Gospels provides the most 
compelling justification for mimetic theory. In this sense, the Gospels surpass the ordinary 
human sciences, without abrogating them. Mimetic theory brings together under the 
category of ‘imitation’ or ‘mimesis’ all the phenomena which specify human society and 
animal behaviour ‘as well as the first concrete means to differentiate the two, concrete in the 
sense that all observable analogies and differences between the two types of organizations 
become intelligible’.92  
 
84 Grant Kaplan, René Girard; Unlikely Apologist: Mimetic Theory and Fundamental Theology (Notre Dame, 
Indiana: University of Notre Dame Press, 2016) p. 18. 
85 Ibid. 
86 Cf. Depoortere, pp 63-83. Author cites an extensive range of scientific studies which add support to Girard’s 
mimetic theory.  
87 Girard, Battling to the End: Conversations with Benoît Chantre, trans. By Mary Baker (East Lancing: Michigan 
State University Press, 2010) Introduction, x.  
88 Cf. Butler, p. 45.  
89 Girard, Battling, Introduction, x. Girard, at times over-emphasizes the scientific nature of mimetic theory; 
the ‘laws’ of mimesis. However, an intellectual understanding of the laws of mimetic desire are clearly not 
sufficient to escape the conflictual possibilities of mimesis. Girard has supplemented the ordinary sense of 
knowing with the theological categories of graced conversion/apocalypse and asceticism.   
90 Girard, Diacritics, p. 35. 
91 Cf. Livingston, Violence and Truth, pp. 122-125.    
92 Girard, Diacritics, p. 35. 
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Representational Mimesis in Classical Literature 
 
Aristotle notes the dual role of mimesis both in how a work of art or literature functions, with 
respect to the world ‘out there’ and as ‘an anthropological a priori, whereby human beings 
were educated and socialized’.93 Aristotle understood the aim of art as the completion of 
nature (e.g., the production of tools) and the imitation of nature, i.e., the production of an 
imaginary world which is an imitation of the real world.94 For Aristotle mimesis allows humans 
to not merely imitate nature as we find it, but to complete and idealize it. Inasmuch as others 
are our models and we are prepared to imitate and learn from them, society advances 
pacifically. Aristotle’s view of mimesis is markedly less contemptuous than Plato’s, but still, it 
fails to account for the role of conflict and rivalry in imitation. Frederick Copleston suggests 
that, ‘[n]ot believing in Transcendental Concepts, Aristotle would naturally not make art a 
copy of a copy, at the third remove from truth’.95 For Copleston, Aristotle’s more positive 
understanding of imitation and of art ‘inclines to the opinion that the artist goes rather to the 
ideal of the universal element in things, translating it into the medium of whatever art is in 
question’.96  
 
Girard perceives in Aristotle, and especially in Plato, an anxiety expressed as 
contempt, for imitation. Girard argues that this disdain was based, not so much on the abyss 
between ideal forms and less truthful, imitated forms, but on the more urgent dangers of 
violent conflict, always inherent in rivalrous (acquisitive) mimesis.97 For Girard, Plato carefully 
avoids addressing acquisitive mimesis in the Republic, and he ‘eventually refuses mimesis, 
because he knows the danger of conflict  behind imitative ideas and practices, which are not 
simply related to art, but to human affairs in general’.98 Girard argues that the ancient Greek 
authors intuited the dimension of conflict in mimesis but carefully avoided opening the 
 
93 Graham Ward, referring to Aristotle (Poetics, 1448a, 1448b) ‘Mimesis’, Liturgy and Theology Vo. 8, No. 1 
(March 1994) https://www.jstor.org/stable/23924717 p. 3. 
94 Aristotle, Physics, (199a 15): ‘Art […] imitates the works of nature’ and ‘art […] completes that which nature 
is unable to bring to completion’. Cf. Ibid. 
95 Frederick Copleston, A History of Philosophy, Vol. I, Greece and Rome (London: Search Press, 1976) p. 360. 
96 Ibid. 
97 Cf. Girard, Diacritics, p. 32,  
98 Girard, Evolution and Conversion, p. 43. Cf. Plato, The Republic, translated by H. D. P. Lee, (London: Penguin 
Classics, 1955) 395e-396b.  
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‘mimetic wound’.99 It is here that Girard’s treatment of mimesis is notably original: the 
imitation of the desire of the Other leads invariably to reciprocal gestures of appropriation, 
with respect to the desired object. By imitation, our mediated or borrowed desires are 
habitually trained on objects whose value increases the more they are withheld. While 
Girard’s work engages with representational mimesis, it is the link between mimesis and 
victimhood that fascinates Girard, not mimesis itself: ‘It is this insistent linking of the two sets 
of data about human beings – the mimeticism of desire, [and] exclusionary violence – that 
forms the very core of Girard’s mimetic theory’.100  
    
‘Men Become Gods’: True and False Transcendence 
 
Girard invariably employs the term ‘mimesis’ in preference to ‘imitation’, since imitation in 
human beings usually connotes a deliberate, conscious activity and mimesis describes a 
mechanism or dynamic in which the conscious participation of the agent is not presumed. 
From Plato on, the term ‘imitation’ suggests something ‘inauthentic’ or patterns of early 
childhood learning, whereas mimesis denotes a process which continues to influence human 
behaviour no less in adult life than in childhood. In human behaviour imitation is frequently 
disguised, appearing not so much as a slavish repetition of the model, but as ‘symmetries’ in 
behaviour. For example, a model and a rival desire to distinguish themselves from each other 
and this desire to distinguish may produce systematically opposite gestures or behaviours. 
What appears to be the demonstration of difference (or indifference) is frequently a slavish 
and largely unconscious reciprocity. Mimesis, then, refers to forms of imitation which are 
frequently mistaken as distinctions or differences.101  
 
In Girard’s sense mimetic/triangular desire can be understood as an aspect of our 
capacity, drive, or instinct towards imitation. It is, therefore, a natural phenomenon which is 
highly developed in humans. Nevertheless, he has stated that, ‘desire is not of this world’. For 
 
99 Girard, When These Things Begin, p. 18. Girard accepted that the risks of exploring mimesis in the 
contemporary West are much less than those of ancient societies, where rapid escalations of mimetic conflict 
were contained by arcane ritual, prohibitions and taboo. The ancient authors went as far as they safely could 
go.    
100 Kirwan, Girard and Theology, p. 12. 
101 Cf. Dumouchel in Girard & Caley pp. 12-13. 
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Girard, to desire ‘is to believe in the transcendence of the world suggested by the Other’.102 
Girard has stated that, ‘there is nothing less “materialistic” than triangular desire. The passion 
that drives men to seize our possessions [acquisitive desire] is not materialistic; it is the 
triumph of the mediator, the god with the human face’.103 Desire which produces false or 
‘deviated’ transcendence makes us ‘gods to one another’, but it suggests, by way of a via 
negativa, the possibility of a true or non-rivalrous trajectory of desire, and a true 
transcendence. Even in his works of literary criticism Girard was compelled to describe the 
journey from false to true transcendence in the terms of traditional Christian faith. 
Dostoyevsky’s Stavrogin,104 is nothing less than the ‘anti-Christ’ and the ‘universe of the 
possessed’ is the reverse image of the Christian universe.105 The entire distorted mysticism of 
internal mediation, has its ‘luminous counterpart in Christian truth’.106 What Girard describes 
as novelistic transcendence is the Christian ideal of the kingdom of God.107  
 
Novelistic Truth and the Romantic Lie 
 
From External to Internal Mediation 
 
Deceit, Desire and the Novel, opens with an exploration of Miguel Cervantes Don Quixote.108 
The protagonist, having being inspired by courtly literature has decided to become a knight 
errant. His choice of model in this enterprise is Amadis de Gaul, whose chivalrous attributes 
Don Quixote ranks higher than other heroes of courtly literature; he chose the best model. 
Don Quixote’s desires are directed towards an entirely fictional character and in this classic 
example of ‘external mediation’ the subject of desire and his model are fated never to meet 
and never to become rivals. The most likely rival for desire in the novel is Don Quixote’s vassal 
and companion, Sancho Panza. The vassal is content to serve his master in pursuit of his 
 
102 René Girard, ‘From the Novelistic Experience to the Oedipal Myth’ in Oedipus Unbound: Selected Writings 
on Rivalry and Desire, edited by Mark R. Anspach (Stanford, California: Stanford University Press, 2004) p. 1. 
103 Girard, Deceit, p. 61. 
104 Fyodor Dostoevsky, Demons, trans. Richard Pevear and Larissa Volokhonsky (London: Vintage, 1994). 
105 Girard, Deceit, pp. 60-61. 
106 Ibid, p. 61. 
107 Cf. Doran, p. 172. Divorced from its religious interpretation, the positive attributes of the ‘novelistic 
conversion’ ‘would appear to be some kind of fantastical utopianism’. Ibid.  
108 Miguel de Cervantes Saaveda, The Adventures of Don Quixote, trans, J. M. Choen (Harmondsworth: 
Penguin, 1950). 
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master’s (and his own more modest) aims; the two never become rivals. The hero’s desire, 
therefore, never leads to violence. Girard notes that Cervantes clearly lacks sympathy for Don 
Quixote’s ‘sermonizers’, those who mock and attempt to undo his desire. Girard insists that 
this does not indicate that the author is for the protagonist: ‘Cervantes quiet simply wants to 
show us that Don Quixote spreads the ontological sickness to those around him. The 
contagion […] affects everyone in contact with the hero and especially those who are shocked 
or roused to indignation by his madness’.109 Even if strict social boundaries limited the range 
of mediators of desire in Cervantes’s novel, yet, the characters who encountered the 
protagonist were not unaffected by Don Quixote’s desires.  
 
Given the social and cultural context of the novel, external mediation fails to provoke 
in the characters the deeper and more violent emotions which characterise desire in 
modernity. The novels which describe the shift from external mediation to internal mediation 
(Proust, Flaubert, Stendhal, and pre-eminently, Dostoyevsky) are invariably tending towards 
more intense hatreds: ‘Starting with Cervantes’s hero, who is steadfast in his loyalty and 
always identical with himself, we gradually come down to the underground man, a human 
rag soaked in shame and servitude, a ridiculous weather-vane placed atop the ruins of 
“Western humanism”’.110  
 
This descent into conflict was, in Girard’s view, the result of the rising tide of 
democratic and social revolutions which weakened institutional absolutism and eroded long-
established social distinctions in the West. Between the novels of Cervantes and Dostoyevsky 
a world of intense and often concealed rivalry, envy, snobbery and hatred came into being. 
Girard states that: 
 
Don Quixote and Mme. Bovary as yet experience no metaphysical disappointment in the 
proper sense of the term. The phenomenon appears with Stendhal. The moment the hero 
takes hold of the desired object its ‘virtue’ disappears like gas from a burst balloon. The 
object has suddenly been desecrated by possession and reduced to its objective qualities, 
thus provoking the famous Stendhalian exclamation: ‘Is that all it is?’111 
 
 
109 Girard, Deceit, p. 97. 
110 Ibid, p. 94. 
111 Girard, Deceit, p. 88-89. 
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Girard associates the modern period with new and typically more negative patterns of 
desiring; patterns of desire which accompanied and accelerated the collapse of social 
boundaries.112 As traditional class boundaries and all forms of absolutism gave way to more 
democratic forms of social life, the modern age in literature gave birth to the misanthrope, 
the coquette, the snob and the underground man; figures whose desires must be more 
creatively concealed from their models. These figures herald the rise of internal mediation. 
The common tropes of wild children, angry young men, rebels, antiheroes, doomed 
romantics, life’s adventurous risk takers, life’s habitual losers, are likewise modern figures, 
who can be accounted for in terms of ‘desire that has broken free of objects and become 
entirely obsessed with the being of models’.113  
 
Desire and the Double Bind 
 
Deceit, Desire and the Novel is methodologically similar to Girard’s later work on William 
Shakespeare, A Theatre of Envy.114 According to Kirwan, both works demonstrate Girard’s 
method of ‘shuffling back and forth between writer and works, more specifically between the 
earlier and later works of the subject, in search of ever clearer hints and indicators of what 
he has called “mimetic realism”’.115 Girard’s assertion that ‘[e]verything, in fact, is false, 
theatrical and artificial in desire except the immense hunger for the sacred’,116 is playfully 
exposed in Don Quixote where desire transforms windmills into giants and basins into 
helmets. It is the nature of mimetic desire to misrepresent reality and to deceive us about the 
quality and form of our desires.117 When the subject and model inhabit the same worlds, such 
as in Shakespeare’s Two Gentlemen of Verona, the mystification is still amusing, but the 
potential for conflict is palpable.  Valentine invites his childhood friend Proteus to imitate him 
in admiring his beloved, Sylvia. Valentine’s hyperbolic praise of Sylvia at first irritates Proteus, 
 
112 Girard, Things Hidden, pp. 423-24. Girard understood cultural differentiation in terms of the ‘closure of 
societies linked to “scapegoat” type practices. To close is always to define an outside and an inside by means 
of exclusions and expulsions. As a result, the more these practices weaken, the more exteriority loses ground. 
Insofar as there are no more victims to close society, it’s opening up; and we’re heading more and more 
toward a mono-culture’. When These Things Begin, p. 57. 
113 Cf. Cowdell, Nonviolent God, p. 14. 
114 See General Introduction, n. 26. 
115 Kirwan, Girard and Theology, p. 14. 
116 Ibid, p. 83. 
117 Cf. Dumouchel, Violence and Truth, p. 4. 
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but Proteus is soon proclaiming his (mediated) desire for Sylvia. Proteus wonders at this 
dramatic change in his affections and asks: ‘Is it mine eye, or Valentinus’ praise | Her true 
perfection or my false transgression | That makes me reasonless, to reason thus?’  
 
Having encouraged Proteus’s desire for Sylvia, Valentine then resists and repudiates 
his friend’s desires: the model becomes the rival. Girard notes that, ‘in addition to the usual 
imperative of friendship – imitate me – another imperative has mysteriously appeared: do 
not imitate me. This is the mimetic ‘double bind’. In the important decision of choosing a bride 
Valentine requires Proteus’s enthusiastic support, ‘a lukewarm response on the part of a close 
friend makes us doubt the wisdom of our choice’.118 The desire is first encouraged and then 
repudiated. The romantic lie of spontaneous desire is exposed in Dostoyevsky’s The Eternal 
Husband: ‘the hero seems to offer the beloved wife freely to the mediator, as a believer would 
offer a sacrifice to the gods, in order that he might not enjoy it. He pushes the loved woman 
into the mediator’s arms in order to arouse his desire and then to triumph over the rival’.119 
In internal mediation, the object of desire, recedes as the hero/disciple pursues the 
‘fascinating rival’, whose being the hero dreams of absorbing and assimilating; to be the Other 
and still be himself.120 What is still comedy in Shakespeare is terror in Dostoyevsky, where 
internal mediation tends to result in violence and murder, as the disciple and model are 
drawn closer together and desire is accelerated.  
 
Desire and Rationality 
 
Proteus asks if he is ‘reasonless to reason thus’, suggesting another theme of mimetic theory: 
that desire cannot be reduced to reason; it has its own largely unconscious but predictable 
grammar, i.e., it can be described in its mechanism, which is conflictual.121 Andrew McKenna 
makes a similar distinction between the logic of reason and the logic of desire:  
 
118 René Girard, A Theatre of Envy, p. 13. Girard reads Shakespeare’s plays as a sustained exploration of 
mimetic desire, Two Gentlemen of Verona being an early example of Shakespeare’s engagement with mimetic 
desire. 
119 Girard, Deceit, pp. 50-51.  
120 Ibid, p. 54. 
121 Cf. Girard, Paroles Gelées, p. 18. 
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the logic of thinking is unitary: if we think the same thing, we will agree, and there will be 
harmony among us. The logic of desire works just the other way; it is essentially divisive, 
conflictual; if we desire the same thing, conflict will arise among us over its possession.122  
 
Since the logic of reason and the logic of desire are distinct, mimetic theory has not developed 
into a positive political programme.123 Girard denied the possibility of a Hegelian dialectic 
bringing violence to an end: ‘Contemporary Hegelians, especially the Marxists, still nourish 
that hope […] But the novelist mistrusts logical deductions. He looks around him and within 
him. He finds nothing to indicate that the famous reconciliation is just around the corner.’124  
 
For Girard, when Shakespeare irritates his rationalist readers by including irrational, 
marginal and superstitious details in his patrician tragedy, Julius Caesar, he is offering an 
account of political history, which is driven as much by the logic of desire as by the logic of 
reason. The inclusion of so many ‘superstitious’ details is an affront to reason and to politics 
as a rational enterprise. However, Girard reads mimetic desire throughout. As in the case of 
ancient myth, Girard considered the superstitious references and ‘inconsequential signs’ to 
refer to a rival, concealed logic at work. Political programmes, like reason itself, are children 
of the foundational murder.125 Derrida’s essay on Plato’s Phaedrus supports Girard’s suspicion 
that Western rationality since Plato has been an exercise in arbitrary exclusions and an 
anxious retreat from the fact of mimesis. Plato (in the voice of Socrates) excluded writing 
(considered as pharmakon, a poison/remedy), as opposed to the spoken word, the logos. 
What writing represents ‘in the mute, mindless opacity of its arbitrary marks, its formal, 
 
122 Andrew McKenna, ‘Uncanny Christianity: René Girard’s Mimetic Theory’ in Divine Aporia: Postmodern 
Conversations about the Other John C. Hawley (ed.), (London: Associated University Presses, 2000), pp. 84-96 
(p. 83). 
123 Terry Eagleton, among others, notes the lack of a political application of Girard’s insights which he 
considers ‘a sizable blind spot’ for a thinker ‘hailed as the most eminent theorist of sacrifice of our time’. Cf. 
Radical Sacrifice, p. 55. Girard’s treatment is ‘a grand moral gesture bought at the cost of historical specificity’. 
Ibid, p. 56. 
124 Girard, Deceit, p. 110. 
125 Cf. Girard, A Theatre of Envy, p. 208. Shakespeare’s reason for including superstitious or ‘inconsequential 
signs’ in his political plays, is surely an open question and here Girard’s assertion may be challenged on the 
grounds of a lack of historical evidence. What may seem superstitious or ‘inconsequential signs’ to a reader 
today, may not have been so in the early seventeenth century. Coppélia Kahn’s review of A Theatre of Envy 
notes that ‘even [Girard’s] most astute, best-earned interpretations are hewn with the gigantic axe he is 
constantly grinding and wielding against those who haven’t seen the light of mimetic desire’, which include 
‘modern critics’, ‘traditional critics’, ‘the critics’ and ‘all critics’. Cf. T. C. Merrill, ‘Critiques of Girard’s Mimetic 
Theory’ in Palgrave, pp. 455-61.      
 40 
artificial representation’ is mimesis: a form without content.126 Girard and Derrida read in the 
structure of Western rationality an original violence and a sacrificial exclusion. For Derrida, 
the history of Western philosophical systems since Plato is the history of arbitrary expulsion, 
in the pursuit of an illusory origin.  
 
Desire and the Scapegoat 
 
Girard’s pursuit of mimesis in literature led him beyond examples of mere comic 
mystification, beyond the troubling conflict of twins, and finally to the question of mimesis as 
sacrificial violence. In his early and literary work Girard attends mainly to the dynamics of 
conflictual mimesis and only later attempts to describe mimetic desire as a cultural 
phenomenon. Nevertheless, what would become the core of Girard’s cultural theory, the idea 
of the scapegoat, is already a recognizable motif in Girard’s treatment of mimetic desire in 
literature. 
 
The term ‘scapegoat’ entered the English language with the publication of William 
Tyndale’s translation of the Bible in 1530.127 The scapegoat refers originally to an atonement 
ritual recorded in Leviticus 16. 21-22, whereby a goat is chosen randomly and is expelled from 
the community into the wilderness, taking with it the sins of the community. While 
acknowledging the origins of the concept in ritual, Girard emphasized a double semantic 
sense of the term, i.e., scapegoating as an archaic ritual and, more broadly, as the ‘human 
tendency to transfer anxiety and conflict onto arbitrary victims’.128 It is significant that in 
Girard’s work, The Scapegoat, the actual Hebrew ritual is referenced only once.129 Thus, while 
attempting to associate the Hebrew ritual and other ‘riddance’ rites with the concept of 
scapegoating as it is understood today, Girard’s interest is more in the dynamic than in its 
cultural origins. That is to say, Girard’s references to scapegoating are typically to the non-
 
126 McKenna, ‘Ends of Violence’, p. 114. 
127 Tyndale translated the Latin term caper emissarius (emissary goat) to ‘(e)scape goat’. In French the term is 
rendered bouc émissaire.  
128 Girard, Things Hidden, p. 132. 
129 Cf. John Dunnill, Sacrifice and the Body: Biblical Anthropology and Christian Self-Understanding (Farnham, 
Surrey: Ashgate Publishing, 2013) p. 152. Dunhill criticizes Girard’s interpretation of the Hebrew scapegoat 
ritual in terms of ritual violence. He contests Girard’s claim the ritual had an aggressive, sacrificial character 
and refutes Girard’s attempt to associate the ritual with the frenzied tearing apart of a sacrificial victim, 
characteristic of the Dionysian ritual of sparagmos. Cf. pp. 150-51. 
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ritualized collective transference of guilt to an individual or marginal group, rather than an 
archaic ritual. 
 
When describing the world of internal mediation, Girard anticipates the work of his 
second phase; a situation where ‘everyone can become his neighbour’s mediator’ and ‘every 
desire redoubles when it is seen to be shared’.130 Acquisitive mimesis leads to conflictual 
mimesis and mimetic desire, fully grown, produces scapegoats.  Shakespeare’s Julius Caesar, 
indicates the sacrificial logic by which social differentiation is achieved at the cost of the 
scapegoat’s blood. Calpurnia’s dream of Caesar’s statue spouting blood, suggests to Caesar a 
violent crime. Decius reinterprets the dream as ‘a vision fair and fortunate’. The statue 
spouting blood, ‘in which so many smiling Romans bath’d | Signifies that from you great Rome 
shall suck | Reviving blood, and that great men shall press | For tinctures, stains, relics and 
cognizance’.131 Girard observes that both interpretations are correct: the dream foretells a 
murder, but the murder will be cast as sacrifice and the scapegoat will bear away the ills of 
Rome.132    
 
 The sacrificial logic expressed in Julius Caesar, cited above, represents for Girard ‘the 
most precious definition of the foundational murder’.133 In his engagement with cultural 
anthropology Girard posited the emergence of social order from a shared (mimetic) act of 
generative violence. The sacrificial logic, which anticipates renewed social order, ‘a vision fair 
and fortunate’, emerging from a necessary ‘sacred’ violence. Girard’s argument for a 
foundational murder, upon which all culture is established, is treated in detail in chapter two. 
Girard has espied in Shakespeare’s work a universal but rarely acknowledged human trait: an 
instinctive faith in violence as generative or redemptive. Over an immense arc of history, 
Girard surmises, episodes of generative violence were gradually ritualized and repeated as 
sacrifice, and from sacrifice emerged every social and cultural institution in human history. 
Girard had to account for the conditions in which Shakespeare (and others) were beginning 
 
130 Girard, Deceit, p. 99. 
131 Cf. Julius Caesar II, 76-90. Girard, A Theatre of Envy, pp. 201-02. 
132 Ibid. Girard notes that Caesar bears the ‘signs’ of victimhood (physical defects, deafness, epilepsy, 
resembling a ‘possessive trance’, a wife afflicted with sterility, etc.) In the context of a mimetic crisis, such 
signs assist in identifying the victim.   
133 Ibid. p. 202. 
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to describe the violent logic upon which their own social realities were established, i.e., how, 
in modernity the sacrificial logic of scapegoating is increasingly exposed and undermined.  
 
Behind the weakening of social boundaries and the erosion of archaic prohibitions and 
taboos  which allowed an exploration of the logic of mimetic desire was, Girard asserts, the 
desacralizing presence of the Gospels. This is the core insight of the third stage of mimetic 
theory, i.e., that the Gospels have declared the violent expulsion of the victim unjust and 
exposed as deceitful the ‘reconciliation’ of conflictual mimesis and scapegoating. According 
to Girard’s thesis the characteristics of modernity are (negatively) an intensification of 
conflictual desire and (positively) a deeper concern for victims, expressed in more democratic 
institutions and a sensitivity to marginalized individuals and groups.  
 
Jean-Pierre Dupuy and others have challenged this thesis, specifically Girard’s idea of 
méconnaissance, i.e., an essential misrecognition which allows all involved in exclusionary 
violence to deem their violence legitimate. Dupuy disputes this méconnaissance, insisting that 
if spontaneous acts of exclusionary violence operate under a cloud of méconnaissance, 
archaic sacrifices did not. Sacrificial rituals are burdened with artifice, too premediated to 
suggest a genuine méconnaissance, a misrecognition only removed with the Gospel 
revelation. Indeed, Dupuy cites the ‘sacred’ violence of the Atomic Age as proof that archaic 
violence can continue to function, without Girard’s supposed méconnaissance.134 In the 
atomic age the intense ideological rivalry of superpower ‘twins’ was contained by the 
accelerated stockpiling of enormous amounts of atomic weapons. In a world, supposedly 
come of age and governed by reason, a fascinating and terrifying liturgy of ‘mutually assured 
destruction’ was the sole mechanism controlling the rivalrous ambitions of the antagonists.135 
Dupuy’s objection takes us to the heart of Girard’s argument, since, according to Girard, the 
misrecognition of mimetic violence as legitimate violence cannot be undone by better or 
more knowledge; it demands the theological category of conversion.   
 
134 Cf. Jean-Pierre Dupuy, ‘Nuclear Apocalypse: The Balance of Terror and Girardian Misrecognition’ in Can We 
Survive Our Origins? Readings in René Girard’s Theory of Violence and the Sacred, edited by Pierpaolo 
Antonello and Paul Gifford (East Lansing: Michigan State University Press, 2015) pp. 253-64. 
135 Cf. Cowdell, Nonviolent God, p. 46. To emphasise the persistence of the sacred in an atomic age, Cowdell 
notes the fetish for naming terrible weapons after mythic gods, ‘Poseidon’, ‘Pluto’, ‘Ariadne’. The submarine-
launched ballistic missile ‘Trident’ evokes the sea-god Neptune.  
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Girard’s theory represents modernity as both an escalation and intensification of 
many forms of mimetic conflict, and at the same time, a growing awareness of the victim. As 
a literary (and potentially theological) theory of modernity, it is more suggestive than 
conclusive.  I will argue in chapters four and five that cultural and social changes which 
characterised the early thirteenth century offer evidence of a rapid collapse of social 
boundaries, accompanied by a remarkable insight into the dynamics of mimetic desire. The 
mimetic realism of the modern age was already anticipated in the early thirteenth century 
and achieved a significant social and political expression in the early Franciscan movement. 
Romanticism and specifically romantic accounts of Francis of Assisi have obscured and 
mystified the genuine mimetic insights of the early Franciscan movement. Girard’s unsparing 
critique of romanticism may risk neglecting or obscuring those ‘things hidden’ which 
romanticism uniquely drew attention to.136 Nevertheless, Girard’s critique of romanticism 
offers a deconstructive tool which facilitates a more vital account of the dynamics of early 
Franciscanism.  
 
The Role of Conversion in Mimetic Theory 
 
In Deceit, Desire and the Novel, Girard insists that the great novels not only reveal mimetic 
desire but also offer redemption from conflictual mimesis in the form of conversion and an 
ascetical path away from conflictual mimesis.137 In this respect Girard states that ‘all novelistic 
conclusions are conversions’.138 These conversions typically involve the protagonist of the 
novel electing to lead a more solitary life or, contrariwise, electing to re-join society. At a 
superficial level these scenarios seem to be opposed, however, what is significant in both is 
that they indicate in the novel a destruction of triangular desire. Thus, Girard asserts, ‘true 
conversion engenders a new relationship to others and to oneself’.139  
 
 
136 Cf. Domenach, Violence and Truth, p. 159. Domenach notes that Girard’s critique of romantic literature 
leaves wholly unexplored the positive role of romanticism (e.g., romanticism as ‘multiplicity’s protest against 
oneness’). It is beyond the scope of this thesis to evaluate Girard’s critique of romanticism, save to 
acknowledge its merit in my own deconstruction of romantic representations of Saint Francis and his Order. 
137 Cf. Girard, Deceit, pp. 290-314. 
138 Ibid, p. 294. 
139 Ibid, p. 295. 
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For Girard, the collapse of the protagonist’s faith in triangular desire is evidence of a 
comparable and real conversion in the author.140 An author, released from triangular desire, 
abandons the project of self-justification when she renounces her pride and recognizes that 
her mediator is a person like herself. The renunciation of adoration/hatred breaks the 
triangular pattern of desire and represents ‘the crowning moment of novelistic creation’.141  
Given the significance of conversion in Girard’s literary theory it is worthy of note that Girard 
himself underwent a conversion experience while writing Deceit, Desire and the Novel. Girard 
was initially guarded about this experience.142 In later works he referred to his conversion as 
a form of intelligence or understanding, specifically an understanding and acceptance of one’s 
own complicity in the persecution of the surrogate victim. In his final book, Girard was explicit 
in linking mimesis and conversion: ‘My conversion is what put me on the mimetic path and 
the discovery of the mimetic principle is what converted me’.143 
 
Girard’s conversion was, by his own admission, first an ‘intellectual’ conversion and 
then a ‘religious’ conversion, though in fact the conversion extended over several months 
1958-59, and was a unitary experience. Girard’s ‘intellectual’ conversion took place in late 
1958 as he made weekly train journeys between Maryland and Philadelphia (he was lecturing 
at Johns Hopkins University and at Bryn Mawr at this time). Girard’s weekly journey in 
‘clattering old railway cars of the Pennsylvania Railroad’ took him past vacant lots and the 
scrap iron detritus of an industrial landscape. Girard later contrasted the unremarkable 
scenes of industrial decay viewed from the train with his own ‘transfigured’ mental state.144 
At this time, Girard recalls, ‘the slightest ray from the setting sun produced veritable ecstasies 
in me’.145 Girard describes these aesthetic episodes as ‘quasi-mystical experiences’. The 
 
140 Cf. Girard, ‘Conversion in Literature and Christianity’ in Mimesis and Theory, pp. 263-73. In Proust’s early 
work Jean Santeuil, mimetic realism is absent. In his later novel In Search of Lost Time, Proust describes the 
tyranny of false transcendence and the quasi-sacred status of the model, who is a source of fascination and 
whose desires are imitated and borrowed. Girard notes that between the early and the later novel Proust had 
ceased to frequent the fashionable salons, the places of borrowed desire, and false transcendence. The 
novelist underwent a personal conversion which is revealed in the new, mimetically realistic world of In Search 
of Lost Time. Girard insists that although Proust never embraced Christianity, nevertheless, he could not create 
a great novel without recourse to Christian symbolism. Cf. Girard, Deceit, pp. 310-11. 
141 Girard, Deceit, p. 299. 
142 Girard expressed the concern that his Christian faith has impeded the diffusion of mimetic theory and on 
this basis, he has at times avoided explicit reference to his faith. Cf. Girard, Evolution and Conversion, p. 110.  
143 Girard, Battling, p. 196. 
144 Cf. Girard, When These Things Begin, p. 130. 
145 Ibid. 
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experiences were connected to a sense of enlightenment but involved no sense of moral 
obligation or ‘any change of life’.146 For a period of several months, Girard wrote, ‘faith was 
for me as a blissful delicacy that heightened my other pleasures’.147 At about this same time 
Girard underwent treatment for what was suspected to be cancer. The existential panic 
associated with this suspected cancer transformed the ‘intellectual’ conversion into an event 
of deeper spiritual and religious significance.  
 
The anxieties surrounding his health lifted on the Wednesday of Holy Week, 1959. 
Girard, who had not practiced the Catholic faith since adolescence made sacramental 
confession that day, received Holy Communion on Holy Thursday, and on Easter Sunday he 
celebrated the Lord’s Resurrection for the first time since his youth. He insisted that his 
‘intellectual’ and ‘spiritual’ conversion had begun before his ‘great Lenten scare’. He was 
intellectually committed to a new faith perspective before his health concerns began. Thus, 
Girard never doubted the motivation for his ‘intellectual’ conversion and looked upon the 
events leading up to his religious conversion as a ‘dark night of the soul’. This period, 
providentially, coincided with the Church’s Lenten period of penance and Girard suggests it 
was a necessary purgation, which mercifully concluded three days before Easter, ‘no doubt 
so that I could calmly and quietly reconcile myself with the Church before the Easter 
holiday’.148  
 
In chapter five of Deceit, Desire and the Novel, Girard explores the disappearance and 
reappearance of vanity in pre-revolutionary and post-revolutionary France, presented in 
terms of a ‘virulent cancer’. Girard’s comparison of more terrifying and lethal forms of vanity 
with cancer indicates perhaps his own preoccupations with mortality at this time.149 However, 
 
146 ‘The Anthropology of the Cross: A Conversation with René Girard’ in James G. Williams, ed., The Girard 
Reader (New York: Crossroads, 1996) p. 285.  
147 Girard, When These Things Begin, p. 130. Girard writes of acquiring at this time a heightened appreciation 
of music. The ‘faith’ he describes is clearly not yet Christian faith, rather, it seemed a preparation or prelude 
for Christian faith. 
148 Ibid, p. 131. 
149 Girard observed that Louis XIV lured the nobility to the palace of Versailles, so as to draw them into ‘vain 
and sterile rivalries’; Louis XIV, the ‘sun king’ was the focus of the aristocracy’s fascination and the person 
around whom their vain rivalries orbited, ceaselessly and pointlessly. However, once the revolution had 
destroyed the idea of the divine right of kings, the succession of King Louis XVI’s heirs and later the accession 
of Louis Philippe was seen to be ridiculous. The role of imitation had passed to where the real power was held. 
The revolution didn’t end vanity but, ‘like a virulent cancer that spreads in a more serious form throughout the 
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the book itself, especially in its final chapters, indicates the actual contours of Girard’s 
intellectual conversion. Girard’s experience of conversion and his intellectual quest for the 
key to ‘novelistic truth’ had begun to occupy the same conceptual landscape: ‘I realised I was 
undergoing my own version of the experience I was describing’.150 Girard had begun writing 
the book ‘very much in the pure demystification mode: cynical, destructive, very much in the 
spirit of the atheistic intellectuals of the time’.151 By the conclusion of the work, Girard’s 
perspective had altered.152  
 
Cynthia Haven compares Girard’s conversion experience to the ‘kind of mental acceleration’ 
associated with similar spiritual/intellectual conversions in figures such as René Descartes, 
Blaise Pascal and Simone Weil.153 The conversion experience functions as a touchstone for 
further developments and applications of thought and practice and it adds to Girard an 
uncommon quality among post-critical theorists. Girard’s intellectual project is fundamentally 
connected to the category of conversion. Haven notes that Girard may have become a 
visionary as much as a scholar, and in some ways a visionary at the expense of being a 
scholar.154   
 
In the final analysis, mimetic theory cannot be reduced to a system of ‘facts’ or a truth 
which is grasped simply by examining the available anthropological data, or reading the great 
novels carefully. The anthropological data and the literature achieve an elegant and 
compelling synthesis once, according to Girard, the fundamental blindness is removed: one 
must recognise oneself as a persecutor, complicit in the scapegoating of others, and for the 
same reasons as others who scapegoat. The conversion which corresponds to the 
apprehension of the mimetic principle has immediate and unavoidable consequences for the 
individual, with respect to violence and victimhood. Mimesis refuses exceptions or 
exemptions with respect to violence and persecution. Dupuy’s critique of méconnaissance 
 
body just when one thinks it has been removed’, vanity took on new expressions among the bourgeoise. 
Deceit, p. 119.    
150 ‘The Anthropology of the Cross’, in Williams, The Girard Reader, p. 285. 
151 Ibid, p. 284. 
152 Cf. Girard, When These Things Begin, pp. 128-32. In this altered perspective the virtues of obedience, 
patience and modesty emerged as authentic while nothing seemed more ‘conformist or more servile’ than the 
‘hackneyed mythology of “revolt”’. p. 132 
153 Haven, p. 112. 
154 Ibid. 
 47 
fails to take account of the category of conversion. The move from misrecognition to 
recognition involves not merely more knowledge, but an actual conversion, which explains 
why the archaic sacred can flourish in the Atomic Age. Méconnaissance is Girard’s reworking 
of Sartre’s mauvaise foi, an existential form of ‘lying to oneself’.155 Not only in literature, but 
as an historical marker, acts of conversion are ‘acts of dissidence’, because such acts release 
us from ‘the biological-psychological impulse of rallying with the crowd against the stranger, 
the outsider’.156 The category of conversion, at the core of Girard’s literary theory, allows 
mimetic theory to function ‘as a discourse for the converted, [operating] within a theological 




In the first phase of mimetic theory, Girard was drawn to questions of desire, identity and 
violence in literature. Girard argued that triangular desire accounts for a variety of human 
behaviours which were hitherto mysterious and opaque. The laws which govern mimesis 
allow for the deconstruction of romantic misrepresentations of reality, produced by mimetic 
desire. Girard’s examples of mimetic realism (‘Romans Romanesque’) are drawn from the 
great literature of the ‘modern’ West. Indeed, Girard considers modernity, to be an historical 
epoch defined by rapid social, cultural, and economic change; a change which simultaneously 
collapses social boundaries and is accelerated by the collapse of these same boundaries. With 
modernity a new sense of the individual emerges, not merely the illusory, autonomous self 
of philosophy and romance, but also the individual who can resist the crowd and subverts the 
social order built on collective violence.158    
 
To establish his argument Girard assembles an extensive body of literary witnesses, as 
historically and culturally diverse as Plato, Aristotle, Shakespeare, Cervantes, Proust and 
Dostoevsky. As Eagleton and others have cautioned, Girard’s work proceeds with little 
 
155 Cf. Dumouchel, ‘Misrecognition of Misrecognition’ in Can We Survive Our Origins? p. 278. For both Girard 
and Sartre this ‘lying to oneself is a form of action, not merely a lack of knowledge’. 
156 Harald Wydra, ‘Victims, Sacred Violence, and Reconciliation: A Darwinian-Girardian Reading of Human Peril 
and Human Possibility’ in Can We Survive Our Origins? pp. 49-69. (p. 67). 
157 Kaplan, Unlikely Apologist, p. 66. 
158 Cf. Girard, Evolution and Conversion, pp. 170-71. 
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attention to the historical specificity of his writers. Writers and texts are, to an extent, 
conscripted by Girard into his great mimetic project. The mimetic insights which Girard draws 
forth come at the cost of a wider historical reading. Girard provides the tools for a 
deconstruction of romantic misrepresentations of Francis of Assisi, and a mimetic reading of 
the saint and the movement. This reading, I argue, is more authentic than romantic and 
hagiographic interpretations, and by the same token, more relevant to our contemporary 
ecclesial and social concerns.  
 
In his early work, Girard’s treatment of mimetic desire was invariably negative and 
suggests, at first glance, that desire and violence are unavoidably paired. However, at the 
heart of the first phase of Girard’s work on mimetic desire is the nascent theological category 
of conversion. The collapse of belief in spontaneous desire and in the quasi-divine autonomy 
of the subject, make possible a renunciation of ‘metaphysical desire’, of ‘divinity’ and of the 
mediator. Since mimetic desire cannot be avoided, in renouncing pride the subject is invited 
to take as her model one who will not, indeed, cannot become a rival. At the conclusion of 
Deceit, Desire and the Novel, Girard intuits a way forward; patterns of desire that do not 
impose on us either ‘an absolute solitude’ or ‘a return to the world’.159 The dynamics of 
mimetic desire leave open the possibility of a non-rivalrous, pacific imitation, a true 















In 1977 Girard published La Violence et la sacré, a work which had matured over eleven years 
and marked a new phase in the development of mimetic theory. In this work Girard put 
forward a novel theory of sacrifice, based on the generative role of mimetic violence, known 
as the scapegoat theory.160 This theory was ‘untimely’ in the context of Western cultural 
anthropology of the 1960s and 1970s. It resembled the ambitious pretensions of an earlier 
generation of theorists such as James Frazer, Émile Durkheim, Marcel Mauss and Georges 
Bataille. However, in that same year, Walter Burkhart published Homo Necans and, 
independently of Girard’s work, argued that ‘in the formative period of our civilization […] 
solidarity was achieved through a sacred crime’.161 
 
Drawing on the ‘classics of ethnology’, Girard argued that mimetic conflict had a 
stabilizing role in creating and maintaining social order through exclusionary violence or 
‘scapegoating’.162 Girard’s scapegoat theory may be briefly summarized as a mechanism by 
which mimesis initially provokes divisive, acquisitive rivalries and, as conflict escalates, 
produces a reunified social order at the expense of a single emissary victim. At the height of 
mimetic conflict, the scapegoat becomes the sole focus of the group’s accumulated desires.163 
In the second phase of his work, Girard’s articulation of mimetic theory was decidedly 
scientific, positivist and anthropological. This chapter will treat Girard’s anthropological work 
under the following aspects: 
 
 
160 The concept of ‘scapegoat’, introduced in chapter one, is here interchangeable with the terms ‘emissary 
victim’ and ‘surrogate victim’. If scapegoating represents Girard’s best-known attempt to ground his theory of 
desire in ethnography, the Hebrew ritual which gave rise to the word is, in a number of ways, poorly matched 
to Girard’s audacious claims about archaic religion and exclusionary violence. Cf. Mary Douglas, Jacob’s Tears: 
The Priestly Work of Reconciliation (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2004) pp. 39-60. 
161 Cf. Nidesh Lawtoo, ‘The Classical World: Sacrifice, Philosophy, and Religion’ in Palgrave, pp. 119-26. 
162 Among the ‘classics’ Girard cites Durkheim, Tyler, Radcliffe-Browne, Robertson Smith, Malinowski and 
Frazer, cf. Girard, Evolution and Conversion, p. 24 and Girard, Scandal Comes, p. 103.  
163 Cf. Girard, Diacritics, p. 33. 
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1. An account of Girard’s engagement with cultural anthropology and his formulation of 
the scapegoat theory. 
2. Girard’s treatment of ‘twins’. Already explored as a literary motif in the previous 
chapter, in this chapter I will indicate how Girard pursued the motif of twins from 
literature to myth and finally to cultural anthropology. In this way I will indicate both 
the novelty and the weaknesses in Girard’s method. 
3. An exploration of Girard’s insights in the poetic register, indicating the rhetorical 
(persuasive) power of mimetic theory, outside the strictly scientific/social scientific 
domain.  
 
Hominization and the Scapegoat Mechanism 
 
From Deceit, Desire and the Novel to Violence and the Sacred, Girard’s theoretical project 
moved from describing the dynamics of mimetic desire to an exploration of the phenomena 
of mimetic desire.164 Eugenio Donato, encouraged Girard to explore the phenomenological 
evidence for mimetic desire in ethnography and cultural anthropology.165 Girard insists that 
initially he had no intention of introducing a universal theory of culture, indeed, his resistance 
to ‘theory’ explains his caution in submitting Violence and the Sacred for publication.166 
Girard’s theory of cultural origins, structured in terms of conflictual mimesis, seeks to offer 
not only an hypothesis on origins, but a ‘privileged window onto our likely global future’.167 
The theory is dynamic and predictive (in a sense, apocalyptic), since humans have not 
‘outgrown’ their violent mimetic origins. Even so, the mimetic mechanism is increasingly 
accessible to description and investigation. This second phase of Girard’s work, is engaged 
with such questions as hominization, primatology, brain development, the role of ritual in the 
domestication of animals, the invention of agriculture, economic exchange, barter and gift.168 
It also raises ethical, philosophical and theological questions since, Girard asserts, the human 
species originated in the context of the sacred and our cultural identities were established on 
exclusionary violence. Girard claims that since the dawn of humanity ‘millions of innocent 
 
164 Girard, Diacritics, p. 31. 
165 Girard, Evolution and Conversion, p. 24. Eugenio Donato (1937-1983) was a university colleague of Girard. 
166 Cf. Girard, Paroles Gelées, pp. 8-9. Girard worked on Violence and the Scared for eleven years.  
167 Cf. Cowdell, Nonviolent God, p. 26. 
168 Cf. Palgrave, p. 5. 
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victims have been killed […] in order to enable their fellow humans to live together, or at least 
not destroy each other’.169  
 
Girard’s hypothesis of cultural origins concerns the primordial process known as 
hominization.170 Hominization may be described as an historical/evolutionary cusp, in which 
early primates gradually became human. Girard theorizes that hominization was achieved by 
an advanced capacity for imitation, driving rapid neurological development. Girard asserts 
that as the capacity for imitation increased so too did ‘the volume of the brain along the entire 
line that leads to homo sapiens […] it must have been the increasing power of imitation that 
initiated the process of hominization rather than the reverse’.171 As the technical capacities 
of hominids increased their instinctual break on violence was lost. The ability to control 
violence arising from mimetic conflict became the decisive question for the survival of the 
species. Girard notes that: 
 
Animals are capable of engaging in rivalry and combat without fighting to the death 
because instinctual inhibitions assure the control of natural weapons, the claws and teeth. 
One can hardly believe that the same type of control was automatically extended to 
stones and other artificial weapons the day hominids began to use them.172 
 
According to this hypothetical scenario, ‘protohuman mimesis increased with brain size to a 
point where instinctual breaks on violence, which inform dominance patterns among other 
animals, were eroded beyond repair. At this point we have a creature, as Eric Gans quipped, 
who is “too mimetic to remain animal”’.173 In Girard’s view, modern theories of origin have 
tended to focus on subsidiary and derivative questions of human evolution.174  
 
 
169 Girard, Battling, ix.  
170 Girard addressed hominization in Things Hidden, pp. 84-104. Scientific theories in support of the central 
role of mimesis/imitation in hominization have been advanced. The evolutionary course from the species 
Australopithecines, (a variety of hominid which existed in a static form circa 3.5 million years ago), to a new 
species with increased brain size, circa 2.5 million years ago, may have been initiated by the development of 
mimetic/imitative skills, leading to new and varied forms of life among the hominids. Cf. Depoortere, pp. 63-
83.  
171 Girard, Things Hidden, p. 95. 
172 Ibid, p. 87. 
173 McKenna, Divine Aporia, p. 84. 
174 Cf. Girard, Things Hidden p. 86. Girard cites Sigmund Freud’s theory of culture, with its emphasis on the 
control of sexual relations as an example in this respect.  
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Girard notes: ‘Today we know that animals possess individual breaking mechanisms 
to ensure that combats between them seldom result in the actual death of the vanquished’.175 
In other animal groups a certain mimetic element must be present, for when the object which 
caused the conflict is removed, the violence does not immediately end. Girard notes, 
however, that the vanquished will eventually submit to the victor. In this way a wide variety 
of animal groups have managed to contain excessive intraspecies violence.176 Girard regards 
this anomaly as the key to human specificity: 
 
Unlike animals, men engaged in rivalry may go on fighting to the finish […] An increased 
mimetic drive, corresponding to the enlarged human brain, must escalate mimetic rivalry 
beyond the point of no return […] it must have caused, when it first appeared, the 
breakdown of societies based on dominance patterns.177 
 
Girard’s hypothesis touches on the much-disputed question of whether humans are 
genetically predisposed to violence. Anthropologist Richard Wrangham, has asserted that 
modern humans are ‘the dazed survivors of a continuous, five-million-year habit of lethal 
aggression’.178 Archaeological evidence of violent conflict among pre-state hunter-gatherers 
is not, in itself, conclusive.179 According to S. Mark Heim, if violent conflict is comparatively 
late in human evolution, then Girard’s theory has ‘the wrong time line’, though ‘it could still 
be quite accurate as an empirical description of a later “fall”’.180 Having determined to link 
our violent (mimetic) origins with hominization, Girard was compelled to look for evidence 
primarily among the much later mythic traditions and rituals of archaic or ‘primitive’ societies. 
The quest for (universal) mythical representations of the antagonistic origins of culture made 
Girard’s thesis anthropologically problematic. Unlike Girard, Walter Burkert, also engaged on 
an ambitious study of ritual, sacrifice, and culture, but limited his anthropological assertions 
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to a series of ‘rigorously defined phenomena, for instance, ancient Greek ritual and myth’.181 
Furthermore, while Burkert provides ‘a wealth of documentation in the form of thorough 
references and footnotes; Girard writes his essays seemingly without worrying about 
documentation or footnotes at all’.182 
 
Girard represents the origins of human culture as the result of countless violent 
mimetic escalations, unchecked by any biological or instinctual breaking mechanism, 
annihilating entire groups in a violent contagion.183 For Girard, at the beginning of the human 
species there is no Edenic, untroubled bliss, rather a powerful dynamic of mimesis, driving 
both rapid evolutionary development and, potentially, massive, unrecoverable species 
extinction. Girard states that ‘humans cannot control reciprocity because they imitate one 
another too much and their resemblance to one another increases and accelerates. We have 
to imagine that for these very reasons the first human groups self-destructed’.184 Although 
some archaeological evidence for sudden societal collapse has been found in Pre-Columbian 
settlements of North America, the causes of such societal disintegration are by no means 
clear.185 Girard accepts that: 
 
[…] we have no mode of access to the phenomena in question. Everything we can learn 
directly or indirectly about ritual belongs to a fully humanized universe. We are 
confronted with a gap of literally several million years. I will be criticized for exceeding the 
limits of the possible when I propose that the victimage mechanism is the origin of 
hominization.186 
 
Since a pre-humanized universe is largely inaccessible to scrutiny, comparisons between 
‘primitive’ and traditional societies, and modern societies must be chastened and tentative. 
Into the conceptual space between what may be observed and described and what must be 
mere conjecture, Girard situates the powerful idea of mimetic violence, that is to say, a 
compelling story. Fiona Bowie notes that, although he draws widely on ethnographic, as well 
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as classical material to support this theory, ‘it would be fair to say that the examples are 
selected to illustrate the theory, rather than the theory arising from the ethnographic data’.187 
 
Girard consistently associates the strict social hierarchies of ‘primitive’ societies with 
the effort to contain rapid escalations of mimetic conflict. He presents ancient societies as 
being perilously poised between social order and mimetic violence. The possibility of descent 
into violence demanded that important social relations were hedged about with rituals, 
taboos and prohibitions, imposing strict limits on autonomy and thus limiting the spread of 
mimetic desire. For Girard, modern societies are characterised by an intensely competitive 
ethic which has flourished in artistic creativity and in the scientific and economic spheres of 
social life. Girard accounts for this difference in terms of the gradual, progressive effacement 
of those symbolic barriers that discouraged rivalry in primitive society.188 Modern societies 
increasingly abandon a wide variety of seemingly unrelated and ‘irrational’ rituals, 
prohibitions and taboos which were indispensable to earlier, traditional societies. If, as Girard 
asserts, all these cultural artefacts were protection against mimetic violence our freedom to 
abandon them without risk indicates a cultural shift of unique significance and power.   
 
The Surrogate Victim 
 
Culture, the Sacred, and the Founding Murder 
 
In Girard’s account, having breached the instinctual breaking mechanisms which had hitherto 
controlled intraspecies violence, hominids were exposed to unpredictable and uncontrolled 
escalations of mimetic conflict. Without language, no possible ‘social contract’ can be 
imagined as a way of creating social accord. Neither can any form of reflection or ‘non-
instinctual attention’ be assumed. Girard’s  narrative begins in a (primordial) world without 
signs, symbols, language or representations. Humans instinctively give attention to food, sex, 
dominant group members: none of these in themselves account for what is specific to human 
beings. ‘Non-instinctual attention’ (the space or condition of symbolic thought, language, 
 
187 Fiona Bowie, The Anthropology of Religion: An Introduction (Oxford, Blackwell Publishers, ltd, 2000) p. 179. 
188 Cf. Girard, Things Hidden p. 93. 
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culture, etc.), Girard maintains, was opened up as the result of a ‘catastrophe’.189 The 
catastrophe (the founding murder), and not any pre-existing characteristic of hominids alone, 
opened up the possibility of symbolic thought.190  
 
According to Girard, the accelerated capacity for imitation among hominids resulted 
in a violent contagion, drawing more and more of the group into conflict. At its height, the 
accumulated conflicts of the group were transferred onto a random member of that group, 
upon whom the collective aggression was unleashed: ‘when unappeased, violence seeks and 
always finds a surrogate victim. The creature that excited its fury is abruptly replaced by 
another, chosen only because it is vulnerable and close at hand’.191  In this frenzied state any 
gesture to surge or rush upon the victim will provoke immediate imitation. Andrew McKenna 
describes the scene thus: ‘The structure is a circle composed of a hallowed, inappropriable 
centre and mimetically gesticulating predators or appropriators surrounding it’.192 The group 
are conditioned by the double bind of mimetic desire (take/do not take), as the mimetic 
doubles convene ecstatically around the now sacralised victim. Once the frenzy has subsided, 
the violence abates and, Girard postulates, silence follows. ‘This maximal contrast between 
the release of violence and its cessation, between agitation and tranquillity creates the most 
favourable conditions possible for the emergence of this new attention’.193  
 
Being a common victim, the scapegoat is the focus of the entire community’s newly 
formed attention and the cadaver is the first object to be embraced by this new attention. As 
the group pass from mere reflex to reflection, the corpse is invested with the intense 
emotions provoked by the crisis, and its resolution. By means of a ‘double transference’ the 
group will henceforth associate the victim with the perilous conflict which engulfed the group, 
and its ‘miraculous’ resolution. This entire process is a blind mechanism, achieving a 
reconciliation which was never planned or anticipated and seems to depend entirely on the 
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victim/scapegoat. In some respects Girard’s hypothesis resembles the work of Thomas 
Hobbes. In Leviathan, Hobbes explores the idea of the ‘state of nature’ in human beings and 
determines that, ‘if any two men desire the same thing, which nevertheless they cannot both 
enjoy, they become enemies […] and endeavour to destroy or subdue one another’.194 In 
Hobbes’s view, human nature  is characterized by a perceived ‘equality of ability’ which gives 
rise to ‘equality of hope’ in securing one’s desires and from this he asserts our natural state 
is ‘a condition of war of everyone against everyone’.195 Girard agrees with Hobbes’s view that 
that society emerged from a prior state of crisis, a ‘dreadful struggle of all against all’.196 
However, he refutes Hobbes’s idea of a ‘social contract’, a reasonable renunciation of desire 
for the sake of greater security, as manifestly ill-fitted to the reality of our violent, pre-
symbolic origins. Girard frequently challenges the improbable scenario of an indistinct group 
of violent hominids/humans discussing the advantages of peace, in the very act of a violent 
mimetic conflict.197 Raymund Schwager suggests that those who, believing in a social 
contract, ‘put their complete trust in reason as the ideal organizer of human society’ were 
‘already the victims of an abysmal irrationality’.198  
  
Though the process which led to the scapegoat mechanism would have taken place in 
stages, ‘perhaps the longest [stages] in all human history’,199 this was nevertheless the origin 
of the universal human experience of the sacred. It also signifies the beginning of properly 
human desire; desire as ‘deferred or imaginary possession […] replete with its essential 
paradox, namely that it imitates other desires and therefore finds in them both a model and 
an obstacle to its gratification’.200 The place of the corpse is the birthplace of language, in that 
language will be structured according to desire. Signs which represent for the community 
both the allure and the terror of the victim, emerge in the reflective space which the surrogate 
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victim has (unintentionally) created for the group. Girard wrote ‘[t]here is no culture without 
a tomb and no tomb without a culture; in the end the tomb is the first and only cultural 
symbol’.201  
 
The symbolic, reconciling power of the tomb is attested by biblical scholar Joseph 
Blenkinsopp, in an essay on sacrifice and social maintenance. Blenkinsopp has noted that the 
covenant/sacrifice of Joseph and Laban (Genesis 31.43-54) may have been offered and shared 
on an actual tomb: ‘While the cairn (gal), referenced nine times in this short narrative, is not 
explicitly designated a burial mound, burial gallîm are mentioned elsewhere (Josh 7.26, 8.29, 
2 Sam 18.17) in general conformity with analogous rites from other cultures’.202 Diverse texts 
suggest ancient cultural foundations were metaphorically and literally laid upon the victims 
of human sacrifice. In 1 Kings 16.34 Hiel the Bethelite, the founder of Jericho, laid ‘the 
foundation thereof in Abiram his firstborn, and set up the gates thereof in his youngest son 
Segun’. This text is widely interpreted as a referring to human sacrifice.203 The above ground 
tomb needed no invention; the surrogate victim lies buried beneath the first human 
monument, the burial cairn, the first pyramid.204  
 
Girard was indebted to Durkheim who was the first theorist to significantly challenge 
Voltaire’s characterization of religion as a ‘widespread conspiracy of priests to take advantage 
of natural institutions’.205 For Durkheim, ‘society is of a piece, and the primary unifying factor 
is religion’.206 For both Durkheim and Girard religion was not invented as society evolved, 
rather it is the foundation of society. Culture emerged from religion and religion from 
sacrifice: ‘To carry Durkheim’s insight to its conclusion […] religion is simply another term for 
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The first use of signs emerge under a cloud of misunderstanding/misrecognition and, 
indeed, this méconnaissance is essential to the functioning of the scapegoat mechanism.208 
To observe the mimetic process at any stage is to collapse the scapegoat mechanism and, 
thereby, interrupt the violent process which typically transforms a mimetic crisis into 
renewed social order.209 The mechanism depends upon the unanimous misunderstanding of 
the group as to the guilt of the scapegoat. The victim may be guilty of some crime, but is 
always innocent of the crime which the community attributes to her, i.e., the sole 
responsibility for a sacrificial crisis involving the entire community. 
 
Ethnologists of the 19th and 20th centuries have described and attempted to categorise 
primitive rituals and frequently declared them to be impervious to rationality.210 According 
to Schwager, ethnologists ‘could never give a satisfying answer to the question of why men 
and women of the most diverse “primitive” cultures placed such great importance on ritual 
actions and became terrified when these were not painstakingly observed’.211 Girard 
attempted to explain this phenomenon by defining ‘the sacred’ as the ‘sum of human 
assumptions resulting from collective transferences focused on a reconciliatory victim at the 
conclusion of a mimetic crisis’212. Prohibitions, taboos, rituals and myth (the concrete 
expressions of those ‘human assumptions’) are perfectly meaningful as long as social stability 
depends on these collective transferences produced by the surrogate victim. The precise 
repetition of ritual is explained by the community’s need to repeat the original, spontaneous 
act of exclusionary violence as each new sacrificial crisis loomed:  
 
All those aspects of the original act that had escaped man’s control – the choice of time 
and place, the selection of the victim – are now premeditated and fixed by custom. The 
ritual process aims at removing all element of chance and seeks to extract from the 
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The requirement of precise repetition of ritual actions can be observed in biblical texts such 
as the rite of ordination, carried out over seven days (Leviticus 8. 14-36) and the setting up 
and anointing of the tabernacle, and the robing and anointing of priests (Exodus 40. 16-38). 
In the Exodus text at each stage of the ritual, it may be noted, Moses meticulously ‘did as the 
Lord commanded him’ (vv. 16, 19, 21, 23, 25, 27, 29, and 32) to complete the ritual act without 
deviation.214  
 
In Girard’s hypothesis the founding murder is not strictly a social reality, except in the 
sense that a group of hominids are involved.215 It is a spontaneous irruption of violence which 
produces over time, fortuitously, socially beneficial results. There is then, a substantial 
similarity and a real dissimilarity between the founding murder and subsequent sacrificial 
rituals. According to Girard, the scapegoat mechanism produces a double substitution; firstly 
the (unconscious) substitution of one member of the community as victim and (supposed) 
instigator of the community’s crisis. Secondly, at a later stage, the community (undergoing a 
‘sacrificial’ or mimetic crisis) assigns to a particular victim the ritualistic role of scapegoat. This 
second ritualistic substitution is super-imposed on the first. The ritual victim was typically a 
marginal figure, a member of the group bearing some arbitrary, identifiable ‘signs’ of the 
victim. The scapegoating of a marginal figure could be relied upon to create the required 
unanimity without, however, provoking retaliation/revenge from within the group.216 The 
two actions (one completely spontaneous, the other carefully orchestrated) are linked by the 
mimetic nature of sacrifice and the fascinating power of generative violence to restore peace 
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and social differentiation.217 Rituals cannot therefore be understood in reference to other 
rituals, since each ritual bears the arbitrary characteristics of a particular social crisis and a 
unique generative act of violence. All archaic rituals are socially constructed re-creations of 
an earlier, random, spontaneous, act of exclusionary violence. Against Joseph de Maistre, 
Girard insisted that the original victim of ritual sacrifice was not an ‘innocent’ individual 
expiating the sins of the guilty, but the random surrogate victim seized in the final paroxysm 
of a mimetic conflict.218 The randomness of the scapegoat underlies the largely subconscious 
nature of the transference of conflict. The arbitrary distinguishing ‘signs’ are only later 
(mis)understood as tokens of the victim’s guilt. The sacrificial sequence begins not in a spirit 
of wonder or veneration, but in undifferentiated violence, i.e., blind rage.219  
 
According to Girard, sacrificial rituals involving human victims come late in the human 
experience of scapegoating violence. Nevertheless, such ritual sacrifices are an important 
evidential link in his theory. Towards the end of this chapter I will examine the evidence of 
bog bodies. Bog bodies are the centuries old human remains of victims of violent sacrificial 
executions. Suggestive of Girard’s theory, some of the bog bodies indicate a physical 
deformity; what Girard refers to as a  ‘difference’ or ‘sacrificial sign’. Finally, the burial of the 
bog bodies indicate a determination, on the part of the community, to efface the memory of 
their victim (and their crimes). 
 
Ritual, Prohibitions and Taboos 
 
Like Burkert, Girard understood ritual to be at the heart of religion and its function was not 
to explain or give reasons for the human experience of the world. Rather, for Girard (and 
Burkert), ritual was a collective restaging of an original founding murder.220 Ritual actions not 
infrequently involve the breaking of a social taboo, the controlled expression of communal 
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hostility, and acts of violence. In this sense they resemble, in a controlled form, the same crisis 
which resulted in the founding murder.221 According to Girard, the reconciling power of 
archaic ritual can explain ‘all the great institutions of mankind, both secular and religious’, 
such as monarchy, political power, legal institutions, medicine, the theatre, and animal 
domestication.222 Girard refutes the assumption that the domestication of animals could have 
been planned, in anticipation of future economic benefits. Rather, animals were selected for 
sacrifice and the period between selection and sacrifice initiated domestication.223 The 
reproduction of exclusionary violence brought about economic benefits and social structures 
(monarchy, political power) which in retrospect, have been considered the product of 
rational, dispassionate forethought.224 Likewise, Girard considers agriculture the product of 
sacrifice. If the sacrificial crisis is the birth of culture, then the burying of seed, in imitation of 
the burying of the corpse, is a sacred action, in anticipation of a beneficial rebirth. Girard asks, 
what first motivated humans to bury seed in the ground? 
 
How do you account for that? What kind of reasoning lies behind those practices? A simple 
naturalistic observation of vegetation is anachronistic because the causal biological links 
are obvious to us, but not to the first people who ‘discovered’ agriculture. It cannot also 
be explained in purely economic terms. Only if you understand the powerful causal link 
between ritual and nature, can you grasp the origins of practices like agriculture.225 
 
Girard’s hypothesis subverts the ‘rational’ explanations for cultural advance which tends to 
recognise, in retrospect, the ingenuity of human cultural institutions. For Girard, these same 
cultural institutions are fundamentally the product of sacrifice.226 Similarly, in hunting, ‘the 
common denominator is the collective murder, whether attributed to animals or men, rather 
than the hunted species or various techniques employed’.227 Apart from highly prescribed 
ritual actions, such common practices as games of chance, drawing lots, finding a ring in a 
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cake, etc., are the offspring of sacrificial logic. In each case the accidental rewards produced 
by chance may be associated with the random selection of the victim.  
 
Myth and Demystification 
 
Girard insists on the essential role of myth in disguising and justifying the scapegoat 
mechanism.228 The reconciling power of scapegoating violence is reproduced in ritual and 
justified in myth. Girard was indebted to Claude Lévi-Strauss, who, in applying structuralist 
methods to cultural phenomena ‘was the first to identify the unity of numerous mythical 
beginnings in terms of a lack of differentiation’.229 In creation myths, for example, light and 
dark are sometimes mixed, implying chaos. In structuralism myth is understood to resolve 
problems of chaos and conflict (undifferentiation) in terms of a new order or differentiation. 
These resolutions are limited to logical or rhetorical systems and have no causal relation to 
historical events.230 Girard, though influenced by structuralism, is not bound by its 
methodological commitments. He offers a diachronic solution to the question of the origins 
of symbolic thought, concluding that an allusion to chaos in myth represents a real, historical 
social crisis. Girard opposes what he considers to be ‘the systematic prejudice against the 
real’ observed in the treatment of the text as autonomous, with no reference beyond itself.231 
Girard rejects the ‘poetico-philosphic project’ that structuralism attributes to myth, insisting 
that, ‘its real project is recalling the crisis and the founding murder’.232   
 
If monsters and grotesques inhabit the world of myth, Girard argues, there is a 
grotesque and monstrous reason: during a crisis of differentiation the victim is typically 
lacking differentiation and appears ‘monstrous’ and alien to the group. Girard states that 
‘myths make constant reference to the sacrificial crisis, but do so only in order to disguise the 
issue’.233 Girard asserts that in myth, ‘the victims become monstrous and display fantastic 
powers. After sowing disorder, they re-establish order and become founding fathers or 
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gods’.234 Girard defines myth as ‘the retrospective transfiguration of sacrificial crises, the 
reinterpretation of these crises in the light of the cultural order that has arisen from them’.235 
Myth functions like ritual in carrying forward the reconciling effects of the murder of the 
surrogate victim.236 Myth by definition is a lie, since it represents scapegoating from the 
community’s perspective, absolving them of violence. As with ritual, a myth gradually loses 
its power to reinforce differentiation and mimetic desire inevitably generates a new crisis.  
 
  According to Girard, during a social crisis, ‘[i]nstitutional collapse obliterates or 
telescopes hierarchical and functional differences, so that everything has the same 
monotonous and monstrous aspect’.237 Social differentiation is maintained normally through 
systems of exchange that differentiate and typically conceal the reciprocal element in each 
exchange. Traditional societies slow down exchange so that a rapid (negative) reciprocity is 
avoided. When social institutions can no longer restrain negative reciprocity, insults, blows, 
revenge and neurotic symptoms abound.238 In archaic societies, devastating plagues, famines 
and floods etc., leading to a rapid cultural eclipse, were typically understood as a social crisis 
(rather than an ‘environmental’ or ‘health’ crisis). The tendency to explain the natural crisis 
by social, and especially moral factors (crimes) predominated. Girard notes that in order to 
assign moral culpability for the loss of social distinctions produced by the crisis, victims were 
often accused of ‘monstrous’ crimes that eliminate distinctions.239  
 
Schwager also asserts that the mythic obsession with floods, raging seas, storms and 
fires, etc., are inextricably linked to ideas of a ‘threatening-fascinating nature united with the 
agitating and confusing experience of tribal life. But the structuring element is always the 
social experience’.240 Accordingly, in mimetic theory, the core of the mythic tradition is 
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located in the fascinating and terrifying experience of mimetic crisis, and its resolution in 
exclusionary violence. This accounts for the monstrous and undifferentiated imagery of the 
myth: ‘[…] in anger humans become blind and can lose sight even of the greatest factual 
differences (e.g., between human and animal)’.241 Representations of mimetic crisis are 
bound to be confused, exaggerated and extraordinary. Girard insists that mythological 
monsters ‘bear witness to the disorder that leaves its traces on these narratives, which spring 
from representational distortions at the time of the mimetic crisis’.242 
 
Texts of Persecution 
 
Against or opposed to the genre of myth, Girard advanced ‘texts of persecution’. In the 
opening chapters of The Scapegoat Girard explores the 15th century poem, the Judgement of 
the King of Navarre by Guillaume de Machaut. A long poem in ‘conventional, courtly style’, 
the author claims to have participated in what Girard describes as ‘a confusing series of 
catastrophic events’, some of which are entirely improbable and others ‘only partially so’.243 
Machaut’s poem describes a persecution of the Jews in medieval France, during a plague, 
replete with mythic and extraordinary claims of heavenly signs and grotesque practices by 
the Jews. Girard points to the ‘tight framework of historical knowledge’ which informs our 
reading of the poem, specifically, historical evidence of anti-Semitic persecution during times 
of plague in medieval Europe.244 In the poem, Machaut evidently believes in the guilt of the 
Jews and the justice of their persecution and murder. Girard draws our attention to the 
remarkable fact that, at a distance of several centuries, we know better than the author what 
actually happened; we know the Jews were scapegoated. Commenting on Girard’s treatment 
of the poem, Finamore explains, ‘an accurate representation of an historical reality can be 
gained from a text whose author unintentionally misrepresented the reality’.245 The poem is 
in fact a ‘text of persecution’ or a failed myth. It misrepresents an historical reality, which 
modern readers can nonetheless unravel, revealing behind the misrepresentation, a true 
picture of historical scapegoating.  
 
241 Ibid, p. 28. 
242 Girard, When These Things Begin, p. 21. 
243 Cf. Girard, The Scapegoat, pp. 1-11. 
244 Ibid, p. 5. While Girard accepts that the poem is a mixture of the probable and improbable he makes a case 
for its historical accuracy with respect to the persecution of the Jews. 
245 Finamore, p. 67. 
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The contemporary reader suspects that the Jews did not, in fact, poison the wells and 
can discriminate between the fantastic and illusory claims of the author and the historical 
events he is reporting. The fantastic claims of heavenly omens, linked to stereotypical 
accusations against a traditionally marginalised group alert us to social disintegration in the 
context of plague and scapegoating. Girard’s reading of de Machaut is, under a certain rubric, 
‘doing violence to the text’. Girard claimed that faced with such a text, ‘one must either do 
violence to the text or let the text forever do violence to innocent victims’.246 Girard argues 
that many myths contain the same dynamics, stereotypes and motifs, yet have been 
exempted from suspicion of actual, historical violence. Girard posited four criteria by which a 
written or an oral account of collective violence may be evaluated as myth. The mythic 
account will indicate (1) social crisis (general undifferentiation), (2) a crime or crimes that 
eliminate difference and are thus seen to provoke the crisis, (3) a person or persons judged 
responsible, not because of direct involvement in the crime(s) but because of certain 
‘paradoxical marks of the absence of difference’ and (4) a violence which is frequently 
associated with the sacred.247 Girard suggests that the juxtaposition of more than one of 
these stereotypes within a text indicates persecution.248  
 
Girard’s theory of myth has been criticised as reductionist and following a circular 
logic.249 However, Girard’s critique of myth is a compelling reversal of the dominant 
interpretations, which posit first the myth (some conception of dying and rising gods, 
fertilizing nature, etc.) and then a violent, sacrificial human performance of this mythic 
belief.250 Girard insists that first came mimetic violence and murderous expulsion, and then 
the many and varied mythic representations of the scapegoating.251 Even today, Girard 
 
246 Girard, The Scapegoat, p. 8. 
247 Ibid, p. 24. 
248 Ibid. 
249 Cf. Kearney, pp. 8-14. Kearney questions Girard’s grounds for distinguishing biblical myth from all other 
myth (Greek, Norse, Celtic, African, Indian, Asian) which are reduced on masse to ‘coded strategies of 
persecution’. p. 10. 
250 James Frazer put forward the naturist interpretation of myth in The Golden Bough: A Study of Magic and 
Religion, third edition (London: Macmillan, 1915) i.e., that myths about dying and rising gods represent the 
seasonal cycle of vegetation. For a contemporary example of this interpretation, cf. Joseph Campbell and Bill 
D. Moyers, The Power of Myth, first edition (New York: Doubleday, 1988) pp. 106-07. 
251 Cf. Heim, pp. 54-60. 
 66 
argues, interpretations of myth successfully conceal or minimize the element of social 
violence and occlude the victim. Heim offers a striking example of this in Joseph Campbell’s 
interpretation of violent myth and ritual. Descriptions of violent murder are merely 
recounted, as if incidental, to the ‘truth’ behind the ritual.252  From Girard’s perspective, the 
link between mythic texts and social violence remains concealed, since myth is habitually  
elevated by commentators such as Campbell. On the other hand, those like Frazer, who 
‘subvert the sacrificial principle by turning it to derision’ equally become ‘its unwitting 
accomplice’.253  
 
The ‘Miracle of Apollonius of Tyana’ by Philostratus (Ephesus, second century AD), is a barely 
concealed account of a lynching and, for Girard, an example of a ‘failed myth’, a fanciful 
justification for mob violence. Girard compared this myth to the Gospel account of the 
woman taken in adultery which, Girard notes, is one of Jesus’s rare successes with a volatile 
crowd.254 Girard indicates how ‘the Gospels constantly reveal what the texts of historical 
persecution, especially mythological persecutors, hide from us: the knowledge that their 
victim is a scapegoat’.255   
 
The Contest of Twins: Mimetic Theory Pursuing a Single Piece of Evidence 
 
Twins as a Literary Motif 
 
In mimetic theory Girard’s account of rivalrous twins represents his ingenuity in pursuing a 
single piece of evidence through different registers, texts and disciplines. It is illustrative both 
of the creative appeal of his work and its weakness. Rivalrous twins or ‘doubles’ appear in 
what Girard terms the great literature of modernity.256 It is also an established motif in 
 
252 Cf. Ibid. Joseph Campbell’s accounts (from New Guinea and the Equatorial regions) of riotous violence, 
violation of social taboos and the bloody sacrifice of victims (with their obvious risk to social stability) is 
explained dispassionately as being ‘analogous’ to patterns in nature. Ibid. p. 59. 
253 Girard, Violence and the Sacred, p. 362.  
254 Girard, I See Satan Fall, p. 59. 
255 Girard, The Scapegoat, p. 117. 
256 Girard offered several examples, such as Monsieur Valenod and Monsieur de Rênal in Stendhal’s The Red 
and the Black. Both men occupy the same town and share a similar social status. Their rivalry is expressed in 
their competition to employ Julien Sorel as tutor. It is mediated desire, not Sorel’s ability, that makes him the 
desired object of both rivalrous ‘twins’. 
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ancient myth and a cultural phenomenon associated with taboos and prohibitions. Girard was 
convinced that myth ‘is not the trace of an immemorial past, it is not a vestigial presence, it 
is the living witness of the novelistic experience’.257 That is to say, the rivalrous twins in mythic 
literature (Girard cites the well-known figures of Cain and Abel, Jacob and Esau, Eteocles and 
Polynices, Romulus and Remus) embody precisely the same mimetic rivalries which are 
explored in the modern novel.258  
 
In Deceit, Desire and the Novel, Girard characterised the rivalrous desire of doubles as 
two identical but opposite triangles, superimposed on each other.259 The characteristic of 
double mediation is that each twin insists ‘that his own desire is prior and previous’.260 In 
great literature, Girard asserts, the ‘sterile opposition of contraries’ tends always to 
accelerate, inevitably to violence, and the brother-enemies ‘always follow the same 
paths…’.261 Paul Dumouchel, commenting on the rivalry between Silas and William Dane in 
George Eliot’s Silas Marner, notes that the rivalrous twins struggle and strive to be rid of each 
other, trapped in a slavish imitation which seems (to themselves) to be anything but. ‘[...] 
William and Silas would both recoil at the idea that they are counterfeit of each other’, and 
yet, that is increasingly what they become.262 This is imitation without representation, 
conscious strategy or artifice and, mechanistically, it drives the subject and the model towards 
conflict: ‘The more intense the hatred the nearer it brings us to the loathed rival. Everything 
it suggests to one, it suggests equally to the other, including the desire to distinguish oneself 
at all costs.’263 The modern novel explores openly what mythic literature must disguise and 
conceal. The rivalrous twins of internal mediation, present (albeit in a ‘monstrous’ and 
disguised fashion) in mythic literature, indicate for Girard that ancient cultures had in fact 
 
257 Girard, ‘Novelistic Experience in Oedipal Myth’, Oedipus Unbound, p. 12. 
258 Cf. Girard, Violence and the Sacred, p. 67. 
259 Cf. Girard, Deceit p. 99. 
260 Ibid. 
261 Ibid, p. 100. 
262 Cf. Dumouchel, Violence and Truth, p. 6. 
263 Girard, Deceit, p. 100. In ‘Novelistic Experience to Oedipal Myth’, in Oedipus Unbound, Girard explored not 
the tragic stature of the hero, but the symmetry and resemblances between Oedipus and Creon and Tiresias 
and how these lead to conflict and violence. 
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suffered the intense escalations associated with desire in modernity. Twins, therefore, 
represent the traces of such violent desiring, providing a key to all mythic literature.264  
 
Twins in Myth 
 
By 1965 Girard was exploring the Oedipus myth in terms of symmetries.265 The Oedipus myth 
is set against the background of a plague in Thebes, an amorphous presence which is as 
unpredictable and as terrifying as reciprocal violence. The plague may have helped to set in 
motion the sacrificial crisis, but it also symbolises it. In the myth, the ills which afflict the 
people of Thebes are attributed to the most egregious crimes and the lawbreaker, once 
identified, is expelled and punished, absolving the people of any violence with respect to the 
crisis.  Girard identified Creon, the enemy brother, and Tiresias the blind prophet, as doubles 
of Oedipus. Curses and accusations hurled at the double, are typically returned, with interest, 
accelerating the crisis. According to Girard, the Oedipal myth begins with the illusion of 
subjectivity and complete innocence. The heroes’ illusion of absolute innocence is frustrated 
by ‘fatality’; a series of tragic occurrences, which undermine the heroes’ purposes. As the 
myth progresses the heroes’ tragedy is not so much a mysterious ‘fate’, as a growing 
misapprehension of mimetic desire. As Oedipus sets out, making vows to punish the unclean 
creature responsible for the plague at Thebes, the curses and accusations he hurls at others 
return to him. He places himself, unwittingly, in the centre of the sacrificial circle. Girard 
compares Oedipus’ zeal to punish and expose the guilty one, with the fierce passion with 
which Proust’s characters Jean Santeuil/Legrandin denounce snobs.266 The straight road by 
which Oedipus sets out to rid Thebes of its evil curves imperceptibly back on to Oedipus and 
becomes a perfect circle. The one who began protesting his innocence is made to admit his 
guilt, to the satisfaction and relief of the community.267  
 
 
264 For Girard modern societies are not immunized against such escalations and occasionally they occur, but 
the influence of Christianity has raised our ‘escalation threshold’; modern societies ‘hardly ever experience 
phenomena of collective possession anymore’. Girard, When These Things Begin, p. 69. 
265 Cf. Sandor Goodhart, ‘Oedipus and Greek Tragedy’ in Palgrave, p. 153. 
266 Girard, ‘Novelistic Experience in Oedipal Myth’, p. 13. Cf. Marcel Proust, Jean Santeuil (Paris: 
NRF/Gallimard, 1952). 
267 Cf. Ibid. 
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For Girard the ‘twin’ represents those destructive ‘symmetries’ associated with 
internal mediation and rivalrous desire both in the modern novel and in myth.268 The 
sacrificial crisis takes on a variety of forms in myth: ‘the appearance of monsters, the fear of 
twins or the phenomenon of demonic possession’.269 The loss of differences, which 
accelerates mimetic conflict and tends towards violence, appears in myth as the confused and 
the ‘monstrous’. The twin represents for archaic societies the paradox that rivalry begets 
imitation, and imitation rivalry, and both increasingly appear as a lack of difference, leading 




In Violence and the Sacred, Girard cited Monica Wilson’s Rituals of kinship among the 
Nayakusa (1957) for examples of a society where the birth of twins and violence/social 
disorder are prominently linked.271 Similarly, Malinowski’s The Father in Primitive Psychology 
(1966) offers examples from Trobriand society of strict prohibitions with respect to the public 
recognition of physical resemblance among members of the society.272 To these (and other) 
examples from cultural anthropology, Girard juxtaposed Clyde Kluckhohn’s assertion ‘that the 
most common of all mythical conflicts is the struggle between brothers, which generally ends 
in fratricide’.273 
 
Absent from Girard’s account in Violence and the Sacred, but worthy of mention, is E. 
E. Evans-Pritchard’s fieldwork among the Nuer, which indicates a particular relationship to 
twin-births and a series of rigid prohibitions associated with the birth of twins.274 The Nuer 
‘speak of infant twins having one soul’.275 Their society was concerned with the physical 
duality of twins, which they nevertheless considered to be a single person (ran). The Nuer 
 
268 Here, Girard departs from the structuralism of Claude Lévi-Strauss, who differentiates twins in myth, since, 
following de Saussure’s definition of the sign as signifying difference, and nothing else, the twin was treated as 
another sign, opposed to a sign. Girard regarded differentiation as methodologically correct on the purely 
linguistic level, but incorrect on the level of culture. Cf. Girard, Scandal Comes, pp. 104-06.  
269 Schwager, Scapegoats, p. 15. 
270 Cf. Mark R. Anspach in Girard, Oedipus Unbound, viii. 
271 Girard, Violence and the Scared, pp. 62-63. 
272 Ibid, pp. 65-67. 
273 Ibid, p. 67.  
274 Cf. E. E. Evans-Pritchard, Nuer Religion (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1956). 
275 Ibid, p. 156. 
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considered the birth of twins a good fortune.276 According to Evans-Pritchard the Nuer 
considered twins to be birds, and both birds and twins were classed as ‘children of God’ (gaat 
kwoth).277 Indicative of the social significance associated with twins in Nuer society, Evans-
Pritchard notes that among the Nuer, husbands and wives typically exhibited a studied 
courtesy towards each other in public, refraining from eating together in public and avoiding 
using each other’s names in public. Such prohibitions eased with the birth of children and the 
passage of time. However, they are demanded ‘with extreme vigour should the wife bear 
twins’.278 In this circumstance the ‘paternal and maternal kin of the twins are for a short time 
in the position of parties of a blood-feud. They may not, under penalty of death (nueer), eat 
or drink or share a pipe together until sacrifices, the meat of which has been divided between 
them, have been made’.279 Although Evans-Pritchard indicated that the twins were 
considered a good fortune, their arrival set in motion a series of strict prohibitions, indicating 
heightened risk. Examples of the killing of one or more twins in nineteenth century Africa are 
well documented, as well as efforts by missionary societies to end the practice.280 The 
phenomenon continues to be observed in some African countries, notably in periods of social 
disorder.281  
 
Girard’s pursuit of the concept of twins in literature, myth and ethnography highlights 
the creativity of his approach. His work is a heady mix of literary tropes and obscure, violent 
 
276 Cf. ibid, p. 195. 
277 Evans-Pritchard explains in detail that the Nuer’s identification of human twins with birds is not, as Lévy-
Bruhl would suggest, evidence of a ‘prelogical mind’, incapable of making distinctions and avoiding logical 
contradictions. Within the Nuer language and religious thought, there is no contradiction. The twins are 
treated as human beings, not as birds, but in addition to being human, the twin-born are a revelation of Spirit 
and ‘the Nuer express this special character of twins in the ‘twins are birds’ formula because […] both are 
associated with Spirit and this makes twins, like birds, ‘people of the above’ and ‘children of God’. Cf. Nuer 
Religion, p. 131.  
278 Ibid, p. 178. 
279 Ibid. 
280 Cf. Misty L. Bastian ‘“The Demon Superstition”: Abominable Twins and Mission Culture in Onitsha History’, 
Ethnology, 40, 1, Special Issue: Reviewing Twinship in Africa (Winter, 2001) pp. 13-27 
https://www.jstor.org/stable/37773886. 
281 Cf. Orji Sunday, Guardian, 19/01/2018, ‘“They ensure each twin baby dies”: The Secret Killings in Central 
Nigeria”, <https://www.theguardian.com/working-in-development/2018/jan/19/twin-baby-dies-secret-
killings-nigeria-remote-communities> The article features the practice in the Bassa Komo tribe, where the 
belief is held that twins are ‘predestined to kill either or both parents.’ ‘“Twin babies, according to our belief, 
are not humans. They are seen as danger to the existence of the entire community because our ancestors told 
us that they have strange powers. We see them as gods among men. So at birth, the entire village is alerted 
that a threat and perhaps an evil has been born into the community.” A local was quoted as saying’. 
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practice. Mimetic theory suggests a single explanatory principle in answer to questions of 
different historical periods, and discreet social and geographical contexts. From an 
anthropological perspective, the explanation of twin sacrifice is not advanced by its selective 
inclusion into a prior literary theory. Recalling this second phase of his work Girard remarked 
that:  
‘Still today I have an extraordinarily vivid recollection of these years, one of the best times 
of my intellectual life. It seemed I was constantly discovering things that had never been 
described before, without knowing how to put them into words myself’.282 
 
While personally satisfying, this stage of his work did not establish mimetic theory within 
mainstream anthropology, as Girard had hoped.283 Notwithstanding the brilliance of his 
work, it has been asked if Girard’s effort to explain the origins of culture on the basis of 
mimetic violence is ultimately an attempt ‘to transfer nuclear panic, the fruit of our military-
industrial complexes into the heart of universal man?’284  
 
Mimetic Theory: Between Science and Poetry 
 
Mimetic Theory: ‘Persuasion’ or Scientific Explanation? 
 
To conclude this chapter, I will explore how Girard’s insights, while not conclusive 
anthropologically, continue to shed light on questions of social order, scapegoating and 
violence. In this respect mimetic theory is helpful in bringing fundamental social dynamics 
to our attention.  
 
 
282 Girard, Scandal Comes, p. 103. 
283 Kaplan suggests that for most anthropologists, mimetic theory ‘remains radioactive’ (Unlikely Apologist, p.  
48). Girard’s cultural theory is typically reduced to a fundamentally negative assumption about human nature, 
grounded in original violence. Cf. Douglas Davies, Emotion, Identity and Religion, Hope, Reciprocity and 
Otherness (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2011) p. 90. Dunhill, who insists that ‘sacrifice is not “about” 
violence or cruelty’ (p. 4) is highly critical of Girard. He critiques the scapegoat theory heavily for confusing the 
Hebrew ritual with violent sacrifice and for confusing the Greek pharmakoi with victims of sacrificial murder. 
Cf. John Dunhill, Sacrifice and the Body: Biblical Anthropology and Christian Self-Understanding (Perth, 
Australia: Ashgate Publishing, 2013). 
284 Luc de Heusch, Sacrifice in Africa: A Structuralist Approach, trans. Linda O’ Brien and Alice Morton 
(Bloomington, Indiana: Indiana University Press, 1985) p. 17. 
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Mimetic theory has achieved its explanatory force by a certain ‘brutalization’ of 
data; a brutalization for which Girard remained unrepentant.285 Kirwan notes that in the 
twenty year period between Things Hidden Since the Foundation of the World and Evolution 
and Conversion, Girard had come to explicitly associate mimetic theory with Charles 
Darwin’s theory of evolution, asserting that Darwin’s theory would never have advanced 
had Darwin been buffeted by demands for conclusive evidence at each stage of his theory’s 
development. In pursuit of mimetic realism Girard habitually transgresses disciplinary 
boundaries and formalistic methodologies, which he asserts are signs of academic 
decadence and represent ‘a huge unionization of failure’ across the sciences.286 Girard views 
evidence of archaic rituals and myth as cultural fossils, thus, the imperative for theorists and 
scientists is ‘filling in the gaps, finding the overall narrative, a theory – like the mimetic 
theory or Darwinism – in which the single pieces of evidence, fossil or ritual, would fall into 
the right place, providing a compelling explanation of the phenomenon at stake’.287 
 
Grant Kaplan has observed that mimetic theory is incapable of falsification and is thus, by 
Karl Popper’s standards, not a scientific theory.288 Girard insisted that Popperian falsifiability 
was not applicable to his theory since mimetic theory wasn’t established on ‘natural 
phenomenon […] that can be tested in laboratories’.289 Girard argues that ‘the elements 
favorable to my thesis are too numerous and consistent to be disputed’ but he accepts that 
‘any of those taken by themselves cannot be regarded as a veritable proof. It is the 
multiplicity of consistent elements that constitutes proof’.290 And yet, it is precisely because 
mimetic theory is grounded on a natural phenomenon (the human capacity to imitate) that 
Girard could critique Freudian and Marxist theories so confidently. Therefore, as Girard 
seems to accept, it is not finally measurable on empirical evidence but the ‘multiplicity of 
consistent elements’, or persuasion that has allowed mimetic theory to exert influence on 
 
285 See General Introduction, n. 5. 
286 Girard, Things Hidden, p. 40. 
287 Girard, Evolution and Conversion, p. 120. 
288 Kaplan, Unlikely Apologist, pp. 52-53. Philosopher, Karl Popper (1902-1994) opposed the classical inductivist 
method of science. According to Popper a theory which produces any number of positive outcomes is, 
nonetheless, unscientific if there are no conditions in which it may be proved false. This view informed 
Popper’s understanding of ‘demarcation’, i.e., the designation of any theory/hypothesis as scientific or 
nonscientific.    
289 Girard, Evolution and Conversion, p. 117. 
290 Ibid, p. 114. 
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a variety of contemporary discourses. Perhaps reluctantly, Girard seems to have accepted 
– in some measure – that his theory owes more to rhetoric and persuasion than his earlier 
positivist assertions allowed.291 
 
Mimetic theory has been compared to an ‘atomic flash’, producing knowledge so 
dazzling that ‘it burns eternally what it has touched’.292 A more modest appraisal of mimetic 
theory suggests not a grand, totalizing meta-narrative but an ‘anti-systematic array of 
carefully angled spotlights illuminating particular texts and situations’.293 Mimetic theory 
remains valid and contentious, if not as a meta-narrative, then as a hypothesis capable of 
deconstructing and demystifying cultural institutions and texts. It may be observed that 
Girard himself became a ‘fascinating’ figure for both critics and adherents of mimetic theory: 
‘reading Girard’s detractors and admirers it is clear that he has become […] model and 
obstacle, mediator and rival. The simplicity and fecundity of his theses attract both avid 
attention and disgruntled suspicion’.294  Girard’s work continues to divide opinion.295  
 
If mimetic theory has not succeeded as a meta-narrative or grand social-scientific 
theory, it continues to demonstrate a particular explanatory power. The explanatory power 
of Girard’s work may be likened to what Ian Bradley describes as the ‘dynamic of sacrifice’. 
For Bradley the power of sacrifice (𝛿𝜐𝜈𝛼𝜇𝜄𝜍) is dynamic, not static (potestas), and may be 
compared to the power of a poem, i.e., the power to evoke a response. ‘It achieves its work 
by yielding and giving up rather than by forcing and imposing. Its strength is its weakness’.296 
The capacity of mimetic theory to bring together a variety of themes and phenomena owes 
much to its dynamic structure and literary approach. In applying this understanding to 
 
291 Cf. Paul Lynch, ‘Rescuing Rhetoric: Kenneth Burke, René Girard, and Forms of Conversion’ in Contagion, 24 
(2017) 139-158. Lynch observes that by framing his project in a positivist manner Girard neglects the category 
of rhetoric, and its relation to truth. Conversion, a central category in mimetic theory is not merely the 
appropriation of knowledge. ‘Even if desire is prior to form, form mediates desire.’ p. 153.  
292 Domenach, ‘Voyage to the end of the Sciences of Man’, p. 157. 
293 Kirwan, Discovering Girard, p. 9. 
294 Gerard Loughlin, ‘René Girard’ in The Postmodern God: A Theological Reader, Edited by Graham Ward 
(Oxford: Blackwell Publishers, 1997), pp. 96-104 (p. 101). 
295 A consistent motif in the reception of mimetic theory has been a heightened rhetoric in the opposing 
arguments. For example, Terry Eagleton has labeled Girard’s theory of the origin of culture ‘absurdly 
hyperbolic’, cf. Terry Eagleton, Radical Sacrifice (New Haven: Yale University Press, 2018) p. 56. Eagleton 
among others, point to Girard’s ‘acolytes’ who are accused of an overly enthusiastic and uncritical 
appropriation of mimetic theory, typically exuding ‘a distinct air of hagiography’, cf. Eagleton, note 42, p. 186.   
296 Cf. Bradley, p. 36. 
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mimetic theory, I will indicate the fecundity of Girard’s work, exemplified in some of the 
poetic work of Seamus Heaney. 
 
As noted above, Girard understands the tomb to be the birthplace of culture.297 
Mimetic theory may be described as a return to the tombs, to uncover the origins of culture 
and to reveal beneath each institution, the scapegoat. All three Synoptic Gospels give an 
account of the demoniac of Gerasa a story Girard has explored since Deceit, Desire and the 
Novel. Part of story’s significance, for Girard, is that it is located ‘among the tombs.’298 The 
tomb, for Girard, marks the place where mimetic conflict is resolved and misremembered. 
Girard likens the human obsession with the mimetic rival to wandering among the tombs and 
committing oneself to death. Freud invented a ‘death instinct’ whereas, for Girard, no such 
‘instinct’ is required because the dynamic of mimetic desire tends towards obsession, 
madness and death.299 In Girard’s view, the Gospel revelation exposes the nature of rivalrous 
desires, desires which condemn humanity to a life wandering among the tombs. At the same 
time, the Gospel has ‘uncovered’ the tombs of those sacrificed in order to contain mimetic 
violence. At its most audacious mimetic theory attempts to explain each ethnographic and 
cultural artifact exclusively in terms of victimage. More modestly, mimetic theory draws 
attention to the social dynamics which create victims, and our collective participation in such 
dynamics. To conclude this chapter, I will explore Girard’s theory in relation to recent 
evidence of Iron Age killings and burials and how Girard’s insights, while rightly checked by 
scientific disciplines, achieve excellence in a poetic register.    
 
 ‘The Tombs were opened’ Evidence from European Bog Bodies 
 
Girard’s work since La Violence et la sacré has at times appeared stridently positivist, and this 
explains, in part, the reluctance of some within the social sciences to engage with mimetic 
theory. In this final section I will examine elements of recent archaeological and ethnographic 
research from the perspective of mimetic theory. I will suggest that a poetic (rhetorical) 
rendering of mimetic theory may be more appropriate and compelling than a scientific one. 
 
297 See above at n. 201. 
298 Cf. Girard, Deceit, p. 289 and for a deeper exploration, The Scapegoat, pp. 165-183. 
299 Cf. Girard, Things Hidden, pp. 413-15. 
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What follows are examples I have drawn together for the purpose of this thesis, not examples 
from Girard’s own research. They will indicate further, therefore, the fecundity of mimetic 
theory to illuminate and to generate new perspectives. 
 
Recent archaeological discoveries in European bog-lands have contributed to the 
question of ritual sacrifice and enthronement rituals in ancient societies.300 The Iron-age 
mummified bodies recovered from peat lands frequently indicate ritual sacrifice as the cause 
of death. Several significant indications (style of dress and ornament, the condition of hands 
and fingernails, indicating that the victim was not accustomed to manual work) suggest the 
royal/high status origins of the victims. In a study in Ireland significant numbers of human 
remains were discovered on or near important tribal boundaries.  Oldcroghan Man was found 
during the cutting of a drain precisely on a townland and parish boundary. This was also an 
ancient tuatha boundary, located close to Croghan Hill, where the kings of Uí Failghe were 
inaugurated. The discovery of remains at or beyond traditional boundary lines suggest an 
expulsion from the community. Writing on the recent discoveries in Irish bogs, Eamonn P. 
Kelly, Keeper of Antiquities at the National Museum of Ireland, has linked human sacrifice and 
kingship in Iron Age societies, both in Ireland and in Denmark. Kelly states that: ‘Human 
sacrifice appears to be represented on the famous Iron Age cauldron discovered at 
Gundestrup bog in Denmark, in what I now believe may depict scenes from the inauguration 
of a king in a ritual that closely corresponds to the Irish tradition’.301  
 
P. V. Glob’s important study on the archaeology associated with ‘bog bodies’ in Danish 
peat bogs indicates a pattern of sacrificial killings associated with high-status victims. Glob’s 
work began with the discovery in 1950 of ‘Tollund Man’ in Tollund Fen, in Bjaeldskov valley. 
Glob refers to the scenes, on the Gundestrup cauldron and suggests that they probably depict 
human sacrifice.302 Glob’s analysis of the remains of ‘the Grauballe man’ note that he lay, 
 
 
300 ‘Cloncavan Man’ March 2003, ‘Oldcroghan Man’ June 2003. 
301 Eamonn P. Kelly, ‘Kingship and Sacrifice: Iron Age Bog bodies and Boundaries’, Archaeology Ireland, 35, 
(September 2006) http://www.jstor.org.ezphost.dur.ac.uk/stable/archirel.35.1  
302 P. V. Glob, The Bog People: Iron Age Man Preserved, trans. by Rupert Bruce-Mitford (London: Faber and 
Faber, 1988) p. 151. 
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with his throat cut, the sign of a ceremony in which the sacrificial blood had to well out in 
a stream to the gods whom it was desired to honour. We do not know how the Grauballe 
man came to be chosen for sacrifice […] His neat hands […] unaccustomed to toil, suggest 
he was not chosen from the body of the peasantry. He may have been picked by lot’.303  
 
The several remains examined by Glob were remarkably well preserved in the acidic 
conditions of the peat bog and indicated high-status victims, a sacrificial death and the 
likelihood of a serious crime or social transgression. To emphasize this latter assertion, Glob 
cites Tacitus in his work on the legal customs of Germanic tribes: 
 
In the assembly it is permissible to lay accusations and bring capital charges. The nature 
of the death penalty differs according to the offence. Traitors and deserters are hung from 
trees; cowards, poor fighters and notorious evil-livers are plunged in the mud of marshes 
with a hurdle on their heads: the difference of punishment has regards to the principle 
that crime should be blazoned abroad by its retribution, but abomination hidden.304 
 
The account of Tacitus indicates that the high-status victims whose sacrificial deaths were 
concealed in peat bogs may have been found guilty of the kind of crimes which especially 
offend social groups and which are, according to Girard, frequently charged to the scapegoat 
in times of social upheaval. At the height of a mimetic crisis the victim is charged with the 
most offensive crimes and the mob are united in expelling and destroying the criminal. The 
crimes of the guilty person are almost too terrible to mention, since they threaten the stability 
of the whole community. In the violent casting out there is no doubt as to the guilt of the 
scapegoat. The perceived cause of the community’s disintegration must be effaced and 
concealed; the abomination must be hidden. At a later stage (the stage of myth-making), once 
social differentiation has been restored, the community attempt to retell the story of the 
criminal in a way which justified his or her murder and, at the same time exonerates the 
community from all guilt. In the myth of Oedipus, Oedipus is guilty of egregious crimes, but 
he did not intentionally commit the crimes. This is the essence of tragedy, for no one is to 
blame, yet the hero/victim had to die. Girard notes that ‘at a critical stage of their evolution, 
or rather of their interpretation, myths frequently reveal innocent culprits, like Oedipus, 
juxtaposed with communities that are innocently guilty’.305 
 
 
303 Ibid, p. 152. 
304 Ibid, p. 153. 
305 Girard, The Scapegoat, p. 82.  
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The recovered bog bodies suggest a link between the sacrificial killing of high status 
individuals and the community’s determination to efface and eradicate all evidence of their 
crime or offence. Other bog bodies are equally notable for bearing the ‘signs’ of victimage 
which, Girard notes, are frequently found in myth (‘sickness, madness, genetic deformities, 
accidental injuries and disabilities’).306 Miranda Aldhouse-Greens’ recent study of bog bodies 
notes several victims were early adolescents.307 Some bore other ‘sacrificial signs’.308 Their 
reemergence in recent years suggests, in a remarkable manner, the physical return of the 
innocent victim; if not a type of the resurrection, then perhaps the ‘opening of the tombs’ 
recorded in the Gospel of Matthew.309 According to Girard the failure of crops, the occurrence 
of plague or some other disaster threatening the community were typically assigned to the 
incestuous and patricidal outrages of an Oedipus figure: ‘Through its recourse to arbitrary 
violence’, Girard writes, ‘the helpless populace manages to forget its helplessness in the face 
of uncontrollable events’.310 
 
Poet Seamus Heaney, drawing attention to the work of P. V. Glob on the bog bodies, 
wrote a series of poems addressed to (or about) the Iron Age victims,  as a means of exploring 






306 Cf. Girard, The Scapegoat, pp. 18-21. In terms of those deemed suitable for sacrifice the ‘weakness of 
women, children, and old people, as well as the strength of the most powerful, becomes weakness in the face 
of the crowd’. p. 19.   
307 Miranda Aldhouse-Green, Bog Bodies Uncovered: Solving Europe’s Ancient Mystery (London: Thames & 
Hudson, 2015) ‘Windeby Girl’ (aged 12-13) ‘Yde Girl’ (aged 16) and ‘Kayhausen Boy’. pp. 14-34. 
308 Cf Ibid, ‘Kayhausen Boy’ and ‘Yde Girl’ both had suffered from a limp. The boy’s impediment was probably a 
diseased and malformed hip joint. ‘Uchter Moor Girl’ was 19 years old and, significantly, left-handed. p. 25. 
309 Matthew 27: 51-52: ‘At that, the veil of the Temple was torn in two from top to bottom; the earth quaked; 
the rocks were split; the tombs were opened and many holy men rose from the dead’. This text evoked for 
Girard, the end of sacrifice and the vindication of the innumerable innocent victims assassinated ‘since the 
foundation of the world’.    
310 Girard, “The Myth of Oedipus, the Truth of Joseph” in Oedipus Unbound, p. 110. 
311 Cf. Charles O’Neill ‘Violence and the Sacred in Seamus Heaney’s North’ in Seamus Heaney, The Shaping 
Spirit, ed. Catherine Malloy and Phyllis Carey (London: Associated University Presses, 1996) pp. 91-105. O’Neill 
explores the political undercurrents in Heaney’s myth of North. O’Neill draws on Girard’s work to illustrate 
how Heaney’s ‘reshaping of myth allows it to speak its timeless human truths, the complicity of all in violence 
and its connection with what Heaney has termed “this terrible sacrificial religious thing”’. p. 19.  
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you were flaxen-haired, 
undernourished, and your 
tar-black face was beautiful. 
My poor scapegoat, 
 
I almost love you 
but would have cast, I know, 
the stones of silence. 
I am the artful voyeur 
 
of your brain’s exposed 
and darkened combs, 
your muscles’ webbing 
and all your numbered bones: 
 
I who have stood dumb 
when your betraying sisters, 
cauled in tar, 
wept by the railings, 
 
who would connive 
in civilized outrage 
yet understand the exact 





312 Seamus Heaney, ‘Punishment’ in North (London & Boston: Faber and Faber, 1981 [1975]) p. 37. Several 
poems in this edition treat the questions of tribal conflict and scapegoating: In ‘Kinship’: ‘Of casualty and 
victim | report us fairly | how we slaughter | for the common good’. p. 45. O’Neill on Heaney’s use of ‘My 
poor scapegoat’ in ‘Punishment’: ‘[Heaney] recognizes in her both the sacrificial victim, whose Iron Age death 
was supposed to have brought fecundity to the community, and the modern collaborator whose ‘punishment’ 
helps to reinforce a sense of group identity that continued violence may have undermined’. pp. 97-8. ‘For 
Heaney, as for Girard, the archaic processes of the past returns to dominate the present’. p. 100. 
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Ultimately, Girard’s theory as cultural anthropology, has proved to be reductionist. 
Frequently, Girard’s ambitious hypothesis attempts to explain a great deal, neglecting or 
minimizing evidence which may suggest alternative explanations.313 Theories of mimesis, as 
Finamore has argued, prove to be more descriptive than explanatory. With these caveats in 
mind, Kirwan’s analogy of mimetic theory as a series of spotlights, illuminating phenomena 
and texts, proves acceptable and valid. Heaney’s poem, exploring contemporary tribal 
violence and scapegoating binds the core insights of Girard’s work with the remarkable 
evidence of archaic ritual, lately unearthed from the peatlands of northern Europe. In Heaney, 
what amounts to the marriage of mimetic theory and ethnographic evidence is presented in 
a rhetorical, persuasive, and poetic register. Unlike Girard, Heaney makes no scientific claims. 
But the argument is no less compelling in Heaney’s rendering, since it testifies convincingly to 
Girard’s core assertion; that human societies – have been and still are – formed in and 
maintained by acts of generative violence, whether on the peatlands of the Iron Age or in 
contemporary European states.  
 
Girard’s theory of culture provides ample tools to explore the cultural context of the 
poor movements of the early thirteenth century; this, in fact, is the task of chapter five of this 
thesis. In chapter five Girardian spotlights will be fixed on such questions as; the meaning and 
role of Franciscan voluntary poverty in the late Middle Ages, as well as broader questions of 
social violence and exclusion. I will argue that, within its historical and cultural moment, the 
early Franciscans represent a heightened social awareness of the role of mimetic desire in 
provoking conflict. With the benefit of Girard’s theoretical spotlights I will argue that, for the 
early Franciscan movement, voluntary poverty became a successful social/political strategy 
for grounding a non-violent, non-rivalrous social ethic; the early Franciscan forma vitae.  
  
 








During the eleven year period between publishing Mensonge romantique et vérité 
Romanesque and La Violence et le Sacré, a period during which he published numerous 
articles and books on literary subjects, ‘Girard’s personal commitment to, and academic 
interest in Christianity, remained unspoken – if not wholly concealed – in his published 
work.’314 Kaplan quotes Girard’s reticence in viewing his project as theology: ‘Theologians 
should refrain from making use of the mimetic reading for parochially ecclesiastical interests 
[…] if (the mimetic theory) is perceived as a mere servant of this or that theology, ancilla 
theologiae, its effectiveness is nullified’.315 Even in a work as explicitly exegetical and 
theological as I See Satan Fall Like Lightening, Girard states: 
 
My research is only indirectly theological, moving as it does across the field of a Gospel 
anthropology unfortunately neglected by theologians. To increase its effectiveness, I have 
pursued it as long as possible without postulating the reality of the Christian God. No 
appeal to the supernatural should break the thread of the anthropological analyses.316  
 
As late as 2004 Girard was quoted as saying: ‘I am a theorist of mythology: I am not a moralist 
or a religious thinker’.317 Although Girard has contributed to the confusion surrounding his 
relationship with theology, nevertheless his work has gained significant stature in 
contemporary theological circles.318 Kaplan asserts that mimetic theory is ‘not merely an 
explanatory tool for theology but also an apology for Christianity’.319 Girard maintained a 
decade’s long engagement with several important theologians.320 Raymund Schwager was 
among the first to incorporate elements of mimetic theory into his theological work.321 Apart 
 
314 Fletcher, p. 91. 
315 Kaplan, Unlikely Apologist, p. 4. 
316 Girard, I See Satan Fall, pp. 191-92. 
317 Girard, Evolution and Conversion, p. 167. 
318 Cf. Kaplan, Unlikely Apologist, p. 48. 
319 Ibid, p. 11. 
320 Ibid, p. 205 note 6. Kaplan cites Henri de Lubac among others. 
321 Raymund Schwager S. J. (1935-2004) Swiss theologian who began a correspondence with Girard in 1974, cf. 
René Girard and Raymund Schwager: Correspondence (1974-1991), trans. by Chris Fleming and Sheelah Treflé 
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from Schwager, theologians who have engaged with Girard’s work, (both constructively and 
critically) include John Milbank, Sarah Coakley, Rowan Williams, Miroslav Volf, David Bentley 
Hart, Robert Doran and Neil Ormerod.322 Kaplan seeks to defend Girard from two standard 
but opposing accusations: (1) that Girard’s work is not theological in the strict sense and (2) 
that his theological bias has infected his work as a social scientist and leaves his theory 
without a strict scientific basis.323 Girard’s eagerness to avoid the epithet ‘theologian’ can be 
seen as a desire to protect his hypothesis from being ‘intimidated out of existence by the 
great theoretical steamrollers of our time’.324 In his initial engagement with academic 
theology, Girard was perhaps aware that a formidable theological inheritance, not necessarily 
free from ‘mythical’ or ‘sacrificial’ influences, might pose a serious danger to his unique 
religious theory. Given Girard’s particular academic concerns and methodology, it is easier to 
distinguish his work from other theological projects, than to characterise his own theological 
approach. Kevin Mongrain, for example, notes that Girard writes theology not in the 
scholastic sense of disputatio or in the modern academic sense of Wissenschaft, but in terms 
which foreground God’s relationship with the world as it emerges in biblical narrative.325  
 
The theological content in Girard’s work is extensive and in consequence I will limit 
myself to those aspects of his work which bear on the theological concerns of the early 
Franciscan movement. This chapter treats Girard’s theological work as follows: 
 
1. Girard’s engagement with the Judeo-Christian scriptures, specifically his ‘hermeneutic 
of the innocent victim’.  
2. Girard’s early evaluation of mimetic desire is typically conflictual. I argue that there is 
scope in Girard’s theory for emphasising ‘positive mimesis’, facilitating a more 
constructive engagement with Christian theology.  
 
Hidden, edited by Scott Cowdell, Chris Fleming, Joel Hodge and Mathias Moosbrugger (New York: Bloomsbury, 
2016). Schwager’s dialogue was both critical and constructive. Must There be Scapegoats? (1978) has been 
described as ‘up to this point, the most Girardian book not written by Girard himself’. Cf. Moosbrugger, in 
Palgrave, p. 145. 
322 Kaplan, Unlikely Apologist, p. 2. 
323 Cf. Ibid, p. 46. 
324 Girard, Diacritics, p. 44. 
325 Kevin Mongrain, ‘Theologians of Spiritual Transformation: A Proposal for Reading René Girard through the 
lenses of Hans Urs von Balthasar and John Cassian’, Modern Theology, 28, (January 2012), 81-111 (p. 84). 
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3. I briefly explore how Raymund Schwager has integrated mimetic theory into his 
theological project, as an example of the positive reception of mimetic theory in 
mainstream theology. 
4. I explore John Milbank’s critique of Girard’s theory of sacrifice and Girard’s deepening 
of his account of sacrifice through his engagement with theology.  
 
Mimetic Theory and the Judeo-Christian Scriptures 
 
The Hermeneutic of the Victim 
 
Girard asserts that ‘[n]othing is more disturbing and more exciting than the irresistible 
resurgence of the Christian text, at a time and place when it is least expected’.326 Specifically, 
he reads in the Christian text a consistent advocacy for the innocent victim, over against 
narratives which justify group violence. Girard was not the first to observe this feature in the 
Hebrew and Christian scriptures; it has been developed, for example, in the work of Abraham 
Heschel,327 and subsequently in the work of Sandor Goodhart.328 Girard, however, employs 
this characteristic in his wider project, understanding the biblical texts to be ‘an active, rather 
than a passive object of anthropological enquiry,’329 uniquely capable of deconstructing myth 
and thereby revealing ‘things hidden since the foundation of the world’. He typically opposes 
biblical literature to myth, based on his understanding of how each approaches the innocent 
victim of any given social conflict.330  
 
Girard’s interpretation of biblical texts has garnered both praise and criticism. Girard 
has been credited with reviving ‘for a new generation a type of multi-layered interpretation 
once practiced by pre-modern exegetes’.331 It has also been asserted that until Girard, ‘we 
possessed no coherent, rational explanation of the prevalence of deceit and violence in the 
 
326 René Girard, Job: The Victim of His People, (London: Athlone, 1987), p. 166. 
327 Abraham J. Heschel, The Prophets (New York: Harper & Row, 1962).  
328 Sandor Goodhart, Sacrificing Commentary: Reading the end of Literature (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins 
University Press, 1996). 
329 McKenna, Divine Aporia, p. 86. 
330 Cf. René Girard, ‘Are the Gospels Mythical?’, First Things, 62, (April, 1996) pp. 27-31. I will indicate below 
problems with Girard’s absolute distinction between ‘Bible’ and ‘myth’. 
331 Ann Astell, ‘Violence, Mysticism and René Girard’, Theological Studies, 78, 2, 389-411 (p. 401). 
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Bible, including the New Testament – at least no explanation which could satisfy the various 
demands of the exegete, the theologian, and the believer’.332 His work has been appropriated 
by a number of scripture scholars.333 Nevertheless, it is accurate to say – as Kaplan does – that 
the reception of his work into biblical studies has been ‘lukewarm’.334  
 
Finamore defends Girard’s mimetic reading of the Gospels on the basis that historical-
critical methods have produced such a wide (and inconclusive) variety of accounts of the 
‘historical Jesus’. Girard is, therefore, ‘entitled to offer a literary-critical reading of the text 
and to take the text as it stands rather than relying on unproven and unprovable assumptions 
about its original life-setting’.335 Girard’s explanation of how the Judeo-Christian scriptures 
could be both an example of the archaic sacrificial mind, and its definitive undoing, has proved 
to be his most ambitious and controversial claim.  
 
The Hebrew Scriptures 
 
Girard considers the Psalms as possibly ‘the oldest texts in human history to let the voice of 
the victims, rather than that of their persecutors, be heard’.336 The application of specific 
psalms, such as Psalm 69.4 (‘they hated me without cause’) in New Testament texts (John 
15.25) allowed the echo of a previous scapegoat victim to be universalised in the experience 
of Jesus.337 Girard’s biblical hermeneutic is fundamentally a typological interpretation of the 
Bible, resembling the figural/typological interpretation of the biblical texts associated with 
the patristic era and influential up to the early modern period.338 For Girard, ‘types’ of the 
 
332 Robert J. Daly, Foreword in Schwager, Scapegoats (v). 
333 Burton Mack, The Myth of Innocence: Mark and Christian Origins (Philadelphia: Fortress Press, 1988), 
supports Girard’s theory of culture, however, unlike Girard, Mack regards the authors of the Gospels as 
persecutors, whose portrayal of Jesus as innocent victim is directed against the Jewish community. The Gospel 
is a ‘myth of origins’ p. 312. Girard’s work has been enthusiastically appropriated by Robert Hamerton-Kelly, in 
Sacred Violence: Paul’s Hermeneutic of the Cross (Minneapolis: Fortress Press, 1992) and The Gospel and the 
Sacred: Poetics of Violence in Mark (Minneapolis: Fortress Press, 1994). James G. Williams, The Bible, Violence 
and the Sacred (Harper Collins, 1991) and Schwager, Scapegoats (2000) draw extensively on Girard’s insights. 
334 Cf. Kaplan, Unlikely Apologist, p. 65. 
335 Finamore, p. 121. Finamore cites fifteen critical works by twelve different Biblical scholars to demonstrate 
the variety of accounts of the ‘historical Jesus’ available. 
336 Girard, I See Satan Fall, p. 116. 
337 Cf. Ibid, p. 151. 
338 This reading of the Bible characteristically identifies ‘types’ in the Hebrew scriptures and reads them in 
relation to corresponding ‘antitypes’ in the New Testament. The movement from type to antitype produces an 
historical consciousness, wherein the ‘old’ is constantly reconfigured and perfected/fulfilled in the ‘new’. Thus, 
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innocent victim in the Hebrew scriptures are amplified and perfected in the passion narratives 
of the Gospels. In the Hebrew scriptures, Girard insists, a work of exegesis is in progress 
operating in ‘precisely the opposite direction’ to the dynamics of myth and culture. ‘And yet 
it is impossible to say that this work is completed. Even in the most advanced texts […] there 
is still some ambiguity regarding the role of Yahweh’.339 For Girard, the lingering ambiguity is 
definitively overcome in the Gospels where Jesus is first seen to offer the Kingdom of God 
(which is entered into by the renunciation of all violence) and, in his death, to reveal the 
scapegoat mechanism.340  Girard’s reworking of an earlier form of biblical interpretation has 
been compared to Origen’s.341 
 
 Just as Girard’s route to the Gospels was through a prior engagement with literature, 
his appreciation of types and figures in the scriptures owns more to Erich Auerbach than to 
Origen.342 Auerbach distinguishes between the style employed in ancient allegory, and 
biblical typology; the latter being a type of prophesy. The ‘types’ in biblical narratives which 
Auerbach characterizes as prophetic are grounded in real, historical persons and events and, 
at the same time, they foretell and disclose a truth yet to be embodied and actualised, a truth 
known retrospectively.343 Auerbach argues that the figural interpretation changed the Old 
Testament ‘from a book of laws and a history of the people of Israel into a series of figures of 
Christ’, making possible ‘a magnificent and universal history’ of salvation, absorbing, for 
example, the cultural world of the Celtic and Germanic peoples.344  
 
 
the mysterious type of the bronze serpent (Numbers 21. 8) is understood according to the antitype of Christ 
on the Cross (John. 3. 14).  
339 Girard, Things Hidden, p. 157. 
340 Girard, Evolution and Conversion, p. 148. 
341 Cf. Daly ‘Biblical Interpretation: Old and New Testaments, a New Hermeneutic(s)?’ Palgrave, 135-141. 
According to Daly, both Origen and Girard have weaknesses and gaps in their writing, inasmuch as they 
‘theorize beyond the available evidence’. Daly argues that Girard, nevertheless, discovered the biblical 
foundation of his mimetic anthropology (an anthropological insight, rather than a theological one) and is not 
reading mimetic theory into the scriptures, but discovering it there. 
342 Cf. Erich Auerbach, Mimesis: The Representation of Reality in Western Literature (Princeton: Princeton 
University Press, 1953) Auerbach notes the distinctive biblical narrative style, which is ‘more realistic’ than pre-
Christian literature. Girard credits Auerbach’s characterization of mimetic representation in the Gospels but 
insists that the content, not just the technique of the Gospels, is mimetic. Cf. Evolution and Conversion, p. 129.  
343 E. Auerbach, ‘Figura’ in Scenes from the Drama of European Literature (Gloucester: Peter Smith, 1973) 
344 Cf. Ibid, p. 52. In the Christian tradition figural interpretations of scripture are dominant from the patristic 
to the early modern period. 
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 Figural or typological readings of the scriptures ensure that Girard’s project is not a 
Marcionite rejection of the Hebrew scriptures. Indeed, from the perspective of mimetic 
theory, Girard emphasises the continuity between the Old and New Testaments.345 However, 
as Gerard Loughlin notes, figural interpretations render the Bible not only coherent but also 
‘all-consuming’ as ‘otherwise independent biblical narratives and extrabiblical stories, 
including one’s own’ are accessed already ‘figured into’ a larger narrative. In Girard’s working 
of the figural interpretation all biblical narratives (and extrabiblical stories) are ‘figured into’ 
a narrative about human violence and the innocent victim.346  
 
In the Book of Job, the protagonist is an upright and prosperous man who suffers a 
series of sudden misfortunes, including the loss of material wealth, social status, family 
members and health. In the narrative, the afflictions of Job result from a wager between God 
and Satan. Girard, however, characterizes Job as a victim of scapegoating, forced by his 
community to follow ‘the ancient trail trodden by the wicked’ (Job 22. 15). Girard presents 
Job as a figura Christi in his participation in the struggle against the scapegoat phenomenon 
that overtakes him, in his opposition to the system of retribution and, chiefly, when he briefly 
eludes ‘the logic of violence and the sacred’ which has triumphed over everyone else.347 In 
the Hebrew scriptures innocent victims such as Susanna, Daniel, and Jonah are delivered from 
unjust mob violence. The Suffering Servant in Deutero Isaiah (Isaiah 52. 13 to 53. 12) 
represents an even more sustained plea of innocence than Job’s. According to Heim, in Isaiah 
the question posed by the Suffering Servant is no longer Job’s question: How can God be 
justified in the face of mob violence against the scapegoat? God’s solidarity with the victim is 
no longer in doubt. The question is moving towards how many, and by what means, can the 
victims be saved?348 
 
For Girard, Job is the subject of ‘a sort of totalitarian or inquisitorial trial’. Job’s 
‘friends’ attempt to convince Job of his guilt, and at times Job accepts the consensus. Girard 
asserts that Job had ‘lived through a period of extraordinary popularity bordering on 
 
345 Girard, Evolution and Conversion, pp. 148-49. 
346 Cf. Gerard Loughlin, Telling God’s Story: Bible, Church and Narrative Theology (Cambridge: Cambridge 
University Press, 1999) p. 43. 
347 Cf. Girard, Job, p. 166. 
348 Cf. Heim, p. 101. 
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idolatry’.349 For Girard, Job represents a particular type of scapegoat, ‘a shattered idol’.350 
Job’s success provoked unanimous acclaim, desire and envy. His subsequent ignominy was 
equally the product of public opinion; ‘unstable, capricious and void of all moderation’.351 In 
Job, the archaic sacred is represented by the ‘seething crowd […] the perfect vehicle for divine 
vengeance. It hurls itself at the victim and tears him to pieces; all the participants share the 
same terrible appetite for violence’.352 Girard argues that in the Dialogues, Job, at times 
faltering, offers a different perspective on the same act of collective violence that motivates 
his ‘friends’ and the crowds: the sacred lie is contrasted with Job’s ‘true realism’.353 In 
distinguishing the Dialogues (chapters 3-31) from the Prologue (1-2) and the Epilogue (42) in 
Job, Girard finds support among biblical scholars.354 A diachronic analysis of the prose-tale 
indicates that it is probably later than the Dialogues.355 While Girard’s literary-critical reading 
is not at odds with historical-critical analysis on this point, his biblical work in general rides 
loosely in the saddle of historical-critical methods.  In Job, Girard neglects the specifically legal 
language found in the course of the Dialogues. Citing Sylvia Scholnick, Barukh Levine argues 
that the Dialogues take the form of a rib, an established form of legal dispute, between Job, 
the creature, who seeks reasons for his misfortune, and God, the Creator.356 Levine asserts 
that Girard ‘extracts from the dialogues of Job those passages which epitomize his own 
concerns: How do the many treat the few, the mob the individual, the strong the weak. I 
insist, however, that Job is no scapegoat’.357 
 
Girard accepts that his approach was ‘somewhat conjectural’; the envy directed to Job 
is not explicit in the text, though in Psalm 73, Girard hears the embittered envy of Job’s 
‘friends’, so well concealed in the Dialogues.358 The victim is being expelled for the sake of the 
community and in Job’s case, the expulsion provokes what Girard considers an extraordinary 
 
349 Girard, Job, p. 11. 
350 Ibid, p. 13. 
351 Ibid. 
352 Ibid, p. 25.   
353 Ibid, p. 32. 
354 Cf. Dermot Cox, Man’s Anger and God’s Silence: The Book of Job (Middlegreen, Slough: St. Paul’s 
Publications, 1990. Cox includes a ‘Theophany’ ( 38. 1 – 42. 6) p. 15. 
355 Barukh Avraham Levine, ‘René Girard on Job: The question of the scapegoat’, 
Semeia, 33 (1985) 125-133 (p. 126). 
356 Ibid, p. 132. 
357 Ibid, p. 133. 
358 Cf. Girard, Job, pp. 55-58. 
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witness to the God of Non-violence: ‘Even now, behold my witness is in heaven’ (16. 19-21) 
and ‘This I know: that my Avenger lives’ (19. 25-27). The victim, in the process of being 
expelled by the false sacred, does not participate in the growing consensus as to his guilt. He 
affirms his faith in an entirely different God.359 In the Epilogue, God speaks as Job’s ‘Avenger’, 
upbraiding Job’s ‘friends’ for failing to speak truthfully of God (42. 7). Of which ‘god’, then, 
were they speaking? The greatness of Job, according to Girard, (like that of the psalms) is the 
continuance, ‘side by side with the still present hope for vengeance, [of] a hope for the God 
of victims’.360  
 
Another example of a biblical story in which Girard perceives an unveiling of the 
scapegoat mechanism is the account of Joseph and his brothers in Genesis 37-47.361 According 
to the story, Joseph was the favourite son of Jacob, and on that account, was both envied and 
despised by his brothers. United in hostility to Joseph, the brothers abandon an original plot 
to murder him, and instead, sell him into slavery. A slave in Egypt, Joseph eventually gained 
a position of importance in the household of Potiphar, captain of Pharaoh’s guard. He resisted 
the advances of Potiphar’s wife and suffered imprisonment on account of her accusations of 
rape. Despite his mistreatment Joseph attained status in the court of the Pharoah of Egypt 
and, when famine forced his brothers to find assistance in Egypt, Joseph did not take revenge 
on his brothers for his own mistreatment. Instead he contrived to implicate Benjamin (the 
last born of Jacob’s thirteen children) in a supposed crime, thereby testing Judah and the 
others. Rather than abandon Benjamin, Judah pleaded with Joseph, that he might take 
Benjamin’s place. Joseph, overcome with emotion, revealed himself as their brother and they 
were reconciled.     
 
Girard compares the story of Joseph with the myth of Oedipus indicating that whereas 
mimetic violence triumphed in Oedipus, it failed in Joseph’s case. For Girard, both figures are 
treated as scapegoats, provoking admiration, fascination, envy and hatred in their 
communities. Both figures are accused of similar crimes, but the account in Genesis takes the 
part of Joseph, not his brothers. Joseph emerges from the text neither demonized nor deified, 
 
359 Cf. Ibid, p. 141. 
360 Ibid, p. 153. 
361 Cf. Girard, Things Hidden, p. 152, Evolution and Conversion, pp. 144-46. 
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hallmarks of successful scapegoating. The narrator ‘bathes him in a warm luminosity that 
would be unthinkable in mythology’.362 Girard considers the two literary forms, the mythical 
and the biblical, so different that ‘even if the story of Joseph were not based on events and 
Oedipus were, the biblical story would still be true and the myth a lie’.363  
 
Joseph confronting his brothers in the Genesis narrative is characterised by Goodhart as a 
deconstruction of sacrificial thinking: Joseph, the victim, identifies himself at the moment he 
has become the potential persecutor of his brothers, calling into question the binaries of 
innocent/guilty.364 Whereas the community’s violence is concealed in the myth of Oedipus, 
in the story of Joseph the ambiguous nature of violence is unavoidable. As McKenna has 
noted: ‘To condemn the other’s violence is to veil one’s own participation in it […] the 
essential aim of scapegoating “since the foundation of the world” is to burden another with 
our own guilt’.365 In the Genesis account of Joseph this burden is not relieved and the 
scapegoat is redeemed, not sacrificed.  
 
The development of Jewish monotheism, according to Girard, enabled the unmasking 
of the scapegoat mechanism. Jewish monotheism ‘no longer turns victims into divinities or 
divinity into a victim. Monotheism is both the cause and the consequence of this 
revolution’.366 The God of Monotheism is completely ‘devictimized’ while polytheistic 
religions are the product of the sacrificial mechanism, the result of many foundational victims 
recast as deities.367 Throughout the Hebrew scriptures Girard perceived a loosening of the 
sacrificial ties, a preparation for the Gospel revelation. Girard’s account is the ‘all-consuming’ 
story of the innocent victim, set against the violence of the community. His tendency is to 
refer to various biblical texts (and contexts) generically, as a single biblical revelation of the 
innocent victim. His absolute distinction between ‘Bible’ and ‘myth’ has been critiqued. It has 
been observed that in his treatment of the Joseph narrative Girard emphasizes transformed 
relationships based on victimhood, while neglecting other possible relationships present in 
 
362 Girard, I See Satan Fall, p. 118  
363 Ibid, p. 113. 
364 Cf. Sandor Goodhart, ‘“I am Joseph” René Girard and the Prophetic Truth’ in Violence and Truth, pp. 53-74. 
365 McKenna, Divine Aporia, p. 92. 
366 Girard, I See Satan Fall, p. 121. 
367 Cf. Girard, Evolution and Conversion, p. 143. 
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the text.368 Hans Jensen observes that in emphasizing strongly the manner in which biblical 
stories differ from the stories of other cultures, Girard minimizes the strong continuities 
between both and asserts, without justification, a total difference.369 It is therefore valid to 
acknowledge that Girard’s work gains its persuasive quality from its strength of literary 
creativity, rather than its exegetical rigour.  
 
The New Testament 
 
In asserting that the ‘Gospels only speak of sacrifices in order to reject them and deny them 
any validity’, Girard overreaches.370 Whereas Girard (and some of his critics) frequently treat 
the concept of sacrifice in a univocal sense, the New Testament admits several possible 
meanings.371 In line with his theory Girard habitually assigns to biblical sacrifice the function 
of exclusionary violence. Even accepting Girard’s sense of ‘sacrifice’, Lucien Scubla notes that 
the Gospel attitude to sacrifice is ‘quite balanced’.  Jesus speaks of being reconciled with your 
brother before making sacrifice (Matthew 5. 24). Jesus also instructed the healed leper to 
make the appropriate sacrifices, as the Law required (Matthew 8. 4).372 Scubla notes that the 
Gospel counsel to pluck out the offending eye (Matthew 5. 29), rather than be cast into hell, 
suggests a sacrificial, ‘exclusionary strategy’, rather than a revelation of the scapegoat 
mechanism. Jesus is not obviously the opponent of cult and sacrifice; however, his teaching 
frequently undermines and relativizes relationships based on marriage and kinship. The 
priority of family and kin, are frequently subverted in favour of the Reign of God. Scubla 
asserts: 
 
It is because he was fighting the traditional forms of filial piety, and not because he was 
desacralizing the tomb of the surrogate victim, that Christ was able to give the impression 
of shaking the foundations of the social order when he opposed the cult of the dead and 
turned men away from their burying places.373  
 
 
368 Cf. Hans J. L. Jensen, ‘The Bible is (Also) a Myth: Lévi-Strauss, Girard and the Story of Joseph, Contagion, 14 
(2007) 39-57. 
369 Ibid. 
370 Girard, Things Hidden, p. 180. Girard’s anti-sacrificial rhetoric, especially evident in Things Hidden, is 
increasingly qualified in a number of his later writings.  
371 Cf. Frances M. Young, Sacrifice and the Death of Christ (London, S.P.C.K., 1975). 
372 Lucien Scubla, ‘The Christianity of René Girard and the Nature of Religion’ in Violence and Truth, p. 162. 
373 Ibid, p. 163. 
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Accepting Scubla’s assertion, it may be added (as James Alison has), that filial piety is itself an 
institution frequently associated with sacred violence. In John 8. 31-59, the pharisees insist 
on their descent from Abraham. For Alison, filial piety and the forms of belonging it 
engenders, may give sanction even to fratricide.374 That the teaching of Jesus was subversive 
of the most ‘natural’ of institutions does not invalidate the assertion that Jesus intended to 
expose the mechanism of sacred violence in all institutions, including the family. Kinship and 
patriarchal/familial bonds function within a range of hierarchies, exclusions and prohibitions 
and are thus sacrificial, according to Girard’s definition.375  
 
Following Girard, Schwager insists that in the Gospels the non-violent belonging which 
Jesus refers to as the ‘Kingdom of God’ is ultimately rejected, in favour of the existing social 
order, governed by exclusion and violence. For Girard and Schwager, initiation into the 
Kingdom of God coincides with the abandoning of all rivalrous desire. In the Sermon on the 
Mount (Matt. 5-7), Jesus compares mere impulses of anger and insults (‘fool’, ‘renegade’) to 
murder (Matt. 5. 21ff), and compares unchaste looks with ‘adultery in the heart’ (Matt. 5. 
27ff). One explanation of this peculiar moral equivalence is that, unacknowledged and 
uninterrupted, the mimetic pattern of desire accelerates from mere impulse to completed 
acts. The rules of the Kingdom of God are explicable in terms of a ‘mimetic conversion’ of 
desire. Lacking this conversion our moral existence is  continually subject to  the sacrificial 
logic of ‘an eye for an eye’ and a ‘tooth for a tooth’ (Matt. 5. 38-42) which represents the 
‘wisdom’ of the ‘entire ancient system of the sacred and revenge’ a wholly ‘negative 
symmetry’, which Jesus seeks to overcome by advocating ‘a gracious human goodness which 
mirrors a preceding divine mercy’.376    
 
In the Gospels, those who reject the Kingdom of God in favour of the sacrificial logic, 
inevitably seek Jesus’ death. Herbert McCabe understood the killing of Jesus as a rejection of 
 
374 Cf. James Alison, Faith Beyond Resentment: Fragments Catholic and Gay (New York: Crossroads Publishing 
Company, 2001) pp. 56-85. Alison argues that Jesus teaches his disciples (contrary to the customs of the 
pharisees) not to attribute anything sacred to our progenitors, either cultural or biological, as progenitors, 
which risks false forms of belonging and encourages rivalrous and fratricidal dynamics. Cf. Ibid, p. 75.  
375 Cf. Blenkinsopp, Theology of the Pentateuch. Sacrifice had a disjunctive (as well as a conjunctive role) in 
maintaining the (patrilineal) hierarchical structures in ancient Israel.  
376 Raymund Schwager, Jesus in the Drama of Salvation: Towards a Biblical Doctrine of Redemption. Trans. by 
James G. Williams and Paul Haddon (New York: Crossroads Publishing, 1999) p. 42. 
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the love that casts out fear, indeed, ‘the fear of love that casts out fear, the fear that without 
the backing of terror, at least in the last resort, human society and thus human life cannot 
exist’.377 This foundational fear, that social order depends on violence, not love, was 
expressed by Caiaphas in the Gospel account of the passion: ‘It is better for one man to die 
for the people, than for the whole nation to be destroyed’ (John 11. 49-50). Scubla denies 
Girard’s scapegoat hypothesis on the grounds that,  
 
if Christ came digging up the graves and exhuming the cadavers around which men have 
long since made peace […] He would be abruptly destroying the work of civilization, which 
has little by little replaced the earliest blood rites with more and more peaceable rituals 
and has slowly eroded human violence, to the point of making it appear more and more 
odious wherever it still retains a remnant of primitive vigour.378 
 
Here, Scubla demonstrates a remarkable confidence in moral progress, given that the 
twentieth century witnessed human violence surpassing in scale, if not in vigour, the historic 
accounts of archaic violence. Social institutions and ‘more peaceable rituals’ were relatively 
powerless to oppose the industrial scale exclusionary violence represented by the Holocaust 
and numerous other genocidal atrocities of recent history. Scubla suggests that, for Girard, 
the Gospel revelation ‘limits itself to stripping man of his ritual protections to yield him up 
naked to his own violence’.379 However, as Schwager argues above, the Kingdom of God is 
precisely an invitation to live without the ‘ritual protections’ of sacrificial economies. Without 
our attachment to ‘ritual protections’, our habitual justifications of ‘legitimate violence’ are 
radically shaken and our fantasies of innocence are undermined. 
 
 Scubla asserts that ‘the Christianity of Girard is not […] that of the Gospels’.380 Indeed, 
Girard’s account of Christianity has been described as ‘Gnostic’, i.e., that Girard represents 
the victory of the cross as mere ‘knowledge’ or ‘awareness’ of the victimage mechanism. 
Girard invariably treats the Christian faith exclusively in terms of a single dominant idea: 
scapegoating. If the truth – hidden since the foundation of the world – is fundamentally an 
idea about our human origins, in and through collective murder, then it is fair to say that, 
historically, this idea has remained largely unthought by a great many professed Christians. 
 
377 Herbert McCabe, God Matters: Contemporary Christian Insights (London: Mowbray, 2000) p. 97. 
378 Scubla, Violence and Truth, pp. 172-3. 
379 Ibid, p. 172.  
380 Ibid, p. 170. 
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The charge of Gnosticism has been routinely denied by Girardian scholars.381 Cowdell notes 
that, for Girard the revelation of God’s saving act takes place in history, both the human 
history of Jesus and the in the historical dissemination of the Gospels, and is therefore not a 
form of Gnosticism.382 Finamore points out that, for Girard, the revelation of the innocence 
of the surrogate victim is not so much an ‘acquisition’ of knowledge but a graced conversion. 
It is praxiological, not intellectual. He regards von Balthasar’s accusation of Gnosticism as little 
more than an attempt to classify Girard’s theory, in order to dismiss it.383 In an interview with 
Rebecca Adams, Girard appeared to accept that ‘it is knowledge that eventually saves us’, 
however he remarked that this knowledge ‘is very ambivalent in the way it works with 
people’.384 Taking his work as a whole, and increasingly in his mature work, it is misleading to 
characterize Girard’s work as Gnostic. Kaplan has noted that in Things Hidden Girard viewed 
Christian Doctrine from ‘as it were, above history’. However, he came to accept that there is 
no essential Christianity apart from historical Christianity and his Gnosticism was ‘gradually 
purged’.385 
 
The Christian tradition emphasizes the uniqueness of the death of Jesus. Christians 
have frequently interpreted this uniqueness in terms of a perverse and unbridled violence, 
tragically associated with the Jews.386 According to Girard the death of Jesus is not unique in 
terms of the violence suffered or the cruelty of the persecutors. It was, in fact, a typical 
scapegoating. Its uniqueness lies in the collapse of unanimity, caused by the resurrection 
event. The scapegoat victim is seen immediately to have been innocent and the anticipated 
mimetic consensus evaporates in the Apostolic witness to resurrection. The strategic alliances 
between Jewish authorities and political power (Luke 23. 11-12) achieved a violent mimetic 
consensus which led to the crucifixion and from which even the Apostles were unable to 
escape. The Resurrection represents not only the acquittal of Jesus of all charges laid against 
 
381 Kirwan describes the charge of ‘gnostic’ as ‘a profoundly unenlightening and contentious tag’, Girard and 
Theology, p. 140.  
382 Cf. Cowedll, Nonviolent God, p. 118. 
383 Cf. Finamore, God, Order and Chaos, p. 112. 
384 Cf. Girard and Adams, p. 26. 
385 Kaplan, Unlikely Apologist, p. 122. 
386 Burton Mack, speaks of the Christian gospel as ‘the lens through which Western culture has viewed the 
world’. Cf. Mack, p. 368. According to Mack, Mark’s Gospel is a ‘myth of innocence’, scapegoating the Jewish 
people producing the anomaly of anti-Semitic attitudes throughout the developing world, ‘wherever the 
gospel is read today’. p. 375.   
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him, but the acquittal of all those who believe in his resurrection (cf. Acts 10. 43), for to 
believe that Jesus is risen is to believe that the ‘necessary’ violence which led to his crucifixion 
has been exposed as a lie, therefore, faith in the resurrection is the definitive basis for our 
deliverance from the reign of violence. 
 
Against the Gospel witness that Jesus is an innocent victim, Girard points to the anti-
witness of the ‘Accuser’ or Satan. The Accuser, for Girard, is the scapegoat mechanism, not a 
‘being’ or personality in its own right. Referred to as the ‘Accuser’/ ‘Adversary’ throughout 
the Bible (3 Kings 11. 14, 23, 1 Kings 29. 4, Job 1. 6, 2 Corinthians 12. 7), the Accuser’s sudden 
appearance in the form of accusations, insinuations and violent consensus is the basis of the 
archaic sacred. Jesus identifies Satan as ‘a murderer from the beginning’ (John 8.  44). The 
‘Advocate’ (Paraclete, Comforter) which Jesus promises to send to the Apostles (John 14. 26), 
defends and pleads the cause of the innocent victim against the scapegoat mechanism, 
teaching and reminding the Apostles to do the same.387  
 
For Girard, the New Testament is distinct from myth (and its philosophical heritage) 
by virtue of a unique Logos. The Logos of John is distinct from the Logos of Heraclitus in as 
much as the Logos of John is expelled and not recognised. Girard agreed with Heidegger that 
the Johannine Logos is not the source of, nor is it derived from, the Greek/Heraclitan Logos. 
Being two different Logoi, one belongs in the world (ordered through violence) and the other 
does not. The Logos of John is the ‘excluded Logos […] the Logos which speaks about 
exclusion’.388 Girard explored the Apocalyptic literature of the Bible, particularly the 
apocalyptic references in the Gospels. The violence of the Gospel apocalyptic reveals not the 
wrath of God, but a world increasingly deprived of the protection of the sacred, and thus a 
world in ever greater danger from mimetic violence.389  
 
 
387 Cf. Girard, Evolution and Conversion, pp. 141-42. 
388 Cf. Girard, Paroles Gelées, pp. 12-13, and, Things Hidden, pp. 263-79. 
389 Matthew 12:26, Mark 3: 22-27, indicate for Girard the end of the sacred order, by which Satan ‘casts out 
Satan’, restoring his kingdom by generative violence. This kingdom is definitively undone and its fall is alluded 
to in the chaos imagery of the Apocalypse. Finamore, in God, Order and Chaos, offers a Girardian reading of 
the ‘chaos imagery’ in Revelation 20 and demonstrates the strength of mimetic theory as a hermeneutical lens 
for New Testament Apocalyptic.   
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Mimetic Theory and the Nonviolent God 
 
Desire as a Positive Theological Value 
 
Girard typically treats desire as problematic and has characterised desire in literature as 
oriented to conflict and death.390 This negative assessment of desire is also the basis for 
Girard’s work in cultural anthropology. Desire is midwife to culture, generating social order 
at the cost of the innocent victim. The conflictual character of mimetic desire is embedded in 
interpersonal relations and, through the ‘sacred’, in wider culture. Girardian scholars can be 
divided between those who emphasise the conflictual nature of desire (Hamerton-Kelly and 
Bailie) and those, like Schwager and Alison who have emphasised the positive role of mimetic 
desire.391  
 
Girard understands the doctrine of original sin in terms of the ‘bad use of mimesis’. 
Our (universal) involvement in the scapegoat mechanism is how the original sin is expressed, 
at the collective level.392 For Milbank, Girard’s alternative to a social order based on 
exclusionary violence is ‘a kind of self-abnegating denaturation, where all self-expressive 
attainments and erotic yearnings must be forgone’.393 Milbank argues that Girard himself was 
still trapped within the ‘pernicious “sacrificial” since he demands the renunciation of the 
mimetic/desiring (the subjective) for the sake of collective peace’.394 Milbank warns that what 
is to be renounced, for fear of provoking rivalry, may be an authentic part of oneself. 
Milbank’s Girard is a blend of positivist and Jansenist, advising the relinquishing of our 
authentic human goals and desires on the basis that they are representations and copies, 
derived through imitation and, therefore, not our own.  
 
 
390 Cf. Girard, Deceit, p. 290. 
391 Cf. P. Steinmair-Pösel, ‘Original Sin, Positive Mimesis’ in Palgrave, p. 188. The Colloquium on Violence & 
Religion (COV&R) was established to ‘explore, criticize, and develop the mimetic model of the relationship 
between violence and religion in the genesis and maintenance of culture’ (https://violenceandreligion.com) in 
line with Girard’s theory. Sensitive to the charge that mimetic theory ‘ontologizes violence’ COV&R has also 
explored ‘good’ or ‘positive’ mimesis, reflecting trends in Girard’s mature work. 
392 Cf. Girard, Evolution and Conversion, pp. 142-43. 
393 John Milbank, ‘Stories of Sacrifice’, p. 50. 
394 Ibid, p. 51. 
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Lytta Basset is likewise troubled by Girard’s attenuation of human desire and has attempted 
to secure within mimetic theory a space for authentic desire:  
 
It is clear that we become human by successive identifications with one human or another 
whom we wish to resemble. But it is also clear that we discover our unique personality as 
the desire to be ourselves grows and is affirmed. No one can dictate another person’s 
deepest desire: that hope to be realised that is held within and that has no model to 
follow.395 
 
Basett argues that the frustration of desire in childhood and the antagonistic, rather than the 
pacific mediation of desire, compels us to appropriate the desires of others through rivalrous 
strategies. The desires of others, either communicated antagonistically or anxiously 
appropriated, are easily mistaken for authentic desire. If human desire is purely imitation, 
Basett asks, on what part of ‘ourselves’ can we rely in order to resist the pull into violence? 
 
In Girard’s earlier work, a thoroughgoing critique of romanticism seems to occlude, 
for functional reasons, any desire which is not borrowed. If our mediated desires are 
unavoidably part of our sense of self, it would seem humans are fated to live in conflict. 
However, Girard’s working of mimetic desire is ambiguous. He insists, for example, that 
following Christ ‘means giving up mimetic desire’.396 In a later work Girard writes that mimetic 
desire is ‘intrinsically good’, and ‘if we were not to desire, we would not be open to what is 
human or what is divine’.397 These assertions contradict one another. Girard appears to say 
that following Christ means ceasing to be human. However, against the background of his 
work as a whole, these assertions represent for Girard a paradox: that mimetic desire is 
always both a positive condition of being human, and the key to understanding our perpetual 
patterns of fratricidal violence.  
 
Positive mimesis, the imitation of Jesus in his imitation of the Father (not the Father’s 
omnipotence, self-sufficiency and perfection) is kenotic, an imitation of God’s gratuity and 
openness to the Other.398 Girard understands the imitation of Christ to be a non-masochistic, 
self-effacement based on the teaching of Jesus in Matthew 25: ‘To imitate Christ is to identify 
 
395 Lytta Basset, Holy Anger, Jacob, Job, Jesus (London: Continuum, 2007) p. 187. 
396 Girard, Things Hidden, p. 431. 
397 Girard, I See Satan Fall, pp. 15-16. 
398 Cf. P. Steinmair-Pösel, Palgrave, p. 189. 
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with the other, to efface oneself before him: “Truly I tell you, just as you did it to one of the 
least of these who are members of my family, you did it to me”’.399 However, this self-
effacement is achieved through a graced conversion which is the simultaneous collapse of 
one’s (hitherto embraced) strategies of rivalrous desiring. The Christ who is imitated is not an 
external model, chosen from among other models. The true imitation of Christ is on the basis 
of what Girard calls an ‘innermost mediation’, whereby the desiring subject and Christ are not 
in conflict or competition: ‘It is no longer I who live but Christ lives in me’. (Galatians 2. 19-
20).   
 
Mimetic theory is not, therefore, a ‘denaturing’ of authentic desire. Our ‘self-
expressive attainments and erotic yearnings’ do not emerge from ‘pure nature’ and are not 
ends in themselves. Their mere existence does not exempt them from the Law of the Gospel, 
once it has been authentically proclaimed and freely received. Girard’s basic insight into the 
potentially violent trajectories of mimetic desire does not void desire as such. Girard 
understands Jesus to be inviting us towards his own desire, i.e., towards the goal of his life, a 
pacific imitation of the Father.400 The Gospel is directed not towards prohibitions, the sacred 
boundaries which contain violence; indeed, the New Testament is significant for collapsing 
sacred boundaries in terms of familial obligations, Sabbath ritual and dietary norms. The 
Christian innovation is to propose positive models of imitation, models who will inevitably 
scandalise some, but are ultimately indicating new non-rivalrous patterns of desiring. While 
these models will ‘protect them from mimetic rivalries rather than involving them in these 
rivalries’, like Jesus, the disciples too will be vulnerable to violence and will scandalise those 
whose desires remain trapped within the sacrificial economy.401  
 
In addressing the violent trajectories of mimetic desire and their social and political 
consequences, Girard draws attention to the shadow of desire, without renouncing desire 
as corrupt. Girard’s mature work is open to (but does not sufficiently develop) a positive, 
 
399 Girard, Battling to the End, p. 133. 
400 Cf. Schwager, Scapegoats. ‘If Jesus goal had been a limited good of the senses, unconditional discipleship 
would necessarily lead to rivalries. But since he renounced immediate desire he motivated his disciples to 
similar deeds’. p. 177. 
401 Basset, Holy Anger, pp. 201-02. Cf. 1 Cor 10. 31 – 11. 1. Paul exhorts the Corinthians not to give offense 
(cause scandal) to Jew or Greek, not to seek their own advantage, and to imitate him, as he imitates Christ. 
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theological account of mimesis. Attending to the eschatological dimension of desire saves 
Girard’s theory from being reduced entirely to its present ‘collective and political form’, or 
lack thereof. In Saint Anselm’s Proslogion the transformation of desire is anticipated 
eschatologically. The blessed in heaven find their desires are fulfilled and satisfied beyond 
all their hopes. Further, in the community of the blessed there is desire without rivalry, for 
all desires are communicated pacifically. Having enumerated the many forms of desire 
fulfilled in his eschatological vision, Saint Anselm concludes: 
 
Where there is such joy and so great a good, how rich and great must be the joy! If man 
abounded in all these things, how great would be the joy of his heart, well-versed in, 
indeed overwhelmed by, suffering. Question within yourself, could you hold the joy of 
so great a bliss? But surely if another whom you loved in every way as yourself, had that 
same bliss, your joy would be double, for you would rejoice no less for him than for 
yourself. And if two or three or more had this same blessedness, you would rejoice for 
each of them as much as you do for yourself, if you loved each one as yourself. So in that 
perfection of charity of countless blessed angels and men, where no one loves another 
less than he loves himself, they will all rejoice for each other as they do for 
themselves.402 
 
In this eschatological vision the rivalrous desires which tend towards conflict are 
transformed into pacific and shared desires, desires which increase in as much as they are 
shared. Anselm continues: ‘In so far as each one loves another, so he will rejoice in the 
other’s good; and as in that perfection of happiness, each one will love God incomparably 
more than he loves either himself or others, so he will rejoice more and without regard in 
the happiness of God than in that of himself and of everyone else’.403 This eschatological 
vision is the obverse side of mimetic desire in its conflictual and competitive manifestations; 
it is the fulfilment of the ‘good mimesis’ which Jesus invites us to undertake. 
Notwithstanding Anselm’s remarkably irenic eschatological vision of desire, he is an unlikely 
theological interlocutor for Girard. Anselm is regarded as the ‘fountainhead of 
substitutionary atonement theology’.404  Mark Heim critiques Anselm’s atonement theory 
on the basis of Girard’s work, giving due recognition to the frequently overlooked ‘anti-
sacrificial’ elements of Anselm’s argument.405 Girard rejects Anselm’s atonement theory in 
 
402 The Prayers and Meditations of Saint Anselm with the Proslogion, (736-50) trans by Sr. Benedicta Ward, SLG 
(London: Penguin Books, 1973), p. 265. 
403 Ibid, (750-55).  
404 Cf. Heim, p. 214. 
405 Ibid, pp. 297-302. 
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favour of the Christus Victor theory of redemption.406 Mimetic theory, then, attends 
primarily to the conflictual realities of desire as it bears upon human relationships and  
wider social order. However, it does not deny the completely pacific goal of desire, as an 
eschatological desideratum. Indeed, for Wolfgang Palaver, ‘[t]he vertical and eschatological 
dimension is essential for achieving reconciliation and can inspire historical shifts’, towards 
an alternative, forgiving, non-rivalrous culture.407  
 
Non-Violent Reciprocity and Political Strategies  
 
If, as Girard concludes, mimetic desire cannot be abandoned it is reasonable to enquire 
whether Girard’s theory can produce a positive political expression. Critics have noted the 
lack of any social and political form in mimetic theory. In the following section I will explore 
the limits of a political expression of mimetic theory. I will argue that any social and political 
form of mimetic theory remains wedded to a personal mimetic conversion (gaining the 
‘intelligence of the victim’) and is, thereafter, sustained within discreet communities 
embodying this ‘conversion intelligence’, modelling reciprocal and non-rivalrous desire.  
 
Girard insists that imitation is inescapable and the law of reciprocity makes conflicts 
practically inevitable. The Kingdom of God cannot simply be established as an alternative 
political reality in a world vulnerable to conflictual mimesis. The rules of the Kingdom of God 
are therefore fundamentally pre-emptive. In Matthew 5. 40-42, Jesus teaches, ‘if a man takes 
you to law and would have your tunic, let him have your cloak as well. And if anyone orders 
you to go one mile, go two miles with him’. For Girard, such excessive demands indicate that 
a dynamic of negative reciprocity is already underway. Girard advises, ‘if you want to put an 
end to mimetic rivalry, you give way completely to your rival’.408 Girard does not see this 
submission as a political strategy: ‘If someone is making excessive demands on you, he’s 
already involved in mimetic rivalry, he expects you to participate in the escalation’.409 The 
only way to deescalate is to meet the excessive demand twice over (‘if someone asks you for 
 
406 Girard, Things Hidden, pp. 191-215. 
407 Cf. Wolfgang Palaver, ‘René Girard and Charles Taylor: Complementary Engagements with the Crisis of 
Modernity’ in Palgrave, 335-42 (p. 338). 
408 Girard, When These Things Begin, p. 47. 
409 Ibid. 
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your shirt give him your outer garment (himation) as well’). Indeed, Wolfgang Palaver has 
observed that, while we can identify institutions which originate in and function by 
scapegoating (xenophobia and warfare), ‘all forms of interpersonal violence and hostility 
begin in the most elementary human relationships. The way out of violence and enmity must 
be found on these rudimentary levels’.410  
 
Walter Wink, drawing on Girard, has argued that Jesus proposed a ‘Third Way’, 
between passive acceptance of injustice and violent resistance.411 However, Wink’s assertion 
that Jesus offers strategies to publicly humiliate the aggressor by overcompliance with an 
already unjust demand is at odds with Girard. Wink represents these strategies as the only 
available means by which the vulnerable can be vindicated and the aggressors given the 
possibility (through their public humiliation) to repent. However, humiliating the aggressor 
(even to bring about metanoia) reduces the Gospel message to political strategy and inducts 
the victim into the victimizing role. Terry Eagleton, similarly mistakes Girard’s reading of the 
Gospel counsel as ‘a negative version of potlatch, in which one outshines one’s rival not by 
squandering more goods than he does, but by yielding to him with fine insouciance more than 
he asks for’.412 However, Girard interprets the Gospels counsel not as a strategy from within 
the sacrificial system, a rivalry between victim and aggressor. The dynamics of conflict, 
dominated by mimesis, can only be exited on the basis of replacing negative mimesis with 
positive, non-rivalrous mimesis.  
 
John Barclay is closer to Girard’s understanding of the fundamental nonviolence of the 
Gospels when he denies that the Gospel counsel has any agenda in terms of ‘humiliating’, 
‘shaming’ or ‘outdoing’ the aggressor. The excessive demands and the negative reciprocity 
which they effect can only be undone by creating a new reciprocity based on a 
superabundant, positive reciprocity. The risk that such a gratuitous gesture will be denied 
indicates that it is truly a gift. It is offered as gift not on the basis of narrow self-interest, (to 
shame or outdo the Other) but with a view to creating a new (mutually beneficial) 
 
410 Wolfgang Palaver, René Girard’s Mimetic Theory, trans. by Gabriel Borrud (East Lansing, Michigan, Michigan 
State University Press, 2014) p. 295. 
411 Cf. Walter Wink, Jesus and Nonviolence: A Third Way (Minneapolis: Fortress Press, 2003). 
412 Eagleton, p. 104. Potlatch refers to the disposal or destruction of wealth especially among the First Nations 
of the North American western seaboard. It may be characterized as an antagonistic form of gift-giving.  
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relationship, characterised by positive reciprocity.413 The reciprocity of gift in this instance 
exceeds all notions of the ‘worth’, behaviour or attitude of the recipient. The logic of the 
Gospel is to conceive a new, ‘shared and mutual belonging’.414 The ‘aggressor’ is treated not 
as aggressor, but is already reimagined as ally or friend in a new reconciled relationship. Good 
reciprocity tends towards spontaneity and lacks the element of obligation (master/slave 
dynamic) which tries to annihilate reciprocity altogether.415  
 
Feminist theologians frequently concur with (early) Girard that Jesus ends each and 
every sacrifice because in him it has become evident that ‘the semantics of sacrifice 
misrepresent the relationship between God and humanity’.416 However, mimetic theory has 
been criticized by a variety of feminist and liberationist theologians for a reading of biblical 
and other texts which emphasize the mimetic dynamic, rather than the justice/injustice of 
the opposing sides. In this respect, Girard has been criticized for excluding all but his own 
conceptual concerns to offer a (theoretically) disinterested perspective.417 Liberationist and 
feminist theologians who have appropriated his critique of sacrificial structures have 
fundamentally disagreed with his contention that social and political movements identified 
with the ‘victim’ are utopian and trapped within the mimetic contest of doubles.418 This is a 
pertinent criticism since, as Asle Eikrem notes, if finitude means that ‘we are at all times both 
victims and victimizers, we lose a morally significant distinction. We are robbed of conceptual 
means to critique and to conceive of various forms of violence as solvable social problems.’419 
In other words, Girard’s theory represents a largely fatalistic and disturbing description of our 
 
413 John Barclay, ‘Beyond Charity: Gift Reciprocity and Community Construction in the New Testament’, The 
Firth Lectures (2018) unpublished, pp. 11-12. 
414 Ibid, p. 12. 
415 Cf. Girard, Evolution and Conversion, pp. 180-81. 
416 Cf. Asle Eikrem, God as Sacrificial Love: A Systematic Exploration of a Controversial Notion (London: 
Bloomsbury, 2018) p. 56. 
417 Girard’s reticence to outline a political theory, one which ‘takes sides’, has led to the suspicion that Girard 
was merely affecting an elevated and disinterested bearing with respect to political realities. Eagleton sees in 
Girard ‘a patrician disdain for the “mob”’. Eagleton, p. 56. The issue may be, as Bartlett suggests, Girard’s 
methodology; his ‘openly sweeping, sweepingly open critique of violence’ which rarely pauses to investigate 
questions (e.g., the ethics of war) systematically. Cf. Andrew Bartlett, ‘Girard and the Question of Pacifism’ in 
Anthropoetics: The Journal of Generative Anthropology, 2, spring 2016, 
http://anthropoetics.ucla.edu/ap2102/2102bartlett Cf. Bartlett, p. 2.  
418 Girard, Things Hidden, p. 287. 
419 Cf. Eikrem, p. 255. 
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inability to transcend the violent consequence of mediated desire. On this basis Girard’s only 
strategy is to withdraw from mimetic escalation, bracketing questions of right and wrong.  
 
It is the lack of historical and political specificity which Eagleton criticises in Girard.420 
Girard has commented that mimetic theory succeeds not merely when one realises that he 
or she has been a victim/scapegoat, but more crucially that he or she has also been part of a 
group that has turned against a victim. For such a realisation grace is necessary.421 A social 
and political expression of mimetic theory seems to require even the victims in a given conflict 
to assume some notional share in the collective violence they suffer. If, as Girard asserts, the 
social order is a result of the scapegoat mechanism then our attempt to confront the social 
Other as Other is misguided. It sets in motion the negative reciprocity which leads inevitably 
to more violence. Since the misuse of mimetic desire is the original sin, we all participate in a 
social order which has come into being by murder and exclusion.422 The ‘aggressors’, under 
this aspect, are themselves victims of the mechanism and do not know what they are doing 
(Cf. Luke 23. 34). Roberto Farneti has suggested that ‘[a] Girardian perspective on conflict 
resolution must therefore concern itself with making rivals reflectively aware of their mimetic 
plight’.423 
 
If mimetic theory deprives us of the conceptual means to critique and distinguish 
forms of violence, as Eikrem suggests, can it have any positive political role? In the succeeding 
chapters I will suggest that the early Franciscan concept of fraternitas as a shared ethical 
space wherein ordinary differences and rivalries are held in tension qualifies as a (premodern) 
political expression of positive mimesis. The condition for occupying this shared space was 
penance, understood as a commitment to acknowledging one’s own rivalrous desire and a 
willingness to learn new pattens of non-rivalrous desire within the community. In conceiving 
violence as a ‘solvable social problem’, without having first acquired the ‘intelligence of the 
victim’ (and attempted some social reality wherein this intelligence can be normative) we 
may unwittingly become the workers of further violence. In other words, the conditions under 
 
420 Eagleton, Radical Sacrifice, pp. 55-56.  
421 Cf. Ann W. Astell, COV&R, May 2015, p. 4, 
https://www.pdcnet.org/covrb/content/covrb_2015_0046_0004_0005  
422 Girard, Evolution and Conversion, pp. 142-43. 
423 Cf. Bartlett, p. 2. 
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which the political form of mimetic theory may function are inescapably tied to a graced 
collapse of rivalrous patterns of desire and a non-confrontational withdrawal from existing 
social realities maintained by exclusionary violence.    
 
In political terms, the primary function of mimetic theory is to identify the scapegoat 
and pleads his or her innocence. In so doing, mimetic theory helps to expose the endlessly 
adaptive mechanism by which social order is created and maintained and to insist that this 
order is not of God. One of Girard’s main contributions to theology is ‘to rid us of the illusion 
that there can be a legitimate, safe violence, the violence of just retribution’.424 Theologies in 
which God is implicated in violence (and in which violence is justified, legitimized or 
‘theologized’) are properly interrogated by mimetic theory. Since we habitually tell ourselves 
that ‘our violence is only reactive, protective, educative, undertaken in self-defence or just 
retaliation’,425 we invariably mistake God for the alien space (the sacred) into which we cast 
our unacknowledged violence.  
 




Girard’s commitment to a scientifically advanced anthropology gradually ‘crystalized’ into a 
theory inexplicable and insufficient outside of properly theological categories. Kevin 
Mongrain observes that even a cursory reading of Girard’s work indicates that he was 
pursuing something like a theological agenda. Furthermore, Mongrain asserts that Girard’s 
anthropology is not anthropocentric but fundamentally theocentric and Christocentric, which 
‘puts it squarely in the family of Christian theology’.426 Girard’s fundamental anthropology 
becomes, in Mongrain’s opinion, the ‘handmaiden’ to a ‘theocentric-christocentric 
perspective on salvation history’.427 In this respect, his anthropological doctrine has been 
‘tailored to better serve the biblical narrative’s panoramic vision of salvation history’.428 
 
424 Loughlin, The Postmodern God, p. 102. 
425 Cf. Ibid.  
426 Mongrain, Modern Theology, p. 82. 
427 Ibid, p. 83. 
428 Ibid. 
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Raymund Schwager observed the theological contours in Girard’s writings in the mid 1970s 
and initiated a decades long correspondence which helped Girard to recast mimetic theory 
as a more theologically robust hypothesis. Schwager, a theologically trained and sympathetic 
(though not uncritical) interlocutor, encouraged Girard to rethink core insights of mimetic 
theory, to accommodate the biblical and doctrinal tradition of Christianity. Whereas Girard 
initially understood the cross to be a source of knowledge about sacrificial systems, Schwager 
was concerned that the Cross be understood as a source of life, not simply a source of 
knowledge.429 Schwager came to appreciate Girard’s perspective in presenting the Gospel 
and the Cross in (anthropological/epistemological) terms accessible to the nonreligious 
reader. Girard was sensitive to the nonbeliever’s perspective, shaped by an Enlightenment 
bias against religion and to the assumption that faith cannot yield any form of real knowledge.  
 
Schwager was initially concerned that in Girard mimetic desire leads – almost mechanically – 
to violence, undermining human freedom and ontologizing violence. To overcome this 
problem Schwager (and Girard) were to locate the ‘Fall’ ‘in between the era of animal 
mimesis, from which humans emerged, and the hell of mimetic entrapment into which free 
but idolatrous choice led subsequent humanity’.430 The effects of conflictual mimesis so 
quickly overtook our hominid ancestors that the ‘primal zone of genuine freedom became 
lost in phenomenological obscurity’.431 Schwager, who shared Girard’s understanding of 
archaic sacrifice, convinced Girard that his earlier repudiation of the Epistle to the Hebrews 
was incorrect and that the sacrificial language in the Epistle was not a lapse into sacrificial 
thinking. In cultures saturated with sacrificial thinking the attempt to present a human death 




429 Schwager notes the symbolic meaning attributed in the Gospels to Jesus’ ministry of healing and exorcism. 
These are an essential component of the proclamation of the Reign of God, indicating a complete liberation 
from evil. Cf. Scapegoats, pp. 166-69. 
430 Cowdell, Nonviolent God, pp. 100-1.  
431 Ibid, p. 100. In 1983 Schwager informed Han Urs von Balthasar that his (shared) concerns about human 
freedom in mimetic theory were now resolved. Ibid. 
432 Cf. Finamore, p. 151. Finamore, following Schwager notes that debates on the nature and role of sacrificial 
language in the New Testament are based on prior decisions about the nature and purpose of sacrifice. In 
Girard’s hypothesis Christ’s death is, on one level a ‘failed sacrifice’. It is also a new kind of sacrifice. Cf. Ibid, p. 
160. 
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Schwager recognised in mimetic theory a range of insights companionable to theo-
dramatic categories. Girard’s insights aided Schwager’s project of reconciling such 
contradictory assertions as Divine Love and Divine Wrath.433 Schwager’s theo-dramatic work 
attempts to bring the history of Jesus and the Church’s doctrinal faith into a synthesis in five 
‘acts’. Theo-drama attempts to do justice to concrete history (like narrative theology). At the 
same time, theo-drama creates the possibility to pursue a genuine line of reasoning, 
something which Schwager judged problematic for narrative theology.434 The theo-drama 
unfolds through an invitation to participate in the Reign of God, an invitation which is 
historically rejected. The manifestation (and consequence) of the rejection is the Cross. In Act 
Four, the Resurrection is the judgement of God, experienced as forgiveness and peace (no 
longer is the scapegoat associated with the ‘poison’ of the community, only its healing). The 
Fifth Act brings dramatic ‘closure’ in the coming of the Holy Spirit and the beginning of a new 
community.    
 
Schwager links Girard’s work to one of the twentieth century’s most prominent 
Catholic theologians, Hans Urs von Balthasar, Schwager having drawn Balthasar’s attention 
to Girard’s work. Balthasar asserts the importance of mimetic theory for theology, especially 
soteriology, and in volume three of his Theodramatik (Vol 4 in English translation),435 he states 
that ‘Girard’s is surely the most dramatic project to be undertaken today in the field of 
soteriology and in theology generally’.436 Mongrain notes that Balthasar’s critique of Girard is 
‘constructive’, ‘irenic’ and provisional, since it evaluates Girard on Things Hidden, before 
Girard’s worked crystalized into a more coherent theological form.437 Mongrain and others 
 
433 The theo-dramatic category suggests the influence of Balthasar on Schwager’s theology. Schwager’s earliest 
use of theo-dramatic categories was in his 1970 dissertation on Ignatius of Loyola’s ‘dramatic’ view of the 
Church. For Schwager drama involves an encounter of persons with aspects of ‘development, conflicts, 
tension, crisis, defeat, and eventual reconciliation’. Although influenced by Balthasar, Schwager’s theo-
dramatic work ‘has a distinctly different outlook’. Cf. Nikalous Wandinger, ‘Raymund Schwager: Dramatic 
Theology’, in Palgrave, pp. 217-24. The dramatic categories integrate genuine episodic experience (setbacks, 
advances, conflicts, trivial moments, etc.) within an overarching theme. The Dramatic includes closure, like 
theory, but attends to the realism of lived experience. Cf. Cowdell, Nonviolent God, pp. 125-29. 
434 R. Schwager, Jesus in the Drama of Salvation: Towards a Biblical Doctrine of Salvation, trans. by James G. 
Williams and Paul Haddon (New York: Crossroad Publishing Co. 1999). ‘The theological line of reasoning can be 
developed out of drama, since drama does not advance without end in epic manner, but expresses itself in 
conflict and its corresponding resolution’. p. 12. 
435 Hans Urs von Balthasar, Theo-Drama: Theological Dramatic Theory, Volume IV (San Francisco: Ignatius Press 
1994). 
436 Ibid, p. 299. 
437 Mongrain, Modern Theology, p. 87. 
 105 
emphasize the points of compatibility between the two thinkers. However, it may be stressed 
that when Girard meets violence and divine wrath in the scriptures, he assumes it is the 
vestige of the ‘archaic sacred’, projected onto God.  Balthasar, on the other hand, is 
committed to attributing violence to God and in a lengthy passage he lists the references in 
both the Old Testament and the Gospels which indicate God’s ‘anger’.438 Balthasar concludes, 
‘contrary to the unconsidered utterances of modern theologians, we must maintain that 
“anger” is an essential and ineradicable feature […] even in the New Testament picture of 
God’.439 While Girard’s contribution to Christian theology has been frequently critiqued, his 
work is a coherent and persuasive critique of influential theologies (such as Balthasar’s) which 
risk sacralising human violence by projecting it onto God.  
 
Girard and the Theory of Sacrifice 
 
Theories of Gift and Sacrifice 
 
Since Violence and the Sacred, Girard’s project has been engaged with the question of 
sacrifice.440 Prominent among Girard’s antecedents in the theory of sacrifice are Henri Hubert 
and Marcel Mauss, who while abandoning the search for the origins of sacrifice nonetheless 
proposed a unified or essential structure (a single ‘mechanism’) within sacrifice.441 In an 
important essay on the concept of gift, Mauss explored how the reciprocal nature of gift-
giving was embedded in all ancient societies and functioned as a ‘total system’.442 Mauss’s 
essay explored how the reciprocity of gift-exchange created essential social cohesion in 
ancient societies where effective protection from violence, the provision of health care, 
education, etc., were minimal. To understand the concept of the gift in ancient societies, 
Mauss argued for the ‘scrambling of contemporary polarities between exchange that is “free” 
or “obliged”, “pure” or “interested”’.443  
 
438 Balthasar, Theo-Drama Vol IV, pp. 338-58. 
439 Ibid, p. 340. 
440 Cf. Keenan, The Question of Sacrifice. Keenan’s genealogy of theories of sacrifice (pp. 10-32) indicates 
Girard’s precursors in theories of sacrifice, as well as his influence on contemporary theories.   
441 Henri Hubert and Marcel Mauss, Sacrifice: Its Nature and Function, Trans. W. D. Halls (Chicago: University of 
Chicago, 1964) p. 47. 
442 Cf. Marcel Mauss, The Gift, Trans. W. D. Halls (London: Routledge, 1990).   
443 Cf. John M. G. Barclay, Paul and the Gift (Grand Rapids, Michigan: William B. Eerdmans Publishing 2015), 
pp. 11-65. Barclay, following Mauss, insists on the essential reciprocity of gift-giving in ancient societies and 
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Mauss’s ‘total system’ of gift-reciprocity drew Girard’s attention to antagonistic gift-
giving, such as potlatch.444 Mauss correctly notes that potlatch was a form of power, 
compelling from the recipient a reciprocal gift of equal or greater value. Girard considered 
potlatch a ‘ritualized form of mimetic rivalry on the social scale’.445 In Girard’s view what is 
important is not the gift offered but the humiliation intended for the rival tribe and, typically 
in the case of advanced mimetic rivalry, that the gift or desired object is destroyed in the 
process. Mauss noted that in German the word ‘gift’ can mean ‘poison’. Girard understood 
gift-giving to be derived from sacrifice and suggests that originally all gifts were those 
desirable objects which tended to provoke mimetic rivalries within ancient societies. What 
was a poison to oneself was properly a valued gift to another. The gift, poisoned to begin 
with, became harmless once transferred outside the immediate group.446  
 
Barclay notes, that in the Greco-Roman context, the reciprocity inherent in gift-giving 
(a reciprocity which embraces such seemingly opposed concepts as ‘voluntary’ and ‘obliged’, 
‘disinterested’ and ‘interested’, ‘generous’ and ‘constrained’), is recognized above all in 
sacrifice.447 Sacrifices may be understood as return-gifts for favours received or as 
inducements, and are embedded in a reciprocal cycle of gift-giving. Whereas Mauss proposed 
a ‘total system’ based on gift-giving Girard identifies mimetic violence as prior to universal 
systems of exchange. The gift – like the ‘sacred’ – is fundamentally ambiguous since 
reciprocity may be positive and generative or negative and destructive. Girard’s theory of 
sacrifice incorporates the reality of negative reciprocity, and in doing so ensures an essential 
distinction between archaic sacrifice and a sacrifice which does not tend towards violence.448  
 
Sacrifice as a Theological Category  
 
 
disassociates modern ideas of a ‘pure’ or ‘free’ gift (such as Derrida’s) from the original (and the biblical) 
concept of gift. A gift without return is a ‘historically and culturally specific western invention’. p. 64. 
444 Cf. Barclay, p. 13. 
445 Girard, Evolution and Conversion, p. 180. 
446 Cf. Girard, Scandal Comes, p. 13. 
447 Cf. Barclay, Paul, p. 27. 
448 Keenan explores the possibility of escaping sacrifice entirely. He warns against naïve attempts to abandon 
the sacrificial. Keenan writes of interrupting the sacrificial tradition, rather than repeating it, in some new 
form.  
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Chronologically, Girard’s interest in sacrifice began with research into archaic religion and 
sacrificial ritual, understood as an effort to ‘revive the conciliatory effects of unanimous 
violence by substituting an alternative victim for the original scapegoat’.449 It is this definition 
of sacrifice he found consistently subverted and undone in the Hebrew and Christian 
scriptures. Citing the biblical story of the judgement of Solomon (1 Kings 3. 16-28) Girard 
could say that his thinking about sacrifice had ‘been nourished from the beginning by this 
inexhaustible text’.450 For Girard, the story of the judgement of Solomon demonstrates the 
true pattern of a ‘Christian’ sacrifice, namely a sacrifice that is ‘not directed toward suffering 
and death, not subordinated to a form of subjectivity, that is both mimetic and solipsistic […] 
and instead is directed towards her neighbour and toward life’.451 Archaic sacrificial discourse 
inevitably tends towards death as the means of securing life and social order, whereas in the 
account of the judgement of Solomon, the sacrifice of the ‘good harlot’ can only be described 
as tending towards life.452 Indeed, in yielding to her rival the true mother disrupts the mimetic 
cycle of reciprocal and accelerating claim which is tending always towards violence and it is 
she, not Solomon, who is the Christ figure in this narrative.   
 
Initially Girard refused to consider Christ’s death as sacrifice, since it represents for 
Girard the failure of the scapegoat mechanism to produce social order through violence. He 
later came to accept that Christ’s death could be described as a sacrifice, in the manner in 
which the ‘good harlot’ was willing to sacrifice her interests and even her life for the life of 
her child. For Girard, to insist that both ritual sacrifice based on scapegoating violence and a 
non-violent, voluntary, self-renunciation are both species of sacrifice, ‘as misleading as it may 
be on one level, nevertheless suggests something essential, namely, the paradoxical unity of 
religion in all its forms throughout history’.453 Girard asserts that mimetic theory in fact 
bridged the two understandings of sacrifice in such a manner that the same word could be 
applied to two terms which occupy either end of the religious-cultural spectrum as it relates 
to human violence and conflict. Sacrifice, deconstructed by means of mimetic theory returns 
as the possibility of a real choice not based on scapegoating violence. 
 
449 Girard, Scandal Comes, p. 41. 
450 Ibid. (My italics). 
451 Girard, Things Hidden, p. 241. 
452 Ibid. 
453 Girard, Scandal Comes, p. 43. 
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Theological Critiques of Girard’s Theory of Sacrifice 
 
Several theologians have critiqued Girard’s theory of sacrifice, specifically, his early ‘anti-
sacrificial’ formulations, which sought to make an absolute distinction between all historical 
examples of ritual sacrifice and ‘Christian’ sacrifice. Bruce Chilton, for example, argues that 
having linked victimhood to sacrifice from the beginning, Girard is obliged to see sacrifice 
always as violence and an expression of mimetic conflict.454 Chilton, who takes a more 
positive view of sacrifice, accuses Girard of scapegoating sacrifice in the ancient world as a 
response to the violence he discovers in the modern world.455 Biblical scholars, such as 
Frances Young, have noted that sacrifice in the New Testament refers to a variety of religious 
actions and attitudes and cannot, therefore, be reduced to Girard’s violent, ‘archaic 
sacrifice’.456 Young has further noted that in the Hebrew scriptures one finds ‘several different 
levels of understanding [of sacrifice] not necessarily compatible, yet operative at the same 
time’.457 The Hebrew scriptures ‘universally regarded [sacrifice] as the only way of 
maintaining a relationship with the divine’, however, this did not imply the relationship was 
maintained exclusively through a violent ritual.458 The early Christian Church (and the authors 
of the New Testament) inherited not only the Jewish scriptures; they also inherited Jewish 
ideas about sacrifice, and this conceptual plurality is evident in the New Testament. When 
Girard states ‘The Gospels only speak of sacrifices in order to reject them and deny them any 
validity’, his rhetoric needs to be tempered with the evidence of Young and other biblical 
scholars.459 However, it must be added, this rhetoric is more common in Girard’s early work 
and his later work on sacrifice demonstrates more nuance and less rhetoric.460  
 
 
454 Bruce Chilton, The Temple of Jesus: His Sacrificial Program within a Cultural History of Sacrifice 
(Pennsylvania: The Pennsylvanian State University Press, 1992), p. 25. Chilton accuses Girard of ‘ideological 
propaganda’ by effectively dividing the modern and ancient worlds into two distinct regions, ibid. 
455 Cf. Ibid. 
456 Cf. Frances Young, Sacrifice and the Death of Christ (London: SPCK, 1975) 
457 Frances Young, ‘New Wine in Old Wineskins: XIV. Sacrifice’ in Expository Times, 86, 10 (1975) 305-09. 
(p.308). 
458 Ibid. p. 309. ‘Sacrifice was not understood as a single type of act with a single meaning’. Ibid, p. 306. 
459 Cf. Girard, Things Hidden, p. 180. Cf. Margaret Barker, The Great High Priest: The Temple Roots of Christian 
Liturgy (London: T&T Clark, 2003). Chilton and Margaret Barker have argued that Jesus as High Priest was a 
fundamental aspect of early Christian self-understanding. 
460 Cf. Girard, Evolution and Conversion, pp. 156-57. 
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John Milbank’s Critique of Girard’s Theory of Sacrifice  
 
In his article ‘Stories of Sacrifice’, John Milbank specifically targets Girard’s theory of sacrifice, 
revisiting his previously stated philosophical and theological critique of Girard’s project in 
Theology and Social Theory. Milbank has questioned whether Girard is correct to ‘go behind 
the seeming contingency of violence, its origins in the subjective will, in favour of a thesis 
about its inter-subjective inevitability?’461 Milbank argues that Girard falls into the same trap 
as the atheist social scientists of the nineteenth century, i.e., proposing an original act of 
murder ‘which has both to be commuted and concealed through ascription to a divine 
authority. For this concealment the gods were born’.462 Milbank surveys four theorists who, 
for different reasons, attempted to find the ‘essence’ of sacrifice, creating any number of 
‘diverting and plausible narratives, none of them convincing’.463 Milbank’s four theorists are 
the German biblical scholar, Julius Wellhausen (1844-1918), Scottish professor of Divinity, 
William Robertson Smith (1846-1894), social anthropologist and folklorist, James Frazer 
(1854-1941) and French sociologists Henri Hubert (1872-1927) and Marcel Mauss (1872-
1950).  
 
Each undertook the ‘quest for sacrifice’ under different influences, Milbank noting 
Wellhausen’s debt to romanticism and the influence of both Charles Darwin and Auguste 
Comte on Robertson Smith. In Robertson Smith’s quest, the institution of sacrifice is 
presented as a natural, evolutionary progress towards Christianity, indeed, he offers a social-
scientific apologetic for Christianity. However, Milbank notes, ‘by a slight twist’ James Frazer 
created a similar narrative amounting to ‘a scarcely veiled exposure of Christian doctrine as 
primitive superstition’.464 It is this ‘slight twist’ which indicates for Milbank the perilous nature 
of the modern ‘quest for sacrifice’. Milbank observes that the gap between atheist 
metanarrative and Christian apologetics is negligible in these stories: both mistakenly confuse 
‘evolutionism (any account of necessitated history) with typology, or the idea that the Cross 
and eucharist both end and fulfil all sacrifice.’465 Milbank does not deny that the Cross and 
 
461 Milbank, ‘Stories of Sacrifice’, p. 42. 
462 Ibid, p. 28. 
463 Ibid, p. 29. 
464 Ibid, p. 35. 
465 Ibid, pp. 40-1. 
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Eucharist both end and fulfil all sacrifice, rather he challenges the attempt to demonstrate 
this assertion in a social-scientific theory.  
 
Having rehearsed the misguided attempts of these theorists to ‘frame’ sacrifice, 
Milbank attempts to prove Girard’s guilt by association. In this effort Milbank’s critique of 
Girard’s theory of sacrifice is chiefly ethnographical.466 The anthropologist Luc de Heusch, a 
noted critic of Girard’s anthropological pretensions is one of Milbank’s chief authorities in this 
critique.467 By Girard’s own admission, his work was influenced by Robertson Smith and 
Frazer. Milbank detects in Girard the baleful influence of 19th century rationalism and, thus, 
while acquitting Girard of ‘any lingering devotion to totemism’, Milbank ‘can still identify in 
[Girard’s] thought thematics akin to those of nineteenth-century positivism’.468 Milbank even 
suggests that, for all his efforts to escape it, Girard is ‘still locked within a pernicious 
“sacrificial” since he demands the renunciation of the mimetic/desiring (the subjective) for 
the sake of collective peace’. 469  
 
Milbank suspects that Girard (and his disciples) represent for religion a temptation 
which should be resisted, i.e., to offer to science the right to explain so as to receive from 
science a proof or demonstration which is arranged around a Christological framework. Such 
a demonstration, Milbank insists, is no more than a cultural bias, ‘whereas one should be 
content with the bias of faith’. 470 Milbank takes seriously Girard’s theory of mimetic desire, 
but while he allows that imitative desire is at work when we desire the object desired by our 
model/rival, is it not also at work when the model simply appears more successful at obtaining 
the desired object? In other words, mimetic desire is also at work when one attempts to 
emulate the other, not from a supposed lack of being, but simply because she is more 
successful in achieving her desires.471  Milbank also raises the question of infinite regression: 
where did the first desire come from? 
 
466 Ibid, p. 46. 
467 Cf. de Heusch. De Heusch critiques Girard’s association of sacrifice with the origins of monarchy. De Heusch 
suggests that Girard ‘somewhat misuses anthropology’ and charges him with ‘ethnocentrism’ and ‘a type of 
neo-Christian, somewhat heretical theology’. pp. 16-17. 
468 Milbank, ‘Stories of Sacrifice’, p. 50. 
469 Ibid, p. 51. 
470 Ibid. 
471 Ibid, pp. 42-3. In reducing mimetic desire to the more conflictual model, Milbank judges Girard ‘high-
handed’. Why is ‘ontological’ desire prior to the kind of imitation/emulation which is focused on the object, 
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While these critiques are valid, Milbank seems more preoccupied with the broader 
question of Girard’s theoretical derivation. Milbank is deeply suspicious of the various social 
sciences which he thinks are themselves theologies or anti-theologies in disguise and some 
of which are established on faith claims which are in direct contradiction with Christianity.472 
Milbank traces the problem back to medieval Nominalism and other ‘deviant’ theologies, 
which created spheres of ‘secularity and autonomy’ from which concepts such as rights, 
sovereignty, and private property became established.473 Milbank links Girard to the 
philosophy of Nietzsche which develops from a violent or agonistic ontology, in contradiction 
to Christianity’s peaceful ontology.474  
 
At the heart of Milbank’s argument, Kaplan notes, is Milbank’s objection to Girard’s 
methodology: ‘One first needs a social theory – mimetic desire – in order to arrive at a 
theological truth or set of truths – in this case the gospel. Such approaches, even by professed 
Christians or theologians, accept the modern displacement of theology’.475 Milbank’s critique 
of theological and philosophical deviations, the antecedents to modernism, begins in late 
medieval Nominalism, with Duns Scotus (who for the first time separates philosophy and 
theology). ‘It is indeed for radical orthodoxy an either/or: Philosophy (Western or Eastern) as 
a purely autonomous discipline, or theology: Herod or the magi, Pilate or the God-man’.476 In 
such a ‘zero-sum’ assessment of the relationship of Christianity to modernity, Girard’s 
theories are inevitably more to be resisted than engaged with. 
 
Milbank’s critique has itself been critiqued.477 Fergus Kerr suggests that Millbank may 
have discovered, perhaps at ‘some fairly late stage’ in writing Theology and Social Theory, 
that Girard was offering an account about ‘the non-ultimacy of violence in a properly Christian 
understanding of history’ comparable to his own.  Kerr argues that Millbank was compelled 
 
not the model? By asking this question Milbank is assuming that certain objects are innately desirable, which 
may be so, but is something Girard rules out. For Girard desire is always mediated. 
472 Cf. Kaplan, Unlikely Apologist, p. 47. 
473 Cf. Ibid. 
474 Ibid. 
475 Ibid, p. 48. 
476 Radical Orthodoxy: A New Theology, edited by John Milbank, Catherine Pickstock and Graham Ward 
(London: Routledge, 1999) p. 32. 
477 Cf. Kerr, ‘Rescuing Girard’s Argument?’ 
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to differentiate his deliberate reworking of Augustine’s De Civitate Dei from Girard’s 
unintentionally similar project.478  Kerr asserts that while Millbank gives a fair account of 
Girard’s project, he critiques it on the basis of misleading references to Freud and Nietzsche 
and, seemingly to differentiate his project from Girard’s, resorts to defects which seem rather 
‘factitious and even fictitious’.479  Millbank’s substantive theological criticism of Girard, that 
anarchy is prior in the human group is not – as Kerr notes – opposed to the Augustinian view, 
the crucial point of which is to assert no ontological priority in anarchy.480   
 
In some respects Milbank’s Radical Orthodoxy appears to be a rival twin to mimetic 
theory since Millbank’s systematic theology is accompanied by ‘an ambitious and high-
minded agenda in political theology’.481 Mimetic theory has arguably reached further into the 
social and political order than Radical Orthodoxy and continues to make a significant impact 
on contemporary social and political thought.482  While Millbank offers a robust critique of 
mimetic theory and other ‘secular philosophies’, Milbank and his circle have themselves been 
accused of a ‘speculative tendency that rides loosely in the exegetical saddle’.483 MacDougall 
has warned that there is in Millbank a mingling of church and state and ‘an imperialistic stance 
that many, particularly political and theological progressives, find profoundly disquieting’.484  
 
Millbank’s account of sacrifice exhibits a determination not to engage with Girard’s 
later work. Other critics have likewise censured Girard for his early statements which were 
subsequently modified or even withdrawn.485 In an interview with Rebecca Adams (1993) 
 
478 Ibid, p. 387. 
479 Ibid, p. 394. 
480 Ibid, p. 397. 
481 Cowdell, The Nonviolent God, p. 119. 
482 In 1981 the Dutch Girard Society was founded in Amsterdam. The Colloquium on Violence and Religion 
(COV&R) was founded at Stanford in 1990. The Association pour les Récherches Mimétiques began in Paris in 
2005. Theology and Peace, The Raven Foundation and Imitatio (funded by one of Girard’s former student, 
Peter Thiel), began in 2007. Groups dedicated to reflection on mimetic theory have also been established 
Australia and South America. Cf. Haven, p. 199. 
483 Cf. Michael S. Horton, ‘Participation and Covenant’ in Radical Orthodoxy and the Reformed Tradition: 
Creation, Covenant and Participation, James K. A. Smith and James H. Olthuis, editors (Grand Rapids: Baker 
Academic, 2005) p. 128. 
484 Scott MacDougall, ‘Scapegoating the Secular: The Irony of Mimetic Violence in the Social Thought of John 
Milbank in Violence, Transformation and the Sacred, pp. 85-98. (p. 95). 
485 As late as 2007 Finlan stated without qualification: ‘René Girard rejects the notion that the death of Jesus 
should be considered a sacrifice’. Stephen Finlan, Options on Atonement in Christian Thought (Collegeville, 
Minnesota: Liturgical Press, 2007) p. 103. 
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Girard accepts, for example, that he misinterpreted Hebrews and was ‘completely wrong’ in 
imposing his vocabulary on the Epistle. Girard accepted that, in Things Hidden he had 
‘scapegoated’ Hebrews and the term ‘sacrifice’.486 In 1995 Girard admitted that he ‘was wrong 
twice’: firstly in stating too absolutely the separation of archaic religions and the Christian 
religion and secondly in avoiding the use of the same term to express two different types of 
sacrifice, diminishing the paradoxical unity of all religions in human history.487 While insisting 
that the overwhelming tendency of the Gospels is anti-sacrificial and that the Gospels achieve 
a true rupture in history, Girard did accept that there is ‘no perfectly non-sacrificial space’. In 
Violence and the Sacred and in Things Hidden, Girard’s purpose was to situate himself in ‘that 
non-sacrificial space from which to understand and explain everything without personal 
involvement’, a position he came to accept was impossible.488 Girard’s comprehensive 
retraction and his more nuanced and inclusive approach to elements of the archaic sacred in 
biblical literature has not always been generously acknowledged. In his 2018 book Radical 
Sacrifice, Eagleton continues to charge Girard with his rejection of Hebrews in Things 




Girard’s treatment of sacrifice, and its theological reception, is instructive. For Milbank, 
Girard’s theory is problematic because, although compelling in certain respects, it cannot be 
trusted. With a ‘slight twist’ the same methodology which appears to function as an apologia 
for Christian revelation may collapse into yet another social-scientific deconstruction of 
religion. However, while Milbank demonstrates Girard’s debt to earlier social-scientific 
theories, he fails to appreciate in mimetic theory a capacity to develop and deepen, in 
conversation with Christian theology. Robert Daly has noted, that as mimetic theory 
developed it is seen to inhabit a properly Christian universe:  
  
One of the striking things about the history of Girardian mimetic theory was that, in its 
initial formulations in the mind of Girard, it was not consciously Christian. Looked at from 
 
486 Girard and Adams, pp. 28-30.  
487 Cf. René Girard ‘Mimetische Theorie und Theologie’, cited by Petra Steinmair-Pösel in COV&R, Bulletin of 
the Colloquium on Violence and Religion, May 2015, p. 16. 
488 Girard, Evolution and Conversion, p. 156. 
489 Cf. Eagleton, Radical Sacrifice, p. 54. 
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the outside, it seems to have become increasingly more Christian as time went on […] but 
from the inside, Girardian mimetic theory did not become Christian in the course of time. 
Rather, in the course of time, it discovered how profoundly Christian it was all along.490 
 
Girard’s anthropology of the Cross allows no recourse to violence in God, and denies the 
sacrificial nature of Christ’s death, in the ordinary sense.491 For Girard archaic sacrifice and 
violence are inescapably linked. Archaic sacrifice obtains for human violence the greatest 
possible justification and concealment. Violence is mimetic and typically no one feels 
responsible for provoking the initial violence. In the context of a sacrificial crisis, ritual 
violence always appears legitimate, sanctioned and divinely approved. Its legitimacy is 
confirmed by the unanimity and social differentiation it produces. Indeed, in contemporary 
society (political) narratives of innocence are frequently wed to the language of sacrifice, 
alerting us to the dangers of associating the archaic with the Gospel.492 By drawing our 
attention to the endlessly adaptive mechanism of mimetic violence, and describing its 
working in anthropological terms, Girard helps us to avoid a naïve incorporation of archaic 
sacrifice into Christian theology.493  
 
The Gospels offer no positive role to violence and Girard insists that even the theme 
of Christian apocalypse is human, not divine terror: ‘As long as the violence seems to be divine 
in origin, it really holds no terror for anybody, since it is either an aid to salvation, or it doesn’t 
exist at all’.494 The arbitrary and uncontrolled quality of mimetic violence is, however a terrible 
responsibility and an ever-present danger, hitherto concealed by the lie of archaic sacrifice. 
In associating human violence with the kingdoms of this world and the social order it creates, 
the Gospels are nothing less than the revelation of the kingdom of God, a social order with 
 
490 Daly, p. 217. 
491 Cf. Things Hidden, pp. 180- 279. 
492 Cf. John Pahl and James Wellman, ‘Empire of Sacrifice: Violence and the Sacred in American Culture’ in Can 
we Survive our Origin? pp. 71-93.  
493 Cf. Ian Bradley, The Power of Sacrifice (London: Darton, Longman & Todd, 1995). In an effort to explore the 
life-giving power of sacrifice Bradley goes some way towards suggesting a kind of equivalence between divine 
self-giving, kenosis, and a variety of mythic stories of violent expulsions and dismembering.  For Bradley 
sacrifice ‘is at once the power which animates and drives life throughout the physical world and the principle 
at the very heart of the being and purposes of God’ p. 25. Bradley writes that this power is exemplified on the 
Cross ‘where Christ’s body is dismembered and broken for the world, to be re-membered at each celebration 
of the Eucharist’, p. 35. Using the language of ‘dismembering’ and ‘re-membering’ the victim, Bradley risks 
associating the Dionysiac myth and the violent sparagmos ritual. Cf. Girard, Violence and the Sacred, pp. 135-
60. Girard argues that the ‘power’ of both sacrifices, the archaic and the Christian are of a different order and 
produce entirely different effects.  
494 Things Hidden, p. 195. 
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no claims to violence. Girard associated Jesus’ ‘hour’ in the Gospel of John with the historical 
moment in which humanity must choose between two forms of reciprocity ‘which are very 
close and radically opposed’.495 Girard differentiates two cities or kingdoms present in the 
world, kingdoms which cannot ultimately coexist or communicate with each other.  
 
To understand Christ’s death as sacrifice risks losing this unique revelation and 
postponing the decision. ‘[I]t is important to say the Christ’s death was not a sacrificial one. 
To say that Jesus dies, not as a sacrifice, but in order that there may be no more sacrifices, is 
to recognize in him the Word of God: “I wish for mercy and not sacrifices”’.496 In a later work 
Girard accepts that there is both a ‘break and a continuity’ between archaic sacrifice and the 
Gospel revelation. Ultimately, Girard does not scapegoat or condemn sacrifice; ‘as if we were 
by nature strangers to violence’.497 In Girard’s mature work sacrifice is not banished but 
inverted. Girard’s treatment of sacrifice may be considered analogous to understanding the 
baptismal waters as ‘a narrative transition that does not destroy the old story but reorders its 
trajectory to a previously unforeseen end, a different, unexpected telos’.498 The old story of 
sacrifice is seen, in this context, to have had ‘only a conditional goal, a meaning that could not 
satisfy, could not be the good of the person’. In his mature work Girard does not attempt to 
obliterate or disown archaic sacrifice; rather it is ‘enfolded in a new story, which by promise 




This chapter has explored important aspects of Girard’s engagement with theology, 
specifically, Girard’s approach to the Hebrew and Christian scriptures. From Girard’s reading 
of the scriptures the victim emerges, against a background of half-concealed jealousies, 
rivalries and collective murders. Girard was not the first to observe the scriptural witness to 
 
495 Ibid, p. 201. 
496 Ibid, p. 210. 
497 Girard, Evolution and Conversion, p. 157. 
498 Loughlin, Telling God’s Story, p. 215. 
499 Ibid, p. 217. 
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the innocent victim, however his reading of this witness through the lens of mimetic desire is 
his unique contribution.500  
 
Girard’s theory of desire was originally expressed almost exclusively in negative terms. 
On this basis, some commentators have misread Girard and accused him of ontologizing 
acquisitive mimesis, whereas, for Girard this is but one modality of human desire.501 The 
passage from negative, rivalrous patterns of desire, to positive patterns of desire is not 
achieved by a merely intellectual process. It is not merely the knowledge of mediated or 
‘triangular’ desire which is decisive. This knowledge must be accompanied by the graced 
awareness of oneself not only as a victim, but also as one who has scapegoated and excluded 
others. The possibility of creating non-conflictual patterns of desire which effect a positive 
political transformation, depends on forming social realities wherein the ‘intelligence of the 
victim’ is socially normative, and creatively modelled and performed.   
 
Sacrifice, a near universal cultural institution is grounded in ideas of reciprocity, as 
Barclay indicates. Girard’s reductive approach to sacrifice may be unwarranted. Nevertheless, 
by emphasizing the reciprocity at work in sacrifice (as well as gift) Girard has alerted us to a 
wider sacrificial economy which is itself subverted by the Gospel. The Gospels are not limited 
to a critique of Temple sacrifice; Jesus is frequently seen to undermine the supposed 
reciprocity upon which social relations and religious institutions were established. Ideas of 
reciprocal violence (God intervening to punish the sinner (Lk 13. 1-5)) and reciprocal benefits 
(God blessing/healing only those within established groups (Lk 7. 1-11)) are challenged in the 
Gospels. In the Gospels, God is seen to be outside of a sacrificial economy. In the parable of 
the Good Samaritan (Lk 10. 25-37), it is the obligations of cult (not any supposed moral failure, 
e.g., cowardice, disgust, etc.,) that serve to separate the priest from the victim, leading Alison 
to note that the human pattern of desire is such that ‘we either create goodness by displacing 
the victims, or find ourselves being made good by moving toward them. But a form of 
goodness which is entirely unrelated to dealing with the human reality of victimhood is not 
 
500 Girard’s reading is, as has been noted, a literary-critical reading. To achieve its overall effect Girard has at 
times neglected historical-critical evidence and historicized mythic motifs.  
501 Cf. James Alison, The Joy of Being Wrong, p. 13. 
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something to which our species can relate’.502 This insight accords with Girard’s hermeneutic 
of the victim in scripture, and Girard’s assertion that in Christ the sacrificial economy does not 


























502 James Alison, ‘Like Being Dragged through a Bush Backwards: Hints of the Shape of Conversion’s Adventure’ 
in Violence, Desire and the Sacred, Vol 1: Girard’s Mimetic Theory Across the Disciplines, edited by Scott 




Mimetic Theory as a hermeneutical key for the Early Franciscan Movement 
 
Introduction and Methodology 
 
In this chapter I will explore the early Franciscan movement, principally through the figure of 
the founder and exemplar of Franciscan life: Francis of Assisi. Treating the sources, which 
include the writings of Saint Francis of Assisi, biographies and early Franciscan texts, I will 
explore Saint Francis in his historical context, through the lens of Girard’s mimetic theory.503 
I adopt Girard’s method of ‘shuttling back and forth’ in this thesis, between the writings of 
Saint Francis, early Lives of the Saint, and contemporary scholarship on Francis of Assisi and 
the Early Franciscan movement.504 In adopting Girard’s method, I will explore the nexus of 
theological and anthropological concerns which stimulated a radically different approach to 
peace-making and social interaction in the early Franciscan movement. This method has as 
its aim the discovery of the mimetic realism at the origins of St. Francis’s conversion and in 
the form of life (forma vitae) which characterized the early Franciscan movement. 
 
To understand the early Franciscan movement as an exodus from sacrificial systems 
the role and function of the founder, Francis of Assisi must be clarified and set within a context 
of rapid social change. This chapter will be divided in three parts: 
 
1. A critique of the ‘romantic’ interpretation of Francis of Assisi associated with Paul 
Sabatier and those authors influenced by his important work on St. Francis, Vie de 
Saint François (1894). This is a necessary prerequisite to applying mimetic theory to 
accounts of Saint Francis and the early Franciscan movement.  
 
503 The writings of St. Francis of Assisi are taken from volume one of Francis of Assisi: Early Documents, edited 
by Regis J. Armstrong, O.F.M. Cap., J. A. Wayne Hellmann, O.F.M. Conv., William J. Short, O.F.M. (New York: 
New City Press, 2000), henceforth FA:ED (1). Other Sources of the early Franciscan movement, Lives of Saint 
Francis of Assisi, and early liturgical works are contained in Francis of Assisi: Early Documents, vols. 2 & 3. 
(FA:ED (2) and FA:ED (3)). 
504 Cf. Girard, Scandal Comes, pp. 50-51. ‘Shuttling back and forth’ imposed on Girard’s work ‘a form of 
composition resembling a snail, or a volute, or a spiral’. He also compared his work to a ‘thriller’, where ‘all the 
pieces are of the puzzle are given at the beginning, but it is only at the end that it becomes clear how they fit 
together’.  
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2. I will offer an alternative ‘mimetic profile’ of Francis of Assisi. In exploring the mimetic 
dimension within early Lives of Saint Francis, I will argue that a mimetic reading of the 
life of Francis is useful in recovering the vital dynamics of the early Franciscan 
movement. I will draw on contemporary scholarship to support this case. 
3. I will explore the category of ‘conversion’ in Girard’s work and in the context of the 
early Franciscan sources. This will follow a three step ‘retrieval’ of Francis of Assisi, 
from romantic hero, Homo Mimeticus, to saint.505  
 
It is my aim to represent Saint Francis, liberated from his status as a romantic/heroic figure, 
perhaps the dominant motif since the late nineteenth century. Shorn of his romantic and 
hagiographic garb, and situated in his historical context, a more authentic picture of Francis 
of Assisi and the early Franciscan movement emerge. By exploring the mimetic dimension in 
the early Franciscan sources, a consistent pattern of life (forma vitae) directed towards non-
rivalrous desiring and peace-making comes into focus. It is this form of life, characterized as 
an intentional, non-confrontational withdrawal from the dominant ‘sacrificial’ social realities, 
which remains culturally and theologically apposite. 
 
The Aims and Limits of the ‘Quest’ for the ‘Historical Francis’ 
 
Any serious engagement with the early Franciscan movement and role of Francis of Assisi 
demands an evaluation of the historical sources. The critical use of these sources, since the 
late nineteenth century, has been the associated with the ‘Quest for the Historical Francis’ or 
the Franciscan Question.506 The critical problems associated with any attempt to evaluate the 
role of Saint Francis and the early Franciscans are raised in the General Introduction to the 
 
505 Homo Mimeticus is used here to indicate the person as mimetic phenomenon, i.e., exercising a degree of 
agency and autonomy, but always within a web of mediated and shared desires. 
506 In treating the legendae and other sources I will rely on Jacques Dalarun, The Misadventure of Francis of 
Assisi: Towards a Historical Use of the Franciscan Legends, trans. By Edward Hagman, O.F.M. Cap., (New York: 
Saint Bonaventure University, 2002). Also, Augustine Thompson, O.P., ‘The Franciscan Question’ in Francis of 
Assisi: A New Biography (Ithaca & London: Cornell University Press, 2012) pp. 153-170. Thompson, citing 
Manselli, concludes that there is nothing more ‘authentic’ in the ‘Spiritualist’ reporting of Saint Francis’s life, 
favoured by Paul Sabatier (1894), than in the ‘Conventual’ reporting favoured by Tamassia (1909). There is no 
‘unbiased source’, including Saint Francis’s own writings. Thompson continues: ‘to some extent, this means 
that the age of the “Franciscan Question”, when the dream was to find the most “primitive”, “unbiased”, 
“true” source, has passed […] If by the Franciscan Question we mean reconstruction of a pure, original, 
unbiased text that lies behind the extant documents, it is impossible’. pp. 168-70.  
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standard English edition of the writings of Saint Francis; Francis of Assisi: Early Documents. 
The editors caution: ‘Even a careful reading of the texts contained in these volumes will 
prompt the reader to wonder if it is possible to write an accurate biography of Francis or 
determine what precisely is at the heart of his vision’.507 The nineteenth and twentieth 
centuries witnessed a remarkable proliferation of translations of the authentic writings of 
Saint Francis and the rediscovery and translation of early sources, which had been lost or 
forgotten.508 This wealth of source material and the critical work of more than a century of 
Franciscan scholarship has, inevitably, raised further questions regarding the social, ecclesial 
and psychological influences which motivated Saint Francis. The modern period has given 
birth to the ‘Francis of Legend’, ‘who straddles the lines between projected history and 
scientific history, between the acts and the imagination of early thirteenth century Umbria, 
and between established religious structures and emerging spiritual beliefs’.509 
 
In his study of the meeting between Saint Francis and the Sultan Malik al Kamil in 
Damietta in 1219, historian John Tolan warns the reader that the ‘[t]wentieth century, like 
the preceding centuries, forged a Francis in its own image, a saint whose actions in Damietta 
corresponds to the needs of his faithful and admirers’.510 Tolan demonstrates the myriad and 
at times contradictory interpretations this historical encounter inspired across the centuries. 
He leaves open the question of whether it is possible to assign any particular meaning to the 
event. If the meaning of a single episode in the life of Francis is so contested, what can be said 
of the more ambitious attempts to ascribe a definite meaning to the entire life of Francis, 
refracted through multiple narratives, poems and vitae? In the century following Francis’s 
death at least twenty major legends were produced.511 Inevitably, a figure as compelling and 
influential as Francis of Assisi gives rise to numerous interpretations and may be considered 
from a variety of perspectives. Outside of a purely historical/critical approach, perspectives 
on Francis range from the compelling to the contradictory and all run the risk of historical 
 
507 General Introduction, FA:ED (Vol. 1) p. 13.  
508 Ibid, pp. 11-27. 
509 Ibid, pp. 12-13. 
510 John Tolan, Saint Francis and the Sultan: The Curious History of a Christian-Muslim Encounter (Oxford: 
Oxford University Press, 2009), P. 323. 
511 Dalarun, p. 22. 
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anachronism.512 I will be sensitive to this risk in forming my own assessment of Francis of 
Assisi and the early Franciscan movement. 
 
In addressing the historical details of Francis of Assisi’s life I will draw on several recent 
critical biographies and historical studies.513 In doing so, my perspective is explicitly 
theological, offering a perspective on shared early Franciscan/Girardian theological concerns 
and eschewing any claim to be a work of historical criticism.514 The multiplicity of historical 
sources indicates, not only the difficulty of finding the ‘Historical Francis’, but the impossibility 
of reducing Francis’s experience or his message to a single voice.515 Girard’s mimetic theory 
is perhaps that ‘single voice’ which, in trying to explain the early Franciscan movement, 
obscures it. Counterintuitively, there is a risk of ‘doing violence’ to the early Franciscan 
movement and its founder by too rigorous an application of mimetic theory. Mimetic theory 
is presented here not as an exhaustive or definitive reading of the sources and context of 
early Franciscanism but as a new theoretical horizon. Against this horizon the message of 
Francis and early Franciscan movement will not be submerged – it will achieve a new and 
compelling articulation. As a heuristic device, Girard’s theory facilitates a meaningful 
exploration of the early Franciscan movement and its core values. With these caveats in mind, 
I will apply to the early Franciscan movement the mimetic lens, offering to the contemporary 
reader a description which is coherent and theologically fertile.  
 
512 An example of contradictory interpretations is Leonardo Boff’s Francis of Assisi: A Model for Human 
Liberation (Crossroad, 1982), which, from the perspective of a Liberation theologian, argues that Saint 
Francis’s choice of voluntary poverty subverted capitalist hierarchies. Works by Brian Hamilton, Pauperes 
Christi: Voluntary Poverty as Political Practice (Doctoral Thesis, University of Notre Dame, 2015. ProQuest 
Dissertations Publishing), and Kenneth Baxter Wolf’s The Poverty of Riches: Saint Francis of Assisi Reconsidered 
(Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2005) argue that Franciscan voluntary poverty reinforced capitalist 
hierarchies.    
513 For the purpose of this dissertation, I will draw mainly from the following sources: André Vauchez, François 
d’Assise: Entre Histoire et Mémoire (Paris: Librairie Arthéme Fayard, 2009), Francis of Assisi: The Life and 
Afterlife of a Medieval Saint, trans. by Michael F. Cusato (New Haven & London: Yale University Press, 2012), 
Jacques Le Goff, Saint François d’Assise (Paris: Éditions Gallimard, 1999), Francis of Assisi, trans. by Christine 
Rhone (London & New York: Routledge, 2004), Augustine Thompson, O.P., Francis of Assisi: A New Biography 
(Ithaca & London: Cornell University Press, 2012) and Raoul Manselli, Francesco D’Assisi (Roma: Bibliotheca di 
Cultura, 1982), St. Francis of Assisi, trans. by Paul Duggan (Chicago: Franciscan Herald Press, 1988). In making 
the case that the early Franciscan movement was ordered towards forming non-rivalrous communities and 
concerned with exiting the systems which create and sustain conflict, I will draw on the work of Sean Edward 
Kinsella, The Lord Give You Peace: Poverty and Violence in the Writings and Early Lives of Saint Francis of Assisi 
(Doctoral Thesis, University of Saint Michael’s College, Canada. ProQuest Dissertation Publishing, 2003). 
514 For a brief survey of the interdisciplinary uses made of historical work on Saint Francis, cf. Thompson, pp. 
144-45. 
515 Cf. Delarun, p. 23.  
 122 
 
I propose to adopt a thematic approach, exploring across a variety of sources the 
traces of mimetic realism. The mimetic component of the early Franciscan movement has 
been obscured, in part due to a dominant romantic tradition which has served to isolate 
Francis of Assisi from his cultural context, presenting him as a heroic/tragic figure. Here, 
Girard’s insights are particularly helpful, since the romantic interpretation of Francis has 
produced a variety of mis-readings of the early Franciscan movement. As I indicated in the 
General Introduction, these romantic mis-readings include both positive (‘heroic’) 
representations and critical (‘anti-heroic’) representation of Francis and the early friars. 
Neither the romantic nor the neo-romantic accounts of Francis are satisfactory and both are 
helpfully deconstructed by mimetic theory.516  
 
In the next part of this chapter, I will explore two dominant interpretations of Francis 
and the early Franciscan movement: the hagiographical and the romantic. Both of these 
interpretations represent authentic expressions of the early Franciscan movement and both 
obscure aspects of the movement which invite attention today.  
 
A Critique of Romantic Interpretations of Saint Francis of Assisi 
 
Francis of Assisi: From Medieval Saint to Romantic Hero 
 
In his treatment of the exemplum of Odo of Cheriton, accounts of the ‘Prophesy of San 
Damiano’, and the accounts of the ‘Final Blessing of Saint Francis’, Jacques Dalarun 
demonstrates how authentic episodes in the life of Francis have been adapted and re-
presented in the legendae, according to hagiographical devices, political development within 
the Order, or the changing status of the founder (from founder to saint).517 The hagiographic 
content in the legendae both obscures and reveals the historical content of the narratives. As 
Dalarun observes, in applying an allegorical sense to an historical ‘fact’ the medieval 
hagiographer is not seeking to obscure historical reality but to reveal it more clearly; ‘for 
 
516 The critical interpretations of Hamilton (2015) and Baxter Wolf (2005) will be treated in chapter five. 
517 Dalarun, pp. 59-92. 
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them, a fact is true if it reveals a higher truth’.518 The presence of specific social and cultural 
contexts indicates to the historian an ‘historical fact’ since the hagiographer’s instinct is not 
to cloud the narrative with local and historical details, if these are not to hand. The 
hagiographer prefers to ‘take refuge in the timeless topos’ rather than construct narratives 
based entirely on the evidence of witnesses.519  
 
The hagiographer Thomas of Celano’s First Life of Saint Francis (1228) is notably 
different from his later work, The Remembrance of the Desire of the Soul (1245-47). The 
earlier work was hagiographic in style, critical of the upbringing of Francis and emphasised 
the role of Elias of Assisi. His later work ‘marks a step backwards in relation to the spiritual 
biography of  Saint Francis,’ more or less denying an earlier account of his dissolute youth and 
emphasising the miracles of Saint Francis, in line with popular conceptions of holiness.520 The 
figure of Francis which Celano produced in his later Life is a ‘saint who is predestined, a 
miracle worker, a prophet, a stern man’.521 Francis had become ‘archaic’ and ‘more monastic’ 
and what is emphasised frequently is ‘his choice for poverty which is constantly praised and 
supported’.522 The incorporation (or exclusion) of other legendae which were compiled in the 
years after the death of Francis, both explain and obscure the historical picture of the founder 
and the movement.523 Celano’s Second Life (The Remembrance), composed almost two 
decades after the First Life, is burdened by the tensions within the Order and was ‘fatally 
condemned to failure because its sources were irreconcilable’. In Celano’s final hagiographic 
work on Francis, The Treatise on the Miracles, ‘it is not so much the rough wonderworker that 
conceals the extraordinary saint. Rather it is the mythologised saint who conceals the man, 
that man whom [Celano] […] no longer recognizes’.524  
 
At the General Chapter of the Franciscan Friars in Narbonne in 1260 the decision was 
taken to produce an authorized and official Life of Saint Francis. Three years later at the 
 
518 Ibid, p. 74-5. 
519 Ibid, p. 111.  
520 Cf. Le Goff, p. 21. 
521 Dalarun, p. 132. 
522 Ibid. 
523 The Anonymous of Perugia (1240-41) emphasized a logical historical progression from founder, to primitive 
fraternity, to Order. The account of The Legend of Perugia described the same historical narrative in terms of a 
‘deplorable failure’. The past is recalled as a rebuke to the present. Cf. Dalarun, p. 215.   
524 Ibid, p. 173.  
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General Chapter held in Pisa, the Minister General of the Order, Saint Bonaventure of 
Bagnoreggio presented, not one but two legendae; The Legenda Maior (Major Life of Saint 
Francis) and the Legenda Minor (a shorter, companion Life of Saint Francis, whose main 
purpose was liturgical). Bonaventure’s Legendae drew on earlier biographical and historical 
accounts by Celano (1228-29) and Julian of Speyer (1232-35). The Legenda Maior remained 
the official and dominant narrative of Saint Francis’s life and the early Franciscan movement 
for the next five centuries. It was in many respects unsatisfactory.  
 
Jacques Le Goff has stated that St. Bonaventure’s Life is ‘tendentious and fanciful’, 
combining contradictory elements taken uncritically from different sources. Bonaventure 
remained silent on any issue which suggests a deviation from the Founder’s intentions, such 
as the place of knowledge and learning, manual labour, the visiting of lepers, the poverty of 
churches and houses, etc.525 Bonaventure’s Legenda Maior Sancti Francisci treats the life of 
Francis not chronologically but thematically, attempting not so much to give an account of his 
life but to achieve a mystical and theological synthesis of the life of the founder and the Order 
he founded.526 The Legenda Maior was not only the authorized and standard biography of 
Saint Francis; in an effort to settle acrimonious internal disputes about Saint Francis’s life and 
legacy it abrogated all earlier legends. It was formally decreed at the General Chapter held in 
Paris in 1266 that earlier legends should be removed (deleantur).527 As critical studies 
demonstrate, hagiographical narratives foreground the concerns (and anxieties) of the 
immediate ‘heirs’ of the early Franciscan movement, as much as they offer a picture of the 
saint himself. 
 
Romantic Interpretations: Paul Sabatier 
 
In the context of political tensions within the early Franciscan movement, the acknowledged 
limitations of hagiographic convention, a dearth of sources and an Enlightenment disdain for 
medievalism, interest in the figure of Francis of Assisi and the early Franciscan movement had 
 
525 Le Goff, p. 19.  
526 Cf. Dalarun, pp. 228-238.  
527 General Introduction, FA:ED, (Vol 1) p. 18. The General Chapter of Paris (1266) ‘calmly voted to destroy’ a 
range of earlier narratives whose accounts of Saint Francis could no longer be assimilated into the dominant 
mystical/theological portrait which Saint Bonaventure produced. Cf. Dalarun, p. 247. 
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dwindled, up to the early nineteenth century.528 The Franciscan Question, which opened 
Franciscan studies to scientific and critical methods began in the mid-nineteenth century and 
is associated with the critical work of Ernest Renan (1823-1892) and his student Paul Sabatier 
(1858-1928).529 Sabatier’s Vie de Saint François was published in 1894.530 Sabatier, himself a 
liberal protestant, portrayed Saint Francis as a deeply human person whose spiritual 
transformation owed little or nothing to the religious tradition from which he emerged. 
Instead, Francis was a uniquely free spirit, a romantic troubadour whose appearance 
prefigures both the humanism of the Renaissance and the radical evangelism of the 
Reformation. This ‘de-catholicizing’ interpretation was a radical departure from the mainly 
devotional and uncritical Lives which had been largely unchallenged up to the nineteenth 
century. Sabatier’s discovery of early Franciscan sources such as the Deeds of Saint Francis 
and the Mirror of Perfection as well as his attention to the writings of Saint Francis, unsettled 
the hitherto uncontested authority of Saint Bonaventure’s Major Life.531  
 
Sabatier’s work coincides with a revival of interest in Saint Francis, associated with the 
romantic movement. Romanticism, as both Frederick Lawrence and Charles Taylor have 
pointed out, was a reaction to Enlightenment rationalism.532 The Enlightenment religion, 
derived from texts such as Immanuel Kant’s Religion within the Limits of Mere Reason, 
 
528 The reputation of Saint Francis suffered in the Reformation and post-Reformation period. Bartolomeo 
Albizzi’s work, published in English in 1542 was entitled: The alcaron of the barefote friars, that is to say, an 
heape or number of the blasphemous and trifling doctrines of the wounded idole Saint Francis, taken out of the 
boke of his rules. In 1826, the seventh centenary of the birth of Saint Francis of Assisi passed almost unnoticed 
outside of Italy, cf. Mary Heimann, (2017) ‘The Secularization of St Francis of Assisi’, British Catholic History 33, 
3, 401-20 (p.406). < https://doi.org/10.1017/bch.2017.4 > The mood of the enlightenment is captured in J. W. 
von Goethe’s 1786 tour of Umbria. Goethe paid a visit to the Temple of Minerva (rededicated to the Virgin 
Mary) to admire its aesthetic quality but avoided the nearby basilica of Saint Mary of the Angels and the shrine 
of Saint Francis, which he dismissed as a ‘Babylonian pile’. Lawrence S. Cunningham, Francis of Assisi: 
Performing the Gospel (Grand Rapids, Michigan & Cambridge: Eerdmans Publishing, 2004) p. 2.   
529 Karl Hase’s, Franz von Assisi: Ein Heiligenbild (Francis of Assisi: The Image of a Saint) was published in 
Leipzig in 1856 and marks a new departure in Franciscan biography, being critical and non-confessional. Cf. 
Vauchez, p. 234. Paul Sabatier, The Road to Assisi: The Essential Biography of St. Francis (Brewster, 
Massachusetts: Paraclete Press, 2004). pp. 234-39. 
530  Paul Sabatier Vie de S. François D’Assise (Paris: Librairie Fischbacher, 1894) in English translation, The Road 
to Assisi: The Essential Biography of St. Francis. Edited with Introduction and Annotations by Jon M. Sweeney 
(Brewster, Massachusetts: Paraclete Press, 2004) 
531 In 1898 Sabatier published the Mirror of Perfection, a source he believed to date from 1227. The text was in 
fact a much later source, dating from c. 1318. Cf. Dalarun, p. 39. 
532 Frederick Lawrence, ‘The Fragility of Consciousness: Lonergan and the Postmodern Concern for the Other, 
Theological Studies, 54, (1993). Taylor describes ‘Authenticity’ as ‘a child of the Romantic period’ and a 
reaction to the disengaged rationality of the Enlightenment. Charles Taylor, The Ethics of Authenticity 
(Cambridge, Mass: Harvard University Press, 1991) pp. 25-29.  
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reduced the human religious experience to purely ethical activity, shorn of superstition 
certainly, but also estranged from embodied religious acts such as fasting, ritual and prayer.533 
The Romanticism of Jean-Jacques Rousseau extolled the purity of nature and asserted that 
human nature is corrupted precisely by its co-mingling with a degraded and sinful society. The 
Romantic hero, who emerged in reaction to Enlightenment rationalism, typically ‘abandons 
society’s norms and lives freely, naturally, unencumbered and uninfluenced by culture’s 
fallenness. Creativity, imagination and originality become the markers of salvation for the 
Romantic, naturally blameless hero’.534 In many respects Francis of Assisi was an ideal 
candidate for the project of Romanticism.   
 
In the Enlightenment period the life of Saint Francis was relegated to the realm of 
medieval piety, if not superstition, and it was in fact Romanticism which renewed interest in 
Francis of Assisi and the early Franciscan movement. Sabatier’s work provoked a profound 
shock among Roman Catholics generally, and particularly among Franciscans. The book was 
added to the Church’s Index of Prohibited Books within a year of publication.535 Sabatier’s Life 
began a ‘histography of suspicion’ in Franciscan studies which implicated the Papacy and 
clerical forces in subverting the Gospel intuitions of Saint Francis and the early Franciscan 
movement.536 Sabatier was influenced by the work of Renan whose approach to historical 
questions in the life of Jesus of Nazareth excluded the possibility of the miraculous and the 
supernatural. Renan stated that ‘No miracle has ever taken place under conditions that 
science can accept. Experience shows, without exception, that miracles occur only in times 
and in countries in which miracles are believed in, and in the presence of persons who are 
disposed to believe in them’.537 Sabatier was less doctrinaire in his treatment of Saint Francis 
than Renan, allowing for the miraculous, defined in terms of key psychological and spiritual 
transformations in history.  
 
 
533 Kaplan, ‘Saint Versus Hero’ pp. 153-4. 
534 Ibid, p. 155. 
535 Cunningham, Francis of Assisi, vii.  
536 Cf. Vauchez, pp. 234-39. 
537 Cf. Jon M. Sweeney’s introduction to Paul Sabatier, The Road to Assisi, xii. Renan had explained the stigmata 
of St. Francis as a deliberate hoax perpetuated by Elias of Assisi, xiii.  
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Sabatier’s approach to the ‘Historical Francis’ is heavily influenced by romantic 
assumptions which have effectively framed St Francis for subsequent generations as a 
romantic genius. Departing from Renan’s enlightenment reductionism Sabatier stated: 
 
Happily we are no longer in the time when historians thought they had done the right 
thing when they had reduced everything to its proper size, contenting themselves with 
denying or omitting everything in the life of the heroes of humanity that rises above the 
level of our everyday experience.538   
 
Sabatier’s Saint Francis was a romantic ‘hero of humanity’ and this view of Francis has proved 
to be highly influential, if not the dominant motif for most of the twentieth century. 
Thompson notes that Sabatier’s Saint Francis is based largely on the witnesses from the 
Spiritual Franciscan tradition,539 and is a ‘remarkably modern individualist, a romantic seeker, 
anachronistic to medieval Italy’. According to the romantic interpretation, Francis was 
inevitably misunderstood and exploited by the ‘institutional Church’.540  
 
The unique achievement of Sabatier in initiating the quest for the ‘Historical Francis’ 
is obscured and limited by the romantic mantle which Sabatier and others imposed upon 
Francis.541 The success of Sabatier’s ‘romantic’ Saint Francis, outside of strictly academic 
discourse, can be judged in a passing reference to Francis of Assisi in James Joyce’s Stephen 
Hero. The protagonist, Joyce’s alter ego Stephen Dedalus, on a visit to Marsh’s Library in 
Dublin, ‘appreciated not without pitiful feelings the legend of the mild heresiarch of Assisi’. 
For Joyce in the early twentieth century, Saint Francis represented the gentle and 
misunderstood hero (the ‘mild heresiarch’) which Sabatier had popularised at the end of the 
 
538 Sabatier, introduction, p. xxx.  
539 The Spiritual Franciscan tradition was a contentions minority within the early Franciscan Order, typically 
opposed to the majority ‘Community’, who had adapted aspects of the early Franciscan life, as the Order grew. 
The Spiritual Franciscan friars ‘repudiated moderation of St Francis’s way of living as no better than treachery’ 
and understood the Franciscan life to be the closest possible imitation of the Founder. Cf. Duncan Nimmo, 
Reform and Division in the Franciscan Order (1226-1538) (Capuchin Historical Institute: Rome, 1987) pp. 78-
193. (p. 78). 
540 Thompson, p. 157. 
541 Sabatier’s critical use of the early sources added credibility to his romantic narrative. Others, before and 
after Sabatier, popularized the romantic Saint Francis. Margaret Oliphant published Francis of Assisi (London: 
MacMillan & Co., 1898) in 1868. Oliphant’s Saint Francis was both a romantic hero and a practical reformer. Cf. 
Mary Heimann, (2017) ‘The Secularization of St Francis of Assisi’ in British Catholic History 33(3), pp. 401-20. 
<https://doi.org/10.1017/bch.2017.4> 
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nineteenth century.542 Anne Marie D’Arcy notes that Joyce’s Stephen Dedalus’s interest in 
matters Franciscan is ‘tinged with a fascination with heresy’ and Joyce himself, D’Arcy asserts 
was influenced by the nineteenth century portrayal of the ‘Spiritual Franciscans’ as romantic 
rebels, such as Renan’s treatment of Friar Gerard of Borgo San Donnino. The witness of the 
Spiritual Franciscans, traditionally a marginal voice within the Franciscan tradition, was 
rediscovered in the nineteenth century as the ‘authentic’ tradition of Saint Francis and the 
early Franciscan movement.543 The Spiritual Franciscans, whose writings have been described 
as ‘the most asocial, the least realistic, and the most hostile to the world’, were taken by 
Renan and Sabatier as the authentic biographers of Francis of Assisi.544 The Francis of Assisi 
which emerged from the Spiritual Franciscan texts served the nineteenth century romantics 
and positivists as early examples of radicalism and the defiance of papal absolutism.545  
 
Franciscans of the nineteenth and twentieth centuries also appropriated the romantic 
Francis, though without any hint of heterodoxy. A typical treatment of Francis by the English 
Capuchin, Father Cuthbert, states:  
 
The Franciscan story is itself a romance; it is woven through and through with the spirit of 
romance; it expressed itself in the language of romance. For all time the Franciscans have 
consecrated the romantic temperament and vision.546 
 
Allowing for the complexities of the romantic movement, expressed philosophically and 
artistically, and allowing for some truth in the romantic interpretations of Saint Francis, it is 
evident that Francis and the movement he founded paid a heavy price for its characterization 
as a purely romantic movement. Romanticism helped to revive the memory of Saint Francis 
after a significant hiatus; enthusiasts readily married Francis to the romantic movement in 
 
542 Cf. Anne Marie D’Arcy, “Joachim of Fiore and ‘Joachitism’ from Stephen Hero to Finnegan’s Wake” in Anne 
Marie D’Arcy, John McCafferty, Marina Ansaldo, and Jason McElligot, James Joyce: Apocalypse and Exile 
(Dublin: Marsh’s Library, 2014) pp. 18-26. 
543 Stanislaus da Compagnola has divided the ‘Sabatier School’ into medievalizzanti who emphasised St. Francis 
as a medieval person, remote from modern sensibilities and perhaps ‘heretical’ and the modernizzanti who 
viewed St. Francis as a source of modern (post-medieval Christian) sensibilities. Cf. Thompson, p. 157. 
544 Cf. Le Goff. P. 72. The Spiritual Franciscans ‘were in great haste to begin to purify the world while ignoring 
its social structure, for them, among the impure incarnations of its evil nature’. Ibid. Francis of Assisi and the 
early Franciscan movement were consistently and creatively engaged with the social reality of the thirteenth 
century, whereas the Spiritual Franciscans are characterized by a pessimistic attitude to social structures.  
545 Cf. Anne Marie D’Arcy, “Joachim of Fiore and ‘Joachitism’ from Stephen Hero to Finnegan’s Wake” p. 21. 
546 Father Cuthbert, The Romanticism of St. Francis: And Other Studies in the Genius of The Franciscans 
(London: Longmans, Green & Co, 1924) p. 2. 
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the strongest terms: ‘Nowhere else outside the Gospels has the spirit of romance so purely 
uttered itself in the realization of Christian faith as in the early Franciscan story’.547 It is here 
that Girard’s early work in literature offers a clarifying perspective on the dominant 
interpretations of Saint Francis and his Order.  
 
The presence of the ‘romantic lie’ serves first of all to obscure the dynamics of early 
Franciscan life. Under the guise of nineteenth century demystification, it effectively mystifies 
the internal dynamics of the early Franciscan movement and its aims. The romantic narratives 
of Francis of Assisi, beginning with Sabatier, tend to remove Francis from his social context 
and interpret him more or less in isolation from the dynamics of the Franciscan Vitae.548 The 
anomalies of the romantic interpretation are responsible for creating a virtually context-less 
Francis of Assisi. The romantic Saint Francis offers only mystification and obscures the vital 
role of the early Franciscan movement in late medieval theology and society. On the other 
hand, the romantic Francis is endlessly accommodating to diverse ideologies. The romantic 
Francis was hailed by Benito Mussolini as ‘the most Italian of saints, the most saintly of 
Italians’ and, at the end the twentieth century claimed by Antonio Negri as a proto-
communist.549  
 
Girard’s insight into the ‘romantic lie’ provokes a healthy suspicion of such narratives. 
From the outset, mimetic theory deconstructs the romantic Saint Francis and directs 
attention to Francis of Assisi as Homo Mimeticus. Mimetic theory points to the accounts of 
borrowed desire, the modelling of desire and the historical context in which desire was 
mediated. Francis of Assisi’s conversion is itself a collapse of a former identity (the romantic 
dream of becoming a knight/member of the nobility) and a renunciation of this identity in 
favour of a life modelled on Christ. The impulse to isolate Saint Francis as a unique exemplar 
continues to obscure the interdividual dynamic of the conversion process.550 A true 
 
547 Ibid, p. 78. 
548 The term Forma Vita, frequently employed in the writings of Francis, I take to refer to the specific form of 
Gospel life which emerged among the early Franciscans in their highly experimental social group. Here, and 
elsewhere, traditional religious language is inadequate to the early Franciscan experience. ‘…the social 
vocabulary of Franciscanism […] escaped if not the religious, at least the ecclesiastical mould’. Le Goff p. 88.   
549 Cf. Cunningham, Francis of Assisi. pp. 137-38.   
550 The term ‘interdividual’ is employed by Girard to indicate the radically inter-subjective nature of the self. 
The monadic or isolated subject is illusory. What is most ‘individual’ in our experience is also something 
already shaped and mediated by our relations to others. 
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conversion, literary or religious, does not produce the romantic hero. At the conclusion of his 
essay on the ‘Franciscan Question’, in which he carefully sets out his criteria for interpreting 
the sources of the early Franciscan movement, Thompson insists on scepticism in dealing with 
accounts which ignore context and maturation in Francis of Assisi’s ideas. Even critical 
biographers such as Manselli have been willing to read Saint Francis’s mature ideas back into 
the accounts of his conversion and the life of the primitive community. Thompson asserts that 
the result is  
 
a Francis who stands outside the events around him, and who tries to impose on his 
followers a vision perfectly formed at his conversion. This is a hagiographic topos: the 
sinner perfected by grace. There is much to suggest that Francis spent much of his time 
groping for solutions to situations that he did not expect to encounter. Careful reading 
suggests that much of the time Francis had to react to new, concrete situations; he did 
not carry out some abstract vision or plan.551   
 
The personality of Francis of Assisi is in no way diminished by being liberated from his status 
as a romantic hero. Rather, when viewed as an example of Homo Mimeticus, conscious of his 
own borrowed desires, and the manner in which borrowed desires can lead to conflict and 
violence, he assumes a renewed and compelling importance. As I will attempt to demonstrate 
in the next section, when his personal conversion is situated in the context of historical 
conflict, rapid social change and upheaval, Francis’s specific role in, and contribution to, new 
forms of non-rivalrous community life becomes apparent. The unshackling of Francis of Assisi 
from the romantic tradition, produces not merely a heroic model but a key figure in a wider 
theological-anthropological phenomenon of the early thirteenth century; an eruption of 
modernity in the Girardian sense, i.e., a deeper apprehension of mimetic desire and its 
dynamics. The unique forma vitae of the early Franciscan movement emerges from the 
shadow cast by the ‘romantic Francis’ and aligns with the main contours of Girard’s 
hypothesis. The Franciscan forma vitae is thus retrieved as a template for the exodus from 
sacrificial systems in a historical context.   
 
 
The Story of two Knights Errant: Francis of Assisi and Don Quixote 
 
 
551 Thompson, p. 170. 
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From the authentic writings and early Lives of Francis of Assisi, it is possible to construct a 
‘mimetic profile’ of the central figure of the early Franciscan movement. This profile, while 
drawing on recent critical sources, is not an attempted biography, but rather a reading of the 
life of Francis under the aspect of mimetic theory. I will argue that early Franciscan sources 
which record significant episodes in the life of Saint Francis, facilitate an alternative and 
hitherto unexplored narrative. Fundamentally, I will argue that the conditions were present 
in the early thirteenth century for Francis to choose models of desire from outside his social 
class. The collapsing of traditional boundaries is a feature of the historical context of the late 
Middle Ages and in some sense, this collapse prefigures or anticipates Girard’s definition of 
modernity, the passage from a world of external mediation to a world of internal mediation. 
Saint Francis is a late medieval precursor of modern patterns of desiring. 
 
As mentioned above, Girard’s work, Deceit, Desire and the Novel, opens with an 
exploration of Cervantes’s Don Quixote. In Don Quixote, Girard asserts, the author introduces 
the idea of mediated desire; the mediator of Don Quixote’s desire being the fictional knight, 
Amadis de Gaul. Behind the fictional Amadis, there is the inventor of Amadis, the author of 
chivalric romances. Girard considers Don Quixote ‘a long meditation on the baleful influence 
that the most lucid minds can exercise upon one another’.552 For Girard, Cervantes’s genius 
is further demonstrated in ‘The Curious Impertinent’, a short story with which the author 
‘padded’ Don Quixote.553 Another chivalric romance, this story compares to Dostoyevsky’s 
The Eternal Husband, a work characterized by Girard as friendship turned to rivalry and 
hatred; the world of internal mediation. For Girard, Cervantes’s writing succeeds in spanning 
the distance between triangular desire at its most charming (and least conflictual) in the 
chivalry of Don Quixote, and at its most destructive. Girard believed that the theory of chivalry 
‘is a way of glorifying mimetic desire’.554 Significantly, for Girard, ‘[a]ll the ideas of the Western 
novel are present in germ in Don Quixote’.555 Girard understood Cervantes to have explored, 
through chivalric romance, the hitherto hidden world of mediated desire, and in doing so, to 
have plotted the course of the modern novel.    
 
552 Girard, Deceit, p. 4. 
553 Ibid, p. 49. 
554 Girard, Evolution and Conversion, p. 54. 
555 Girard, Deceit, p. 52. 
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From the perspective of mimetic theory, modernity emerged in the Renaissance, with 
authors like Cervantes and Shakespeare. Girard defined modernity as the ‘universalization of 
internal mediation’, an epoch defined by the absence of ‘areas of life that […] keep people 
apart from each other […]’.556 In Girard’s view a ‘type of external mediation still ruled in the 
Western Middle Ages’.557 Girard asserts that the dissolution of this hierarchical, ‘functional 
society’ occurred in the period between the Renaissance and the Enlightenment.558 However, 
Girard accepted that even the Middle Ages was not a completely ‘traditional’ society and it 
experienced ‘the disintegration of a certain type of order’ which had dominated ‘up to a point 
in the twelfth and thirteenth centuries and then breaks down’.559  If Cervantes is unique for 
having first explored mimetic desire in chivalric romance, the accounts of the life of Francis 
of Assisi indicate clearly that Francis’s personality and his desire was moulded precisely within 
the late medieval tradition of chivalric romance.560   
 
Several centuries before Cervantes, Francis was himself an aspiring knight errant, 
though he was born into the emerging urban, merchant class. Unlike Don Quixote, Francis’s 
model was not a single fictional knight, ‘the pole star, the morning star, the sun of all valiant 
knights and lovers’.561 His models were not limited to the courtly literature of the late Middle 
Ages; rather, Francis took his models from the rapidly changing social environment of 
thirteenth century Assisi. Here too, models abounded; self-made men like his father, Pietro 
di Bernardone. Francis proved capable of exploiting the weakening social boundaries which, 
according to Girard, had served to contain the conflicts produced by mimetic desire; he 
actively aspired to live the life of a noble. However, his desires were frustrated in the harsh 
reality of military defeat. He experienced a religious conversion which was also, properly 
 
556 Girard, Evolution and Conversion, p. 171. 
557 Ibid, p. 172. 
558 Ibid. 
559 Ibid. 
560 Girard himself referenced the thematic association between Saint Francis and chivalric desiring. ‘Great 
literature literally led me to Christianity. This is not original […] It happened to many great saints such as Saint 
Francis of Assisi and Saint Theresa of Avila who, like Don Quixote, were fascinated by novels of chivalry […] In 
my case, it was not Virgil or even Dante who guided me through hell, but the five novelists I discussed in my 
first book: Cervantes, Stendhal, Flaubert, Dostoevsky, and Proust’. René Girard, ‘Conversion in Literature and 
Christianity’ in Mimesis and Theory: Essays in Literature and Criticism, ed. René Girard (Stanford, California, 
Stanford University Press, [1999] 2008) pp. 263-64.  
561 Cervantes, Don Quixote, p. 202.  
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speaking, a mimetic conversion. The collapse of his ambitions did not lead to resentment, 
concealed envy, indifference or hatred; the characteristics of desire in the great modern 
novel. Neither did he merely transfer the value he had placed on the object of his desire 
(nobility) to another model/models. Such a transfer of value could not account for his 
religious and historical significance. In Francis, the convergence of a variety of social, religious 
and personal circumstances produced a movement that was both of its time and ‘modern’.562  
 
Francis of Assisi: A Mimetic Profile 
 
The available historical sources invite a mimetic profile of Francis of Assisi.563 Biographical 
details of the early life of Saint Francis portray a young man of confidence, ‘flamboyant 
display’, ‘vain accomplishments: wit, curiosity, practical jokes and foolish talk, songs, and soft 
and flowing garments’.564 The opening pages of the First Book of Thomas of Celano’s First Life 
of St Francis are framed in the highly moralistic language of a medieval hagiographer. Celano 
was concerned to present not a critical biographical account of Francis of Assisi and the early 
Franciscans, but to root Saint Francis in the Church’s tradition of sanctity. Thus, Celano 
contrasts the saintly founder of the Friars Minor with a pre-converted Francesco di 
Bernardone, whose parents had ‘reared him to arrogance in accordance with the vanity of 
the age’.565 Arrogance in this instance does not indicate an unpleasant or overbearing 
 
562 Beginning in the nineteenth century, Francis of Assisi has been characterised as a ‘modern’ figure. Henry 
Thode’s Franz von Assisi und die Anfange der Kunst in Italien, (1885) argued that the origins of the Italian 
Renaissance were rooted in the new spiritual sensitivity Francis popularized, which influenced art and wider 
culture. The Dutch scholar Johan Huizenga credited Saint Francis with shifting the nature and dating of the 
Renaissance from a phenomenon of the intellect to one of the affections: ‘The Renaissance […] was no longer 
a growth of the mind […] but a growth of the heart: the opening of the eyes and the soul to all the excellence 
of the world and the individual personality’. (Cited in Sabatier, Introduction, xv). According to Le Goff, ‘If Saint 
Francis was modern, it is because his century was so’, cf. Le Goff, p. 45. Both Francis and his times appear 
‘modern’, under certain aspects. A mimetic reading of early Franciscanism, may indicate why both Francis and 
his times appear to anticipate characteristics of modernity. 
563 In creating a mimetic profile of Saint Francis, I draw on various sources, already cited, and on scholarly 
editions of Saint Francis’s life. I pay particular attention to Thomas of Celano’s First Life. Jacques Dalarun has 
demonstrated that even in terms of a hagiographical work of its time, Celano’s First Life is faithful to Francis’s 
own narrative in the Testament, presenting us with a ‘conversion in several stages’ (p. 104). ‘[…] the whole 
basic structure (though not the whole substance), the outline of the first part of the First Life is filled with the 
writings of Francis. Among these, the one that stands out most of all is the only one that is autobiographical: 
the Testament’. (p. 108) Cf. Dalarun, pp. 104-108. I will also pay close attention to The Legend of the Three 
Companions, which Manselli regarded as the most ‘Assisian’ of the legendae. Ibid, p. 196. 
564 Thomas of Celano, The Life of St. Francis (1228-29) FA:ED (Vol 1) p. 183 [2]. (henceforth, Celano, First Life). 
565 Ibid, p. 182. [1]. This style is typical of the literary tradition of the medieval Church and the in particular, the 
influence of St. Augustine of Hippo (d. 430) on medieval hagiography. Celano contrasts the wretchedness and 
depravity of an unconverted youth with the excellence of the mature saint. Cf. note (b), ibid.  
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personality, since all the sources agree in presenting the young Francesco di Bernardone as 
courtly, affable and generous by temperament. Rather, arrogance suggests social ambitions 
and an interest in material wealth.566 But Celano allows that the pre-converted Francis, whilst 
wealthy, was ‘not greedy but extravagant, not a hoarder of money but a squanderer of his 
property’.  
 
Notwithstanding this moralistic tone Celano offers glimpses of the personality of 
Francis di Bernardone. Celano notes that Francis was ‘a rather kindly person, adaptable and 
quite affable, even though it made him look foolish’ and, on account of this attractive 
personality, ‘many went over to him’.567 Celano portrays an outgoing figure and one who 
provoked imitation and fascination in others: ‘Thus with his crowded procession of misfits he 
used to strut about impressively and in high spirits, making his way through the streets of 
Babylon’.568 Thompson characterises this following as societas iuventum, a kind of fraternity, 
‘young men’s dining club’.569 Such ‘confraternities of youth’ marked certain Church holidays, 
such as Holy Innocents with ‘farcical parades’. On the feast of Saint John the Baptist, ‘danced 
parodies’, recalling the dance of Salome were enacted; ‘demonstrations marked by ritual 
perversions’.570 As a wealthy young reveller his negative association with the ‘confraternity 
of youth’ was tempered by his general courtesy, charm and promise.571 Thompson suggests 
that the young Francis had a touch of ‘vanity and narcissism’. In a highly eccentric and 
provocatively mimetic manner he added patches of old cloth onto his fashionable, new 
garments, ‘producing outlandish and even clownlike effects’.572 The accounts of the young 
 
566 Cf. Brian Moloney, Francis of Assisi and His Canticle of Brother Sun Reassessed (New York: Palgrave 
Macmillan, 2013) p. 13. 
567 Celano, First Life, p. 184. 
568 Ibid. 
569 Thompson, p. 8. 
570 Vauchez, Francis of Assisi, p. 15. Vauchez notes that, throughout his life Francis had a taste for ‘disguise and 
even dressing up, which, by blurring established boundaries, laid bare the reality of his thoughts and impulsive 
actions’. Francis’s ‘provocative spirit’ was expressed in the ‘abolition of the distinctions between social 
classes’. Vauchez asserts that Francis ‘considered hierarchical distinctions nothing more than flexible standards 
which should not be treated like barriers – without, of course, ever claiming to abolish them or to deny their 
reality’. Ibid. 
571 Since contemporary sources give little information on the activities of Francis in such groups, Vauchez is 
unwilling to speculate. However, ‘sexual games, muggings and rapes were part of the normal activities of these 
bands of well-to-do bachelors […] this seductive young man had no reason to behave other than as the 
customs of his time and age group dictated’. Ibid, p. 16. 
572 Thompson, p. 9. 
 135 
Francis di Bernardone suggest both a model of desire, imitated by a fascinated group of 
admirers, and an imitator of the desires of others, notably members of the aristocratic class.  
 
Francis was fascinated by the models of the nobility and the culture of knightly 
chivalry.573 Another source of fascination for Francis Bernardone, which biographers noted, 
was his cultivation of the French language and French customs. The use of the French 
language was bound to heighten the mimetic fascination of his contemporaries; French being 
the language par excellence of poetry and chivalrous sentiment. Even after his conversion 
French ‘continued to be the language of his intimate outpourings’.574 He eagerly took part in 
military adventures, notably taking up arms against the rival city of Perugia, in the disastrous 
campaign that ended in defeat for Assisi at Collestrada (1202).575 Unlike the fictional Don 
Quixote, Francis di Bernardone’s aspiration to knighthood would have demanded not merely 
the acquisition of armour and weaponry, but also the mastery of horsemanship and a 
proficiency in the art of war. As Brian Moloney has observed: 
 
Learning to use heavy weapons – lance, sword, axe, or mace – means learning how to kill 
or maim other men as expeditiously and efficiently as possible. These were prices Francis 
was clearly willing to pay to achieve his ambition. He had thoroughly internalized the 
values of his society.576   
 
Francis was taken captive by the Perugians in 1202. During his imprisonment Francis was 
confined, not among his own class but with the nobility of Assisi, which indicate his ingenuity 
and his ability to cross the social boundaries into the nobility and knightly class.577  
 
 
573 Francis was influenced by the French ‘courtly romances’ and chansons de geste which had become popular 
at this time in Italy. The models of this genre were as diverse as Charlemagne, Roland, Olivier, Parsifal and 
Lancelot. Francis sought to imitate them and to distinguish himself by the practice of their virtues, 
‘magnanimity, generosity, and especially courtliness […] fundamentally, the courtly attitude of standing back 
from (or at least at some distance from) the rawness of desire and the aggressive assertion of one’s own 
power’. Vauchez, p. 17. 
574 Le Goff, p. 23.  
575 The Holy Roman Empire and the papacy were the dominant political powers in the late Middle Ages. The 
supporters of the papacy, known as Guelphs were mainly from the merchant class. The supporters of the Holy 
Roman Emperor were known as Ghibellines and were represented by the nobility (Maiores). Papal 
intervention in the internal politics of Assisi in 1198 provoked a Guelph uprising, which the sixteen-year-old 
Francis took part in. Some of the nobility fled to nearby Perugia for refuge. Moloney asserts that armed 
conflict was ‘more or less endemic’ at this time. Cf. Moloney, pp. 15-17.    
576 Ibid, p. 18. 
577 ‘[Francis] had led in his youth a chivalrous lifestyle, whose practice, as Marc Bloch has ably shown, 
sometimes permitted him to slip into the knightly class itself’. Le Goff, p. 83. 
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Celano has drawn attention to what, in the medieval mind, was an anomaly; that the 
son of a merchant was not remarkable for prudence, a hallmark of the merchant class, but 
had a reputation for generosity, a distinguishing feature of the nobility.578 The young Francis 
had ‘imitated the aristocracy and longed for their society’.579 Celano notes that ‘seething with 
desire’ Francis once followed a nobleman of Assisi to Apulia to achieve military glory in battle. 
It was on this journey, Celano recounts, that Francis had a dream in which his whole house 
was decorated with armour and weaponry, saddles, shields and spears. The dream delighted 
Francis but also puzzled him for, Celano notes, he was not used to seeing such things in his 
house but rather, ‘stacks of cloth to be sold’.580  
 
From these and other similar accounts of the young Francis a mimetic profile begins 
to emerge. Francis di Bernardone was able to subvert the strict social hierarchies by taking 
his models of desire from diverse and traditionally distinct social groups. Francis, the 
merchant’s son, proved he was capable at first to move socially upward into the nobility, 
taking models from among the nobility (the maiores) and, after his conversion, to move 
downward, below his own merchant class (known as the minores). In his descending move, 
his model was Christ, whom Francis understood as being revealed in poverty and humility: 
 
Behold, each day He humbles Himself as when He came from the royal throne into the 
virgin’s womb; each day He Himself comes to us, appearing humbly; each day He comes 
down from the bosom of the Father upon the altar in the hands of a priest.581 
 
This remarkable vacillation between classes indicates the fluid social boundaries which were 
the context of his life in the early thirteenth century. After his conversion Francis continued 
to interact with members of the nobility (and did not simply exclude them or form a 
movement that would be a ‘rivalrous twin’ to the aristocracy). Thus, we cannot detect in 
Francis traces of resentment, having been unable to successfully enter the ranks of the 
nobility. His post-conversion relationship with members of the nobility indicates neither a 
 
578 Cf. Le Goff, p. 83. 
579 Thompson, p. 46. 
580 Celano, First Life, [5] p. 186. In Le Goff ‘s view Celano’s makes his class-conscious point ‘somewhat 
maliciously’, Le Goff, p. 25. 
581 The Admonitions, [1], FA:ED (Vol 1) p. 129. Saint Francis experiences the humility and mercy of God in the 
sacramental economy of the Church. He has ‘a visceral need’ for the sacraments. Le Goff, p. 60.  
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fascination with their state nor an embittered confrontation.582 He received hospitality from 
the nobility and even accepted the gift of a mountain sanctuary from Count Orlando of Chiusi 
in 1213. In Girard’s literary hypothesis the collapse of strong social boundaries places the 
subject and the model in ever closer proximity, provoking morbid fascination, rivalry and 
violence. The late Middle Ages were mimetically less charged according to his scheme, since 
the social boundaries were largely intact. However, as Girard intimated, social change in the 
twelfth and thirteenth centuries allowed for a first intuition or indication of ‘universalized 
internal mediation’, i.e., modernity.583  
 
Conversion: The category of graced transformation 
 
Francis of Assisi: Conversion and the collapse of mimetic personality 
 
The conversion of Saint Francis is fundamental to the subsequent social and religious 
consciousness of the early Franciscan movement.584 I propose to read traditional accounts of 
the conversion of Francis through the hermeneutic of mimetic theory, indicating the contours 
of what may be called a ‘mimetic conversion’.585 The events surrounding the conversion of 
Saint Francis indicate a crisis of identity and meaning precipitated by the collapse of ambitions 
for inclusion in aristocratic and knightly society. The traumatic reality of feudal warfare, and 
his own military misadventure and subsequent imprisonment, led Francis to both physical 
and mental breakdown. The period of his imprisonment in Perugia and his life afterward in 
Assisi, a protracted period of crisis, lasted about eighteen months. Celano refers laconically 
to Francis, ‘worn down by a long illness’. Saint Francis was ransomed, probably in late 1203, 
 
582 Cf. Thomas of Celano, Remembrance of the Desire of a Soul (‘Second Life’ of Saint Francis) FA:ED (Vol 2) pp. 
266-67. Celano gives an account of Francis riding a donkey in the presence of an aristocratic brother Leonard. 
Francis anticipates the offended thoughts of brother Leonard and dismounts, insisting that Leonard, being 
nobly born, is worthier to mount the donkey. Such an account indicates a non-confrontational attitude 
towards the nobility, but in giving way, Francis exposed the dangers of aristocratic privilege. Saint Francis 
insists: ‘It is not right that I should ride while you go on foot, for in the world you were more noble and 
influential than I’. ‘Nobilitor et potentior’. Le Goff notes here that even when he respects natural hierarchies, 
Francis rejected the impermeability of the classes. Le Goff, p. 83. 
583 Girard, Evolution and Conversion, p. 171. 
584 For an exploration of the category of ‘conversion’, Andrew Buckser and Stephen D. Glazier, eds., The 
Anthropology of Religious Conversion (Lanham, Maryland: Rowman & Littlefield, 2003) and Lewis R. Rambo, 
Understanding Religious Conversion (New Haven, Connecticut: Yale University Press, 1995). 
585 Conversion in the Franciscan tradition presupposes an interdividual, rather than ‘innate’ dynamic. Francis of 
Assisi is converted through of a series of encounters with others. Cf. Pierre Brunette, O.F.M., Francis of Assisi 
and his Conversions. Trans by Paul Lachance, O.F.M., and Kathryn Krug (Quincy, Il, Franciscan Press, 1997). 
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his health severely damaged by his ordeals. Returning to Assisi, he would have found the city 
under papal interdict for the offence of having attacked the pro-papal city of Perugia. The 
interdict was lifted on 8th June 1204.586 Francis was a troubled, traumatised and weakened 
young man. He was also a man who in later life exhibited a ‘visceral need’ for the 
sacraments.587 The withholding of the spiritual means of healing and reconciliation as a 
penalty indicates the all-pervasive role of violence within ecclesial as well as social systems in 
the late Middle Ages.  
 
Early biographers have characterised this period in the life of Francis as a time of 
disturbing dreams and terrifying visions, a period of his life characterised by listlessness and 
a loss of purpose. Francis attempted to recapture his romantic ideal with another military 
adventure, this time joining an Assisi militia to fight with papal forces against the army of 
Frederick II. Francis, having acquired the arms and livery of a knight for the expedition, 
seemed unable to conjure his former enthusiasm for battle and offered his armour to a poor 
knight. He made some effort to join the expedition but at Spoleto, thirty miles from Assisi, he 
turned back. At Foligno he sold his arms and horse and walked back to Assisi. Francis offered 
the money from the sale of his horse and arms to the priest at San Damiano Church on the 
outskirts of Assisi. The priest, sceptical of Francis’s intentions and fearful of inviting conflict 
from the Bernardone family, refused the money.588 The priest at San Damiano suspected that 
he was being mocked, since ‘just the day before, [Francis] was living outrageously among his 
relatives and acquaintances and exalting his stupidity above others’.589 Nevertheless, Francis 
begged refuge at San Damiano and began, in his troubled state, to convince the priest of his 
sincerity. The priest accepted Francis’s request.  
 
In Assisi, the former bon viveur, who used ‘to strut about impressively and in high 
spirits’ was now a source of puzzlement and concern for family and associates. Medieval 
biographers characterised this period as a time of self-loathing and of God-given humiliations, 
 
586 Thompson, p. 9. 
587 Le Goff, p. 60. 
588 Celano, First Life, FA:ED (Vol 1) p. 189. 
589 Ibid. 
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required to purge his earlier vanity.590 Even at a distance of several centuries the records 
suggest that the trauma of his involvement in a series of violent conflicts had taken a heavy 
psychological toll on Francis. Propelled by the borrowed desires of the nobility and knightly 
class, Francis had experienced neither glory in battle nor, we may conjecture, the ideal of 
chivalry to which he aspired. The collapse of his patterns of desire effectively ended his own 
youthful ambitions which had been tied to his family’s fortunes and his father’s ambition. 
According to the narratives, the person most disturbed by the Francis’ existential crisis was 
his father, Pietro. 
 
The Old Models of Desire: Pietro di Bernardone 
 
In the early Franciscan legendae Francis’s style of life, which imitated that of the aristocracy, 
is frequently contrasted with his humbler origins as a merchant’s son. It was noted that in 
appearance, Francis resembled the son of a prince rather than the son of a merchant.591 The 
borrowed desires of Francis di Bernardone came from outside his social class, but they were 
clearly a source of satisfaction to his father Pietro. Pietro di Bernardone is a ‘very disturbing 
figure’ in Celano’s First Life of Saint Francis.592 A relatively late narrative of Francis’s birth cast 
his mother Pica in the role of Elizabeth, choosing for her son the name John.593 Drawing on 
this tradition Thompson notes that Pietro is represented as the anti-Zechariah figure who 
refused the name John and imposed on his son the name Francesco.594 In his later life Francis 
instructed the friars to humiliate him by referring to him as ‘a worthless peasant day-labourer’ 
(rusticum, mercanarium, et inutilem).595 Responding to these characterizations Francis said, 
‘Yes, that is what the son of Pietro di Bernardone needs to hear’. The adult Pietro was neither 
rustic or worthless. Rather, he had become a successful and wealthy merchant. Thompson, 
suggests that Pietro may have come from a humbler ancestry. He may have been among the 
 
590 Celano, First Life, FA:ED (Vol 1) p. 184-5: ‘Thus worn down by his long illness, as human obstinacy deserves 
since it is rarely remedied except through punishment, he began to mull over with himself things that were not 
usual for him […] the beauty of the fields, the delight of the vineyards, and whatever else was beautiful to see 
could offer him no delight at all […] From that day he began to regard himself as worthless and to hold in some 
contempt  what he had previously held as admirable and lovable’.   
591 Legend of the Three Companions, FA:ED (Vol 1) p. 68. 
592 Delarun, p. 113. Cf. 1 Celano, FA:ED (Vol 1) pp. 190-93. 
593 Cf. Arnald of Sarrant, The Kinship of Saint Francis (1365), FA:ED (Vol 1) pp. 673-733 (p. 683). 
594 Cf. Thompson, p. 7. 
595 Ibid, p. 6. Cf. Celano, First Life, FA:ED (Vol 1) p. 228. 
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many rural dwellers who fled the country areas to work in the expanding urban economies 
during the twelfth century.596 If this is the case, Pietro’s own social advance, from rustic 
labourer to wealthy merchant, must have been as audacious as his son’s aspirations to the 
nobility. 
 
Pietro’s wealth funded his son’s social life and his aspirations to join a higher social 
class. Francis’s ‘noble’ virtues; magnanimity, generosity and courtliness, not only made him a 
source of fascination to members of his own class, but signalled his sympathy with the 
aristocratic class.597 Within the aristocratic class courtliness and generosity were emblematic 
of an elite perspective and a rejection of the values of lower classes; the avaricious and 
parsimonious values of the merchant class, for example.598 There is no indication in the 
legendae that Pietro disapproved of his son’s profligate habits, until after Francis’s return 
from imprisonment in Perugia, when he relinquished his armour to a poor knight and sold his 
horse and weapons in order to give alms to a priest. It is here that profligacy was no longer a 
strategy for inclusion in a higher social order, but rather a meaningless gesture and baleful 
offence to his father’s family ambitions. Pietro is a recognisable motif in the hagiographies, 
but he is also a remarkably accurate embodiment of the complex social evolution which 
Francis lived through. In the hagiographies, Pietro is a wholly unsympathetic character, 
avaricious, violent and uncomprehending. Beyond hagiography, Pietro’s reaction to his son is 
at least explicable, if not understandable.  
 
Francis’s ‘former prodigality, allied with charm and courtesy was now replaced by, 
what his father regarded as a less appealing, perhaps compulsive dissipation of wealth, a 
guilty almsgiving, rather than a courtly benevolence’.599 Francis’s use of Pietro’s wealth, 
originally part of a careful strategy to enter the nobility was, from Pietro’s perspective, 
increasingly squandered on absurd and meaningless gestures. Francis’s seclusion in the 
 
596 Thompson, p. 7.  
597 Celano, First Life, P. 185, [5]: ‘a certain nobleman from the town of Assisi was furnishing himself on a large 
scale with military weaponry and, swollen by the wind of empty glory, he asserted solemnly that he was going 
to Apulia to enrich himself in money or distinction. When Francis heard of this, because he was whimsical and 
overly daring, he agreed to go with him. Although Francis did not equal him in nobility of birth, he did outrank 
him in graciousness; and though poorer in wealth, he was richer in generosity’. 
598 Cf. Vauchez, p. 17. 
599 Thompson, p. 13. 
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vicinity of San Damiano aroused shock and confusion in his family. To avoid his father, Francis 
hid for periods of time in a pit or a cave.600 Francis’s behaviour had gone from ‘moody and 
distracted to withdrawn and isolated and finally to bizarre and self-destructive’.601 His pattern 
of life at this stage was one of mortifications and he appeared emaciated and unkempt. On 
his return to Assisi he was mocked and ridiculed. Celano allows Pietro no compassion or 
understanding for his son; rather his personal sense of humiliation had hardened his heart 
towards Francis and ‘with no restraint, he pounced on Francis like a wolf on a lamb, and 
glaring at him savagely, he grabbed him and shamelessly dragged him home’. Saint Francis 
was imprisoned in his own home, where his father ‘badgered him, beat him, and bound 
him’.602 
 
When Pietro departed for a business trip the saint’s mother, pitying her son, released 
him from imprisonment. 603 The tensions of several months reached a disturbing and violent 
climax as an enraged Pietro, on returning from his business abroad, discovered his son to be 
a fugitive. Francis had returned again to his poor dwelling on the outskirts of Assisi. Pietro 
‘raced to the place shaking and screaming, so that if he could not call his son back, he might 
at least drive him from the area’.604 Thompson proposes some mitigation for Pietro’s violent 
expulsion of his son.605 The hagiographic symmetry of chapter VI of Celano’s First Life, perhaps 
conceals the long months of frustration suffered by Pietro and the financial risk the family 
faced. Francis is referred to as the ‘child of grace’ and, the ‘greatest scorner of the things of 
the earth and the outstanding seeker of heavenly riches’. Pietro is presented as avaricious 
and cruel. The rivalrous element of the relationship is alluded to in Celano’s First Life. Pietro 
‘became obsessed with recovering the money’ Francis had made from the sale of the horse. 
Celano observed that the money was in no sense a desired object for Francis, who ‘was not 
bound by any affection for it’ and ‘was not disturbed in any way by its loss’. On recovering the 
money Pietro led his son to the Bishop of Assisi, to make him renounce into the bishop’s hands 
 
600 Celano, First Life, FA:ED, (Vol 1) p. 190. Legend of the Three Companions, FA:ED (Vol 2) p. 80 
601 Thompson, p. 14. 
602 Celano, First Life, FA:ED, (Vol 1) p. 193. 
603 As a merchant in the cloth trade Pietro di Bernardone may have travelled to the Cloth markets in 
Champagne, along the trade route from the Mediterranean to the North Sea. Cloth trade was well established 
in Troyes, Provins, Bar-sur-Aube, and Lagny. After a journey of some weeks, Pietro di Bernardone must have 
hoped to return to Assisi to find his son chastened and docile. Cf. Celano, First Life FA:ED (Vol 1) p. 192 (b). 
604 Celano, First Life, FA:ED (Vol 1) p. 193. 
605 Cf. Thompson, pp. 14-17. 
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all rights of inheritance. Francis happily acceded to this demand and stripped his clothes (‘He 
did not even keep his trousers on’). Celano’s First Life uses the motif of nudity to convey a 
spiritual rebirth.606 However, later sources link spiritual rebirth with the repudiation of Pietro: 
‘Until now I have called Pietro di Bernardone my father. But, because I proposed to serve God, 
I return to him the money on account of which he was so upset, and also the clothing which 
is his, wanting to say from now on: “Our Father who are in heaven” and not “My father Pietro 
di Bernardone”’.607   
 
Pietro’s role as model and obstacle in Francis’s life is significant and it admits a 
Girardian reading. In his essays on the Oedipus myth Girard accepts the Oedipal triangle 
proposed by Freud, but he refutes Freud’s hypothesis that desire for the mother is intrinsic. 
As Mark Anspach explains:  
 
[T]he son’s ‘oedipal’ urges actually derive from the father himself in his role as model […] 
the father can be perceived as an obstacle and rival only ‘when the diminution of his 
paternal authority has brought him into a direct confrontation with his son, obliging him 
to occupy the same sphere’ in other words, only when the father-son relationship has 
succumbed to the spread of internal mediation.608  
 
Anspach notes that Freud’s Oedipus is forever bound to a primordial object, the mother, and 
a primordial rival, the father, and later relationships, for better or for worse, perpetually re-
enact this original triangle. Girard ‘unbinds’ Oedipus, cutting him loose from any particular 
object and endowing him (and every person) with a primordial desire that is abstract, 
metaphysical and utterly open-ended, ‘capable of remolding itself in protean fashion to fit 
the mediator of the moment’.609 Described in terms of mimetic theory, the relationship of 
Francis and Pietro di Bernardone is one of shared/borrowed desires; the model becomes the 
rival and the objects of desire (status, social acceptance, wealth) are all but destroyed as the 
rivalry increases. When Francis returned the money, Celano records, ‘the rage of his angry 
 
606 This is explicit in Henri d’Avranches’s work The Versified Life of Saint Francis, FA:ED (Vol 1) p. 449: ‘Without 
a stitch, stark naked he stands, for all the world like Adam. But he differs from Adam in this: he suffers freely 
what Adam was forced to endure’. 
607 Legend of the Three Companions, FA:ED (Vol 2) p. 80. In Celano’s later Life, The Remembrance of the Desire 
of a Soul, FA:ED (Vol 2) p. 251, Celano includes this evangelical renunciation of Pietro, absent from the First 
Life.  
608 Mark R. Anspach, Introduction, xxxvi-xxxvii, in Girard, Oedipus Unbound.  
609 Ibid, xxxvii. 
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father was dampened a little’. But this was not enough; public humiliation and a formal 
renunciation of the family fortune was demanded. Francis ‘hastened joyfully and eagerly to 
do what was demanded’, indicating that wealth and social status were no longer objects of 
desire, and that his father was no longer his model or his rival. 
 
The declaration that henceforth he would not call Pietro di Bernardone his father, and 
henceforth he would only say ‘Our Father in heaven’, coming later in the sources, may be a 
hagiographic trope. Nevertheless, it recalls the Gospel counsel to ‘call no man your father on 
earth, for you have one father who is in heaven’ (Matthew, 23. 9). James Alison has explored 
this text in relation to mimetic theory and has concluded that this injunction signals the 
unique Gospel revelation that all human culture is established on a fratricidal murder, that of 
Abel by Cain and that all humans are, by virtue of that origin, radically distorted in our willing 
and our knowing. There are in fact two paternities, that of the Father ‘which is accessible in 
and through the imitative creation of an inclusive fraternity following Jesus,’ or the paternity 
which in its cultural, religious and even biological forms is implicated in and reflects ‘the 
murderous distortion of fraternity into fratricide’.610  
 
The early narratives of Francis’s life have produced both the hagiographic Francis of 
the thirteenth century and the romantic Francis of the nineteenth and twentieth centuries. I 
have argued that mimetic theory offers us another Francis; Francis as Homo Mimeticus. The 
‘mimetic’ Francis was both a subject and a model of borrowed desire. Living in the early 
thirteenth century, he witnessed (and took advantage of) the weakening of the traditional 
barriers, characteristic of a social order still governed by external mediation.  Francis stands 
between the worlds of external and internal mediation. He is not a romantic hero, but in 
choosing Christ as his model he is, in mimetic terms, a saint.611 The category which allows us 
to break free from the romantic hero is ‘conversion’.  
 
Francis of Assisi: From Homo Mimeticus to Saint 
 
 
610 James Alison, ‘Jesus’ Fraternal Relocation of God’ in Faith Beyond Resentment, pp. 64-5. 
611 Cf. Girard, Evolution and Conversion, pp. 160-61. The choice of Christ as one’s model is part of the part of 
‘the discovery that we have always, without being aware of it, been imitating the wrong kind of models who 
lead us into the vicious circle of scandals and perpetual frustration’. p. 160.  
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The conversion experience of Saint Francis is centred around a number of historical and 
interdividual loci, which include a renunciation of family and commune, in Assisi.612 From his 
release from Perugia, however, the church of San Damiano becomes the privileged place of 
conversion. Certain legends depict the events at San Damiano in dramatic, miraculous 
terms.613 In Celano’s First Life, however, the circumstances of the conversion are suggested 
in terms of certain actions which, in themselves, are not extraordinary. For André Vauchez 
Francis’s conversion experience ‘encompasses a whole series of very different episodes 
among which it is not easy to find a connecting thread’. While later legends offer precise 
moments of conversion, Celano’s First Life is ‘imprecise about the exact moment when his 
subject was truly transformed’.614 Celano’s conversion account is perhaps the most reliable; 
he presents us with a troubled, traumatized man who had already begun to withdraw from 
the familial and social systems in which he had formed and modelled his desires.  
 
Living at San Damiano, Francis adopted the common medieval spiritual remedies for 
mental disturbance or spiritual weakness: he mortified his body, gave alms and made vigils of 
prayer. A spiritual remedy which Francis employed was a pilgrimage to Rome. In Rome he 
exchanged cloths with a beggar at Saint Peter’s Basilica, he begged in French, having cast his 
coins ostentatiously at the grill before the altar in Saint Peter’s. While Le Goff argues that 
‘little credence can be given to Celano’s account of Saint Francis’s trip to Rome and his 
interaction with the beggars there, Thompson considers the account plausible.615 It suggests 
a typical medieval remedy for a deeply troubled young man, whose troubles were inevitably 
understood at that time as spiritual in nature. The account of the pilgrimage to Rome is 
therefore realistic, as is the account of his unusual interaction with the beggars.616  
 
 
612 The Commune refers to the social, economic and political structure of the late medieval Italian city-state. 
Comparatively more participative than the powerful feudal families, the Commune was nevertheless a vehicle 
for the rising Merchant and middle class, and operated in their interests. It is characterized by Fortini as 
materially acquisitive and motivated by economic expansion. Cf. Arnoldo Fortini, Francis of Assisi, trans. Helen 
Moak (New York, Crossroad Publishing, 1992) p. 158. 
613 Legend of the Three Companions, FA:ED (Vol 2) p. 76. 
614 Vauchez, p. 20. 
615 Cf. Le Goff, p. 27 and Thompson, p. 13. 
616 Cf. The Legend of the Three Companions, FA:ED (Vol 1) p. 73. Jacques Dalarun has noted, however, that in 
an earlier source, the recently published Vita Brevio of Celano, Francis’s original visit to Rome was a business 
trip (a ‘merchant among merchants’) and not a pilgrimage. Cf. Jacques Dalarun, The Rediscovered Life of St 
Francis of Assisi by Thomas of Celano, trans. Timothy J. Johnson. (New York: St Bonaventure University, 2016). 
 145 
Celano’s account of Saint Francis’s life is schematized by several changes of clothing, 
from the ‘foppish and idle adolescent who loved to dress after the mode of his class’, to the 
knight in livery and armour, to the clothes of a beggar and later a hermit. Twice in the 
narrative, when he renounces his ties to his father Pietro and as he lay dying, Saint Francis 
strips naked. The frequent change of outward attire, observed by early biographers, suggests 
a man accustomed to taking a variety of different models for his desire.617 The traumatised 
young man who traded places with a beggar was reaching the extremes of imitation in his 
search for a model. Francis’s erratic behaviour, once tolerated as charming and idiosyncratic, 
was at this time tending towards the obsessive and even, Celano suggested, insanity.618    
 
Girard notes that ‘faced with a collapse the subject may decide the object was a fraud, 
it never had the value attributed to it and he will confer the value on another object’.619 It 
could be argued on the evidence of the sources that Francis, having been frustrated in his 
knightly ambitions, merely transferred his desires onto religious models. In the dream of a 
house ‘filled with soldier’s arms’, Celano’s interpretation indicates a straightforward transfer 
of desire, from temporal, earthly militancy, to a heavenly militancy. This simple transfer of 
desire to another and higher model is explicit in Celano.620 
 
Celano makes use of this hagiographic trope; the defeated soldier whose defeat leads 
him to embrace a higher cause: ‘Francis, Christ’s bravest soldier, went around the cities and 
villages proclaiming the kingdom of God and preaching peace’.621 The re-presentation of 
Francis from an aspiring knight in armour into a spiritual warrior of Christ is, perhaps, too neat 
and obscures what was a long and painful realignment of patterns of desire from the rivalrous 
and confrontational to the pacific. Francis did not simply confer the value of one model onto 
another, rather, he experienced a protracted and uncertain period of existential collapse. The 
early Lives indicate that Francis endured a lengthy period of emotional and spiritual 
 
617 Cf. Lawrence Cunningham, ‘Francis of Assisi as a Catholic Saint’, Logos: A Journal of Catholic Thought and 
Culture, 9, 1, (2006), 56-71 (p. 60). 
618 Cf. Celano, First Life, FA:ED, (Vol 1) p. 191: ‘when those that knew him saw him, they compared his latest 
circumstances with his former and they began to reproach him harshly. Shouting that he was insane and out of 
his mind, they threw mud from the streets and stones at him’. 
619 Girard, Deceit, p. 90 
620 Celano, First Life, p. 186. 
621 Ibid, pp. 214-5. Also, cf. The Versified Life of Saint Francis, FA:ED, (Vol 1) pp. 440-1. 
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breakdown, during which time he was burdened by guilt and remorse for his past sins and 
lost his following of admiring friends. 622  
 
In the first stage of his conversion Francis withdrew from the protecting systems of 
family and commune. In the winter of 1206 Francis was wandering alone in the Spoleto valley 
where he was robbed and beaten.623 He served for a time as a scullery worker in the kitchen 
of a monastic community and from there moved on to Gubbio. It was at this time, Celano 
writes, that Francis encountered the lepers. He lodged in a house for lepers and undertook 
the lowly and demanding tasks of cleaning and caring for the lepers. In his Testament, Francis 
would recall these encounters with the lepers as the turning point or conversion of his life. 
Francis acknowledged in his Testament a natural aversion to lepers, which he described as 
‘bitter’. In the circumstances of his conversion this aversion was transformed into 
‘sweetness’. Girard, writing of the process of conversion in Dostoyevsky’s novels, described 
conversion, not as conferring value onto another model but something akin to an inversion: 
 
In renouncing divinity the hero renounces slavery. Every level of his existence is inverted, 
all the effects of metaphysical desire are replaced by contrary effects. Deception gives way 
to truth, anguish to remembrance, agitation to repose, hatred to love, humiliation to 
humility, mediated desire to autonomy, deviated transcendency to vertical 
transcendency’.624 
  
Thompson notes that at this point in his life, ‘Francis’s aesthetic sense, so central to his 
personality, has been transformed, even inverted’.625 His emotional response to lepers may 
properly be called an inversion, since encounters previously experienced as ‘bitter’ were 
transformed into ‘sweetness of soul and body’.626 The sources indicate that Francis’s 
encounter with the lepers marked a long-desired release from guilt and anxiety about his 
past, now characterized as ‘the days of his vanity’.627 Thompson asserts that, in his encounter 
with the lepers, Francis sensed himself ‘remade’ and his torment about past sins disappeared 
 
622 Celano writes of Francis in this period as in a ‘pit and in darkness’. His life was taken up with ‘fasting and 
weeping’ as he became burdened by guilt. Ibid, p. 191 
623 Celano, First Life, FA:ED (Vol 1) p. 194. 
624 Girard, Deceit, p. 294. 
625 Thompson, p. 17. 
626 The Testament, FA:ED Vol (1), p. 124. 
627 Cf. First Celano, FA:ED Vol (1), p. 195. 
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in a moment of ‘rebirth and healing’.628 Being at once released from the guilt of his past life 
(a past associated with rivalry, revelry, social ambition and warfare), Francis is removed to 
the company of the outcast, the leper. But his attitude towards the leper has changed 
completely. This is characteristic of the ‘intelligence of the victim’: an awareness that our 
consciousness has been formed in rivalry and that in the pursuit of borrowed desire we have 
excluded others.629   
 
Girard’s novelistic conversion releases the romantic hero from an enervating circuit of 
models and subjects of desire. At the moment of conversion ‘[…] exhausted, the hero finally 
lets himself fall into the abyss. He expects to smash against the rocks below but instead he is 
supported by the air: the law of gravity is annulled’.630 Girard’s collaborator, the psychiatrist 
J. M. Oughourlian makes use of this early Girardian reference to desire as gravity:   
 
Just as in the cosmos, the planets, stars, and galaxies are simultaneously held together 
and kept apart by gravity, so also mimesis keeps human beings together and apart, 
assuring at one and the same time the cohesion of the social fabric and the relative 
autonomy of the members that make it up. In physics, it is the force of attraction, gravity, 
that holds bodies together in space. They would be pitilessly hurled against each other 
into a final fusion if gravity did not preserve their autonomy, and hence, their existence, 
through motion. In psychology, the movement of mimesis that renders one autonomous 
and relatively individual is called ‘desire’.631  
 
Francis of Assisi’s conversion, which is the locus of what will become the Franciscan 
movement is, in Girard’s terms, a release from the gravitational pull of borrowed desires. 
Oughourlian, following Hegel, postulates that ‘desire gives rise to the self and, by its 
movement, animates it’. Having broken free from the gravitational pull of borrowed desires, 
specifically those desires modelled by the nobility, Francis is transformed. The self which 
collapses in conversion is not replaced by a new, ‘natural’, autonomous self. It is not at this 
point that Francis of Assisi becomes the romantic hero he had desired to be. Rather, as Girard 
asserts, in the dynamic of conversion the Holy Spirit assumes an influence and a role which is 
experienced as the inversion of rivalrous mimetic desires. The grace of conversion is 
exemplified in the post-Resurrection disciples. After the Resurrection, ‘[…] It would be false, 
 
628 Cf. Thompson, p. 17. 
629 Cf. note 14, above. 
630 Girard, Deceit, p. 294. 
631 J. M. Oughourlian, The Puppet of Desire, (Stanford, California: Stanford University Press, 1991) pp. 11-12.  
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for example, to say the disciples “regained possession of themselves”; it is the Spirit of God 
that possesses them and does not let them go’.632  
 
The presence of the Holy Spirit is a non-rivalrous presence, thus the converted do not 
resent lacking their ‘true’ autonomous self, rather they find their true self now, ‘hidden in 
Christ’. (Colossians, 3. 3). Kaplan notes that for Girard, there is ‘no holiness without the 
renunciation of pride, though lack of certainty and of confidence can accompany true 
holiness’.633 The converted person’s life is grounded in the Holy Spirit and lacks the 
pretensions to ‘originality’, ‘spontaneity’ and ‘autonomy’, characteristic of the romantic hero. 
Francis exhibited an extraordinary certitude in those things which were ‘revealed’ to him by 
God and were fundamental to the forma vitae. At the same time, he often showed himself 
uncertain and reached important decisions either on advice from others or by some form of 
prayerful discernment or consultation. From the beginning of his conversion, he adopted a 
consistent practice of consulting the scriptures, specifically the Gospels, for directions and 
indications.  
 
In the two years after his initial conversion experiences, Francis had taken on the life 
of a hermit, nominally under the jurisdiction of the Church but essentially free to organise his 
life around the care of lepers, the rebuilding of churches, casual labour and prayers. The 
sources suggest that sometime in 1208, while attending Mass, Francis heard the Gospel 
account of Jesus sending out the disciples (Matthew 11. 7-10) and this text became 
programmatic for his pattern for Gospel living.634 He relinquished his leather belt and 
replaced it with a cord. He adopted a tunic that was very poor, plain and rough, so that it 
would not be coveted.635 He chalked a cross on the back of his tunic, to symbolize taking the 
up the cross, not in the sense of going on crusade, but of inhabiting the cross for protection, 
 
632 Girard, I See Satan Fall, p. 189. 
633 Kaplan, ‘Saint Versus Hero’, p. 158. 
634 Théophile Desbonnets notes that Saint Francis’s appropriation of the Gospel takes on a deeper 
ecclesial/theological significance in the later sources: Celano’s First Life (1228-29) records that Saint Francis 
hears the Gospel. Julian of Speyer’s Life of Saint Francis (1232-35) notes that he hears the Gospel ‘at Mass’ and 
Saint Bonaventure’s Major Life, III, 1, (1260-66) notes that he hears the Gospel at Mass, ‘on the feast of the 
Apostles’. Saint Francis’s conversion is described, in time, under the rubric of the Church’s sacramental and 
apostolic character. Cf. Desbonnets, p. 6. 
635 Cf. Celano, First Life, FA:ED (Vol 1), p. 202. 
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or simply in obedience to the Gospel mandate.636 The conversion process of Francis can be 
described in three movements:  
 
Saint Francis was converted from a life of luxury and status and withdrew from the familial 
and social systems in which those desires were accommodated and encouraged. The care for 
lepers was the practical expression of this conversion. His conversion to the hermit’s life gave 
some structural stability to this withdrawal from familial and social systems, though it had a 
temporary status. The occasion of hearing the Gospel read at Mass signalled a deepening of 
the conversion. Francis understood his vocation as a call to itinerant (lay) preaching, 
depending on providence, and taking as his model the poor Christ. Abandoning the garb of a 
hermit, Francis was indicating a new forma vitae.637  
 
A Freudian Misreading of Saint Francis: Francis the Anti-Hero 
 
As I have noted above, for Girard, Freudian desire misrepresents the true nature of desire by 
ontologizing family relationships and binding desire intrinsically to paternal/filial 
relationships. In another respect Freud is worthy of our attention: I will now argue that 
Freud’s mis-reading of Francis of Assisi is an early example of Francis the ‘anti-hero’. 
Furthermore, I will indicate in the next chapter how this neo-romantic, anti-heroic 
interpretation of Francis has, in recent years, found expression in some critical academic 
studies of Saint Francis and the early friars. 
 
Freud undertook a study of Francis of Assisi in section four of Civilization and its 
Discontents.638 Freud describes universal ‘Christian’ love as an ‘unchangeable, undeviating, 
tender attitude’ and he adds that ‘Saint Francis of Assisi may have carried this method of using 
love to produce an inner feeling of happiness as far as anyone’.639 Freud argues that love is a 
specific activity, directed towards particular persons, for particular reasons. Its specificity 
entails the pains, tensions and disappointments which are characteristic of a properly erotic 
and embodied love. Freud raised two objections against universal love: ‘a love that does not 
 
636 Cf. Matthew 10. 38, and 16. 24, Mark, 8. 34, Luke 9. 23 and 14. 27. 
637 Francis and the early friars were frequently referred to  simply as ‘penitents’.  
638 Sigmund Freud, Civilization and its Discontents (London: Penguin, 2002). 
639 Ibid, p. 20. 
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discriminate seems to us to lose some of its value, since it does an injustice to its object. And 
secondly, not all men are worthy of love’.640  Freud’s aim, according to Jennifer Leader is to 
demystify magical and metaphysical explanations of human nature and the world.641 From a 
perspective ‘as yet unexploded by the postmodern affirmation of multiple subjectivities’ 
Freud asserted that ‘there are no sources of knowledge of the universe other than the 
intellectual working-over of carefully scrutinized observations – in other words, what we call 
research – and alongside it no knowledge derived from revelation, intuition, or divination’.642 
Denying the possibility of what I have called ‘conversion intelligence’, Freud is compelled to 
consider Saint Francis the romantic anti-hero of Christianity and emblematic of religious 
mystification.  
 
The Saint Francis Freud identifies (and repudiates) is a romantic construction. Freud’s 
assertion that all men are not ‘worthy’ of love is related to his insistence that ‘men are not 
gentle, friendly creatures wishing for love, who simply defend themselves if they are 
attacked’.643 Freud’s research indicated rather that they are the sort of creature for whom 
their neighbour is ‘a temptation […] to gratify their aggressiveness on him, to exploit his 
capacity for work without recompense, to use him sexually, without his consent, to seize his 
possessions, to humiliate him, to cause him pain, to torture and kill him’. Freud rejects any 
moral system in which a person sublimates love to such a degree that those persons most 
unworthy of love are loved indiscriminately, for the benefit of the one who loves. Without 
denying the agonistic anthropology Freud described, Girard maintained that through 
conversion the same violence one sees so clearly in others may be recognized in oneself.   
 
The sublimation of love to its highest degree, so as to attain happiness, is a project 
wholly void of conversion or grace. What Freud and the romantic movement ignored is the 
real conversion in which Francis’s patterns of desire and models of desire collapse, creating a 
graced understanding, the ‘intelligence of the victim’. Francis, on this account does not 
approach the lepers to include them in his project of sublimation; this is properly speaking 
 
640 Ibid. 
641 Jennifer Leader, ‘Freud and St. Francis’ in Divine Aporia: Postmodern Conversations about the Other. Edited. 
John C. Hawley (London: Associated University Presses, 2000) pp. 249-61. 
642  Cf. Cited in Jennifer Leader, ‘Freud and St. Francis’, p. 251. 
643 Sigmund Freud, Civilization and its Discontents. Cited in Jennifer Leader ‘Freud and St. Francis’, p. 257. 
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the romantic ideal. Rather, in showing mercy to the lepers Francis discovers himself released 
from the guilt of his own past sins. The leper and the outcast were not the romantic foils to 
Francis’s heroic life; they were the graced encounter by which Francis was released from his 
own rivalrous desires, and simultaneously absolved from complicity in a life hitherto 
enmeshed in violence and exclusion. 
 
Rather than sublimation, conversion explains the inversion of values which 
characterize Francis’s encounter with the leper and the outcast; In renouncing divinity the 
hero renounces slavery. This inversion explains the costly reordering of desires which may 
appear, from the outside, as one more attempt to achieve mastery, divinity. The psychological 
and spiritual inversion associated with Francis’s response to the lepers suggests the ‘two 
trumpets’ of scripture which announce Christ as both ‘the fairest of the children of men’ 
(Psalm 44) and insist that ‘he had no beauty, no majesty to draw our eyes, no grace to make 
us delight in him’. (Isaiah 53, 2).644 The inversion produced by mimetic conversion functions 
outside of the dynamic of rivalrous desire and produces a paradoxical intelligence. The ‘fairest 
of the children of men’ is recognised, for the first time, as the despised outcast, the suffering 




In this chapter I have argued that interpretations of historical sources of Saint Francis’s life 
have produced, first a stylized, medieval saint and, more recently a romantic hero. Drawing 
on mimetic theory I have critiqued the romantic interpretation on the basis that it mystifies 
and obscures the historical, cultural and theological significance of Francis. Dethroning 
romanticism is the first essential phase of a mimetic reading of the early Franciscan 
movement. Using the historical sources, I have proposed a ‘mimetic profile’ of Francis, one 
which takes seriously the borrowed nature of desire and the social and cultural factors which 
both shape and are shaped by mimetic desire. This reading of Francis hinges on the category 
of conversion. Conversion produces not a romantic hero but a saint. In Girardian terms, a 
 
644 Cf. Joseph Ratzinger, ‘The Feeling of Things, the Contemplation of Beauty’. Message of His Eminence 




saint has undergone a graced collapse of rivalrous desiring and emerged with what Alison has 
termed the ‘intelligence of the victim’. The desires of the saint are, henceforth patterned on 
the non-rivalrous desires of Christ. By observing this dynamic in the life of Francis, the 
romantic fallacy is avoided. Finally, I have indicated that the romantic mis-reading of Francis 
is open to negative as well as positive representations, equally misleading and unhelpful. It is 






The Cultural Context of the Early Franciscan Movement 
 
Introduction and Methodology 
 
In the previous chapter I applied mimetic theory to accounts of the life of Francis, critiquing 
the dominant romantic and hagiographic interpretations. The romantic interpretation in 
particular has served to mystify and obscure the core values of Saint Francis and the dynamics 
of the early Franciscan movement. In this I drew on the first stage of Girard’s work; a mimetic 
reading of desire in literature. Having outlined a ‘mimetic profile’ of Saint Francis in the 
previous chapter, I will explore the social and cultural context of the early Franciscan 
movement. Girard’s treatment of culture, in the second stage of his work, draws our attention 
to the role of violence in creating and maintaining social order. I will explore the early 
Franciscan’s creative and non-violent response to the social order, through the lens of 
voluntary poverty. Voluntary poverty was emblematic of the early Franciscan’s non-
confrontational withdrawal from the dominant social and ecclesial systems. It was not merely 
a romantic choice, rather by choosing poverty the early Franciscans were free to establish 
their unique forma vitae, oriented to non-rivalrous community and peace-making. The 
chapter will be divided into two parts: 
 
1. An evaluation of recent critical interpretations of Francis of Assisi and early Franciscan 
voluntary poverty (i.e., Hamilton (2015) and Baxter Wolf (2003)).645 I will critique these 
interpretations by exploring the historical context of the late twelfth-early thirteenth 
centuries, specifically the questions of rapid social change and the role of violence, 
which Hamilton and Baxter Wolf neglect. 
2. An exploration of the work of Sean Edward Kinsella, linking voluntary poverty with 
early Franciscan peace-making.646 I will argue that Kinsella offers a more compelling 
 
645 Brian Hamilton, Pauperes Christi: Voluntary Poverty as Political Practice (Doctoral Thesis, University of 
Indiana, ProQuest Dissertations Publishing, 2015) and Kenneth Baxter Wolf, The Poverty of Riches: St Francis of 
Assisi Reconsidered (New York: Oxford University Press, 2003). 
646 Sean Edward Kinsella, The Lord Give You Peace: Poverty and Violence in the Writings and Early Lives of Saint 
Francis of Assisi (Doctoral Thesis, University of St Michael’s College, Canada, ProQuest Dissertations Publishing, 
2003). 
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reading of early Franciscan voluntary poverty as a strategy of withdrawal from the 
social order maintained by violence. 
 
Francis of Assisi and Voluntary Poverty: Competing Interpretations 
 
Brian Hamilton has asserted that a variety of voluntary poverty movements emerged from 
within a growing social awareness of the poor as a distinct social class during the late Middle 
Ages. This awareness can be traced, Hamilton argues, to the transition from ‘a classical Roman 
to an early Christian economic imagination’.647 It develops further in the radical social changes 
of late feudal European society in the 12th and 13th centuries, during which time various 
movements known under the general title of the ‘poor of Christ’ began to challenge political 
and ecclesial power.648 Hamilton argues that the early ‘poor of Christ’ movements 
represented a new social/political phenomenon which witnessed ‘the poor’ beginning to 
claim justice on their own behalf. In this context, Saint Francis and the Franciscan movement 
are both a successful and popular breakthrough and a decisive rupture. Hamilton asserts: 
 
If the core strength of Francis’ theological vision lies in his description of Christ’s solidarity 
with the lowest, its core weakness lies in the way he casts that solidarity in terms of 
humility. As a practice of humility, voluntary poverty loses its critical force. It begins to 
function as a means of enforcing the patterns of exclusion and stratification that the 
earlier movements of poverty had opposed.649  
 
For Hamilton this connection between humility and voluntary poverty represents that 
‘essential ethical ambiguity’ of the Franciscan tradition.650 Hamilton notes that Francis of 
Assisi carefully avoids the anticlerical tone of earlier poverty movements and underlines 
obedience to ecclesiastical authority.651 He also posits that by consistently pairing poverty 
and humility in his writings, Francis gradually undermined an earlier and more radical critique 
 
647 Hamilton, abstract.  
648 On the ‘Poor of Christ’ movements, Hamilton repeatedly cites, among others: Herbert Grundmann, 
Religious Movements in the Middle Ages, trans. Stephen Rowan, (Notre Dame, Indiana: University of Notre 
Dame Press, 1995) and on the relationship between the medieval poverty movements and social and 
economic changes of the Middle Ages, Lester K. Little, Religious Poverty and Profit Economy in Medieval 
Europe, (Ithaca, New York: Cornell University Press, 1978). The relationship between the Poor of Christ 
movements and medieval heresy has been treated in R. I. Moore, The Birth of Popular Heresy, (Toronto: 
University of Toronto Press, 1995).     
649 Hamilton, p. 106. 
650 Ibid. 
651 Cf. Ibid, p. 122. 
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of exclusion and stratification. The movement of voluntary poverty as a political force became 
increasingly identified with Saint Francis and Franciscanism in the late thirteenth century. 
Hamilton points to two key subversive traits of the earlier voluntary poverty movement which 
were effectively abandoned by the early Franciscans: traveling in mixed communities of men 
and women and presuming to preach the Gospel on their own authority, as opposed to 
preaching with the consent of local bishops and the Roman Curia.  Politically subversive 
practice within the poor movements indicates, for Hamilton, that these groups were 
legitimately claiming justice on their own behalf. Francis weakened this claim, Hamilton 
argues, when he redefined voluntary poverty by coupling the concepts of poverty and 
humility. Hamilton insists that while this does not completely undermine the impetus for 
political action, it does ‘significantly qualify and subdue it’.652 For Hamilton, Francis’s concern 
to ‘live within the boundaries of orthodoxy’ effectively enervates the voluntary poverty 
movement and deprives it of the radical political force it had enjoyed.653 With Francis the 
decidedly anti-clerical bias in the earlier poor movements is jettisoned in favour of a voluntary 
poverty lived within the Church structures and always docile to Church authority. Thus, for 
Hamilton, Francis fails in his ambition to establish his own vision of a community based on 
mutual obedience. This failure is a consequence of, on the one hand, attempting to ‘break 
down the barriers between clergy and laity, between lord and servant’ and, at the same time, 
reifying ‘the distinctiveness of clerical authority as an order’.654 
 
Hamilton’s argument is persuasive in that it situates Francis and the early Franciscan 
movement within the social context of the High Middle Ages and the ‘poor of Christ’ 
movements which had emerged in the previous century. Within this context, Hamilton 
asserts, the coupling of voluntary poverty and humility signals a withdrawal from political 
action as confrontation and a change in the modus operandi of those who would critique 
unjust power structures in late medieval Europe. This decisive change, Hamilton asserts, 
amounts to a defeat for the voluntary poverty movements which had begun to conceive of 
the ‘the poor’ as an active and contentious social category confronting the centres of social 
power with accusations of injustice. The poor of Christ movement produced a consciousness, 
 
652 Hamilton, P. 133. 
653 Ibid, P. 125. 
654 Ibid. 
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which Hamilton describes as an ‘irruption of the poor’; the poor are recast as social agents 
within society with legitimate claims for restitution. The poor, Hamilton argues, gained a form 
of social primacy in the medieval imagination during this period which has yet to be 
recovered. Hamilton favours a retrieval of this historical intuition, which conceives of ‘option 
for the poor’ or voluntary poverty as more than a minority witness against the inevitably 
destructive practices of the dominant centres of power. He favours an ‘active confrontation 
with the system […] not just a witness to its violence’.655  
 
Hamilton reads the voluntary poverty movement and the role of Francis of Assisi 
within it, primarily as a social/economic history wherein the established power claims of the 
dominant social group came to be critiqued and then robustly challenged by a subversive 
reordering of social norms, on the part of ‘the poor’. Francis, inspired by the just claims of the 
‘poor of Christ’ movement and sympathetic to their critique of social inequality, both 
popularised the movement and recast it as a moral and ascetical enterprise, rather than a 
political one. In Hamilton’s view, Francis’s concern for ‘orthodoxy’ effectively limited his 
freedom to challenge the authority of the Church, then a major power group in society. Saint 
Bonaventure and other Franciscan theologians of the 13th and 14th centuries subsequently 
framed this intuition in a theological structure, giving institutional and religious credibility to 
the coupling of poverty to obedience. The debates within the Franciscan Order and the wider 
Church regarding the poverty of Christ and the proper role of Mendicant Orders in the 
universities inevitably informed these theological reflections. Hamilton observes that, in 
contemporary discourse, voluntary poverty is usually considered an aspect of individual piety 
or personal virtue; it is largely divorced from groups which consciously advocate for the poor, 
as poor (the 17th century English groups known as the Levellers or the Diggers may be 
considered examples of this radical strain, as can the Base Communities of 20th century Latin 
America).656  
 
These groups, Hamilton notes, are consistently a minority in society and in the 
churches. Late 20th century Roman Catholic social thought frequently employs the term 
 
655 Ibid, P. 225. 
656 Ibid, p. 224. 
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‘development’ when addressing poverty and disadvantage, thus speaking from a position of 
political power.657 The socially radical and combative energies of the nascent ‘poor of Christ’ 
movements are judged by Hamilton to have been first harnessed and then effectively 
absorbed into the wider social context of a dominant Church which emphasised the value of 
poverty always in relation to the virtue of humility. This process left the social order more 
aware of ‘the poor’ as a group, but still fundamentally unchanged.  
 
Hamilton’s desire to retrieve the socially active and politically engaged approach of 
the medieval poor movements in a contemporary context is certainly compelling. In 
contemporary Western society men and women forming itinerant preaching communities 
can no longer be considered subversive to the social order. Where then, Hamilton asks, can 
the political energy of the medieval movements be directed in a contemporary context? This 
vital political force, he asserts, was dissipated through the poor movement’s identification 
with Franciscanism and the particular concerns of Francis of Assisi. He cites the Occupy 
movement (a popular, grassroots, protest movement in response to the 2008 world-wide 
financial crisis) when identifying the possible heirs to the medieval poverty movements. 
 
Hamilton’s thesis, situating Francis in the midst of a social history of medieval poor 
movements, inevitably understands the saint and his early followers to have failed as ‘social 
reformers’, or even as ‘Christian socialists’. Stanislaus da Compagnola laments the ‘tendency 
[...] to give a sociological interpretation to the religious movements, orthodox and heterodox, 
of the Middle Ages’.658 The response of Francis and the early Franciscans was essentially a 
religious response to religious problems. Indeed, Hamilton acknowledges that scholars of 
Franciscanism (Grundmann, Religious Movements in the Middle Ages, p. 233 and Thompson, 
St. Francis of Assisi, p. 5, p. 33) have repeated ‘ad nauseam’ that the poor movements of the 
Middle Ages were not instances of class conflict.659 Nevertheless, Hamilton insists that the 
success of the mendicant orders of the 13th century is based, in part at least, on their 
 
657 Ibid. 
658 Stanislaus da Campagnola, ‘Francis of Assisi and the Social Problems of His Time’, Greyfriars Review, 2, 1, 
Jan (1988), 133-144 (p. 140). 
659 Hamilton, p. 67. 
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association with an already vibrant, popular ‘poor of Christ’ movement. Joining the expanding 
ranks of the involuntary poor, the mendicant friars eventually beg alms from door-to-door.660  
 
The willingness of the early Franciscans to share the depravations of the involuntary 
poor may have added an ‘aura of sanctity’ to the humble lifestyles of the poor, as Bronislaw 
Geremek asserts.661 Hamilton, however, insists that the social benefits flowed in the opposite 
direction: it was the successful and credible poor movements which invested the new 
mendicant orders with the hallmark of authenticity and relevance in the social context of the 
times.662 Hamilton asserts that the Franciscan innovation, in social terms, resulted in 
enforcing the ‘patterns of exclusion and stratification which earlier movements of poverty 
had opposed’.663 Da Compagnola, agrees that being gradually aligned with a definite urban 
class and the ranks of the clergy, the Franciscans, helped to ‘deepen the gap between the 
poor, the clergy and the nobility, [a gap] which would come to characterize the history of the 
following centuries, or at least the era of the ancien régime’.664 Notwithstanding this 
ambiguous legacy, Hamilton’s assessment of Francis and the early Franciscans is reductive. 
By presenting Francis as a well-intentioned but hapless late-comer to a successful grassroots 
political movement, Hamilton casts the saint as an anti-hero, whose personal religious 
commitments subvert and finally defeat the poor movement’s political energies.   
 
The Merchant Class and rise of Voluntary Poverty 
 
The first Franciscans, like Francis himself, were drawn primarily from the more prosperous 
classes of society. C. H. Lawrence has claimed that ‘although the early Franciscans recruited 
their members from all social groups except the unfree, their chief attraction was for the 
young of the most affluent classes and the clerical intelligentsia, young people who had never 
 
660 Hamilton repeatedly identifies of the early Franciscans with the Pauperes, the class of the indigent and 
involuntary poor. Addressing the early Franciscan relationship to begging da Compagnola states: ‘Begging was 
not meant to be a simple substitute for work or a kind of social remedy. It was meant to be the exercise of a 
spiritual activity, the performance of a moral act, humiliating yet fruitful for both giver and receiver’, p. 136. 
Early Franciscans were not exclusively beggars; indeed, the norm of Franciscan life was work as labourers and 
artisans. 
661 Cf. Hamilton, p. 86. 
662 Ibid. 
663 Ibid, p. 106. 
664 Da Compagnola, p. 141. 
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experienced real want’.665 Contrary to Hamilton’s thesis, David Flood suggests that significant 
social change in medieval Europe emerged precisely from those social groups which were 
materially and socially secure. Flood asserts that those who were established socially were 
better placed to critique the social and economic strategies employed against the poor. The 
sons and daughters of merchants, notaries and occasionally nobles, who opted for voluntary 
poverty in the late medieval period had significant advantages in evaluating unjust social 
systems over ‘those brought up to fear and honour social reality’. Those who were socially 
and materially established could reject the ‘co-opting maneuvers more easily than those from 
the lower social rungs.’666  
 
In the twelfth and thirteenth centuries, it may be argued, the most socially 
contentious group were not the ‘poor movements’ but the emerging merchant class. During 
the 11th and 12th centuries the merchant class advanced from the condition of pauperes and, 
‘protected and admonished by powerful people’, they assumed ‘the condition of being 
guarantors of economic order and, therefore, of the Christian public’.667  The merchant class 
posed several problems to aristocratic and ecclesiastical interests in late feudal Europe; as 
the coin economy developed merchants were at the fore, advancing, lending and collecting 
the purchasing power of coin. Their success was eroding the typical coincidence between 
wealth and power which was at the heart of feudal society. Secondly, merchants were 
professionally implicated with the ambiguous practice of usury.668 Giacomo Todeschini notes 
that usuary was an ‘obsession’ for Christian medieval Europe between 1100-1250.669 The 
fortunes and social standing of merchants improved in the late 12th century. The century 
ended with the canonization of Homobonus of Cremona in 1199, by Pope Innocent III. 
Homobonus was a fabric merchant noted for his piety and care of the poor and for his witness 
 
665 C. H. Lawrence, The Friars: The Impact of the Early Mendicant Movement on Western Society (New York: 
Longman Group, 1994) p. 34. 
666 David Flood, Work for Justice: A Franciscan Vademecum. (2012), 1-53, (p. 5, Note 7). 
https://en.ccfmc.net/images/David_Flood-_HistoryBelow.pdf  
667 Giacomo Todeschini, Franciscan Wealth: From Voluntary Poverty to Market Society, trans. By Donatella 
Melucci, edited by Michael F. Cusato O.F.M., Jean-François Godet-Calogeras and Daria Mitchell O.S.F. (New 
York: Saint Bonaventure University, 2009) p. 18. 
668 Cf. Todeschini, p. 20. Usury was the requirement of restitution, ‘in money or in nature, of a value greater 
than was lent’ for reasons of private interest. 
669 Ibid. ‘This obsessive fear depended in part on the mere difficulty of explaining what, in reality usury was’. p. 
19.  
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to peace as a mediator between competing factions.670 And yet the merchant class remained 
contentious in late feudal Europe. As Marie-Dominique Chenu observed, the occupation of 
the merchant, ‘free from personal ties, free from the services imposed by fief-holding, 
manipulating money without working, was suspect to the regime and thus suspect in the 
Christendom run by this regime’.671 From their materially secure but socially ambiguous 
status, the members of the merchant class were capable of undertaking a serious critique of 
social inequality and exclusion. The merchant class was in some respects critiquing, if not 
subverting, the social hierarchies which excluded the poor and functioned by identifying 
wealth with power and the right to rule.  
 
Kenneth Baxter Wolf has likewise insisted that the popularity of the Franciscan 
movement in the early thirteenth century owed much to the rising influence of the new 
middle classes, comprising merchants, lawyers, notaries, school masters, etc,. 672 He has 
characterized the attitude of this group towards the involuntary poor as a ‘pervasive and 
deep-seated combination of guilt and mistrust’.673 In the Franciscan movement, the 
ascendant middle classes recognized a group of poor men and women who were ‘truly 
deserving of their alms’.674 Of Saint Francis himself Baxter Wolf suggests: 
 
[…] one could argue that it was his success in taking poverty as a virtue away from the 
involuntary poor and giving it, in a newly spiritualized form, to the rich that secured for 
Francis the respect and veneration of guilty burghers who had the resources and the 
influence to transform him overnight into an altar Christus and his followers into a 
powerful order […], there were, after all, plenty of ‘second Christs’ at work in early 
thirteenth-century Italy, but perhaps only one whose conception of poverty spoke so 
directly to the needs of the non-poor.675 
 
670 Ibid, pp. 23-4. 
671 Marie-Dominique Chenu, Nature, Man and Society in the Twelfth Century, edited and translated by Jerome 
Taylor and Lester K. Little (Toronto: Toronto University Press, 1997) p. 226. 
672 Baxter Wolf’s work The Poverty of Riches has been heavily critiqued as an historical study of St Francis and 
Franciscan poverty. Baxter Wolf admits to imposing ‘modern liberal notions’ on the medieval texts. A 
significant amount of recent historical scholarship is entirely absent from the work and psychologizing 
references (e.g., ‘guilty burghers’) abound. Hamilton considers Baxter Wolf’s argument that St Francis’s 
voluntary poverty increased disdain for the poor as ‘compelling’ (p.8). Cf. Joseph P. Chinnici, ‘The Poverty of 
Riches, St. Francis of Assisi Reconsidered (Review)’ in Spiritus: A Journal of Christian Spirituality, 2004, Vol 4 (1) 
pp. 98-101. Project MUSE, doi:10.1353/scs.2004.0006. Todeschini refers to Baxter Wolf’s thesis as 
‘anachronistic’ and ‘completely misleading’. Cf. Todeschini, p. 170, note 34.   
673 Kenneth Baxter Wolf, The Poverty of Riches: St. Francis of Assisi Reconsidered, (New York: Oxford University 
Press, 2003), p. 88. 
674 Ibid. 
675 Ibid, pp.89-90. 
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Hamilton and Baxter Wolf correctly locate Francis within a wider ‘poor movement’, and 
indicate the contemporary social and political currents which came to shape Franciscan 
voluntary poverty. However, Hamilton moves quickly to scapegoat the early Franciscan 
movement and explain the demise of voluntary poverty as political force in terms of 
Franciscan compliance with social and ecclesial power structures. Hamilton points out that 
the early Franciscans joined the ranks of the involuntary poor and adopted the practice of 
begging. However, he ignores the historical evidence that the early Franciscans mainly lived 
by day labour and begging was typically an alternative when labour could not be found or 
payment was refused.676 In Hamilton’s thesis the early Franciscan mendicants are 
represented as competitors with the involuntary poor, depriving them of scarce resources. 
The historical reality was more nuanced. The Early Rule (Regula Non Bullata, 1221) insisted 
on the friars taking part in manual labour and the reference to begging (admittedly removed 
in the Later Rule of 1223) suggested a twofold context for Franciscan begging: social and 
apostolic. As Le Goff notes, the Early Rule indicates that begging is motivated by solidarity: 
‘they must be happy to be among people of low condition and of no account, among the poor 
and the weak, the sick the lepers and the street beggars’. This solidarity (not competition) 
with the involuntary poor is the context of begging within the early Franciscan tradition.677 
Missing from Hamilton’s thesis is an exploration of the early Franciscan friars as workers, 
labourers and economic agents.678  
 
Furthermore, the relative success of medieval poor movements in effecting social 
change must be questioned. What Hamilton fails to explore sufficiently is the nature of 
violence in medieval society. In the context of our contemporary Western society many 
 
676 Thompson, p. 29. 
677 Le Goff, p. 48. 
678 Flood insists that the early friars were not pauperes and not identical with the involuntary poor. The term 
fratres is more fitting, even for the brothers who begged. Those who begged were nevertheless occupied with 
labour, in leprosaria, for example. According to Flood, their work in almshouses and among lepers was not 
understood to be charity: they had developed a unique concept of work as service and ‘rendering back’ 
(reddere). They were working in the service of the weaker members of society (the elderly, the lepers, the sick) 
and begging alms was considered an extension of their idea of work. In the early Franciscan movement friars 
employed in essential work which offered no form of payment had every right to remuneration, in the form of 
meeting their material needs. This form of begging was conceptually different from the begging undertaken by 
the pauperes. David Flood, O.F.M., ‘Franciscans at Work’ in Franciscan Studies, Vol. 59 (2001), pp. 37-19. 
https://www.jstor.org/stable/41975283 accessed: 24-09-2018. 
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individual and collective rights have been enshrined in law and the power of the State and 
the Church has been limited, including its coercive powers. This was manifestly not the case 
in the 13th century, where poor movements were unlikely to achieve their aims without 
recourse to violence or without withstanding the real threat of politically organised violence. 
Absent from Hamilton’s account, but cited in Michael Kirwan’s Political Theology: A New 
Introduction are historical accounts of the violent repression of ‘poor movements’. Kirwan 
pays particular attention to historical accounts of violent coercive action, on the part of the 
state, against poor movements in the sixteenth century.679 Until relatively recently political 
action and social subversion on the part of the poor or ‘poor movements’ was likely to lead 
to comprehensive, violent reaction, on the part of social elites or the state. Radical groups 
which eschewed participation in the coercive structures of the state, such as the Anabaptists 
and later the Mennonites, tended to withdraw entirely from, rather than directly confront, 
the powerful structures of Church or State.680 To exclude this harsh reality from a treatment 
of the poor movements of the 13th century is to underestimate the inevitably violent 
consequences of organised social and political action by the poor for most of Western history. 
Hamilton’s assertion that the poor movements of the thirteenth century were on the cusp of 
effecting fundamental social change, from below, serves to romanticize those movements 
and remove them from the context of a social order maintained by violence.   
 
An evaluation of Franciscan voluntary poverty must include the historical context of 
heightened violence in a time of rapid social change. As a response to Hamilton and Baxter 
Wolf’s critical evaluation of Franciscan voluntary poverty I argue that the social and political 
change represented by the early Franciscans was attuned to the realities of violence and 
developed effective strategies for social solidarity and peace-making in this context.     
 
Violence and social undifferentiation in Thirteenth Century Europe 
    
The twelfth and thirteenth centuries in Europe witnessed widespread social change, 
ecclesiastical reform, the growth of urbanization, philosophical and theological innovation 
 
679 Michael Kirwan, Political Theology: A New Introduction, (Minneapolis, Fortress Press, 2009). 
680 Cf. Ibid, pp. 74-9. 
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and economic expansion.681 The rapid social change of the early thirteenth century, whilst 
bringing many benefits, was nonetheless marked by violence. In Finding Francis, Following 
Christ, Michael H. Crosby has asserted that St Francis ‘lived in a world defined by violence’ 
and that ‘culturally sanctioned violence reached its apogee in the conflict between the Pope 
and the Holy Roman Emperor’.682 Le Goff affirms a tripartite scheme of social differentiation 
in the late Middle Ages: the oratores, the bellatores and the laboratores (those who pray, 
those who fight, and those who work). The social barriers which distinguished these three 
groups were in flux in the early thirteenth century.683 The Gregorian reform led in the twelfth 
century to new religious orders, ecclesiastical diversity and, in the case of the Cistercians, for 
example, a combination of economic success and spiritual renewal. Lay society also made 
inroads into religious life, even though the Church reforms which forbade marriage and 
cohabitation in the clerical state served to radically separate the oratores from the bellatores 
and the laboratores, ‘by imposing a frontier in terms of sexuality.’684 Social differentiation was 
further challenged with the emergence of military orders, comprising a new fusion of the 
oratores and the bellatores, wedding the religious life to codes of chivalry. In this changing 
social context violence and conflict were characteristic. The traditional orders in society, 
which had been effectively buffered and distinct were less defined and as a consequence 
episodic violence was ubiquitous. Thomas N. Bisson notes that: 
 
in the eleventh and twelfth centuries most of the fighting and coercing was done by armed 
men on horseback, and to the extent that the freedom to fight and command elevated 
one above the incompetent masses, it came to seem that force (violentia in its special 
sense) was an attribute of human distinction.685  
 
681 Cf. Chenu. In Nature, Man and Society in the Twelfth Century, Chenu situates the theological developments 
of the twelfth century within the structure of Latin Christian theology and dynamic social and economic 
progress in Western Europe. The interaction of monastic theology with Church reform, renewed 
understanding of concepts such as ‘history’ and ‘nature’, and a ‘symbolist mentality’, all contributed to 
development in doctrine and social dynamics. Cf. Chenu pp.202-38. Chenu maintains that, far from merely 
reacting to social change, it is precisely the ‘discovery of the Gospel’ (p.231) which allowed religiously inspired 
groups to interact in a dynamic way with evolving social and economic structures and facilitate significant 
intellectual, cultural and religious development.   
682 Michael H. Crosby, Finding Francis, Following Christ, (Maryknoll, New York, Orbis Books, 2007) p. 4 
683 Cf. Chenu, pp. 263-64. Chenu notes that evangelical fraternities ‘invalidated after a fashion the more or less 
sacred tripartite division of society into clerics, knights and peasants. That division offered no sociological or 
religious identity to their clientele, who included merchants and urban artisans’. Fraternities helped 
desacralize social differences; mendicants such as the Franciscans never consecrated the guardians of their 
communities, as, for example monastic communities consecrated their abbots. 
684 Le Goff, p. 4. 
685 Thomas N. Bisson., The Crisis of the Twelfth Century: Power, Lordship, and the Origins of European 
Government (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2009) p. 64. 
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In the twelfth and thirteenth centuries, as urban society began to develop and expand, the 
urban square re-emerged as a place of social and civic importance. Le Goff notes that it was 
here in the civic square, rather than in church buildings, that the early Franciscans attempted 
to preach (and perform) their unique way of life.686 This appropriation of the public space 
occasionally provoked a violent reaction from the bellatores. Saint Francis’s attempt to preach 
in Perugia town square was interrupted by knights on horseback who intimidated and 
disrupted the crowds and sought to disband the assembly.687 The knights were, to use 
Bisson’s terms, elevating themselves from the lower social orders and distinguishing 
themselves by means of violence. Within the higher social orders violence functioned to 
create and maintain social difference. Feuding, for example, was: 
 
a way of communicating to the aristocratic community one’s personal traits, disclosing 
one’s moral characteristics, one’s commitment to the values and norms that helped define 
membership in the local or regional nobility […] feuds could signal that the feuder was a 
man of principle, a man of honour, a moral person who could be trusted by others to do 
the right thing even at a personal cost to himself.688   
 
The role of violence in feudal society was further focused and targeted on specific categories 
as cultural and economic advances necessitated the redrawing of social boundaries. R. I. 
Moore asserts, ‘deliberate and socially sanctioned violence […] [was] directed through 
established governmental, juridical and socially sanctioned institutions, against groups of 
people that were scapegoated to such a degree that membership of such groups in itself came 
to be regarded as justifying those attacks’.689 Moore does not engage in the argument that 
medieval Europe was more or less violent than previous or subsequent periods in European 
history, rather, he maintains Europe became a ‘persecuting society’ during the twelfth and 
thirteenth centuries. Moore writes that ‘religious persecution had, of course, been familiar in 
the Roman Empire […] But in the West, far from being “normal” in medieval society, it had 
 
686 Le Goff, p. 100. 
687 ‘Once blessed Francis was preaching in the Piazza at Perugia to a large crowd gathered there. All of a 
sudden some knights of Perugia began racing their horses around the Piazza, jousting with their weapons, and 
thus disturbing the preaching. Although the men and women, who were intent on listening to the sermon, 
reprimanded them, they did not stop’. Assisi Compilation [75] FA:ED (Vol II) pp. 178-9.  
688 Hillary Zimora, ‘Values and Violence: The Morals of Feuding in Late Medieval Germany’ in Feud in Medieval 
and Early Modern Europe, ed. Jeppe Büchert Netterstrøm and Bjørn Poulsen (Asrhus: Aarhus University Press, 
2007) pp. 157-8. 
689  R. I. Moore, The Formation of a Persecuting Society: Power and Deviance in Western Europe, 950-1250, 
Second Edition (Oxford, Blackwell Publishing, 2007), p 4. 
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faded away with the Roman Empire, and did not reappear until the eleventh century’.690 
Moore links the re-emergence of systematic violent persecution with the eleventh century 
advances in the intellectual, cultural and economic spheres of European life, ‘when for better 
and for worse, the continuous history of modern European society and achievement 
begins’.691 Surveying various persecuted groups in late medieval Europe, groups which had 
escaped systematic persecution previously, Moore asserts: ‘The activity at the core of 
persecution is classification, in accordance with what Leach […] called the freedom of human 
beings to “carve up the external world into named categories, and arrange the categories to 
suit our social convenience”’.692  
 
Moore indicates that the social undifferentiation of the late medieval period was the 
source of renewed persecution and official, social violence. The great social, intellectual and 
economic changes which were reshaping late medieval Europe called for the rearrangement 
of a wide variety of social categories: ‘Old boundaries had to be redrawn more precisely and 
many new ones, social, cultural and intellectual as well as topographical, invented’.693 This 
was required to re-establish a common perception of the world which was changing for the 
peoples of Europe, ‘in almost every conceivable dimension’.694 Moore argues that the 
eleventh and twelfth centuries may be described variously as ‘the reordering of Christian life’, 
‘the renaissance of the twelfth century’, ‘the twelfth century revolution in government’ or 
the ‘age of chivalry’; it is largely a matter of taste. But, however that ‘tremendous extension 
of the power and influence of the literate is described, the development of persecution in all 
its forms was part of it, and therefore inseparable from the great and positive achievements 
with which it is associated’.695  
 
Conclusion: Deficiencies in Hamilton’s Account 
 




691 Ibid, P. 171. 
692 Ibid, P. 184. 
693 Ibid. 
694 Ibid.  
695 Ibid, P. 171. 
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1. A reductively economic reading of the early Franciscan movement. 
2. A neglect of the social context with respect to the role of violence. 
3. A fundamentally ‘romantic’ view of Saint Francis which undervalues the theological 
categories of humility and conversion. 
 
The historical context of rapid social change and periodic escalating violence, described 
above, is a significant lacuna in Hamilton’s account of the early Franciscan movement. The 
assertion that the poor movements could have achieved significant political and social change 
in this context, without inviting violent confrontation is contentious, at the very least. 
Notwithstanding the ambiguous legacy of the Franciscan movement with respect to the poor 
in society, it is both unfair and unrealistic to assert that the ‘poor movements’ could have 
achieved in the thirteenth century what, for example, non-conformist poor movements of 
the sixteenth century failed to achieve. Kirwan warns against the ‘romantic exaggeration’ of 
the influence of non-conformist poor movements in the sixteenth century. This caveat has 
even more relevance for ‘poor movements’ engaged in political action in the context of the 
decline of feudalism.696  
 
In Hamilton’s (and Baxter Wolf’s) social and economic reading of the early Franciscan 
movement, Sabatier’s romantic saint, unworldly, idealistic and tragic, is once again on view. 
He is the pious fool whose personal sanctity serves to elevate and sanctify voluntary poverty, 
but at the same time, robs it of its original political dynamism. Much of the social context is 
neglected in Hamilton’s account. Chenu’s essays, for example, have explored the importance 
of theological and philosophical discourse and a changed understanding of the concept of 
‘nature’, indeed an ‘increasingly acute sensitivity to natural phenomena’ in the late Middle 
Ages. Along with the merchant (mercator) the late Middle Ages the saw the appearance of 
the homo artifex, ‘the maker of shapes and forms’ whose ability to distinguish between the 
animate and the mechanical was achieved by ridding himself of ‘the childish fancies of 
animism and the habit of seeing divinity in the marvels of nature. The sacred realm which he 
secularized by this process no longer possessed any properly religious value for him’.697 And 
 
696 Michael Kirwan, Political Theology, p. 73. 
697 Chenu, pp. 44-5. 
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this new functionalism occurred in the century in which Francis composed the Canticle of 
Brother Sun. Chenu advises us: 
 
not to yield, as some have done, to the temptation to transform these movements of 
highest religious quality into mere secondary effects of a social crisis; this would be to 
misunderstand the real causes of the apostolic movement, under the pretext of 
emphasizing the circumstances surrounding it. It is unmistakably the discovery of the 
gospel which lay behind this development of Christianity.698 
 
The ‘discovery of the gospel’ in the eleventh century, and the social, economic and political 
changes it helped produce, evidently changed the status of the poor within wider society. The 
voluntary poor movements, including the Franciscans, embodied and shaped this new 
consciousness of ‘the poor’ as a distinct social reality. At a deeper level, the ‘discovery of the 
gospel’ called into question social and ecclesial systems which created and accelerated 
violence. This violence was not restricted to one class within society but engaged and 
implicated all social classes and the social structures which defined the late Middle Ages. The 
early Franciscan movement, and its founder, who came to be known by the sobriquet Il 
Poverello, has inevitably been judged on its relationship to the involuntary poor. This serves 
to microscope the wider concerns of the movement. The involuntary poor were one group 
among many with which the early Franciscan movement was in contact. Early Franciscans 
engaged with all social classes, with lepers, heretics, labourers, artisans, clerics, and non-
believers. The early Franciscan movement’s ‘discovery of the gospel’ took the form of 
modelling non-rivalrous, peaceful relationships, preaching and performing peace, 
significantly in the ‘secular’ domain. Their aim was not political action in Hamilton’s terms, 
but a peaceful and non-confrontational withdrawal from the very systems which provoked 
rivalry and produced social conflict and violence. 
 
Finally, Hamilton’s and Baxter Wolf’s narrative avoids or obscures the theological 
categories which gave rise to the early Franciscan movement. Hamilton regards the 
connection between involuntary poverty and humility as the Franciscan movement’s 
‘essential ethical ambiguity’ and its ‘core weakness’. In terms of a mimetic conversion, the 
pride associated with ‘metaphysical sickness’ can only be overcome by the virtue of 
 
698 Ibid, p. 231. 
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humility.699 What was for Hamilton the core weakness of the early Franciscan movement’s 
forma vitae, is in Girard’s hypothesis, its essential strength. Hamilton and Baxter Wolf fail to 
recognise a real conversion, described either in terms of mimetic theory, or in classical 
Christian terms. Baxter Wolf claims that when Francis and his companion’s interacted with 
social outcasts, they did so primarily for the ‘spiritual benefits to which they could lay claim 
for having voluntarily abandoned the world. They did not do so to relieve the pain and 
suffering, whether here or in the next world of people who had no choice but to live the very 
life that Francis had voluntarily assumed’.700 According to this assessment, the conversion of 
Francis had no reality in the order of grace and the Franciscan life was a continuation, or even 
a malignant growth of their previous patterns of rivalrous, acquisitive desire.  
 
Girard has stated that ‘conversion is not something of our own doing but the personal 
intervention of God in our lives. The greatest experience for Christians is the experience of 
becoming religious under the compulsion that they feel cannot come from themselves but 
from God alone’.701 Conversion is the undoing of pride in its destructive forms and the 
ultimate critique of the illusion of the autonomous individualism which cannot but use others 
to achieve a greater sense of self. Girard notes that writers like Proust ‘do not consider what 
we call their genius a natural gift with which they were born. They view it as a belated 
acquisition, the result of a personal transformation not of their own doing, which resembles 
a conversion’.702 Kaplan notes that this quality ‘pervades the lives of the saints, whose almost 
nihilistic denial of their own self-worth or extraordinary qualities seems insincere to readers 
ensconced in a Romantic frame of reference’. The narrative of the early Franciscan movement 
offered by Hamilton and Baxter Wolf suggests this Romantic frame of reference, which has 
reduced Francis’s engagement with the involuntary poor and social outcasts to categories of 
personal aggrandizement and blithe self-interest. The saint who recognizes his or her 
rivalrous desires is compelled to acknowledge these desires and to adopt spiritual strategies 
 
699 ‘Belief in the Incarnation, for Augustine, is inseparable from the translation of pride into humility, as he 
explains in the Confessions: “Nor yet was I humble enough to grasp the humble Jesus as my God, or did I know 
what his weakness had to teach”. In light of Christ’s kenotic love, Christianity could not conceive of itself 
without this virtue, whereas the pre-Christian world could not imagine an order in which humility was a 
virtue’. Grant Kaplan, ‘Hero Versus Saint’, p. 157.  
700 Baxter Wolf, p. 15. 
701 René Girard, ‘Conversion in Literature and Christianity’ in Mimesis and Theory, cited in Grant Kaplan, 
‘Romantic Hero Versus Saint’, p. 157. 
702 Ibid, p. 158. 
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to overcome their conflictual outcomes. This, in classical Christian mystical and ascetical 
theology, is the virtue of apatheia. As Kaplan notes the difference between the converted 
saint whose relationships are now subject to periods of conscious, pacific withdrawal 
(apatheia) and the studied indifference of the neo-romantic, who ‘seems to want nothing and 
care for nothing’ is ‘separated only by a hair’s breadth yet by a chasm’s depth’.703 In avoiding 
any serious engagement with the categories of humility and conversion, Hamilton and Baxter 
Wolf’s theses fall into this chasm. 
 
The weak, romantic/heroic figure of Saint Francis is particularly vulnerable to this mis-
reading. Without a mimetic reading, Francis of Assisi, degenerates from Sabatier’s exemplary 
(heroic) figure, into what late-modernity/post-modernity considers a mere vaniteux. The 
inverted romantic hero is scorned for his illusory sense of autonomy. He is cast as one of those 
‘metaphysically sick’ characters who strive to be ‘original’, ‘spontaneous’ and are ultimately 
both unconcerned with others and obsessively envious of the Other. Baxter Wolf asserts that 
Francis kisses the leper, not because he has come to see his desires were borrowed and 
rivalrous, that what he had hated and feared in the leper was his own spiritual disease, his 
‘metaphysical sickness’. Rather, he asserts that Francis kissed the leper in order to make 
himself a ‘super leper’, who would henceforth compete with the leper for the limited 
resources available in Assisi.704  Giving no real importance to the role of conversion in the life 
of Francis, Baxter Wolf’s interpretation amplifies Freud’s earlier misreading of Francis. In 
both, Francis the romantic hero is deconstructed and recast, as romantic anti-hero.    
 
Voluntary Poverty and a Non-Rivalrous Social Order 
 
‘The Lord Give You Peace’: Sean Edward Kinsella and the Early Franciscan movement 
 
Sean Edward Kinsella has argued that the mendicant Orders of the thirteenth century, and in 
particular the early Franciscan movement, were instrumental in proclaiming and performing 
peace in the context of significant social change and violent conflicts.705 In his 
 
703 Ibid. 
704 Baxter Wolf, p. 14. 
705 Cf. note 646 above. 
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historical/theological study of the early Franciscan movement, Kinsella explores the systems 
of reciprocity and obligation which characterised feudal and late medieval societies and the 
manner in which belonging to such systems implicated individuals and groups in violence. 
Kinsella’s work provides a compelling narrative of the early Franciscan movement, one which 
is highly compatible to mimetic theory. Kinsella observes how the early Franciscan movement 
departed from the established patterns of monastic life, and adopted radical strategies for 
peaceful relations within the wider society.  
 
In several respects early Franciscan communities were socially significant. They 
represented the social undifferentiation which characterized their times, being a religious 
movement with significant economic and social agency: a hybrid of oratores and laboratores, 
an as yet undifferentiated and emerging social category. Early Franciscanism was a movement 
which promoted the laity within the Church as part of ‘a general movement for the 
“secularization” of society’.706  Early Franciscan communities sought to embody and model 
peaceful relations, not within the confines of a religious cloister, but in a wider social milieu, 
one which was in regular contact with economic and social institutions.707 Significantly, the 
early Franciscan communities formed new patterns of communal living, largely free from the 
nexus of privileges and obligations which defined not only wider society but also monastic 
communities. Francis of Assisi consistently opposed attempts to impose a traditional 
monastic rule upon the Friars Minor or to adopt the existing monastic forms of asceticism. 
Kinsella observes that Francis’s determination not to observe a monastic form of life (nor to 
attempt a reform of monasticism) was based on his commitment to a new form of religious 
life, one based on the Gospel but as free as possible from systems of power and privilege 
which create conflict and violence.708  
 
706 Cf. Le Goff, p. 109. 
707 This experimental, socially fluid movement gradually underwent a process of clericalization which is treated 
in Raoul Manselli’s ‘La Clericalizzazione dei Minori e San Bonaventura in San Bonaventura francescano, 
Convegni del Centro di Studi sulla Spiritualitá medievale, 14 (Todi: Accademia Tudertina, 1974) pp. 181-208. 
708 Cf. Sean Edward Kinsella, ‘“The Lord Give You Peace”: The Preaching of Peace in the Writings and Early Lives 
of St Francis of Assisi’ in Mediaevistik, 16 (2003), pp. 51-99 (p. 56).  Kinsella cites an early Franciscan account of 
Pentecost Chapter of 1217, during which several ‘wise and learned brothers’ invited Cardinal Hugolino, 
Cardinal Protector of the Order of Friars Minor, to persuade Francis to adopt one of the established monastic 
rules. Francis insisted ‘I do not want you to mention to me any Rule, whether of Saint Augustine, or of Saint 
Bernard, or of Saint Benedict’ since the Lord desired Francis to be ‘a new fool in the world’. The Assisi 
Compilation (18) FA:ED, Vol (2) p. 132-33. 
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As Kinsella establishes, monastic religious life in the High Middle Ages was at times 
obsessively entangled with the familial obligations, inherited rights and the social 
commitments of those who would enter monastic obedience. Kinsella cites Bernard of 
Clairvaux’s letter to Alexander, Bishop of Lincoln, regarding Philip, a Canon of Lincoln who had 
entered the monastic community at Clairvaux. In this letter the Abbot assumes that, 
notwithstanding Philip’s monastic vows, he continues to be obliged to a large social milieu 
outside the monastery. Kinsella notes that Philip remains enmeshed in the nexus of privileges 
and obligations which characterise the social and political reality of this period.709 The 
evangelical life espoused by Francis was entirely opposed to such compromises. From an early 
Franciscan source, Kinsella cites the example of a candidate for the Franciscan Order who was 
dismissed by Francis for having distributed his goods and property not among the poor but 
among his own family. Francis rebuked the candidate, ‘brother Fly’, since the man’s intention 
was to enter the brotherhood while effectively reinforcing reciprocal commitments within his 
family.710 This legend is instructive since it supports much recent scholarship which locates 
Saint Francis’s motivation not in creating a lifestyle organised around material poverty, but in 
escaping the social systems which create conflict and reinforce rivalry, exclusion and 
dominance.711 
 
The Gospel command to sell all one’s possessions and give the money to the poor is 
both the ‘founding text’ of Francis’s evangelical commitment and the form of life he insists 
upon in the Rule of the Friars Minor. Indeed, the first and second chapters of the Earlier Rule 
(Regula Non Bullata) are animated by this imperative and it continues to inform many of Saint 
Francis’s writings. 712 It is Kinsella’s assertion that this separation from worldly interests is not 
to be understood as a ‘privileged distance’ but ‘a separation from the structures of social and 
 
709 Kinsella, Poverty and Violence, P. 9.  
710 Cf. The Assisi Compilation, FA:ED (Vol 2) p. 165. A similar account of St Francis refusing a candidate for the 
Order, a young nobleman, due to attachments to family and rank is recorded in the same legend, ibid, p. 173.  
711 Saint Francis’s ‘suspicion, if not hostility’ towards knowledge and intellectual work is on the basis of 
learning creating distinctions and inequalities in social relations, thus reintroducing pride. The learned accrue 
status and privileges denied the uneducated and these often prove inimical to the forma vitae. Cf. Le Goff, p. 
115. Thompson situates Saint Francis’s understanding of poverty in the context of The Word of God becoming 
poor for our sakes and asserts that the clericalization of the Order, ‘more than any supposed deviation from 
Francis’s view on poverty […] would transform the order into something Francis had never imagined’. p. 112.   
712 The Earlier Rule, FA:ED (Vol 1) pp. 63-5. 
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religious obligation which can easily become instruments of power and cause violence’.713 It 
is Kinsella’s contention that ‘Francis rejects those structures, both conceptual and material, 
which maintained a social order articulated through power and dominance and based on the 
implicit threat or explicit exercise of violence’.714 Kinsella suggests that Francis understood 
violence to be a: 
 
response to an extensive system of attachment and obligation, which, although 
established in an effort to provide social order and to curtail violence, could actually 
precipitate violence because it enmeshed an increasing number of participants in an 
increasing number of obligations, not all of which could be satisfied at the same time.715 
 
Mimetic theory describes how reciprocal relations lead to conflict, even when individuals and 
groups within the social structure do not intend violence.716  The complex web of feudal 
obligations at the heart of medieval society is characterised by Kinsella as ‘spiralling – that is, 
continuously spreading, accelerating, and increasing’ often resulting in social instability, 
culminating in violence.717 Hamilton has described the ‘effective social power’ in the eleventh 
and twelfth centuries as an ‘open field’.718 In a brief acknowledgment of the endemic political 
violence of the 11th and 12th centuries, Hamilton cites Thomas M. Bisson’s description of the 
feudal revolution during which time ‘banal lords and knights […] swept forward in a tidal wave 
of self-promoting opportunism’, dramatically usurping power and dominating existing feudal 
families, whose fortunes were in decline.719 According to Bission the feudal revolution 
contributed to an atmosphere in which ‘violence was as normal and enduring as the public 
order it afflicted’.720 
 
The description of European feudal society in the 12th and 13th centuries as a society 
in an advanced state of social crisis, an ‘open’ and undifferentiated political landscape, 
 
713 Kinsella, Poverty and Violence, p. 10. 
714 Ibid. 
715 Ibid, p. 11. 
716 ‘Once violence has reached a certain threshold, social and cultural institutions themselves are of no avail to 
limit its diffusion. Every attempt to diffuse the conflict is seen as a further provocation and usual mechanisms 
of arbitration […] are seen by all as a party in the quarrel rather than a judge’. Cf. Paul Dumouchel, Violence 
and Truth, p. 13.  
717 Kinsella, Poverty and Violence, p. 11. 
718 Hamilton, p. 62. 
719 Ibid, pp. 60-61. 
720 Ibid, p. 62. 
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competing feudal barons and an enmeshed and highly complicated social structure, is very 
enlightening. The assertion of spiralling and accelerating demands and counter demands, 
provoking conflict and violence bears a strong resemblance to the Girardian structure of 
mimetic conflict leading to undifferentiation, chaos and violence. Situating the early 
Franciscan narrative within this social context facilitates a more expansive and historically 
satisfying explanation of Francis and the Franciscan movement. Set against this horizon, 
episodes from the early Franciscan sources are highly suggestive of a strong corporate 
intuition about how rivalrous desire leads to violence.  
 
Demons and Seditious Powers: Pre-critical images of Mimetic conflict 
 
In drawing attention to the historical context of social violence, Kinsella’s narrative achieves 
a greater explanatory scope than does Hamilton’s or Baxter Wolf’s. Many significant episodes 
from early Franciscan history can be explored and situated within the wider narrative of 
peace-making and peace-preaching. Pre-critical understandings of conflict and social disorder 
necessarily rely on language and modes of discourse which are largely eschewed in 
modernity.721 For example, the presence of demons and spirits is frequently associated with 
civil strife in the early Franciscan sources. In an early account of Francis’s mission to preach 
peace in the town of Arezzo an illuminating phrase is employed. In language which is 
reminiscent of earlier mythic accounts of a mimetic crisis, Francis ‘saw demons over the city 
leaping for joy and arousing the troubled citizens to mutual slaughter’. The violence which 
afflicted Arezzo, the account asserts, was the result of ‘seditious spiritual powers.’722 The 
association of violence with ‘demons’ and ‘seditious spiritual powers’, is not infrequent in 
early Franciscan sources. Such ‘mythic’ references provide no obstacle to a Girardian reading 
of the early Franciscan sources; indeed, Girard’s work accommodates references to the 
demonic and seditious spiritual powers. Girard’s treatment of the demonic and ‘seditious 
spiritual powers’ of pre-critical texts is an example of where his ‘fundamental anthropology’ 
overcomes a reductive reading of pre-modern texts. 
 
721 Cf. Finamore. The ‘chaos’ imagery in the apocalyptic scriptures may indicate ‘the abolition of differences 
and distinctions’ associated with social crisis. In the Bible, chaos is ‘used to describe the undifferentiated state 
of the universe prior to creation’ and ‘anything which tends to move the universe back towards such a 
condition’. Finamore employs Girard’s theory to explain the chaos imagery of Revelation in terms of a social 
order losing its distinctive characteristics. pp. 2-3.   
722 Bonaventure, Major Life, Chapter 6, part 9, FA:ED (Vol 2) p. 574. 
 174 
 
In this respect, Cynthia Haven notes the profound influence of André Malraux’s work 
on Girard. Girard was familiar with the five-volume work Malraux produced, La Psychologie 
de L’Art, between 1947-9. Haven notes that Girard was ‘profoundly shaken’ by the passage 
that claims that history is ‘no longer a chronology but an anxious interrogation of the past to 
try to discover the destiny of the world’.723 Girard, the historian, adopted a method which 
privileged meaning, or the ‘order of understanding’ over a strict chronology. Thus, Girard’s 
‘shuttling back and forth’ to ‘interrogate the past’ in his search for the mimetic realism which 
decodes our past and plots our possible future destination. Haven notes that Malraux speaks 
of the range of devils from war to psychological complexes – all present in primitive art – that 
had reappeared. Mankind, Malraux contends, is aiming towards its own destruction: ‘The 
demons of Babylon, of the Church, of Freud and of Bikini Atoll all have the same face.’724 These 
demons are indicative of the violent conflicts which are unleashed by rivalrous, mimetic 
desire. Girard readily identifies the ‘Principalities and Powers’ of the New Testament with 
social, political, and institutional systems which function by means of excluding the surrogate 
victim, i.e., the victimage mechanism.   
 
In the New Testament, the powers which are called ‘celestial’ are not distinct from 
those powers which are ‘of this world’, ‘sovereignties’, ‘thrones’ and ‘dominions’ (Ephesians, 
1. 21) of all kinds. According to Girard, the ‘powers and principalities’ are not themselves 
demonic or satanic, though they are associated with the satanic principle, the scapegoat 
mechanism. The ‘powers and principalities’ indicate diverse cultural forms of social order, 
established through generative violence. The ‘celestial’ aspect of these powers is the false 
religious transcendence which accompanies the violent expulsion, the seemingly miraculous 
restoration of peace at the highest pitch of conflict.725 Girard, therefore, does not discount 
the presence of the demonic or the satanic as evidence of mere superstition, but applies it to 
situations where competing desires have produced violent social conflict.  
 
 
723 Haven, p. 57.  
724 Ibid. Girard indicated Malraux’s influence on his earlier writings, though Girard came to regard Malraux’s 
work as ‘luridly romantic’. Cf. Adams, 1993, p. 14.  
725 Cf. Girard, I See Satan Fall, pp. 95-98. 
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In Arezzo, the demons goaded the community towards its sacrificial rituals as the only 
possible way of saving itself from destruction. The presence of Francis and Brother Sylvester 
(and whatever particular form of peace-making/peace-preaching they enacted in front of the 
city gate), on this occasion was effective in restoring social order without a violent, sacrificial 
expulsion; the scapegoat mechanism failed. In the legendae this episode is accorded the 
narrative status of a miracle, a supernatural triumph over demonic powers. Within the 
context of mimetic theory, successful resistance to mimetic frenzy is evidence of a converted 
life. Gil Bailie notes that the ability to resist the lure of mimetic frenzy indicates nothing less 
than the moral force of an even greater power than that which the old system of sacred 
violence had been able to produce.726 The ability to restore peace without recourse to 
violence or scapegoating is, in effect, the sign of conversion associated with the early 
Franciscan ministry of peace-making. The account concludes with some suggestion that the 
conflict (‘scandal’) was originally based on the reform of the city’s civil laws: ‘At once the city 
returned to peace and all the citizens reformed their civil law with great tranquillity’.727   
 
Reciprocity and patterns of violence 
 
The ability of Francis and the early Franciscan friars to work peace effectively, without 
recourse to threat or violence, indicates the essential conversion experience which liberates 
the individual from pride and affords him or her some protection against the social systems 
established on victimage and scapegoating. The early Franciscan community intuited a formal 
relationship between rivalrous desire and social systems which accelerate rivalry and lead to 
violence. Henri J. M. Claessen has described relations between members of the feudal 
hierarchy as ‘asymmetrical, vertical, formal, dyadic, personal and reciprocal’.728 These 
relations both protected individuals and groups from violence and exposed them to violence. 
Kinsella notes that social constraints established to order society and control rivalrous 
conflicts may become the sources of violence in a society undergoing rapid social change: 
‘Violence, rather than being restricted or restrained by the social order, could, in a certain 
sense, be understood to be constitutive of the social order or, even, an ordering system 
 
726 Bailie, pp. 196-97. 
727 Bonaventure, Major Life, Chapter 6, part 9, FA:ED (Vol 2) p. 575. 
728 Kinsella, Poverty and Violence, p. 11. 
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itself.’729 It was their ability to stand at some distance from these systems which allowed the 
early Franciscans some success in limiting their violent consequences.  
 
In demonstrating the labyrinthine patterns of honour and obligation which lead to 
cyclic violence in the 13th century, Kinsella alludes to a conflict which formed the background 
to Francis of Assisi’s boyhood. At the beginning of the 13th century, the rivalrous ambitions of 
the rising middle classes of Assisi, represented by the commune, and the dominant nobility of 
the city, led to the attack and pillaging of the properties of a number of the city’s noble 
families. One such defeated nobleman, Girardo di Gislerio, applied to the neighbouring and 
competing city of Perugia for citizenship. In a formal ceremony, Girardo di Gislerio and his 
family was welcomed to Perugia and bound to the city by feudal oaths and promises as well 
as legal contracts. The city of Perugia was thus ennobled by a new lord and enriched by the 
taxes from his estates, and at the same time Girardo di Gislerio was formally inducted into 
Perugian society as a nobleman, as were his family and kinsmen. The dispute with Assisi was 
now a matter of honour which embraced di Gislerio’s adopted city of Perugia. The city of 
Perugia demanded satisfaction for the losses incurred by di Gislerio and when the commune 
of Assisi refused, war was declared. ‘What had begun as a personal and familial rivalry had 
developed, through the deliberate use of existing social conventions and connections, into a 
much larger armed conflict between two cities.’730  
 
Arnoldo Fortini’s historical research explored the ‘implacable rivalry during the Middle 
Ages that divided Assisi and Perugia, the two cities on the opposite sides of the Tiber.’731 In 
his multivolume biography of Francis, Fortini observed that Assisi and Perugia were in conflict 
from the earliest days of their communal lives until the harsh restoration of papal authority 
in 1540, a restoration which limited Assisi’s autonomy. Fortini’s research has emphasised the 
social and psychological effects of being formed within a contest of ‘doubles’. The term rival 
has its etymology in the word rivus, the Latin word for river.732 Assisi and Perugia were ‘twin’ 
communes, divided by the river Tiber and locked into an exhausting competition for power. 
 
729 Ibid, P. 12. 
730 Ibid, p. 16. 
731 Fortini, p. 56. 
732 Cf. Girard, Things Hidden, p. 11. 
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Fortini collected from the municipal chronicles of Assisi and Perugia historical evidence of the 
enmity between the two city states and catalogued a number of accounts of reciprocal, 
rivalrous violence. Fortini makes an explicit connection between the violent context of 
Francis’ youth in Assisi and his later commitment to non-violence and voluntary poverty, 
insisting that the ‘incredible violence’ to which he was exposed ‘destroyed his youth.’733 
Girardo di Gislerio’s defection to Perugia provoked the conflict that occasioned the battle of 
Collestrada in November 1202 and resulted in Francis of Assisi’s capture and yearlong 
imprisonment.734  
 
The great political rivalry of the late Middle Ages was between the Holy Roman 
Emperor, Frederick II and the papacy. In his formative years Francis’ life was lived in the 
shadow of, and was defined by, the Assisi/Perugia rivalry. Within these larger conflicts, 
multiple conflicts were sustained and extended. Kinsella maintains that as a result of his 
personal experience of violence, Francis ‘gradually began to move further and further away 
from those attitudes and conventions which governed the mores and behaviour of the world 
around him’.735 Mimetic theory indicates that the demons which Francis encountered in 
Arezzo were demons he had encountered on numerous occasions before. They were the 
demons of the archaic sacred. What is significant about the early Franciscan movement is its 
power to subdue the demons of mimetic conflict. Accounts of early Franciscanism which are 
reductively economic or social, tend to neglect this essential characteristic of the Franciscan 
charism. Girard’s fundamental anthropology explains the Arezzo episode in terms of the grace 
of conversion, a principal effect of which is the collapse of the mystifying power of the 
scapegoat mechanism.736  
 
After his conversion Saint Francis could write: 
 
 
733 Fortini, p. 56. 
734 Ibid, Cf. pp. 151-55. 
735 Kinsella, Mediaevistik, p. 65.  
736 Once again, I favour James Alison’s understanding of conversion in terms of a graced acquisition of ‘the 
intelligence of the victim’. The knowledge promised by the Holy Spirit is ‘the active and creative overcoming of 
the lie which is at the root of human culture’. James Alison, Living in the End Times: The Last Things Re-
imagined (London: Crossroad Publishing Company, 1996) p. 68. The lie succeeds when it creates unanimity 
about the guilt of the victim and causes the violent expulsion of the victim. Contrariwise, by producing 
unanimity about the nature of the lie, each time the lie is being performed, genuine peace is established. 
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There are many people who, when they sin or are injured, frequently blame the enemy or 
their neighbour. But it is not so, because each one has the enemy in his power, that is his 
body through which he sins. Blessed is that servant, then, who always holds captive the 
enemy delivered into his power and wisely safeguards himself from him, because as long 
as he does this, no other enemy visible or invisible will be able to harm him.737 
 
In this admonition Francis indicates that the body is the source of injuries and sins, but this is 
not recognized, hence the need to blame others for one’s own sins. In his essay on Oedipus, 
Girard framed this intuition in terms of the mythic figures of accuser and accused: ‘Each man 
is Oedipus, the guilty party, to the Other, and Tiresias, the misjudged prophet, to himself. 
Every man is a blind prophet […] We all speak the truth while remaining blind, none of us 
recognizing in what we say the truth about ourselves’.738 Francis had achieved a remarkable 
insight, consistent with the ‘intelligence of the victim’: ‘For Francis, enemies do not exist 
outside ourselves’.739 The ‘sacrificial’ element of Francis’s intuition is located in assigning all 
culpability to ‘the body’.740  
 
Excursus: The Body as Scapegoat? 
 
Given Francis’s apparently sacrificial attitude towards his body, it is worth reflecting, from the 
perspective of mimetic theory, on the role of Francis’s body in early Franciscan spirituality. 
His body, which he had struggled to subdue became, in death an object of desire, since Assisi’s 
rival commune, Perugia, made claims upon the corpse of Saint Francis.741 Saint Francis’s body 
was known to be afflicted, however, Chiara Frugoni has observed that Francis did not 
associate his various afflictions with Christ’s passion. A spirituality centred on the passion of 
Christ which came to dominate the Franciscan Order was not the original spirituality of 
 
737 Francis of Assisi, The Admonitions, X, FA:ED (Vol 1), p. 132. 
738 ‘Whether we are assiduous or inattentive readers of Sophocles, we all identify Tiresias with lucidity and 
Oedipus with blindness. We want true and false to be solidly anchored in a world without surprises. Good and 
evil must be embodied once for all by infallible champions.’ Such is the goal of myth. However, as Girard notes, 
what we find in Oedipus and Tiresias is symmetry and identity. ‘The two characters correspond perfectly to the 
mirror image metaphor […] [w]hich is the original, which the reflection?’ René Girard ‘Oedipus Analyzed’ in 
Oedipus Unbound, pp. 36-7. 
739 Le Goff, p. 32. 
740 It should be noted that Francis’s apparently sacrificial attitude to ‘the body’ indicates less a contempt for his 
physical body than the body understood as ‘the source of evil and sin within us, that is, our whole personality 
in so far as “we are … opposed to good but prompt and willing to embrace evil” (Early Rule. 22. 6) Thaddée 
Matura O.F.M., Francis of Assisi: The Message in His Writings (New York: St Bonaventure University, 1997) p. 
133. 
741 Cf. Le Goff, p. 45 and Michael Robson, O.F.M. Conv., Saint Francis of Assisi: The Legend and the Life 
(London: Continuum, 1997) pp. 249-70.  
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Francis. Francis’s writings and prayers emphasise the incarnation as the expression of God’s 
limitless love for creation, rather than the passion. It was Francis’s followers who later 
identified his weak and wounded body with Christ’s wounded body. Francis’s wounded body, 
and a mystical experience on Mount La Verna in 1224, were represented by Celano as the 
resolution of a spiritual crisis.742 In this account the body of the saint becomes the spiritual 
locus for founding the Order. Francis’s wounded and afflicted body came to symbolise the 
troubled body of the nascent Order, for which a divine sealing, in the form of the stigmata 
was considered the mystical resolution to internal inconsistencies and tensions. Dalarun 
states that in Book Two of Celano’s First Life:  
 
The suffering body of Francis is the central element, the chief support of the entire 
institutional and spiritual edifice. Chapter IV, which described Francis’s illness and his 
ravaged and torn body, is most expressive. His physical woundedness reflects his moral 
anguish. The Order, here epitomized in the founder’s body (which becomes a founding 
body) is also in danger of being torn apart.743  
 
The language is resonant of Girard’s characterization of the founding of differentiation on the 
body of the emissary victim. Dalarun interprets Celano’s treatment of the wounded and 
afflicted body of Francis as the resolution of Francis’s inner conflict; the division of roles within 
the order, representing the institutional vocation and the charismatic vocation. In Celano, the 
separation of the roles represents the resolution of the conflict in the early Order, not the 
emerging conflict itself, as Sabatier would mistakenly suggest.744  
 
The body of Saint Francis is also associated with the peaceful refounding of Assisi. 
Unlike Saint Dominic, a universal saint with no local ties, Francis is a universal saint and also 
a ‘penitent from Assisi’. Dalarun notes that ‘when the saint’s body, now dead and at peace, 
goes from the Portiuncula back to San Damiano it becomes the “cement” of the city of 
Assisi’.745 Communication between Saint Clare and the sisters at the convent, and the body 
of Saint Francis, took place through the same window at which the sisters received Holy 
Communion. Since their first encounter, the merchant son of Pietro di Bernardone and the 
 
742 Celano, First Life, FA:ED (Vol 1) pp. 263-65. 
743 Dalarun, pp. 120-1. 
744 Ibid, p. 121. 
745 Ibid, p. 122. 
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daughter of the nobleman Favarone di Offerduccio,746 effected a symbolic pact which comes 
to characterise the union of two competing classes in Assisi: ‘The spiritual communion 
between these two bodies becomes material and spiritual proof of the Concordia civitatis. 
Holiness or perhaps better, hagiography, is always a means of reconciliation and refounding. 
Francis is also the civic refounder of Assisi, but only in company with Clare’.747 The peaceful 
refounding of Assisi on the body of Francis, is attested by the long association of the city with 
its most notable saint.   
 
A non-confrontational form of Gospel Life 
 
Kinsella’s account explains of why the early Franciscan movement consistently avoided 
incorporation into traditional forms of monastic life. In Girardian terms, monastic 
communities frequently functioned as ‘doubles’ with secular institutions and social groups. 
Kinsella describes the reality of monastic seclusion in the 12th and 13th centuries, a seclusion 
in which ‘the social structures of lay society were alternately denigrated and exploited’.748 
Monastic religious communities were commonly creating a ‘double bind’ with respect to their 
way of life.749 On the one hand they eschewed the social and material privileges which were 
deemed proper to the lay state – for the sake of the Gospel – and on the other hand effectively 
concealed these privileges within a structure which was, theoretically, radically free of 
material and conceptual appropriation. Francis was determined not to adopt any of the 
existing monastic rules or to model the way of life of the Friars Minor upon existing monastic 
models. His Rule is significant for its opposition to appropriation of material and social 
privileges, which would inevitably become the objects of desire and rivalry in community. In 
his Testament Francis wrote: 
 
Let the brothers be careful not to receive in any way churches or poor dwellings or 
anything else built for them unless they are according to the holy poverty we have 
promised in the Rule. As pilgrims and strangers, let them always be guests there. I strictly 
command all the brothers through obedience, wherever they may be, not to dare to ask 
any letter from the Roman Curia, either personally or through an intermediary, whether 
 
746 Saint Clare of Assisi (1194-1253). The daughter of Assisian nobility, Clare was associated with Francis from 
1212, eventually forming a community of Poor Ladies at the church of San Damiano. 
747 Dalarun, p. 122. 
748 Kinsella, p. 18. 
749 The double bind is the result of a double imperative that comes from the model as model: (‘imitate me’), 
who becomes the rival: (‘do not imitate me’). Cf. Girard, Things Hidden, pp. 279-283. 
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for a church or for another place or under any pretext of preaching or the persecution of 
their bodies. But, wherever they have not been received, let them flee into another 
country to do penance with the blessing of God.750  
 
As Kinsella demonstrates, both monastic and secular clergy were typically enmeshed in the 
social structures of feudal society and attached both materially and conceptually to its centres 
of power. Monks and clerics were inevitably drawn into the mimetic conflicts which produced 
violence and were themselves unable to curtail violence, being invested in the structures 
which produced and accelerated the conflicts. In its attempts to restore peace and curtail 
violence the representatives of Church authority were frequently compelled to use the threat 
of violence or impose ecclesiastical penalties, which amount to a form of social violence, in 
order to restore peace. Kinsella cites several examples of episcopal authority implicated in 
violence, either in the pursuit of peace or merely in the preservation or extension of its own 
claims to power.751 
 
In the context of late feudal society, characterised by endemic violence, Francis 
emerges as a figure of unique significance. He intuited the necessary link between the 
appropriation of material and social privilege and violent conflict. Thus, he formed a way of 
life which did not seek to confront power structures and thus become embroiled in the 
struggle of ‘doubles’. Kinsella’s interpretation of the Franciscan forma vitae asserts that: 
 
by virtue of the willing abandonment of social position, and its accompanying advantages, 
Francis and his brothers were able to stand outside that societal structure which 
promised, on the one hand, the power and privileges which would give them dominion 
over others and, on the other, which would involve them in all the attendant attachments 
and obligations, and therefore the conflicts and violence that such privileges entailed.752    
    
The lack of material wealth and property exposed the early Friars Minor to all the antipathies 
and dangers which the dispossessed suffered, and as Kinsella observes, their initial campaigns 
of preaching were often met with mockery and violence.753 The early companions of Francis 
 
750 The Testament (1226) FA:ED (Vol 1), p.126. 
751 Kinsella, Poverty and Violence, pp. 20-3. Kinsella cites Guy, Bishop of Le Puy’s attempt to establish regional 
peace ‘backing threats of excommunication with the troops of his nephews, the counts of nearby Gévauden 
and Brioude’. Mediaevistik, p. 68.  
752 Kinsella, Poverty and Violence, p. 24. 
753 Cf. Ibid, pp. 39-40. Thompson characterized the friars of this period as resembling ‘pious tramps’, p. 38. He 
suggests that the general population would have avoided them, as they would vagabonds, thieves or the 
unbalanced paupers that frequented the roadways. pp. 38-39. 
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stood outside the protective web of social power and domination and were vulnerable to 
derision.754 When the friars sought ways to ameliorate the violence which their life invited, 
specifically by appeal to the protection of the powerful, Francis insisted on remaining outside 
the very structures which acted as both a protection from and a provocation to violence. The 
peace-making and peace-preaching initiatives of Saint Francis and the early friars were 
gradually acknowledged as an authentic witness to peace and reconciliation, uncompromised 
by the power interests of feudal society.755 In Hamilton’s estimation the Franciscan innovation 
of consistently joining the practice of voluntary poverty with the virtue of humility was 
detrimental to the transformative political power of the ‘poor of Christ’ movements. Kinsella 
asserts this combination assured Francis of Assisi and the early Franciscan friar’s remarkable 
success in establishing and modelling peaceful and non-competitive relationships in a society 
characterised by rapid and sudden escalations of violence. 
 
Kinsella notes that the life of the Friars Minor, while embracing a non-appropriative 
life-style, was directed to preaching penance and conversion and was manifestly Christo-
centric. The friars undertook to imitate Christ’s example in the Gospel, an example which 
implied the ‘acceptance of suffering in the service of peace’.756 This raises the question of 
asceticism and the particular form asceticism took in the early Franciscan movement. In 
chapter six I will argue that early Franciscan asceticism is indicative of that mimetic 
consciousness associated with true conversions. Thus, the early Franciscans avoided the 






754 In a study of the violence directed towards Mendicant Orders over the thirteenth and fourteenth centuries 
Geltner identified a total of eighty-four recorded violent attacks (including four directed to Poor Clare 
convents). The level of violence, whilst not excessive in degree or frequency for the historical period, is 
significant. As Mendicant Orders became involved (confrontationally) in anti-heresy campaigns and benefited 
from the patronage of the powerful elites, they were more likely to be the subjects of violent attack. Cf. G. 
Geltner, ‘Mendicants as victims: scale, scope and the idiom of violence’, Journal of Medieval History, 36, 2, 
(2010) 126-141, DOI: 10.1016/j.jmedhist.2010.02.001  
755 Cf. Kinsella, Poverty and Violence, pp. 38-44. 
756 Ibid, P. 153. 
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Reducing the early Franciscan movement primarily to economic realities and models offers 
an impoverished and deficient narrative. The lingering mystification of romanticism produces 
such distortions and obscures the dynamics of the movement. Mimetic theory addresses 
fundamental cultural and social realities in relation to violence, incorporating the theological 
category of conversion. By avoiding the romantic characterizations of hero/anti-hero, it is 
possible to situate Francis and the early friars as both the subjects and the agents of change 
within their historical and cultural moment. Their unique social and religious project, which 
defies simple economic, religious and social reductions, may be described as a common life 
of peace-making, preaching, labouring and begging. Induction into this way of life was 
achieved by the graced collapse of previous, rivalrous patterns of desiring, i.e., a conversion 
experience which produces in the early Franciscans the ‘intelligence of the victim’.  
 
In linking Franciscan poverty to a consistent ethic of peace-making, Kinsella has 
indicated how the early Franciscan way of life embodied important insights into rivalrous 
desire, social order and violence. The social and ecclesial systems from which Francis emerged 
were generative of violence. The early Franciscan movement did not confront these systems, 
but rather attempted an exodus, by creating non-rivalrous alternatives, free from the social 
protection, status and obligations which characterized late medieval monastic life. The 
historical and cultural context of the late Middle Ages is significant for rapid social change and 
violence. The early Franciscan movement emerged in this context, sharing many 
characteristic features of the epoch, but also embodying significant counter-cultural 
characteristics. In attending to the cultural and historical context of violence Kinsella has 
offered a satisfying explanation of the early Franciscan movement’s voluntary poverty. 
Romanticism, which first produced Francis the hero, has produced Francis the anti-hero. A 
mimetic reading of the early Franciscan movement, alerts us to what is concealed in such 
representations; the presence of demons over Arezzo, i.e., the dynamics of conflictual 
mimesis and the limits of any social order based on exclusion to ever effectively proclaim or 





Franciscan and Girardian Asceticism: The Social and Political Form of an Exodus 




Girard’s critics have observed the absence of any structured explanation of what a non-
sacrificial, non-rivalrous community would look like, ‘taking a collective, political form’.757 
Even those engaged more sympathetically with Girard’s work have acknowledged the lack of 
a positive description of the movement from sacrificial to non-sacrificial social realities.758  
Building on the insights of Kinsella in the previous chapter, I will argue that the early 
Franciscan movement developed and performed a unique asceticism, which I will characterise 
as an asceticism-for-peace.  
 
The question of asceticism is closely united to the question of imitation and I will argue 
that this dual preoccupation is a defining characteristic in the early Franciscan movement: 
how is it possible to imitate without rivalrous and violent consequences? Early Franciscan 
forms of asceticism resemble – but were distinct from – existing monastic and eremitical 
forms of asceticism. Early Franciscan asceticism had a performative and didactic character. A 
mimetic reading of the early Franciscans offers an explanation for the specific forms of 
asceticism associated with the movement. The asceticism associated with Francis became 
increasingly problematic as the Franciscan Order grew and developed. A more classical 
Christian asceticism prevailed over time, one which suited an increasingly clericalized Order. 
Using Girard’s categories I will explore in this chapter the relationship between imitation and 
asceticism. I will argue that the early Franciscan forms of asceticism indicate a determination 
to express a shared mimetic awareness, distinct from monastic forms of asceticism. 
 
757 Milbank, Theology and Social Theory, p. 395. 
758 ‘[…] while I am convinced that mimetic theory helps us better understand many dynamics governing human 
life, particularly the mechanics generating exclusion and violence, it is not clear in my reading of Girard (and 
his many interpreters) what kind of everyday practices – or askeses – are critical for bringing about 
conversion’. Brian D. Robinette, ‘Deceit, Desire, and the Desert: René Girard’s Mimetic Theory in Conversation 
with Early Christian Monastic Practice’ in Violence, Transformation and the Sacred, eds. Margaret R. Pfeil and 
Tobias L. Winright (Maryknoll, New York: Orbis Books, 2011) pp. 130-43 (p. 131). 
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Building on chapters four and five, I will argue that the core values of the early 
Franciscan movement demonstrate a real understanding of the role of borrowed/mediated 
desire in creating conflict and an understanding of the systems which both accelerate and 
contain mimetic conflict, through exclusionary violence.  I will argue, as Brian D. Robinette 
has argued in another context, that a pre-critical religious tradition, such as the early 
Franciscan movement, was capable of structuring its ascetical programme in a manner that 
suggests ‘a profound intuitive grasp of mimetic desire’.759   
 
This chapter will be divided into three parts: 
 
1. Before exploring early Franciscan asceticism I will indicate the characteristics of 
asceticism as it is treated in mimetic theory. Specifically I will explore the fundamental 
relationship between the categories of imitation and conversion in Girard’s work. 
2. I will explore the question of imitation and asceticism in the early Franciscan 
movement. Just as the early Franciscan movement developed outside of monastic 
structures, early Franciscan asceticism was characterized by a practical solidarity with 
the socially marginalised. Over and above the ordinary asceticism involved in a 
mendicant lifestyle, early Franciscan asceticism was frequently performative and 
didactic. In its performative expressions it does not invite direct imitation so much as 
demonstrate/embody the conflictual dynamic of mimetic desire, specifically, 
appropriation. I will, therefore, argue that the early Franciscans had an intuitive 
understanding of the mimetic nature of desire and developed strategies to interrupt 
or reconfigure triangular desire in its initial stages of conflict.  
3. I will introduce the bridging concept of scandal to further explore how early Franciscan 
practice can be aligned to concepts in mimetic theory, specifically Girard’s use of the 
biblical concept of skandalon. I will argue that the early Franciscan movement was 
accustomed to provoking scandal, by refusing to interpret the Gospel life in terms of 
exclusion or to form identities through exclusion.  
 
759 Cf. Ibid, pp.130-143. 
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Exploring Asceticism in Mimetic Theory and the Early Franciscan Movement 
 
Asceticism and Mimetic Theory 
 
Ann Astell has asserted that ‘the language of asceticism and mysticism abounds in Girard’s 
early work Deceit, Desire and the Novel, as it does, Girard argues, in the novels themselves’.760 
This view is shared by the theologian Wolfgang Palaver, who has described Girard’s first major 
work, essentially a work of literary criticism, as ‘a masterpiece of Christian spirituality’.761  
Astell notes that at the heart of Deceit, Desire and the Novel is Girard’s contention that 
  
the novelist, a ‘metamorphosized hero’, ‘cured of metaphysical desire’, shares in the 
freedom that his or her fictive Other finally gains through the ‘renunciation of 
metaphysical desire’, of ersatz divinity, of envy and pride-inhibiting vices that, in the 
author’s case, have frequently enslaved him or her to the mimesis of other writers.762  
 
Astell understands Girard to exemplify his own theory of mimesis in literature; she asserts a 
real connection between his insights into mimetic realism in the great writers, and his own 
religious conversion. In Deceit, Desire and the Novel, Girard notes that the various political or 
social systems which seek, by a Hegelian dialectic, to end violent relationships and usher in 
an age of the spirit, are always rejected by the novelist (and by Girard himself). The ‘famous 
reconciliation’ is preached, but the novelist continues to observe instead, ‘Stendhalian vanity, 
Proustian snobbism and the Dostoyevskian underground, enlisted in the battle for supremacy 
in the universe of physical non-violence’. 763 Girard insists: 
 
Whatever political or social system is somehow imposed on them, men will never achieve 
the happiness and peace of which the revolutionaries dream, nor the bleating harmony 
which scares the reactionaries. They will always get on together just enough to enable 
them never to agree […] they will never tire of inventing new discord.764 
 
The mimetic nature of desire remains hidden in the contest of ‘doubles’ and, as Girard 
illustrates in Deceit, Desire and the Novel, once entered into, the opposing doubles come to 
resemble each other more and more. In this regard he states: ‘We constantly find the same 
 
760 Astell, p. 392 
761 Ibid. 
762 Ibid, p. 393. 
763 Deceit, p. 110. 
764 Ibid, p. 111. 
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oppositions between aristocrats and bourgeois, between the devout and the atheists, 
reactionaries and republicans, lovers and mistresses, parents and children, rich and poor.’765 
The differences, which are presented as fundamental, are exposed in the novelistic universe 
as ‘absurd ornaments’ and ‘false windows’ which are there ‘for symmetry’.766 For Girard the 
choice is between conversion; abandoning the illusion of absolute autonomy (pride), and 
the chimeric ‘autonomy’ of romanticism. The multiplication of binaries, whose ‘differences’ 
are both concealed and revealed by increasingly subtle (and more virulent) forms of 
hypocrisy, snobbery and hatred, betray the supposed emancipation of modernity. Mimesis 
has triumphed.767 Girard asserts: 
 
As soon as the subject who desires recognizes the role of imitation in his own desire he 
has to renounce either this desire or his pride. Modern lucidity has shifted the problem 
of askesis and broadened it. It is no longer a question of renouncing the object 
temporarily in order the better to possess it but in renouncing the desire itself.768 
 
Girard explored the role of true and false asceticism as a means of transcending mimetic 
desire. In Deceit Desire and the Novel, Girard insists that the non-desiring of neo-
romanticism is not the same as the non-desiring of the great religions or the higher 
humanisms. Without an understanding or intuition of the mimetic nature of desire, non-
desiring comes to resemble not a path to freedom but rather something like the ‘numbing 
of the senses, of a total or partial loss of vital curiosity’.769 The asceticism which Francis of 
Assisi undertakes cannot be described as a ‘loss of vital curiosity’ or a ‘numbing of the 
senses’; nothing in the sources, least of all his exhilarating poem, Canticle of Brother Sun 
suggests any diminished sense of wonder or engagement. Rather, Francis’s asceticism is 
better understood as a reordering of the patterns of desire, as a result of his ‘mimetic’ 
conversion. For Girard, unconverted asceticism is yet another mimetic ruse; an asceticism 
of hypocrisy. In his analysis of novelistic desire Girard concludes that to hide our desires and 
affect disinterest requires considerable self-discipline. It is precisely in hiding desire and 
 
765 Ibid, p. 151. 
766 Ibid. 
767 The rational model opposes the mimetic model and because the rational model does not grasp the mimetic 
principle it inevitably focuses on the single figure who has become a rival or an obstacle. Without the 
renunciation of the ‘autonomy of desire’ the mimetic principle continues to triumph. ‘[T]he rational model 
cannot thwart mimetism. Mimetism’s law is implacable’. Cf. Girard, Battling to the End, p. 131. 
768 Girard, Deceit, p. 272. 
769 Ibid, p. 273 
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affecting a disinterested outlook that many novelistic characters arouse the strongest 
desires in others.  
 
In Deceit, Desire and the Novel Girard insists that, alongside a true, ‘vertical’ askesis, 
there is a false ‘asceticism of desire’, which imitates true asceticism and may be superficially 
indistinguishable from vertical asceticism.770 In false ascetism the gravitational pull of desire 
is meticulously concealed under the guise of indifference or a studied self-sufficiency. 
Vertical or true asceticism is the product of mimetic conversion. It is a response to the 
graced insight/ ‘Intelligence’ that we are all, or have been ‘[…] persecutors without knowing 
it. All participation in the scapegoat phenomenon is the same sin of the persecution of 
Christ. And all human beings commit this sin’.771   
 
Without a prior mimetic conversion, even ascetical practices are strategies of 
acquisitive mimetic desire. In Girard’s fundamental anthropology asceticism avoids a 
Manichean division of nature.  In Dostoevsky’s novel ‘the universe of the possessed is the 
reverse image of the Christian universe. The positive mediation of the saint is replaced by 
the negative mediation of anguish and hate […] Deviated transcendency is a caricature of 
vertical transcendency’.772 Essentially, we occupy a single universe, in which our mimetically 
charged desires, are channelled into ‘good imitation’ and alternatively, the conflict of 
‘doubles’. Our strategies for surviving violent escalations of rivalrous conflict are 
murderous. To withdraw from the systems which are founded on and maintained by the 
victimage mechanism Girard insists on the necessity of conversion (a gratuitous, new 
understanding) and asceticism (the taking of new, non-rivalrous models).  
 
As I indicated in chapter three, the role of positive mimesis is largely 
underdeveloped in Girard’s work. It stands in relief to his treatment of the dynamic of 
negative mimesis. Notwithstanding this imbalance, Girard has tentatively explored the 
theme of positive mimesis, giving scope for further development of this theme. For 
example, Girard treated the relationship between positive mimesis and true/vertical 
 
770 Cf. Ibid, 153-75. 
771 Girard, Evolution and Conversion, p. 142. 
772 Girard, Deceit, pp. 60-61. 
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asceticism in his speech to the Académie Française.773 Girard explored the spirituality of 
Father Robert Ambroise-Marie Carré, O.P., and noted that the spirituality of the young 
Carré, (in the Dominican community at Neuilly) was modelled on the persons who were 
close to Jesus, and to whom he attributes a ‘difficult’ and ‘hardworking’ faith. ‘These two 
adjectives come back often to describe his own faith’. Girard observed in the mature 
writings of Father Carré a transformation with respect to his asceticism: 
 
I was recently reading notes I took during my ordination retreat. The necessity for me to 
be a saint occurs with a vigour that literally strikes me. So much light, such strong 
certainties that made me write: ‘If I do not become a saint, I will really have betrayed’. I 
don’t reject those lines written at the age of twenty-four […] But I have a long experience, 
that of a traveller who, on a tiring journey, is less and less confident in his own strength 
and knows that reaching the goal does not entirely rely upon his will. A certain restlessness 
of desire now gives way to the sweetness of hope. Holiness or not? The question is not 
phrased in those terms anymore. I only think about God’s tenderness.774  
 
Girard states that, in his mature spirituality, ‘the Father rejects expressly what was hidden 
pride in his project of holiness. When he said: “If I do not become a saint I will really have 
betrayed” he was setting a trap for himself that would then catch him, but his humility 
eventually freed him’.775 Girard asserts that Carré’s mystical and ascetical life at Neuilly was 
‘the occasion of a fall’, or at least a long and arduous exercise which he came to recognise 
as mistaken. Girard concludes: ‘Instead of making God an Everest to climb, the late Fr. Carré 
sees in him a shelter. This is not sceptical humanism which is here expressed, but the 
surrender to the divine mercy. Without denying his mystical aspirations, the Father (Carré) 
recognised his incapacity to achieve them by his own means’.776 In the religious, as well as 
the literary context, rivalrous desire can produce a false asceticism. In Father Carré’s case 
Girard asserts, a conversion can be observed in the subtle but unambiguous change in 
language used to express his spirituality. Taking Christ (or the friends of Christ, in Carré’s 
case) as an external model is problematic precisely because of mimesis.  
 
773 Girard was elected a member of the Académie Française on 17th March 2005. Following the tradition of the 
Académie, Girard’s speech was dedicated to the former occupant of the chair, in his case, the Dominican 
scholar Robert Ambroise-Marie Carré O.P. (1908-2004). 




776 Ibid.  
 190 
 
Imitating the ‘Conversion Intelligence’ of the Founder 
 
As Schwager observes, if a believer attempts to take Jesus as his or her external model and 
seeks to imitate his behaviour the result must be a ‘deadly moralism’. Schwager asserts that, 
‘in purely external fixation on the messenger of love, the disciple would fall into a growing 
inner tension. Almost by necessity, the disciple would sooner or later commit acts that 
totally contradict the model. The imitation of love ends in violence’.777 Both during the life-
time of Francis and in the decades after his death, the question of imitation preoccupied 
the Franciscan Order. The role of Saint Francis as model within the early Franciscan 
movement was problematic. After his conversion experiences, Francis was drawn to periods 
of seclusion and solitude, and typically undertook manual labour and cared for lepers and 
the sick. The collapse of his early ambitions and rivalrous desires, his ‘conversion 
intelligence’ may be expressed in the phrase subditi omnibus, i.e., a desire to be subject to 
all. Francis also felt called to preach the Gospel, receiving a papal licence to do so in 1208. 
This dual vocation provoked a tension and anxiety within Francis. The work of preaching 
was, in some sense a pretension to holiness and wisdom; according to Thompson, ‘distress 
over this interior conflict would plague Francis for the rest of his life’.778 
 
Francis struggled to model his ‘conversion intelligence’, while avoiding the trap of 
becoming a model/rival to others. He frequently requested a guardian/superior, even a 
novice, to act as his superior. In this asceticism the Founder regularly rediscovered the 
liberation of being subject to all and thereby avoiding rivalrous desires which lead to 
conflict. Even as Francis modelled non-rivalrous relationships within the community, 
anomalies occurred; Francis, sensitive to his own moral weakness, frequently asked for 
penances, which his superiors, in deference to their founder, reluctantly imposed.779 
 
 
777 Schwager, Scapegoats, p. 176. 
778 Thompson, p. 28-9. 
779 Thompson notes that Francis’s role as exemplar was frequently frustrated by bouts of illness, which 
required some mitigation of the Rule. In his frequently weakened state, Francis was persuaded to provide for 
his bodily needs, such as taking food cooked in lard during Lent and having fox fur sewn into his habit during a 
winter illness. On these occasions, anxious of the charge of hypocrisy and bad example, Francis either 
requested or imposed on himself corrective penances. Cf. The Assisi Compilation, FA:ED (Vol 2) p. 183. 
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External Fixation and Saint Bonaventure’s Mystical Solution to Imitation 
 
As the Order grew in numbers and in influence, the friars themselves struggled to imitate 
their Founder. This tension is seen in Bonaventure of Bagnoregio, the celebrated theologian 
and Minister General of the Franciscan Order (1257). Bonaventure was acutely aware of the 
importance of imitation, weaving concepts such as ‘exemplarity’ into his philosophical and 
theological works.780 Bonaventure’s theology of creation gives maximum consideration to 
the concepts of ‘emanation’, ‘exemplarity’ and ‘consummation’, conceiving all created 
things as vestiges (vestigium) or images (imago) upon an ascending scale of resemblance to 
the Triune God. The term ‘likeness’ is proper to those creatures which express the Creator 
to the highest degree.781 Exemplarity reaches its peak in the incarnation. Christ is exemplar 
in a two-fold manner: eternally in relation to creation and temporally in relation to the New 
Creation. The same Word of God ‘is the principle of perfect creation and the mediator of 
perfection to lost-and-redeemed humanity’.782  
 
Bonaventure anticipated Schwager’s concerns about ‘external fixation’ on the 
model by several centuries. In his Commentary of St. Luke’s Gospel and several other works, 
Bonaventure argues that Christ, in his humanity, represents for us, the possibility to imitate 
the transcendent goodness and love of the Father, inimitable in their source, but accessible 
to us in the Incarnate Word. For Bonaventure, discipleship requires not imitating Christ in 
those things which would be fruitless (e.g., circumcision) or impossible to imitate (deeds of 
power). Rather, Christ can be imitated in his humility and his poverty. For Bonaventure, 
Christ’s material poverty and his nakedness on the cross reveal divine humility: ‘The cross, 
encapsulating love, humility and poverty, resets humanity on a Godward course: the cross 
becomes the essential signpost for redeemed man’.783 According to Gregory Shanahan in 
Bonaventure’s commentary on Saint Luke’s Gospel, Jesus is the mediator of a new covenant 
of compassion for alienated humanity and the exultant response to this new covenant is 
 
780 Cf. Gregory B. W. Shanahan, Sequi Christum est se perfecte illi configurare: St. Bonaventure’s Theology of 
Discipleship with reference to his Commentary on Luke (PhD Thesis, Oxford University, 1993). According to 
Shanahan, Bonaventure made exemplarism ‘the basis of his entire mystical system and the foundation also of 
this teaching on external conformity to Christ’, p. 300. 
781 Cf. Ibid, p. 153. 
782 Cf. Ibid, p. 300. 
783 Ibid, p. 222. 
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typically expressed in voluntary abnegation and following Jesus freely to the cross. This 
imitation finds its own perfect model in Francis’.784  
 
For Bonaventure, the question of how an increasingly learned and clericalized Order 
could imitate a founder so averse to learning was given a mystical solution. Bonaventure 
emphasised the miracle of the stigmata of Saint Francis: ‘The cross or sign of the cross 
imprinted on his body symbolized his love of Christ crucified and by the flame of that love 
he was totally transformed into Christ’.785 In the sermon of 1255 and in his Major and Minor 
Lives, Bonaventure resolved the problem of admiration versus imitation by means of 
mystical categories. Bonaventure taught that transformation is a spiritual grace, received 
by few. In the late thirteenth century the dramatic and extreme ascetical practices of Francis 
recorded in the early sources were increasingly eclipsed by Francis’s status as alter Christus, 
sealed and transformed by the mystical experience on Mount La Verna. In Bonaventure’s 
Legenda Maior the austerities and asceticism of Francis are recorded with some 
embarrassment.786  
 
By the end of the thirteenth century the frustrations associated with external 
fixation were overcome by representing Saint Francis as a unique imitator of Christ, one 
who was sealed by Christ.787 The Legenda Maior carefully avoids a strict chronology of 
 
784 Cf. Ibid, p. 303. 
785 Bonaventure, Sermo IV in Dalarun, p. 230. 
786 Cf. Bonaventure, Major Life, 6, 2., FA:ED (Vol 2) p. 570.  
787 In Chiara Frugoni’s work, Francesco e l’invenzione delle stimmate: Una storia per parole e immagini fino a 
Bonaventura e Giotto (Torino: Einaudi, 1993) it is asserted that images have preserved and popularized aspects 
of Saint Francis’s life that were excluded or neglected in the texts. In the late Middle Ages images of Saint 
Francis were an important means of telling the story of Saint Francis to the many who could not read the texts. 
Images tended to survive when texts were destroyed, preserving a subtle religious and political witness to the 
changing interpretations of Saint Francis. Frugoni notes that in the work of Giotto there are two distinct 
iconographic depictions of the miracle of the stigmata. In the Louvre altarpiece, Frugoni observed that the 
luminous rays which are emitted from the Seraph proceed in straight lines to the body of Francis (From the 
right hand of the Seraph to the left hand of Saint Francis, as in a mirror image). However, in the later Bardi 
fresco of Santo Croce in Florence, the luminous rays are crossed, linking the right hand of the Seraph to the 
right hand of Saint Francis. The wound on the Seraph’s right side is repeated on the right side of Saint Francis. 
Thomas of Celano, among the earliest (and most consistent) recorders of the stigmata of Saint Francis, placed 
the wound on Saint Francis’s right side. Saint Francis, in late thirteenth century Franciscan art becomes, not 
merely a mirror image of the Seraph/Christ, but the alter Christus; the one impossible to imitate since he is so 
identified with Christ. Imitation is raised to a mystical aspiration and is institutionalized within the formal 
asceticism of the Order.  
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Francis’s life, as Celano’s First Life attempted, in preference to thematic presentation.788 As 
the sources created distance between the early Franciscan practice of asceticism and 
penance, they emphasised the mystical nature of Francis’s union with Christ. Dalarun notes:  
 
If the Francis of the First Life is to be properly incorporated into the Major Life, his body, 
his sexuality and his relationship with women will have to be eliminated […] the idea that 
the marks of Christ’s passion were imprinted on non-virginal flesh was gradually 
considered more and more scandalous – and not only by Bonaventure. That is why the 
general chapter of Narbonne in 1260 had already replaced the antiphon that recalled 
Francis’s dissolute life.789 
 
The ‘historical Francis’ disappeared behind the mystical image of the Founder. Étienne 
Gilson noted that ‘imitation of St. Francis could not be literal imitation as he [Bonaventure] 
had to omit the extraordinary asceticism and the extreme macerations practiced by him: it 
had to be a translation. And this translation was possible only provided that some other 
discipline should come to fill the place left void, and play the part played in the earlier saint 
by discipline of the body’.790 This translation was achieved by filling the void with the 
discipline of the mind, not only in prayer and meditation, but in learning.  
 
The problem of asceticism and imitation in the early Order appears to require either 
an impossible ‘external fixation’, producing not love, but a ‘deadly moralism’ and a sacrificial 
violence, or Bonaventure’s ‘mystical-political’ solution. If, however, a mimetic reading is 
applied a new possibility emerges: The early Franciscan asceticism was aligned to a unique 
awareness of the victim, a ‘conversion intelligence’ and it functioned within the community 
as a series of strategies for remaining outside the dominant social, ecclesial and political 
systems which required victimage. As the Order developed this ‘intelligence’ was weakened 
or lost. The ascetical practices became incomprehensible and embarrassing to the later 
generations of friars, such as Bonaventure. Attempting to practice these ascetical practices 
from within the systems of social, ecclesial and political power was anomalous. In the next 
chapter I will explore one reason why the friars could no longer understand their own 
 
788 Bonaventure’s Major Life is divided according to a threefold mystical pattern: 
Chapter V-VII: Austerity, obedience and poverty (Purgative), Chapter VIII-X: Devotion, charity and prayer 
(Illuminative) and Chapter XI-XIII: Understanding of the Scripture, preaching and the Stigmata (Imitative). Cf. 
Dalarun, p. 238. 
789 Dalarun, p. 255. 
790 E. Gilson, The Philosophy of Saint Bonaventure (New York: 1938) pp. 81-2., in Dalarun, p. 255. 
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founding asceticism: the abandoning of daily labour, in favour of more traditional forms of 
ecclesial life.    
 
Girard’s theory of mimetic desire sheds light upon the tempestuous decades 
following the death of Francis. Francis represented for the Church of the early thirteenth 
century an extraordinary model of Christian discipleship. He came to be described in 
Joachimist terms as the harbinger of a new age, even the ‘angel of the Sixth Seal’.791 Yet, in 
the early Franciscan narratives he referred to himself as the ‘little back hen’, a more 
vulnerable and homely moniker. And a great deal that was homely, concrete and descriptive 
was omitted from Bonaventure’s Major Life; the feathers of the Seraph being irreconcilable 
with the feathers of the black hen.792 Girard insists that we are obliged to take models: 
‘Every human being is in every respect too deeply dependent on models that an attempt to 
follows one’s own intuition and to act with complete autonomy makes no sense at all’.793 
According to Girard, the collapse of our rivalrous patterns of desiring presents us with either 
a return to models/rivals or to Christ. Of Christ, Girard wrote: ‘There is no acquisitive desire 
in him. As a consequence any will that is turned to Jesus will not meet with the slightest of 
obstacles […] with him there is no risk of getting caught up in the evil opposition of 
doubles.’794  
 
Jesus’s desires are always addressed to the Father and are identical with the 
Father’s. Since Jesus’s desires are not directed towards limited goods, Jesus never enters 
into rivalry with the disciples, but rather, he initiates them into the non-rivalrous kingdom 
of God. In the kingdom of God, the non-rivalrous love of the Father is rich enough for all and 
excludes none. Early Franciscan asceticism and especially voluntary poverty should be 
understood as a means and not a sacrificial end: In the concrete performance of voluntary 
poverty Francis created ‘a space in the world for an ethic of sharing that would manifest 
God’s providential liberality toward all human creatures’.795 The problem of imitation is 
 
791 Bonaventure, Major Life, Prologue, nn. 1,2 
792 Cf. Dalarun, p. 257. 
793 Schwager, Scapegoats, p. 176. 
794 Girard, Things Hidden, p. 430. 
795 Joseph Chinnici, When Values Collide: Sexual Abuse and the Challenge of Leadership (Maryknoll, New York: 
Orbis Books, 2010) p. 76. 
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overcome in Christian discipleship when Christ is taken as the model. Christ’s life is a 
consistent witness to the non-violent God, a God who is not jealous of human beings.796 
Indeed Christ’s not grasping at equality with God (Philippians 2:6) may be understood as 
refusing to hold on to equality with God for himself exclusively, ‘as opposed to willingly 
undergoing everything necessary to make of that equality with God something to be shared 
with us’.797 In judging Francis as the perfect follower of the Gospel (totius evangelicae 
perfectionis exemplar) Bonaventure recognised a true form of Christian imitation and 
discipleship. 798 However, there was much in the life of Francis he found difficult to 
assimilate or appreciate. From within the same social and ecclesial systems which Francis 
and the early friars had exited, the non-rivalrous strategies (asceticism) had become 
incomprehensible. In the next part of this chapter, I will explore some of those early 
ascetical practices which embarrassed later generations of Franciscans and I will argue that 




Franciscan Asceticism: introduction 
 
In his second edition of The Admonitions of St. Francis: Sources and Meanings, Robert Karris 
O.F.M.,799 applies to Franciscan scholarship an insight common to scripture studies, i.e., one 
does not look for ‘sources’ but parallels. Parallels indicate what was ‘in the air’ when authors 
were composing their texts. The medieval legendae associated with Francis indicate what 
was ‘in the air’ with respect to the founding dynamics of early Franciscanism. If the legendae 
typically express a sectional or party bias it must also be acknowledged that even the 
authentic writings of Francis of Assisi have been influenced both by contemporary sources 
 
796 Cf. Matt 5:23-24, which puts human reconciliation before external cult 
797 James Alison, ‘My sheep her my voice and I know them: Reflections on language, tone, and teaching in the 
space between Magister and Magisterium’ paper presented at the Celebratory Conference for the 10th 
anniversary of the CCS, Durham University, April 19th 2018. 
798 Bonaventure Major Life, c. 15 n. 1 
799 Robert Karris, O.F.M., The Admonitions of St Francis: Sources and Meanings (New York: St Bonaventure 
Publications, 2015) xiii-xiv. 
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and earlier religious and secular texts.800 While certain early Franciscan narratives betray 
the barely concealed polemical concerns of a later generation of Franciscans, projected back 
onto Francis and his companions, other narratives suggest a pungent and reliable 
provenance in life of Francis himself, and in the lived experience of the early community of 
friars. With these caveats in mind, I will suggest that the early sources provide us with a rich 
account of early Franciscan asceticism, one distinct from contemporary monastic practice. 
While Franciscan asceticism has an important performative, didactic quality, I will argue, 
with David Flood, that Franciscan asceticism was, to a large extent the asceticism, not of the 
cloister, but of the market and the field, i.e., an ordinary asceticism, undertaken not 
sacrificially, but in consequence of the friar’s economic and social agency living and working, 
among the poor.801  
 
Peace Performed and Proclaimed: Stories of Franciscan Asceticism from the Early 
Sources 
 
An Asceticism towards material and conceptual ‘purses’ 
 
In the Legend of the Three Companions, Francis directs his brothers:  
 
As you announce peace with your mouth, make sure that greater peace is in your hearts. 
Let no one be provoked to anger or scandal through you, but may everyone be drawn to 
peace, kindness and harmony, through your gentleness. For we have been called to this: 
To heal the wounded, bind up the broken and recall the erring. In fact, many who seem to 
us to be members of the devil will yet be disciples of Christ.802  
 
This irenic vision is programmatic of the early Franciscan forma vitae. The early Franciscans 
undertook a unique experiment in peace-making, remaining socially and economically 
engaged, but within an alternative, non-rivalrous social reality. Since the friars were not 
 
800 Cf. Robert Karris O.F.M. ‘St Francis of Assisi’s Admonitions in New Ecclesiastical and Secular Contexts’. 
Franciscan Studies 74, 207-230. Franciscan Institute Publications. Retrieved June 18, 2018, from Project MUSE 
database.  
801 Chapter seven will explore Flood’s work on the Early Rule. Briefly, Flood describes early Franciscan life as 
promoting daily labour as service (not as servile) and it included what Flood calls a ‘natural asceticism’. Work 
as service meant the friars did not seek remuneration or to appropriate material wealth. A non-rivalrous 
Franciscan asceticism was the by-product of a larger world view which was positive and liberating. The legacy 
of Francis was not a ‘difficult inheritance’. Cf. David Flood, The Daily Labor of Early Franciscans (New York: The 
Franciscan Institute, 2010) p. 20.     
802 The Legend of the Three Companions, (58c) FA:ED (Vol 1) p. 102. 
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attempting this way of life within the confines of a monastic cloister, the specific insights 
and values of their forma vitae required repeated performance. The emphasis on personal 
conversion in peace-making was unqualified. In the Later Rule, Francis writes: 
 
I counsel, admonish and exhort my brothers in the Lord Jesus Christ, that when they go 
about in the world they do not quarrel or fight with words or judge others; rather, let them 
be meek, peaceful and unassuming, gentle and humble, speaking courteously to 
everybody, as is becoming.803 
 
The importance of courtesy and moderation in conversation is identified as an essential 
component of peace-making. Some of the early Franciscan writings emphasize this in 
dramatic and memorable terms. Thomas of Celano offers a vivid illustration of Franciscan 
ascesis in his account of a brother who had spoken sharply of another brother in the presence 
of a nobleman. When the friar realized that he had offended his brother and introduced 
violence into the fraternal relationship ‘[…] he took some donkey manure […] and put it into 
his mouth to chew, saying: “Let the tongue which spat the poison of anger upon my brother 
now chew manure!”’.804 
 
The appropriation of material possessions (acquisitive mimesis) as a root of violence 
is equated with the appropriation of opinions and arguments which cause division and dissent 
and draw the friars into unnecessary and escalating conflicts. The Assisi Compilation speaks 
of the friar who has concealed the ‘purse’ of his opinions. The reference, found also in Francis’ 
Admonitions, is to Judas, who holds onto the purse and by avarice betrays the Lord. It is 
implied that friars who hold on to their conceptual or intellectual ‘purses’ also betray the Lord 
and introduce conflict and dissension into the community.805 Early Franciscan asceticism is 
notably opposed to the accumulation of material goods and the coin economy. As Giacomo 
Todeschini has observed: ‘Money, coins, pecunia – all these little copper, bronze and silver 
objects – have in themselves a mysterious power to represent the value of ordinary useful 
things such as bread, wind, land, water and domestic animals.’806 The ‘mysterious power’ was 
 
803 The Later Rule, FA:ED (Vol 1). 
804 Thomas of Celano, Remembrance of the Desire of a Soul, FA:ED (Vol 2) p. 347. 
805 Cf. The Admonitions of St. Francis of Assisi, (IV), FA:ED, (Vol 1) p. 130.  
806 Todeschini, p. 13. 
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part of the fascination which accelerated mimetic conflict and perhaps explains Francis’s 
opposition to entering into the coin economy. 
 
Todeschini notes that for centuries European Christianity had been using coin as 
symbolic language to speak of faith and religion. Around 1120 a French monk, Honorius of 
Autun, ‘compared the consecrated host to a very good coin. Without scandalizing anybody, 
Honorius observed that the roundness of the host resembled that of a coin just as the capacity 
of the host to be equivalent to salvation resembled the capacity of the coin to represent 
value’.807 It is significant in Celano’s First Life of Saint Francis that, having sold his horse and 
some of his father’s valuable cloth, Francis the successful merchant (felix mercantor) has no 
longer any use for the money. When the priest of San Damiano refused to take the money, 
Francis, threw it on the window ledge, ‘indicating according to his biographer’s words that a 
physical separation from money was more important than using it in acceptable ways’.808  
 
The rejection of coin is part of Saint Francis’s ‘conversion intelligence’, since it is an 
extension of the bonds which bind society into violent, excluding systems. Todeschini notes 
that in the Rules of 1221, 1223 and the Testament, certain fundamental ideas emerge 
strongly: ‘the refusal to touch money, the refusal to consider property as the fundamental 
condition for belonging to the human family, the importance attributed to alms and work as 
ways to earn a living, the search for contact with those usually considered outside the sphere 
of human society, i.e., animals, lepers, wanderers, criminals, mendicants, the poor and 
farmers.’809 It is illustrative to compare with the previous account of asceticism another 
account which links coin to acquisitive mimesis. In the sixth chapter of the Anonymous of 
Perugia, brothers in the community at Saint Mary of the Portiuncula discovered money left 
on the altar. It was removed from the altar to the window ledge and finally a brother 
approached Francis to enquire what was to be done. Francis reminded the brother that the 
friars should not merely avoid using money but should abstain from touching it. Francis’s 
determination that money was a route back into systems of social exclusion required a 
performative ascetical expression. The brother asked Francis for a penance and Francis 
 
807 Ibid, p. 14. 
808 Ibid, pp. 58-9. 
809 Ibid, p. 61. 
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instructed the brother to carry the money from the church in his mouth, and when he came 
across some ass’s dung to place the money on it.810 Such performative ascetical practices 
(both involving dung) underlined for the friars the core values of the community, by insisting 
on the worthlessness and danger of monetary tokens. For Francis, coins represented units of 
value directed towards hoarding, ‘as opposed to the common welfare, which was understood 
as the perpetual redistribution of resources or, rather, as continuous and reciprocal exchange 
of favours, donations, and alms.’811 
 
This demanding ascesis, which requires complete detachment from the material and 
conceptual objects of rivalrous desire, was itself scrutinized, lest it provoke pride or 
competition. Francis writes that the friars are not to judge or condemn others: ‘I admonish 
and exhort them not to look down on those people they see wearing soft and colorful clothing 
and enjoying the choicest food and drink’.812 This demanding asceticism is the ascesis by 
which the ‘intelligence of the victim’ is habitually acknowledged. 
 
Imposing Peace and Performing Peace 
 
Bonaventure’s Major Life of Saint Francis records that Francis began all of his sermons with 
the greeting ‘may the Lord give you peace!’ This greeting was so noteworthy of Saint 
Francis’s preaching that every one of the sources of his life mention it.813 In the Testament, 
Francis records the origin of this greeting in a divine revelation: ‘The Lord revealed to me a 
greeting, as we used to say, “May the Lord give you peace!”’814 In the contentious 
circumstances of the early 13th century the brothers, who had been instructed by Francis to 
use this greeting everywhere, found that it provoked confusion, indignation, and even 
hostility among people. The friars were frequently questioned as to the meaning of this 
greeting. In the Assisi Compilation it is recorded that a friar, through embarrassment, asked 
Francis for permission to use another greeting; Francis declined, insisting on the divine 
 
810 The Anonymous of Perugia [30] FA:ED (Vol 1) pp. 47-8.  
811 Todeschini, Franciscan Wealth, p. 79. Francis also referred to coins as ‘flies’. Cf. Celano, Remembrance, 
FA:ED (Vol 2) p. 298.  
812 The Later Rule, FA:ED (Vol, 1). 
813 Kinsella, p. 115, footnote 104. 
814 Testament, FA:ED (Vol 1) p. 126. 
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origin of this salutation.815 Saint Francis’s peace greeting is distinct from what was the 
common priestly greeting, ‘pax huic domo’, recited on entering the homes of the sick. This 
greeting takes the form of an imperative and implies the authority of a minister of the 
Church to bless, whereas Francis’s greeting is a prayer and implies no ecclesial authority.816  
 
In wishing and inviting, rather than imposing or declaring peace, Francis was 
articulating the ‘intelligence’ of his conversion. In the early thirteenth century the 
proclamation of peace is seen to provoke resentment and indignation. The proclamation of 
peace outside the systems of power and exclusion sounds different from the 
proclamation/declaration of peace from within such systems. Part of the friar’s training for 
peace was a willingness to endure misunderstanding and contempt, since the proclamation 
of peace may have been misunderstood as yet another example of domination. The peace 
greeting represents a subversion of the systems which traditionally concealed violence and 
declared peace. In separating the Gospel proclamation of peace from the coercive power to 
declare/impose peace, Francis was indicating distance from an ambiguous social order 
which imposed peace through violence. This proclamation unsettled and provoked 
misunderstanding and hostility, but Francis insisted that it was of divine origin, and in some 
way part of the ‘intelligence’ which Francis associated with his conversion. 
 
Francis did not permit the peace-greeting to be recast or abandoned, even though 
it provoked hostility. Neither did the asceticism-for-peace allow an appeal to authority or 
power when the motives of the peace-makers were contested. In The Legend of the Three 
Companions, it is related that when a sympathetic bishop suggested to Francis that it is was 
difficult to possess nothing in this world, the saint replied: ‘Lord, if we had possessions, we 
would need arms for our protection. For disputes and lawsuits usually arise out of them, 
and, because of this, love of God and neighbor are greatly impeded. Therefore, we do not 
want to possess anything in this world’.817  
 
 
815 The Assisi Compilation, FA:ED (Vol 1) p. 205.  
816 Cf. Thompson, p. 36. 
817 The Legend of the Three Companions, FA:ED (Vol 1) p. 89. 
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Borrowed Desire: Envy and Conflict 
 
Franciscan asceticism was carefully non-confrontational. It avoided a Manichean disdain for 
material goods and often suggested immediate, sometimes visceral, remedies to the 
slightest provocations to rivalry. As Kinsella concludes, for Francis, the cause of violence lies 
in avarice and envy. Envy, invidere, ‘means to look with malice’. It is characterized by Francis 
as a blasphemy in The Admonitions: ‘Therefore, whoever envies his brother the good which 
the Lord says or does in him commits a sin of blasphemy, because he envies the Most High, 
who says and does every good’.818  This conclusion is reached by Girard who begins his book 
I See Satan fall like lightning with a reflection on the Decalogue. The 6th – 9th 
commandments are against violence, in order of seriousness. The 10th commandment is 
against coveting, which implies a perversion of desire. But Girard insists the Hebrew word 
is desire, rather than a perversion of desire. 
 
A prohibition on desire, as such, seems to make a nonsense of the ascetical life. 
However, mimetic desire potentially places rivalry at the heart of all human relationships. 
Girard states: ‘The phenomenon is so common, so well-known to us, and so contrary to our 
concept of ourselves, thus so humiliating, that we prefer to remove it from consciousness 
and act as if it did not exist’. Girard maintains that if we kept the 10th commandment the 
four previous commandments, not to murder, steal, commit adultery or bear false witness 
would be superfluous, since these are all fruits of mimetic desire, the desire for my 
neighbour/neighbour’s possessions.819  
 
For Girard, the scriptural prohibition is not directed primarily to the desirable objects 
but rather to the object which belongs to my neighbour. It is my neighbour, my model/rival, 
who invests in the particular object a mysterious, metaphysical value, igniting my desires 
and leading me into the field of mimetic conflict. Girard characterized the beginning of 
violence as ‘a double idolatry of self and other’.820 Since, according to Saint Francis, all good 
comes from God, to hate or resent the good we find in our neighbour is to hate God. To 
 
818 Kinsella, p. 197. 
819 Girard, I See Satan Fall, p. 12. 
820 Ibid. 
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discover a good in my neighbour is to discover a good of God and it invites praise of God, 
not appropriation or envy. Humility is indispensable if we are not to enter into competition, 
not only with our neighbour but with God.  
 
An early Franciscan source, describing an exchange between Francis and a novice, 
captures the intractable ties by which desire, appropriation and domination are bound in 
human experience. In response to a novice’s persistent demands for a psalter Francis 
replies: ‘After you have a psalter, you will and want to have a breviary; after you have a 
breviary, you will sit in a fancy chair, like a great prelate telling your brother: “bring me my 
breviary!”’. Francis’s insight into human desiring and its end in domination and power, if 
not conflict, is comparable to mimetic theory. In typical fashion the story ends with an 
element of performance: to the novice’s amazement and embarrassment, Francis ‘speaking 
in this way with great intensity of spirit […] took some ashes in his hand, put them on his 
head, rubbing them around his head as though he were washing it, saying “I, a breviary! I, 
a breviary!”’.821  
 
The immediate and performative element in the parable indicates that in matters of 
desire, mere intellectual argument and reasoning falls short, and an embodied response to 
the threat of mimetic desire in community is required.822 A number of early Franciscan 
sources include accounts of similarly provocative or unpleasant ‘reactions’ to simple 
requests or expressions of acquisitive desire. The value of this sometimes shocking or crude 
asceticism is precisely in its destabilising of what is, as Girard notes above, ‘so contrary to 
our concept of ourselves, thus so humiliating, that we prefer to remove it from 
consciousness and act as if it did not exist’.823 That is to say, we fail to appreciate, in our 
own case, how our desires tend towards rivalry, domination and conflict. 
 
 
821 The Assisi Compilation, FA:ED (Vol 2) p. 209. Cf. Celano, Remembrance of the Desire of a Soul, FA:ED (Vol 2) 
p. 372. 
822 For an assessment of the ‘performative’ element within Francis’s preaching, Cf. Richard Boileau, ‘The Great 
Communicator of Assisi: How Francis transmitted his Spiritual and Religious Insights’, The Cord, 59 (2009) 131-
53. Cf. Raoul Manselli, ‘Gesture as Sermon in St Francis of Assisi’, trans. By Patrick Colbourne, O.F.M. Cap and 
Edward Hagman, O.F.M. Cap., Greyfriars Review, 6, (1992), 37-48. Cf. David, L. Jeffrey, ‘St Francis and Medieval 
Theatre,’ Franciscan Studies, 43 (1983), 321-347. 
823 Girard, I See Satan Fall, p. 9. 
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Franciscan asceticism is directed towards peaceful relationships, such that friars live 
in peace among themselves and become credible witnesses of peace to their 
contemporaries. In a social order aligned to violence and scapegoating, this takes the form 
of ‘provocative’ peace greetings and an exaggerated, almost theatrical, asceticism. The 
locus of Franciscan peace-making was originally among the workers and artisans of Assisi, 
not within a monastic enclosure. This was manifestly a novelty in the early 13th century. 
While many examples of Franciscan Asceticism referred to above are drawn from the post-
canonization Lives of Francis, I concur with David Flood that originally, Franciscan Asceticism 
was primarily the asceticism of ordinary work and the burdens associated with remaining 
outside the prevailing social system. Flood maintains: 
 
The brothers and Francis first of all, understood themselves as the servants of the Spirit 
of the Lord. They celebrated the good which the Spirit worked through them, returning 
all good to God. (Early Rule XVII, 17-19) […] When they held back anything from flowing 
into the current of action raised by the Spirit of the Lord, they needed a social context 
where they could locate such deeds and reap esteem. That was the world.824 
 
‘The world’ is thus synonymous with the social and economic systems which the friars had 
abandoned on entering into obedience. To withdraw from the ‘world’ was the first essential 
step which allowed a genuine participation in the action of the Holy Spirit. Attachment to 
possessions, property and status were indications of a return to the ‘worldly’ economy 
which Francis and the friars had voluntarily abandoned. The daily asceticism of the early 
Franciscans was primarily their commitment to a way of life outside the system of social and 
economic rewards. Francis achieved in his context a remarkable – if limited – liberation from 
mimetic violence at a time of great social change. Girard has helped to articulate 
thematically what has historically been a Gospel intuition; that human desiring is inherently 
complex and tends towards conflict. This process is invariably concealed, especially to those 
most immediately involved, and cannot usually be resolved without escalation and crisis, 
i.e., without violence. Alternatively, the process is halted, for the individual, by a conversion 
experience. In the dynamic of conversion the mimetic nature of one’s desires (and one’s 
own part in the conflict those desires create) is disclosed. 
 
 
824 Flood, Franciscans at Work, p. 47 
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Asceticism as Withdrawal 
 
Early Franciscan ascetism was also expressed in the practice of withdrawing to solitudes and 
retreats. While Francis refused the life of a hermit as an exclusive choice, he undertook 
regular retreats and instituted an eremitical Rule for the friars. Benedikt Mertens insists that 
eremitism represents an authentic expression of the forma vitae, ‘no less than the 
preaching apostolate’, and it was successfully integrated into the way of life of the early 
friars.825 The role of eremitism is significant since from the beginning, Franciscans were 
noted for their refusal of the cloister and monastic way of life. In chapter thirty-two of his 
work Historia Occidentialis (c. 1221-25) Jacques di Vitry extols the ‘Lesser Brothers’ as an 
order of perfection, noted for evangelical zeal. They represent for di Vitry a fourth form of 
religious life (along with hermits, canons and monks) which is, in fact, a renewal of the 
primitive Church.826 The Lesser Brothers are significant for their ‘spacious cloister’, i.e., the 
world.827 In The Sacred Exchange between Saint Francis and Lady Poverty (1237-39) Lady 
Poverty asks the friars to show her their cloister: ‘Taking her to a certain hill, they showed 
her all the world they could see and said: “This, Lady, is our enclosure”’.828 A rhythm of 
labour and evangelizing activity in urban centres, and regular withdrawal into the solitude 
of hermitages, was fundamental to the early Franciscan movement.829 
 
In several ways early Franciscan eremitism is significant: It represents the first 
attempt to combine occasional eremitical experiences with itinerant preaching, as a ‘mixed 
life’. It developed according to its own core values, being a fraternal experience (three or 
four friars were required for each hermitage, never a friar alone), it uniquely included lay 
friars as well as clerics, and it adopted a familial format with friars taking on the roles of 
 
825 Benedikt Mertens, OFM, ‘Eremitism: An Authentic Element of Franciscanism’ in Franciscan Solitude, Edited 
by André Cirino OFM and Josef Raischl (New York: Franciscan Institute Publications, 1995) pp. 139-40 
826 Jacques di Vitry, Historia Occidentialis, FA:ED (Vol 1) pp. 582-85. 
827 Ibid, p. 585. 
828 The Sacred Exchange between Saint Francis and Lady Poverty, FA:ED (Vol 1) p. 552. 
829 Cf. Vauchez. Among the hermitages in use were the Carceri, on the slopes of Mount Subasio, Poggio 
Bustone, la Foresta and Fonte Colombo (Rieti Valley), the Sacro Speco of Saint Urban, above Narni, the Isola 
Maggiore in Lake Trasimeno, Le Celle, near Cortona and Montecasale. p. 128. With the exception of the Assisi 
Compilation the early sources rarely mention this regular withdrawal into solitude, suggesting that it’s 
fundamental significance for the forma vitae was lost on later generations of Franciscans.  
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Martha and Mary (the Rule also refers to ‘mothers’ and ‘sons’). Those roles were not fixed 
but were exchanged by the friars living in the hermitage.830  
 
In formulating his Rule for Hermits, Francis makes no reference to earlier and 
established forms of eremitism, such as the Eastern desert writers or monastic or pre-
monastic eremitical ideals. Traditional practices such as Lectio Divina, radical asceticism and 
the recitation of the psalms are not referenced in early Franciscan eremitism.831 We may 
therefore consider early Franciscan eremitism to function, like other aspects of the forma 
vitae, according to a specific ‘conversion intelligence’. Precisely without the traditional 
enclosure of monasticism and in the context of life and work in largely urban settings, the 
friars adopted a pattern of regular and prolonged withdrawal, creating an essential distance 
from which to continue their determined way of life. Girard emphasized withdrawal as an 
element of mimetic conversion. Both in the life of Proust and the German poet Friedrich 
Hölderlin (1770-1827) Girard associated mimetic conversion with an extended withdrawal 
from society. Mimetic relationships depend on reciprocity whereas Christ uniquely places 
us ‘at the right distance’, he is simultaneously ‘near and difficult to grasp’.832  
 
Kirwan notes that periods of withdrawal indicate a true asceticism: ‘the overcoming 
of the “social Other” by means of the presence in withdrawal of the “Other Other” entails 
both a personal ascesis and an explicit rejection of the strategies of spiritual and aesthetic 
self-improvement, the religion of “endless striving”’.833 The asceticism of withdrawal 
indicates an intuition among the early Franciscans that their way of life, no longer subject 
to traditional social and ecclesial boundaries (e.g., a life of monastic stability) was vulnerable 
to the dynamics of rivalrous desire. Living their forma vitae, the friars were a source of 
scandal and fascination for many. Extended periods of withdrawal served to create the 
 
830 Cf. Franciscan Solitude, pp. 206-08 
831 Cf. ibid, p. 208. 
832 Girard, Battling to the End: ‘The presence of the divine grows as the divine withdraws: it is the withdrawal 
that saves, not the promiscuity’. Girard asserts that a god that can be appropriated is a god that destroys. ‘To 
imitate Christ is to refuse to impose oneself as a model and to always efface oneself before others. To imitate 
Christ is to do everything to avoid being imitated’. p. 122. 
833 Michael Kirwan, ‘“A Candle in Sunshine”: Desire and Apocalypse in Blake and Hölderlin’, Contagion: Journal 
of Violence, Mimesis and Culture, 19, (2012), <http://www.jstor.org/stable/41925339> 179-204 (p. 200).  
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‘right distance’ between those they encountered in their daily work and evangelical 
missions, and themselves.  
 
The Affective Dynamic of Scandal: Early Franciscan and Girardian Approaches 
 
The Early Franciscan Understanding of Scandal and Girard’s use of Skandalon 
 
To conclude this chapter on Franciscan asceticism, I will argue that the Franciscan forma 
vitae, frequently provoked scandal among those whose investment in the established social 
orders was threatened by aspects of an alternative, non-rivalrous social reality.834 It was 
characteristic of the early Franciscan movement to endure both misunderstanding and a 
poor reputation, rather than accommodate the dominant social systems which functioned 
by exclusion and victimage.835 The extent to which early Franciscans were a source of 
scandal to others indicates another aspect of their unique asceticism: the formation of a 
fraternal/sororal social order which functioned to mediate between traditionally opposed 
social groups; clergy and laity, rich and poor, male and female, learned and uneducated. 
Within these shared spaces non-rivalrous patterns of desire were practiced and a mutual 
dependence was encouraged on the basis of reciprocal exchange. Drawing on Joseph 
Chinnici’s work I will argue that early Franciscan fraternities defied the exclusionary 
strategies of the dominant ecclesial and social institutions and thus provoked ‘scandal’. I 
propose to read the early Franciscan understanding of scandal in parallel with Girard’s 
exploration of the New Testament concept of skandalon.  
 
Early Franciscans and Scandal 
 
The first eyewitness account of the early Franciscan movement comes to us from Jacques 
de Vitry in his letter of 1215.836 The letter does not mention Saint Francis himself but notes 
 
834 For an exploration of the use of ‘scandal’ in contemporary theology and Canon Law, Cf. Aidan McGrath, 
‘The Problem of Scandal and Canon Law’, Priests and People 17, (2003), 111-115. Also, Patrick Connolly, ‘The 
Concept of Scandal in a Changed Ecclesial Context’, Studia Canonica 51, (2017) 135-148. 
835 CF. Celano, First Life, FA:ED, (Vol 1) p. 217. In a descriptive and somewhat nostalgic passage Celano notes 
that the early brothers were ‘truly lesser who, by being subject to all (“subditi omnibus”) always sought the 
position of contempt, performing duties which they foresaw would be the occasion of some affront.’ (my 
Italics). 
836 Jacques di Vitry (1160/70- 1240), French Canon Regular and theologian. Elected Bishop of Acre in 1214.  
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that by night the friars were to be found in vigils and prayer and by day they went from 
village to village, seeking out souls for Christ.837 There is nothing to suggest that they had at 
this stage any influence beyond the Spoleto Valley. De Vitry notes that the brothers were 
‘grieved, indeed troubled, to be honoured by the clergy and laity more than they wished’.838 
That the brothers were, counterintuitively, grieved and troubled by their good reputation 
indicates an ambiguous relationship between the early Franciscan community and the 
systems of social inclusion and exclusion.  
 
Within moral theology ‘scandal’ carries a variety of meanings which may include ‘a 
stumbling block to faith; anything that brings discredit upon religion; injury to reputation; a 
false imputation; malicious gossip; slander; a disgraceful fact, thing or person; a shocked 
feeling’.839 Joseph Chinnici has noted that the early Franciscan movement was accustomed 
to public shame and ecclesial rejection.840 Chinnici draws attention to the manner in which 
the early Franciscan movement gave scandal to some within wider society by including the 
excluded and marginalised sections of society, and by consciously forming con-fraternities, 
wherein socially distinct groups; male and female, learned and uneducated, rich and poor, 
cleric and lay practiced humility and mutual obedience.841  
 
Chinnici notes that the social conditions of the early thirteenth century, were 
characterised by ‘a structural conflict between the hierarchical arrangements of the landed 
feudal society and the communal arrangements of an emergent urban economic and social 
world’.842 This rivalrous struggle of ‘doubles’ had in some sense ordered the patterns of 
Francis’s youthful desires. After his conversion Francis and the early friars responded to this 
struggle by establishing non-rivalrous fraternitas/fraternities, organised around their core 
 
837 Later accounts tended to exaggerate and exemplify the role of Francis within the movement, for the 
purposes of identifying the Founder with particular groups or perspectives within the Order. As Thompson 
observed, Francis was a Franciscan; a brother among the brothers. The movement shaped Francis even as 
Francis shaped the movement. Cf. Thompson, p. 154. 
838 Jacques di Vitry, Letter I, FA:ED (Vol 1) p. 580. 
839 Cf. McGrath, p. 111. 
840 Cf. Chinnici, p. 172. For examples of ecclesial rejection cf. The Chronicle of Roger of Wendover, FA:ED (Vol 1)           
   pp. 598-9.  
841 Cf. Chinnici, pp. 101-6. 
842 Ibid, p. 101. 
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values of Gospel living.843 Chinnici insists that Francis accepted an essential hierarchy and 
this was expressed in Franciscan thought and spirituality. However, Francis and his followers 
were formed in the world of the Assisi commune; a distinctively participative reality which, 
in the context of urban growth and the rise of a merchant class was asserting its role in 
society. Franciscan fraternitas/fraternity effectively created a shared ethical space between 
the horizontal and vertical structures of early thirteenth century society.  
 
Belonging to the fraternity was, de facto, a commitment to penance which was the 
expression of ‘conversion intelligence’. Penance, as Chinnici observes, is the recognition of 
competing desires; desire for fraternity and mutual flourishing (good mimesis) and the 
desire for power, rivalry and self-aggrandizement (bad mimesis).844 Fraternitas/fraternity is 
the shared ethical space wherein identities may be formed pacifically, not over against 
others.     
 
Giving Scandal: Early Franciscan Association with Lepers 
  
In exploring the Franciscan tradition of living with scandal, Chinnici points helpfully to the 
early Franciscan association with lepers. Citing Nathanial Brody, Chinnici observes that 
lepers of the thirteenth century endured not only social exclusion but also moral 
judgement.845 Their presence represented a threat to social order and they fall within those 
categories of groups and individuals which Girard noted are particularly vulnerable to 
scapegoating in times of social crisis.846 Girard also noted the link between the contagious 
nature of mimetic violence and societal fears of all infectious disease. If, as Paul Ricoeur has 
noted, the Good is commonly understood to be attractive, the transmission of evil is 
commonly described in biological terms such as ‘contamination’, ‘infection’ and 
‘epidemic’.847  
 
843 To emphasis the innovation of fraternity and its affective and relational importance within the writings of 
Francis, Chinnici notes that Francis used the relational term ordo, seven times; the term religio, eleven times, 
and the term frater/brother two hundred and thirty-two times. Ibid, p. 105. 
844 Cf. ibid, pp. 108-09 
845 Nathanial Brody, The Disease of the Soul: Leprosy in medieval Literature (Ithaca, New York: Cornell 
University Press, 1974). 
846 Cf. Girard, The Scapegoat, pp. 126-140. 
847 Cf. Ann W. Astell ‘Saintly Mimesis, Contagion, and Empathy in the Thought of René Girard, Edith Stein, and 
Simone Weil’ in Shofar, Winter 2004, Vol 22, No. 2. p. 116. 
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According to Girard, in primitive social groups any change in the status of individuals 
was, potentially, the cause of a mimetic conflict. The passage from childhood to adulthood, 
from virginity to sexual union, from pregnancy to childbirth, from health to sickness and 
from life to death, were potentially destabilising to the social order and were thus hedged 
round with various prohibitions, rituals and taboos, protecting the community from sudden 
outbreaks of conflict. Violent conflict was viewed as something contagious and imminently 
communicable, indeed a type of infection.848 Those who, for whatever reason, were 
considered unclean or infected were also considered potentially dangerous. For the sake of 
the community, they were by unanimous agreement, excluded and cast out, or at least 
isolated. Thus, the leper of the thirteenth century is a scandalous figure and those who 
crossed the social boundaries which isolate the leper were themselves the cause of 
scandal.849 
 
In exploring Francis of Assisi’s relationship to the leper, Chinnici returns to the 
Testament and specifically to Francis’s use of the words ‘bitterness’ and ‘sweetness’.850 As 
already noted, Francis’s relationship with lepers was ‘inverted’ in his conversion experience; 
what had once been bitter was transformed into sweetness. Here, Chinnici observes, is the 
language of Exodus. In the Exodus account the waters of Marah are bitter, indicating the 
bitterness of the journey of liberation out of Egypt. The bitterness of the water is changed 
only by Moses striking the waters with a piece of wood. Chinnici reads the conversion of 
Francis in terms of a similar journey or Exodus. At first Francis considers the leper a source 
of bitterness, but later discovers in the leper, Christ, the Suffering Servant of Isaiah (53: 4), 
disfigured and quasi leprosus, almost a leper. The transformation in the case of Francis is 
achieved by the wood of the cross which makes what was bitter into sweetness.  
 
 
848 Ibid, p. 119. 
849 According to André Vauchez, in the medieval mind lepers ‘incarnated not only a horrible malady but also 
the suspicion of a hereditary defect or some abnormal sexual behavior which would have caused it […]’. Their 
exclusion was justified both by a fear of contagion and the suspicion of a serious transgression against an 
important social taboo. Cf. Vauchez, p. 23. 
850 Testament, FA:ED,  (Vol I), p. 124. 
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The ‘intelligence of the victim’ compels the early Franciscans to endure public shame 
and ecclesial rejection. The ‘outward limits’ of belonging to the fraternity were tempered 
by a shared commitment to a path of continuous conversion and reform.851 The symbolic 
and material affiliation with the leper demonstrates the early Franciscan agenda as the 
widest possible incorporation of what is repugnant, unwelcome and marginalised in 
medieval society. ‘Being scandalised’ or taking offence can negate the transformative 
encounter with Christ in the Other who is weak or whose presence is socially problematic. 
This transformative encounter with the Other, which potentially changes what was bitter 
into sweetness, is at risk in social, economic, and religious systems based on ‘othering’.  
 
In 1219 tensions among the friars required Francis to return from his meeting with 
the Sultan. The crisis was in part, provoked by the imposition of new laws limiting the eating 
of meat within Franciscan communities.852 These new laws would have brought the friars 
into line with monastic and even pious lay habits of fasting and, according to Thompson, 
the impetus to impose these new laws on the friars was a reaction to criticism and invidious 
comparisons with other orders and pious associations. Francis resisted these innovations 
and revoked the fasting laws on his return to Assisi.  
 
According to Thompson, in the absence of Saint Francis, the brothers were ‘unwilling 
to endure the humiliation of pious misunderstanding’.853 That is to say, the friars were 
abandoning an important characteristic of the ‘intelligence of the victim’, to gain social 
recognition. It is without doubt that the early Franciscan movement caused scandal by 
egregious moral lapses and bad example. Francis admonished the friars against causing 
scandal by sin.854 However, there is also a willingness to give scandal rather than abandon 
 
851 Ibid, p. 175. 
852 Early Franciscan itinerancy, which was an important and distinguishing feature of Francis and his 
companions required a realistic attitude to food. Thus, Jacques di Vitry noted, ‘If anyone invites them to 
dinner, they eat what is set before them’. Historia Occidentialis, FA:ED (Vol 1), p. 583. ‘In accordance with 
Gospel, it may be lawful for them to eat of all food that is placed before them’. Earlier Rule (1209/10-1221), 
FA:ED (Vol 1) p. 66. 
853 Thompson. p. 73. 
854 Cf.  Celano, First Life, FA:ED (Vol 1), pp. 218-19. The Assisi Compilation, FA:ED (Vol 2) p. 146, p. 160, and 
Thomas of Celano, Remembrance of the Desire of a Soul, FA:ED (Vol 2) p. 359. 
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practices and attitudes associated with their ‘conversion intelligence’.855 From the historical 
sources it is evident that the early Franciscans both edified and scandalized their 
contemporaries. Serious moral lapses were certainly an occasion of justified scandal, but 
significantly, the willingness to cross arbitrary social boundaries, also caused scandal. 
Francis and the early friars were prepared to endure this scandal, rather than forfeit their 
unique, and still developing, way of life.  
  
Skandalon: René Girard’s Reframing of a New Testament Concept 
  
According to Girard, in the Gospels the word skandalon never indicates a material object. 
‘It is always someone else, or it is myself to the extent that I am alienated from other 
people’.856 Girard notes that the term has its etymological roots in the verb skadzo, meaning 
‘I limp’; thus, for Girard skandalon is already rooted in mythological expulsion.857  According 
to Robert Hamerton-Kelly, the analysis of the meaning of ‘scandal’ in the Gospels belongs 
among Girard’s most brilliant achievements.858 Girard associates the word skandalon with 
the early stages of mimetic rivalry. Skandalon cannot refer to random obstacles which 
happen to block our progress or cause us frustration. What makes the skandalon significant, 
indeed decisive, is its obsessional power, a power derived from the model, not from the 
object.  
 
The model is always someone I desire to emulate and to surpass. If I surpass the 
model, he/she ceases to be a model for my desires. Therefore, the desire depends precisely 
on this tension of its being offered and withheld, and so the model is both loved and hated, 
desired and despised. The model is the Skandalon or stumbling block of my desire. ‘We 
attack and cherish, hate and love, diminish and exalt him. This is scandal, and it is the 
 
855 This form of scandal is traditionally understood as passive scandal: “Scandal may be only passive, if one 
takes occasion for scandal from conduct which is good under every respect. This was the case of the Pharisees, 
who were scandalized over the doctrine and beneficent activity of Jesus.” Cf. McGrath, citing, L. Bender, 
“Scandal”, in Dictionary of Moral Theology, ed. P. Palazzini, London 1962, 1095-1096; cf. also L. Babbini, 
“Scandalo”, Dizionario Enciclopedico di Teologia Morale, Roma 1973, 873-874; B. Häring, The Law of Christ, 
Vol. II, Westminster Maryland 1967, 473-474). 
856 Girard, Things Hidden, p. 416. 
857 Girard, The Scapegoat, ‘physical and moral monstrosity are always heaped together in myths that justify 
the persecution of the infirm’. p. 35. 
858 Hamerton-Kelly, The Gospel and the Sacred, p. 46. 
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essence of anxiety (and addiction) because it is the love of what one hates and the hatred 
of what one loves.’859 This understanding of scandal incorporates the traditional theological 
definition of scandal as admiratio, i.e., wonderment and fascination. According to Girard 
desire cannot remain in a state of scandal indefinitely. If desire cannot escape the 
fascinating stumbling block which both attracts and defeats us, it loses its equilibrium and 
descends into envy and finally hatred. 
 
In this sense those who are scandalized have not recognised the mimetic or 
borrowed nature of their desires and have allowed the model of their desire to become the 
rival of their desire. It is noteworthy that in the references to scandal that appear in the 
indices to Francis of Assisi: Early Documents a significant number of references to scandal 
are precisely scandals of this sort. 860 The previously mentioned account of Francis’s visit to 
Arezzo described the violence between the two rival factions in the city as the breaking out 
of a ‘scandal’. This account captures well Girard’s understanding of contagious violence, 
wherein the objects of desire disappear as the scandal develops and the rivals are content 
not only with securing the desired object but with obliterating the model who has become 
the rival. The text notes:  
 
When they arrived at Arezzo, there was a great scandal and war night and day throughout 
almost the entire city, because of two factions who had hated each other for a long time 
[…] it seemed to [Francis] that the demons were overjoyed by this and were inciting the 
people to destroy their city with fire and with other dangerous means.861 
 
A bitter conflict between the mayor of Assisi and the Bishop Guido III is also referred to as 
a ‘scandal’ in the early sources.862 Though seriously ill, Francis was called upon to remove 
the stumbling block (their rivalrous conflict) which was the source of such grief among the 
people. His intervention was considered miraculous: ‘All the others who were present and 
heard it took it for a great miracle, crediting it to the merits of Blessed Francis, that the Lord 
had so quickly visited them, and that without recalling anything that had been said, they 
returned to such harmony from such scandal’. There are numerous references in the 
 
859 Ibid, p. 95. 
860 FA:ED Index, p. 117 
861 The Assisi Compilation (108), FA:ED, (Vol 2) p. 215. 
862 Ibid. (84), p. 188. 
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Franciscan sources to rivalrous conflict in terms of ‘scandal’.863 The creative manner in 
which early Franciscans engaged with these rivalrous ‘scandals’ suggests a conceptual 




In Chapter XI of the Later Rule it is stated that the brothers ‘may not be godfathers to men 
or women, so that scandal may not arise among the brothers or concerning them on 
account of this’.864  The man who would enter the brotherhood was directed to offer himself 
inwardly to God and the to give up all possessions, keeping nothing because those who 
entered obedience ‘should not cause scandal by keeping a money bag.865 The early 
Franciscan community was, therefore, sensitive to the role privileged social positions 
(godparents), material wealth, and even opinions played in provoking admiratio or 
fascination, and thus in provoking envy and scandal. This was the route back to a social 
order maintained by violence. In significant ways the early Franciscans and Girard appear to 
have a shared understanding of scandal, i.e., scandal, as a stumbling block, a misreading of 
desire which occasions rivalrous conflict and hatred. Early Franciscan fraternities were, 
among other things, mediating spaces where the initial stages of desire, the scandal, could 
be creatively managed. 
 
The early Franciscans were committed to a variety of practices which provoked 
‘pious misunderstanding’ or scandal. These practices included visiting and living among 
lepers, forming communities outside the privileged monastic structure, and forming 
‘confraternities’ which were both male and female and in which different social classes 
partook of a common religious life. These ‘provocations’ qualify as passive scandals since 
they involve the taking of offence ‘from conduct which is good under every respect’.866   
 
Mimetic conversion, ‘taking a collective, political form’, represents a potential 
escape from scandal: ‘He who loves his brother abides in the light, and there is no cause for 
 
863 Some forty-one references to scandal (actual, avoid, generate) are included in the FA:ED Index, p. 117. 
864 Later Rule, FA:ED (Vol 1) p. 106. 
865 Celano, Remembrance of the Desire of a Soul, FA:ED (Vol 2) p. 300. 
866 McGrath. P. 111. 
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stumbling [skandalon]. But he who hates his brother is in the darkness and walks in the 
darkness, and does not know where he is going, because the darkness has blinded his 
eyes’.867 The ‘collective, political form’ represented by the fraternitas was both a cause of 
‘scandal’, and a radical effort to neutralize the scandal of fascination/admiratio which 
devolves into envy, conflict and violence.  
 
James Alison has argued that Jesus is a scandalous figure to some, not on account of 
the so-called ‘hard sayings’ which occur in the Gospels.868 Rather, the Gospel gives scandal 
when the presence of God in a particular human group is experienced not as ‘laborious or 
burdensome, but contrariwise, God is experienced as being loosed from the moorings to 
the sacred. The heavy demands of the Gospel turn out to be the existential risks of exclusion, 
persecution and death at the hands of “people of unbound conscience and bold speech”’.869  
Thus, the Gospel typically scandalises those who have invested much in whatever justifies 
them as ‘good’ in their society and ‘it is noticeably less scandalous to those who have found 
themselves living in the shadow side of that goodness’.870 Francis and the early friars formed 
their identities precisely among those groups that existed on the ‘shadow side’ of social 




Questions of imitation, desire, asceticism and ‘scandal’ characterise both the early 
Franciscan and the Girardian projects. Mimetic theory may be helpfully applied to a variety 
of early Franciscan practices to suggest a social and political expression of a converted 
mimetic social order taking shape. Dalarun, commenting on the ascetical accounts of 
Francis’s life contained in the Legend of Perugia asserts that Francis ‘had a very free attitude 
regarding any rule of life. He did not hesitate to uphold great freedom, great imagination 
even, especially in the area of bodily discipline. In fact, the saint is first presented as opposed 
 
867 Cf. Girard, Things Hidden pp. 416-7. (1 John 2: 10-11). 
868 Cf. Luke, 9:60, 12:4-5, 14: 25-33, 16:18, 18:22, 22:36, Matt 5:27-32, 5:48, 8:22, 10:28, 10:37, 19:21, Mk 
10:11-12, 10:17-22. 
869 Alison, Faith Beyond Resentment, p. 179. 
870 Ibid. 
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to systematic penance and excessive fasting, opposed to mortification and asceticism’.871 
The imitation of the Founder, which became problematic for later generations of 
Franciscans indicates not a lack of good will, but the imperceptible drift back into the very 
social and ecclesial realities from which Francis and the early brothers had emerged. 
 
Ascetical practices aligned to the core values of the early community became a 
source of puzzlement to later friars, or they simply migrated from the centre to the margins 
of the Order (such as regular experiences of the eremitism). In the decades after the death 
of Saint Francis, the practice of poverty became divisive within the Order, often aligned to 
the questions of imitation and exemplarity. Michael Cusato has observed a qualitative 
change in the practice of voluntary poverty from the Founder and the first friars to the 
‘Second Generation’ of Franciscans. Cusato has observed the recasting of voluntary poverty 
from ‘a positive ethic of creation’, a manner of life (forma vitae) which Saint Francis receives 
from the poor, the lepers and the marginalized, to an attitude of renunciation, in the pursuit 
of evangelical perfection.872 Mimetic theory enables a rereading of early Franciscan 
asceticism and poverty (as well as fraternity) as ‘a positive ethic of creation’, a web of 
reciprocal, non-rivalrous relationships, spun experimentally, outside of the dominant 




871 Dalarun, p. 207. The ambiguities and anomalies, Dalarun suggests, may be accounted for by the author’s 
need, on the one hand, to account for Saint Francis’s unique ascetical life and on the other hand to include 
accounts of asceticism more typical of the time and more in conformity with the history of Christian 
asceticism. It may be that both accounts are true and simply express the difficulties of forming a non-sacrificial 
ascetical life. Cf. Dalarun, p. 209.   
872 Michael Cusato, OFM, ‘The Fortunes of Poverty: Minor(ite) Musings on a Medieval Matter’, The Cord, 64, 




A Social and Political expression of Non-Rivalrous Relationship: Franciscan Labour 




The structure of this thesis is that of a ‘double triptych’. The first three chapters offer an 
account of mimetic theory in terms of the three stages of Girard’s work, in literature, cultural 
anthropology, and theology. Chapters four to six interpret the early Franciscan movement in 
light of those three categories. The structure allows for mimetic theory to shed light on the 
early Franciscan movement, and the early Franciscan movement to suggest an historical, 
political and social form for Girard’s insights. This final chapter, standing outside the double 
triptych, nevertheless builds on the insights of the previous six chapters. Specifically, whereas 
the previous three chapters offer a mimetic reading of the early Franciscan narratives, this 
present chapter will explore the movement’s social and political form. The Franciscan forma 
vitae, I will argue, has its own idiom and political expression – an expression grounded in the 
conversion experiences which I have characterized as the ‘intelligence of the victim’.  
 
The chapter will be divided into four parts: 
 
1. An exploration of the forma vitae as a unique social and religious programme with its 
own distinctive idiom and character. 
2. An introduction to the work of David Flood O.F.M., Franciscan historian; the aims and 
methodology of Flood’s critical analysis of Franciscan history, with respect to the role 
of daily labour among the friars. 
3. Flood’s interpretation of the early Franciscan writings and the argument for a social 
history of withdrawal from the dominant social systems based on exclusion 
(consonant with Girard’s mimetic theory).  
4. Conclusions.   
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The Franciscan Forma Vitae: Positive Mimesis taking ‘collective and political form’ 
 
Revisiting John Milbank’s Critique of Mimetic Theory 
 
As we noted in the General Introduction and in chapter three, John Milbank has criticized 
Girard’s project for failing to offer a plausible account of what a non-violent, non-sacrificial 
community would look like, ‘taking a collective, political form’.873 According to Milbank, in 
Girard’s scheme ‘[…] all that Jesus seems to offer is a denial of culture, and not the 
imagination of something beyond culture, which would be humanly problematic’.874 The crux 
of the problem for Milbank is Girard’s apparent neglect of ‘idiom’. Milbank has emphasised 
the Church’s role in communicating to humanity the ‘idiom’ or logos of an adequate return 
of God’s glory to God: 
 
Mutual forgiveness and the bearing of each other’s burdens becomes the modus vivendi 
of the Church: an ‘atoning’ way of life. It is highly significant that from Paul, through Origen 
to Augustine, the early Christians seem to have thought in terms of ‘continuing’ 
atonement […] Hence to the Anselmian speculation one needs to add: only God incarnate 
could first make an adequate return of God’s glory to God, but the point of the incarnation 
was more to communicate to human beings the idiom, the logos of an adequate return, 
so that it could be made universally. For until there is a universal return, then surely God 
must continue to suffer the ‘contradiction’ of a loss of glory, an alienation of his 
participated being.875 
 
Milbank suggests that Girard is theorizing from a space outside of the Christian ‘idiom’. 
Outside the Christian ‘idiom’, violence is recognised whenever we are ‘forced’ to do 
something, even when we may appear to do it willingly, for we are often ‘manipulated’. 
Milbank argues that ‘if indeed there are no objective standards of truth and goodness, as 
nihilism claims, then every act of persuasion is in fact an act of violence’. Even so, Christianity 
does not claim that the good and the true are self-evident either to objective reason or to 
dialectical argument. From the Christian perspective faith, ‘pistis’ which is precisely a form of 
persuasion, is required to save us from violence. Milbank argues that ‘we need the stories of 
Jesus for salvation, rather than the speculative notion of the good, because only the attraction 
 
873 Milbank, Theology and Social Theory, p. 395. 
874 Ibid. 
875 Ibid, p. 398. 
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exercised by a particular set of words and images causes us to acknowledge the good and to 
have an idea of the ultimate telos’.876 
 
For Milbank, then, Girard argues from outside this ‘idiom’ in the barren spaces of post 
Enlightenment secular reason. Thus, Milbank concludes:  
 
An abstract attachment to non-violence is therefore not enough – we need to practice 
this as a skill to learn its idiom […] For further elaboration of the idiom we must turn back 
from Girard to Augustine, who by placing the Church, and not Christ alone, at the centre 
of his metanarrative, pays far more attention to the concrete shape of a non-antagonistic 
social practice.877 
 
Fergus Kerr observes that, having criticised Girard for an absence of non-violent practice 
‘taking collective, political form’, Milbank himself fails to offer a positive description of non-
violent practice.878 According to Kerr, ‘[R]emarks about how the Church might offer “a social 
space where a different, forgiving and restitutionary practice is pursued” (Theology and 
Social Theory, 422) certainly go a little beyond anything Girard has said’.879 However, Kerr is 
slow to fault either theorist on this point since, given the pervasiveness of institutionalised 
violence, we must ask if ‘any vision of an alternative can be delineated in much more than 
negatives and promises?’880   
 
Girard asserts that the Gospel revelation is working to interrupt and nullify the 
scapegoat mechanism progressively throughout history. According to Girard, this process 
has already collapsed innumerable social boundaries and weakened the social order 
established on victimage and exclusion. A world with fewer and weaker sacred boundaries 
is a world more at risk of mimetic conflict; hence the apocalyptic tone of much of Girard’s 
later work. Kerr asks: ‘Until we learn to think and feel non-violently, how would it be 
possible to flesh out “the absolute Christian vision of ontological peace” (Theology and 
Social Theory, 434)?’ It may indeed be impossible to describe the absolute Christian vision 








the sacred social order should we not expect to find historical instances of a nascent, non-
violent social reality accompanying the demise of the old, sacrificial order? In this chapter I 
will argue that the early Franciscan movement may be considered an attempt to ‘flesh out’ 
just such a vision, equipped with its own social strategies, vocabulary and political 
programme, i.e., its own idiom.  
 
Taking seriously Milbank’s assertion that Girard’s theory lacks an ecclesial 
dimension, Milbank’s own assumptions about ecclesial non-violence must also be probed. 
The extent to which violence operates within and through ecclesial structures and sacralised 
versions of the Gospel is neglected in Milbank’s analysis.881 Examples of ecclesial violence, 
e.g., medieval bishops imposing peace agreements under pain of excommunication or 
interdict, and even threat of military violence, are provided by Kinsella.882 As I sought to 
demonstrate in chapter five, Francis’s experience of social and ecclesial violence (and the 
problem of effective peace-making from within the dominant social structures) required a 
fundamentally different approach to social conflict. The early Franciscans, unlike other 
reform movements, responded to social and ecclesial violence non-confrontationally, 
suggesting an intuitive understanding of how mimetic desire operates in accelerating 
conflict. While deliberately distancing itself from forms of ecclesial life which create and 
contain violence, the early Franciscan movement did not attempt to scapegoat or to ‘other’ 
the Church, as institution. 
 
Early Franciscan fraternities represent a new, shared ethical space in late medieval 
Europe; an ethical space attuned to the risks of acquisitive desire and competing interests. 
The various characteristics of the Franciscan forma vitae, taken together, represent a new 
social consciousness with definite strategies for avoiding rivalry, conflict and violence. The 
collapse of social boundaries in the late Middle Ages, which increased the risks of violence, 
also made possible a unique social reality; part religious order, part worker’s cooperative, 
sharing a common life and obedience, oriented towards minority and peace-making.883  
 
881 Cf. Scott MacDougall ‘Scapegoating the Secular’ in Violence, Transformation and the Secular, pp. 85-95. 
882 Cf. Kinsella, Poverty and Violence, pp. 20-23. 
883 ‘Minority’, lived in fraternity, may be considered the hermeneutic of a Gospel life, according to the Early 
Rule. Cf. Regis J. Armstrong, ‘If My Words Remain in You: Foundations of the Evangelical Life’ in Francis of 
Assisi: History, Hagiography and Hermeneutics in the Early Documents. Jay M. Hammond (Ed) (New York: New 
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Evidence for this new social consciousness may be found in a unique Franciscan 
vocabulary. This vocabulary represents a determination to articulate not merely a new 
social and religious structure from within the existing social order but a heightened 
awareness of how established social order creates and contains violence. The early 
Franciscans did not attempt to break with the Church or repudiate it. However, their form 
of life indicates a grappling with the reality of ecclesial violence. Milbank’s ecclesiological 
assertions benefit from some historical nuance: 
 
[…] in the high Middle Ages, the cultural passivity of the mass of society (rooted in the 
social and political subjection that left it little more than heresy as an expression of revolt) 
made it possible for the Church to act upon society by means of a ‘terrorist’ language of 
the sacred (use of Latin, idealist symbolism, lack of realism in Romanesque art, etc.). The 
emancipation of an increasing number of categories in secular society (the nobility, urban 
strata, rustici, less rigidly defined and supported by heretical organizations) made this 
language increasingly inoperative. The Franciscan’s concern to be effective in the new 
society demanded a new language, vocabulary, with a certain relationship with reality, 
and primarily with social reality, in its group institutions.884  
 
The Early Franciscan Idiom 
 
As I have argued in previous chapters, the early Franciscan movement, was characterized 
by distinctive practices directed towards positive reciprocity and the avoidance of mimetic 
conflict. An exploration of the early Franciscan lexicon suggests significant discontinuities of 
idiom, with respect to the general social and religious vocabulary. I have already suggested 
that the significance of Saint Francis’s ‘peace-greeting’ is precisely its ambiguity in wishing 
rather than imposing God’s peace. Other examples of a distinct Franciscan idiom indicate a 
definite, conscious, determination to stand outside of the dominant social and ecclesial 
realities. In describing their project, the early Franciscans frequently avoided contemporary 
ecclesiastical terms in favour of more ‘secular’, political and economic ones. The early 
Franciscan ‘idiom’ expressed the Gospel revelation according to a shared ‘conversion 
intelligence’, and to do so, employed ways of speaking and acting which were, in some 
sense, sustained by the ‘secular’. 
 
City Press, 2004) pp. 64-89 (p. 68). The friars are constituted as ‘minor’ or ‘lesser’ brothers. Minority/becoming 
‘lesser’ is fundamental to the friar’s identity.  
884 Le Goff, p. 65. 
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Jacques Le Goff characterised Francis as ‘a figure half religious, half secular’.885 This 
assertion is developed in an analysis of the specific vocabulary of early Franciscan writings. 
Le Goff notes that Francis rarely used a political vocabulary (imperator, rex, regina, 
principes, magnate, etc) and the vocabulary of the commune is used minimally (potestas, 
civis, homo, popularis, etc). Le Goff observed that, ‘with his political pessimism […] Saint 
Francis avoided language of a political type’.886 Francis used non-religious terms alongside 
religious terminology, crafting a distinct social and religious frame of reference. Le Goff 
asserted that ‘[…] the social vocabulary of Franciscanism also escaped if not the religious, at 
least the ecclesiastical, mould’.887 Francis favoured the term subditi, a term found in Paul 
(Titus 3. 1) which had made its way into the writings of medieval jurists, as well as the 
contemporary vocabulary. Subditi omnibus; being ‘subject to all’ was a common 
characterization of Franciscan life in Francis’s writings. As such it signals the novelty of the 
early Franciscan movement and its occurrence is indicative of the particular concerns and 
values of the movement.  
 
David Flood’s assertion that the early Franciscan movement was defined not by 
voluntary poverty, much less by begging, but by work, also finds support in the early 
Franciscan vocabulary. When Francis addressed his letter ‘ad populorum rectores’ and 
referred to superiors of Franciscan communities as ‘custodes’ (never as prior) he was using 
the emerging vocabulary of the corporations of workers, which were then in the process of 
establishing their statutes. Those who were responsible for the welfare of the corporations 
(examples exist for the corporation of Toulouse, 1227) were referred to as rectores and 
custodes. Eschewing the extant religious titles of responsibility, Francis and the brothers 
referred to ‘ministers’, which was then commonly used to refer to a trade’s apprentices, 
also called ‘discipuli’ or ‘laboratores’ (or ‘laborantes’). The organised trades were known at 
this time as ‘“ministeria” rather than artes, a word which later gained precedence in Italy 
and whose semantic field is completely different.’888  
 
885 Ibid, ix.  
886 Ibid, p. 88. 
887 Ibid. 
888 Ibid, p. 89. 
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Francis’s use of a distinct vocabulary which was both religious and ‘secular’ 
demonstrated a determination to form a way of life which was outside the dominant social 
self-descriptions of Church and society. Le Goff notes that Francis strove to avoid using pairs 
of opposites in his writing. Nevertheless, his social and religious project recognised the 
inequality which defined social institutions. According to Le Goff, Francis aimed to 
 
replace these antagonisms with a society founded on family relationships, in which the 
only inequalities would be based on age and gender – natural inequalities and therefore 
divine. Hence his mistrust or hostility towards all those who raise themselves above others 
through social artifices.889  
 
His vision for a more equal and less violent social reality was capable of inspiring 
cooperation (and avoiding confrontation) within the emerging class of urban and rural 
workers. In the context of labour, new forms of non-rivalrous participation could be 
proposed and it is significant that Francis and the early brothers draw freely on the 
vocabulary of these emerging social groups, rather than adopting traditional religious 
terminology indiscriminately. 
 
Absent from Saint Francis’s vision were designations which included the prefixes 
marking superiority: magis- (magnus, magister, magnatus), prae- (praelatus, prior), super 
(superior).890 Those to whom Francis most often referred and associated with were the 
people excluded from society: minores and subditi.891 The early Franciscan writings are 
significant for the use of terms which emphasise equality and fraternity, values which were 
shared in the workers corporations and guilds. As previously noted, Francis rarely described 
social relations among the friars in the typical language of ecclesial or social hierarchy.892 
 
889 Ibid, p. 90. 
890 Francis uses the term praelatus in the Admonitions. This anomaly may be accounted for by Francis’s 
extensive use of monastic and ecclesiastical sources in the composition of this text. Cf. Karris, Admonitions of 
St Francis, p. 9.   
891 Le Goff, p. 90. Flood suggests that Francis and the brothers use the terms maior and minore, as did Jesus, to 
indicate the priority of the lesser over the greater in the Kingdom of God, cf. Matt 23. 11. Flood acknowledges, 
however, that in a civil context maior referred to the social standing of the feudal aristocracy and minore 
referred to the emerging social class of merchants, bankers, notaries, who were free from feudal bonds. Each 
particular commune at this time gave the terms a particular interpretation, as social conditions changed. Cf. 
Flood, Francis of Assisi’s Rule and Life (Phoenix, Arizona: Tau Publishing, 2015) p. 55, note 66. 
892 Cf. Chinnici, p. 105. Francis uses ‘ordo’ only seven times in his writings, ‘religio’ eleven times, and ‘frater’ 
two-hundred and thirty-two times. 
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Steven Epstein notes that ‘brother’ was a relational term in common use among medieval 
workers, especially those involved in guilds.893 It is, therefore, possible that in making frater 
his preferred relational title Francis was borrowing, not so much from traditional monastic 
practice, but from the emerging labour cooperatives and guilds. 
 
Fraternity (fraternitas) came to represent a third reality, situated between the 
inherited, hierarchical institutions and the new authority of the commune. Chinnici defined 
fraternity as the social space which mediated the horizontal and vertical structures of wider 
society, but belonged to neither. Chinnici notes that the ‘guiding ethical principles for 
becoming a brother and a sister were reciprocal charity, humility and mutual obedience’.894 
The principle of fraternity was dynamic and expressed itself in multiple con-fraternities 
which created new mediated spaces in which the wealthy and the poor, the learned and the 
uneducated, clergy and laity, men and women ‘could learn self-mastery and constructively 
intersect their lives and concerns’.895 Le Goff concurs that the early Franciscan movement 
was ‘in the first instance, in the literal sense, more of a fraternity or a confraternity of a 
secular type than an Order of a religious, ecclesiastical type, to which he finally had to resign 
himself’.896 As instructive as the use of ‘fraternity’ is in the early writings, its later absence 
in the narratives is perhaps even more telling: ‘Théophile Desbonnets reminds us, this term 
[fraternity] is not found in the Anonymous of Perugia, the Legend of the Three Companions, 
the Legend of Perugia, the Second Life, the Major Legend, and the Minor Legend or the 
Mirror of Perfection. It appears only in the First Life: “He said, I want this fraternity to be 
called the Order of Lesser Brothers”’ (1 Celano, 38). Delarun observes that the word 
‘fraternity’ appears ten times in the writings of Saint Francis; ‘It almost seems as if the 
brothers themselves, after 1230, wanted to forget this word and all it involved’.897 There is 
evidence, therefore, of the beginnings of a non-confrontational social reality (fraternitas), 
 
893 Cf. Steven Epstein, Wage Labor and Guilds in Medieval Europe (North Carolina: University of North Carolina 
Press, 1991) pp. 86, 90, 114 and 157. Cited in David Flood, Francis of Assisi’s Rule and Life, p. 43, note 50. 
894 Chinnici, pp. 104-6. Early Rule IV-VI and Admonitions III-IV lay down the principles.  
895 Ibid, p. 108. Also, cf. Celano, Second Life, FA:ED (Vol 2) [191] p. 370. ‘[Saint Francis] wanted to unite the 
greater to the lesser, to join the wise to the simple in brotherly affection, and to hold together those far from 
each other with the glue of love’. 
896 Le Goff, p. 75. 
897 Cf. Delarun, p. 178 and Desbonnets, pp. 65-82. 
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with its own specific vocabulary, making a determined effort to create a non-violent social, 
political and ecclesial form of life. 
 
The Form of Life 
 
Giorgio Agamben has indicated a novelty among the early Franciscans, in that they are 
committed not to a Rule, but to ‘form of life’. Agamben has argued that what is most 
significant about the early Franciscan movement is that the ‘Friar Minor does not obey the 
rule, but live it – with an even more extreme reversal, it is the life that is to be applied to 
the norm and not the norm to life’.898 Agamben understands this to mean a radical 
dislocation of ethics and politics from the sphere of action to that of ‘form of life’. The forma 
vitae comes first and only with difficulty is it translated into coherent, juridical terms. These 
terms or rules were (originally) always themselves subject to the form, which is prior. 
Agamben asserts that the earliest commentary on the Franciscan Rule, the Expositio 
quatuor magistrorum, notes that among early Franciscans, the normal state of living is 
governed by the vita and exceptions are governed by the Rule: thus, the friars are 
committed to a form of life (in their case one still developing around their core values), not 
to the traditional practice of observing Rule. Agamben observes that the relationship 
between rule and life is at the heart of the ‘novelty and inadequacy of the Franciscan 
movement – its extraordinary success and its foreseeable failure […]’899  
 
Agamben emphasizes the discontinuous aspect of the early Franciscan social and 
religious project: ‘the attempt to realize a human life and practice absolutely outside the 
determination of the law’.900 Agamben goes beyond the reductive understanding of 
voluntary poverty found in Hamilton and Baxter Wolf. Poverty is part of the idiom of 
withdrawal from ‘the law’, since the law regulates the systems of appropriation (but not the 
natural right of use) of material goods. The friars renounced property and ‘every faculty of 
appropriating’, but not the natural right of use, which is, in so far as it is a natural right, 
 
898 Giorgio Agamben, The Highest Poverty: Monastic Rules and Forms-of-Life, trans. Adam Kotsko (Stanford, 
California: Stanford University Press, 2013) p. 61. 
899 Ibid, p. 109. 
900 Ibid, p. 111. 
 225 
unrenounceable’.901 It is Agamben’s contention that with Francis and the early friars the 
forma vitae (life according to the form of the Holy Gospel) ‘is situated on a level that is so 
distinct from that of the life according to the form of the holy Roman Church that it cannot 
enter into conflict with it’.902 Being a particular Gospel form of life, it escapes a rivalrous or 
antagonistic relationship with the form of the Roman Church, which is related to material 
and temporal goods by law.903 Agamben, therefore, asserts a positive social and political 
novelty in early Franciscanism; an attempt to live sine proprio. Living ‘without anything of 
one’s own’ was (counterintuitively) a positive form of life, in that it was directed to 
evangelical perfection, beyond the limits of positive law. 
 
Among the social and ecclesial realities of the late medieval period the Franciscan 
forma vitae has continuous and discontinuous elements, and along with Le Goff and 
Agamben, I have emphasized the discontinuity. It is possible to describe the early 
Franciscans as an instance of the radical reworking of social relations, around a specific form 
of life. This forma vitae reframes voluntary poverty as a positive ethic of gift, lived within an 
ongoing commitment to penance, i.e., the renunciation of conflictual mimetic desire. This 
defines the social reality of fraternitas. While Agamben and Le Goff have addressed the 
idiomatic novelty in terms of vocabulary and conceptuality, David Flood O.F.M., gives an 
account of how this form of life was radically dependant on the exigencies of daily labour. I 
will argue that Flood’s account of the early Franciscan movement supports my assertion 
that it represents a remarkable instance of non-violent practice ‘taking political, collective 
form’. 
 
Early Franciscans and Daily Labour 
 
David Flood: Preliminary remarks  
 
 
901 Ibid, p. 115. 
902 Ibid, p. 122. 
903 By law, i.e., under the conditions which regulate and limit appropriation, thus from within the ‘sacrificial’ 
system. Agamben notes that the early Franciscans were committed to a sustained reflection on their relation 
to temporal things, whether ‘ownership’, position, usufruct or simple use. p. 124. 
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A significant effort to ground this conceptual and idiomatic novelty in its historical context 
has been undertaken by the Franciscan historian David Flood, O.F.M.904 Flood’s particular 
contribution has been his efforts to retrieve and clarify the social and political values which 
found expression in the Early Rule and in the writings of Saint Francis. Flood has attempted 
to situate Francis exclusively in the context of the early Franciscan movement retrieving him, 
as far as possible, from later representations which tend to minimize the social history in 
favour of the romantic/heroic and exemplary Francis.905 Franciscan history begins, as Francis 
himself asserted in his Testament, ‘after the Lord gave me some brothers’.906 Flood notes that 
to ‘focus on Francis as the unique and sole source of Franciscan inspiration and history is to 
miss the point of these words of Francis, as well as the evidence of the text of the Early 
Rule’.907 Flood’s work on the Early Rule reveals a common commitment and purpose, 
emerging from a shared Gospel form of life; not merely the dictation of moral instruction 
from a founder to his disciples, but a genuinely shared enterprise. The brothers together, and 
not merely Francis, are the subjects of Franciscan history.  
 
Flood has also insisted on characterizing the early Franciscan movement as a 
religiously inspired ecclesial movement which is also, and essentially, a social reality. In 
situating Francis within the movement – not outside or above it – as in romantic 
interpretations, Flood affirms early Franciscanism’s unique social and political significance. 
Flood asserts that the early Franciscans ‘lived an alternative economic reality by working to 
supply the needs of the day for themselves and lepers and the sick’.908 According to Flood, an 
early Franciscan economy emerged in contrast to (but not in competition with) the emerging 
economy of the Assisi commune. Significantly, Flood interprets Franciscan poverty not as an 
 
904 David Flood’s bibliography numbers ‘more than fifty entries and includes a significant number of critical text 
editions, each of which is recognized as a quality example of medieval text editing’. Cf. Michael W. Blastic O.F.M. 
Conv., ‘David E. Flood, OFM., 17th Recipient of the Franciscan Institute Medal’ in Franciscan Studies, Vol. 63 
(2005) pp. 28-34. St. Bonaventure University Press, https://www.jstor.org/stable/41975342.  
905 Medieval Franciscan narratives were less interested in the facts of Saint Francis’s life than in representing 
Francis as the model or interpretative key of their particular social and religious aims. Later romantic 
interpretations were no less anachronistic. They produced histories which frequently obscured the fact that 
Francis was himself a Franciscan. Cf. Thompson, p. 154.  
906 Francis of Assisi, The Testament, FA:ED (Vol 1) p. 124. 
907 Blastic, Franciscan Studies, p. 31. 
908 Ibid, p. 32. 
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ascetical practice but, in line with Kinsella, as a concrete social stance towards wealth and 
power and the social order which creates and contains violence. 909 
 
In asserting the centrality of the social dynamic in early Franciscanism, Flood adopts a 
questioning attitude to what is generically called ‘Franciscan spirituality’. In Flood’s view 
Franciscan spirituality has tended to obscure and dissolve the social dimension which was 
fundamental to the early Franciscan forma vitae. As the early Franciscan movement lost touch 
with its origins in local labour and drifted into high status roles within Church and society, the 
spiritual and mystical significance of poverty and minority were accentuated, if not fetishized. 
While Flood insists on the religious nature of the early Franciscan movement and the role of 
graced conversion, he asserts that the early Franciscan writings employ ‘new categories of 
spiritual practice – the realm of politics and economics, social structures and institutional 
reform’.910 Flood’s reading of the early Franciscan writings has helped to relocate these 
founding texts in a social and economic consciousness aligned with the needs of the poor and 
marginalised. If what I have described as (mimetic) ‘conversion intelligence’ is, in fact, prior 
to the dominant hagiographical and romantic interpretations of early Franciscanism, Flood’s 
work on the largely forgotten category of Franciscan labour is an essential piece of evidence.  
 
Flood argues that the writings of Saint Francis reveal not so much the ‘behavioural 
patterns of a religious institution’, or a spiritual master instructing his disciples.911 Rather, the 
Early Rule is Francis’s invitation to the brothers to reflect on their own shared experience as 
brothers and labourers, living outside the established systems of social and economic power. 
In this respect Flood is in agreement with Agamben who notes that the lines in the Early Rule: 
‘the things which are written in this life’ (quae in ista vita scripta sunt) represent not a set of 
norms imposed on the friars, but a forma vitae. Agamben affirms that ‘precisely what was 
written here was a life and not a rule, a form of life and not a code of norms and precepts, 
the text itself can be defined as “life”’.912 In the writings of Saint Francis, the Founder speaks 
in his own voice, chiefly to articulate and recommend a way of life, not his own spiritual 
 
909 Cf. My discussion of Kinsella, chapter five. 
910  Blastic p. 33. 
911  Ibid. 
912  Cf. Agamben, p. 99. 
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teaching. At the conclusion of the Early Rule, Francis asks the brothers ‘to learn and frequently 
call to mind the tenor and sense of what has been written in this life’.913 In speaking of the 
tenor and sense of the life, Francis is inviting commitment to a dynamic social and political 
reality, not the observance of religious precepts.914  
 
It is the ‘tenor and sense’ of the life which is most important and, in this regard, Francis 
asks God to bless those who ‘teach, retain, remember, and put into practice’ their common 
memory, not merely observe religious rules or ascetical practices.915 In other words, the 
forma vitae cannot be deduced from a series of rules and ascetical practices; it is not a 
religious rule imposed on life, but a form of life which the brothers together have practiced 
and benefited from. For Flood, the ‘tenor and sense’ of this form of life is something 
experienced in the context of daily labour. It is in the context of daily work that the friars 
enact the ‘intelligence of the victim’, redefining work in a manner calculated to avoid rivalry, 
exclusion and conflict.  
 
David Flood’s Historical Criticism: Aims and Methodology 
 
The Importance of Daily Labour 
 
Flood studied with Franciscan historian Kajetan Esser, O.F.M. (1913-1978) at 
Mönchengladbach, Germany between 1961-1965. Esser’s distinguished career in early 
Franciscan history spanned several decades and culminated in the critical edition of the 
writings of Saint Francis which was published in 1976 (Die Opuscula des hl. Franziskus von 
Assisi, Neue textkritische Edition). Esser’s work on the writings of Francis demonstrated what 
Dalarun considers ‘an excessive distrust of the legends of Francis’.916 Flood demonstrates a 
similar distrust of the legends.917 Esser’s critical work on the writings of Saint Francis has 
 
913 Early Rule, FA:ED, (Vol 1) p. 86. 
914 Cf. Blastic, p. 33. 
915 Cf. Early Rule, FA:ED, (Vol 1) p. 86. 
916 Dalarun, p. 43. 
917 Flood’s stance towards the legends is not dissimilar to Girard’s view of ‘archaic myth’. Flood assumes in the 
legendae strata of mis-remembering. In contrast, the early Franciscan writings, such as the Early Rule are 
trustworthy expressions of an emerging forma vitae. ‘In our study of the Early Rule, we have acquired 
knowledge that does not depend on testimony’. The Early Rule is characterized by Flood as ‘empirical’ 
knowledge, an authentic self-description of the values and dynamics of early Franciscan life as it took shape 
between 1209-1221. The legends, even the earliest, date from an historical context in which the legacy of 
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achieved what Sabatier and earlier Franciscan historians had hoped were possible; a 
Franciscan histography which treated the writings of Saint Francis as the primary and 
authoritative source of Francis’s life, and consigned the narratives (legendae) to the 
Franciscan debates which followed the canonization of Saint Francis in 1228.918 Flood takes 
issue with Esser’s critical assessments occasionally, specifically on the Rule.919 Nevertheless, 
he is committed to Esser’s project of developing a critical history based on the writings of 
Saint Francis and is highly suspicious of the narrative tradition.920   
 
Flood identifies with what E. P. Thompson termed ‘history from below’.921 Flood has 
applied the ‘history from below’ approach to the early Franciscan movement, reclaiming the 
neglected tradition of early Franciscan labour by means of a careful reading of texts and 
reference to social histories of the late Middle Ages.922 Flood advocates reading the early 
Franciscan writings, which allude to the practice of work, in the context of a ‘thick description’ 
or ‘detailed contextualization’ of social history. Flood argues that the social context of daily 
work offers a compelling hermeneutic key to the written history of Francis and the early 
movement. The Early Rule functions as a ‘manifesto’ of the emerging Franciscan movement 
 
Francis is in dispute. The information contained in the narratives is already distilled through ‘an emerging 
clerical institution’: Cf. Flood, Francis of Assisi’s Rule and Life, p. 14 and p. 83. Whatever their value, Flood 
insists ‘We do not know what events lay behind a narrative, nor do we know the phases of its tradition, 
especially if it belongs to a compilation’. Cf. Flood, ‘Franciscans at Work’, Franciscans Studies, Vol. 59, (2001) p. 
31, note 26. 
918 Flood, Work for Justice, p. 16, note 43. 
919 Flood notes that Esser was committed to defending the Later Rule as expressing the spirit of the Early Rule. 
This was, in Flood’s view, motivated by Esser’s visceral opposition to Sabatier’s characterization of the Later 
Rule as an ecclesial/papal imposition on Francis and the Order; an imposition which effectively halted their 
project of Gospel renewal. Central to Flood’s argument is the contention that on the matter of work at least, 
the Later Rule expunged the spirit, if not the letter of the Early Rule.  
920 Flood distinguishes two types of Franciscan history: That which originated in the late nineteenth century 
with the ‘Franciscan Question’ and is compelled to rely on the narratives, which Flood characterizes as more 
‘literary’; and that which dates from after the Second World War and is associated with the critical study of the 
writings of Saint Francis (notable historians of this ‘school’ were Sophronius Clasen, Théophile Desbonnets, 
Stanislao da Compagnola, Kajetan Esser and Flood himself). Esser and his school is more properly ‘historical’ in 
Flood’s estimation. Cf. David Flood, ‘Francis of Assisi, History, Hagiography and Hermeneutics in the Early 
Documents’, (Review) in Catholic Historical Review, 90, 4, (October 2004) 764-65 (p. 765). 
www.jstor.org/stable/25026725.  
921 Cf. E. P. Thompson, The Making of the English Working Class (London: Penguin Publishing, 2013) [originally, 
1963]. The term, popularized by Thompson, indicates social history written from the perspective of groups 
usually ignored or neglected by historians and chroniclers.  
922 Augustine Thompson regards Flood as one of the two great leaders of Francis studies in the 1960s, 1970s 
(along with Théophile Desbonnets). Nevertheless, Thompson suggests that Flood’s critical work has ideological 
concerns and that Flood’s Frere François et le Mouvement Franciscain (1983) ‘read Francis through the lens of 
Liberation Theology’. Thompson, p. 159. 
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not simply another ‘Religious rule’. Flood reads in the Early Rule a commitment to daily labour 
and, indeed, to a unique conception of work. This commitment remains outside of the 
acquisitive and competitive dynamics of the Assisi commune.923 The manifest absence of a 
detailed account of Franciscan labour in the legendae indicates, for Flood, a determined 
retreat back into socially secure systems within Church and society. According to Flood, the 
early Franciscan social reality was oriented to creating and maintaining peaceful relations 
and, as an essential component of peace-making, was committed to the just redistribution of 
material goods.924 Flood’s historical project involves articulating the voice of the working 
brothers (including Francis, the worker) in the writings of Francis of Assisi. 
 
An example of Flood’s approach is his critique of Saint Bonaventure’s treatment of 
work in the life of Francis. In the Legenda Maior, Bonaventure characterised Francis’s work in 
repairing churches as a purely moral exercise, ‘to prevent his body from becoming sluggish 
with laziness’.925 Flood notes that in Bonaventure’s writings Francis ‘did not work save 
occasionally but gave his life to preaching’.926 In Flood’s estimation, Bonaventure’s 
characterization of Francis as a preacher, whose relationship to manual work was determined 
by merely moral and ascetical considerations, is evidence of a wider debate on the character 
of work in the mid-late thirteenth century Order. By the late thirteenth century, we can detect 
only the dominant, clerical position of this argument, as the working brothers and their 
shared memory had become increasingly marginalized.  
 
That Bonaventure addressed the question of whether Francis worked indicates to 
Flood that in the mid to late thirteenth century there were still friars who recalled the 
fundamental role of labour in the early Franciscan Order and contested its increasing 
marginalization in official narratives of Saint Francis. Flood’s historical criticism of the early 
Franciscan movement is informed by his assertion that work is always a social act and, as 
such, communicates meaning and social values.  On the evidence of the Early Rule and other 
 
923 Cf. Flood, ‘Franciscans at Work’, p. 33, n. 30. 
924 Cf. Ibid, pp. 55-58. 
925 Legenda Maior, FA:ED (Vol 2), p. 540. 
926 David Flood, ‘Franciscans At Work’, Franciscan Studies, Vol 59 (2001) p. 43. Flood cites C. Wenin, ‘Saint 
Bonaventure et le travail manuel’ in J. Hamesse, ed. Le travail au moyen âge (Louvain-la-Neuve, 1990), pp. 
141-155., on Saint Francis’s absence from the world of manual labour.  
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early Franciscan writings, primitive Franciscan communities had formed their communal 
identities within the social laboratory of everyday labour.927 Later attempts to deduce 
‘freestanding’ spiritual and moral principles from these texts, diminishing or avoiding the 
social character of work, produced a flawed Franciscan history.  
 
Apart from the historically contested and polemical nature of many of the early 
Franciscan narratives Flood observes an absence of what we might expect to find: accounts 
of friars involved in daily labour. The legenda known as The Anonymous of Perugia notes that 
the brothers worked every day with their hands.928 This is a rare admission of Franciscan daily 
labour in an early narrative source; a source which situates Francis as a brother among the 
brothers and not yet the great exemplar of most legendae. Nevertheless, The Anonymous of 
Perugia is effectively an apologia for the increasingly clericalized Order of the mid to late 
thirteenth century. While the author emphasises the social exclusion of the early community, 
and their pattern of daily work, neither social exclusion nor daily work are idealized or 
presented as constitutive of Franciscan living. Indeed, the message of The Anonymous of 
Perugia is that the origins of the Order, characterised by hardship, exclusion, and folly were 
not betrayed, but perfected, as the movement gradually became a formal and clericalized 
religious Order.929 The narratives are thus removed from the social and religious context of 
the early writings, such as the Early Rule and, while containing fascinating details of early 
Franciscan life, they generally describe work in terms of moral virtue and not social action. 
They represent a rupture with the form of life expressed in the Early Rule. For Flood the early 
Franciscan writings uniquely locate Francis, speaking to the brothers as a brother, from within 
the Franciscan forma vitae.  
 
The Early Franciscan Idiom: Living and Working in the World 
 
Flood draws attention to Francis’s Later Admonition and Exhortation (c. 1220). Traditionally 
read as a general, pastoral letter to ‘all the faithful’, the text is now commonly understood 
 
927 Flood is referring to what are commonly called the authentic writings of Saint Francis. These writings are 
neither autobiographical or purely ‘directional’ works of Saint Francis; rather they represent the core values 
and aims of the early brotherhood as it emerged. Francis speaks in his own voice, but he is still speaking as a 
‘brother among brothers’.  
928 Anonymous of Perugia, FA:ED, (Vol 2) p. 46. 
929 Cf. Dalarun, p. 189. 
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to be a commonitorium; a work reminding and encouraging a specific group of earlier 
undertakings and commitments.930 Those addressed by Francis in the commonitorium 
include men and women, (illi et illae), and since it is a message of recall and exhortation, 
the recipients are likely to have encountered the brothers in the context of their daily 
labour. The commonitorium invites the brother’s fellow workers to recall the distinctive 
spirituality which found expression in their daily labour.931 Flood insists that ‘the early 
writings simply encompass too much experience and too developed a linguistic culture’ to 
be the invention of one man.932 The vocabulary developed as the brother’s forma vitae 
matured within the local economy of day labouring, and in the context of emerging guilds 
and worker’s corporations. 
 
Flood identifies the Early Rule, the Admonition and Exhortation, the Admonitions 
and A Salutation of the Virtues as early Franciscan texts which bear witness to the forma 
vitae by use of a distinctive vocabulary.933 According to Flood, these and others texts invited 
those who undertook to live the forma vitae to recall and remember why and how they ‘left 
the world’.934 Flood argues that, taken together, the texts form a definite social and 
economic alternative to both the feudal social order and merchant class interests, 
expressed in the contemporary social contracts, the charters of 1203 and 1210.935 To ‘leave 
the world’ is to withdraw from the social and economic model of the charters of 1203 and 
1210; something the Church was not prepared to do, since it was so much a part of those 
very systems. Flood maintains that the early Franciscan vocabulary was not simply 
borrowed from the world of labour, but was crafted and developed by brothers who were, 
 
930 Cf. Later Admonition and Exhortation, FA:ED, (Vol 1) p. 45, note a. 
931 Flood understands the Later Admonition and Exhortation (which he refers to as the Message of Recall and 
Admonition) as a critique of work as appropriation. The commune of Assisi issued charters in 1203 and 1210 
which invited the citizens to work for the interests of the city, principally the property-holders. Flood 
interprets the Admonition and Exhortation as the response of early Franciscans and their co-workers to the 
charter of 1210. The early Franciscan movement insisted on work as service, renounced the property and wage 
economy in favour of distributive justice and developed a spirituality indistinguishable from their patterns of 
working. Cf. David Flood, ‘Poverty and the Gospel’, pp. 1-15. For the Assisi Charter 1210, cf. A. Bartoli Langeli 
‘La realtà sociale assisana e il patto del 1210’ in Assisi al tempo di san Francesco, Assisi 1978, pp. 271-336. For 
an evaluation of the economic and social agenda of the Italian commune, cf. J. K. Hyde, Society and Politics in 
Medieval Italy: The Evolution of the Civil Life 1000-1350 (London: Macmillan, 1973). 
932 David Flood, Francis of Assisi’s Rule and Life, p. 73. 
933 Cf. FA:ED (Vol 1) pp. 63, 45, 128, 164.  
934 Francis wrote of having ‘left the world’ in his Testament, cf. FA:ED (Vol 1), p. 124. The theme is present in 
chapter XXII of the Early Rule, cf. ibid, p. 81 and in A Salutation of the Virtues, ibid, p. 165. 
935 Flood discusses the Assisi charters of 1203 and 1210 in ‘Franciscans at Work’, pp. 34-36. 
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in every respect, workers, laborantes. It was in the field of work that the early Franciscans 
modelled a non-rivalrous and non-acquisitive ethic. 
 
It is axiomatic for Flood that words and phrases which appear frequently in late 
medieval spiritual works (e.g., carnaliter and spiritualiter), have a specific meaning in early 
Franciscan idiom and represent a distinct Franciscan social and religious consciousness.936 
The characteristic bond between work and the early Franciscan spiritual programme was 
gradually abandoned, as the later Franciscan documents testify. Steven Epistein’s work on 
labour in medieval Europe has also indicated a conspicuous absence of historical accounts 
of work in the late Middle Ages.  
 
In his examination of Frederic Tubach’s index of medieval sermon exempla, Epstein 
notes an absence of stories about guilds, artisans or journeymen. This absence is striking 
since a considerable number of the clerics preaching the exempla were the sons of 
merchants and artisans. Epstein concludes: ‘This gap of information, or comprehension, and 
whatever caused it of course constitute an implicit attitude about work and the people who 
lived by it’.937  In the context of the late Middle Ages daily labour and reflection on the 
purpose and aims of labour is discreet or absent. The friars involved in labour have left little 
indication of how their working lives formed their social and religious lives. It is evident that 
when official Franciscan history begins to take narrative form the role of daily labour was 
being marginalised in favour of preaching and pastoral work in the Church, and this signals 
an accommodation with the systems of power and status which Francis and the brothers 
had attempted to leave.  
 
The Sources of Early Franciscan Life 
 
 
936 It is reasonable to assert that what constitutes ‘of the flesh’ and ‘of the spirit’ in an enclosed monastic 
context is understood differently in the context of brothers engaged in daily labour, actively avoiding 
reintegration into the social and economic systems of exclusion. Flood writes: ‘Francis and his brothers 
wrested their linguistic creation from the age’s culture and broke society’s control over them. Then they used 
it to deepen their sense of the Spirit in their lives’. ‘The early brothers talked one another into the common 
language they needed to engage in post-conventional action, to use Habermas’s terms, or to fashion a new 
Christian language in the early thirteenth century’. David Flood, O.F.M., ‘What is a Franciscan? Constituting the 
Franciscan Subject’ in Franciscan Studies, Vol. 63 (2005) p. 47. https://www.jstor.ord/stable41975343  
937 Epstein, p. 183. Cited in Flood, Francis of Assisi’s Rule and Life, p. 157, note 211. 
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Beginning with his doctoral work on the Early Rule, Flood has argued that the Regula non 
Bullata of 1221 is structured around three foundational chapters: Chapters I, VII and XIV. 
According to Flood, these three chapters are indicative of the origins and core values of the 
early Franciscan movement.  Of the twenty-four chapters in the Rule, Chapters XVIII-XXI 
were added after the fourth Lateran council of November 1215. Chapters IV-VI were 
inserted into the text and revised in 1217-18. The first chapter is programmatic and 
describes the origins of the brotherhood. Chapter VII explores the practical questions of 
how the brothers would provide for themselves (The manner of serving and working). 
Chapter XIV describes how the brothers ‘should go through the world’.938 The Early Rule is 
witness to how the forma vitae developed between 1209 and 1221 and the core of the text 
records the decision of the brothers to ‘leave the world’, a traditional religious motif, 
radically redefined in light of the social and political aims of the early Franciscans.  
 
The brothers engaged in daily labour in the local economy as subditi, i.e., subject to 
others. Having decided to withdraw from familial and social systems and their web of 
obligations, the brothers were careful not to be drawn back into those structures through 
work: ‘none of the brothers may be treasurers or overseers in any of those places where 
they are staying to serve or work among others.’939 The core value of withdrawing from the 
dominant social, economic and ecclesial systems was given a definite purpose in Chapter 
XIV: the brothers were to avoid appropriating material goods, they were to observe the 
Gospel counsel to make peace and they were admonished not to resist anyone evil; ‘Let 
them give to all who ask of them and whoever takes what is theirs, let them not seek to take 
it back’.940 Flood takes these three chapters to be the core of the 1209 Rule and in its 1221 
form he considers it equivalent with the forma vitae.941 Even in its 1221 form, the Rule is 
 
938 Flood, Francis of Assisi’s Rule and Life, p. 7. 
939 Early Rule VII, FA:ED (Vol 1) p. 68 
940 Early Rule XIV, FA:ED (Vol 1) p. 73. 
941 Flood insists on the term vita, or forma vitae. The traditional religious motif of ‘following the Gospel’ is 
unhelpful in reconstructing early Franciscan history and, as Flood notes, ‘perfectly vacuous’. To reiterate that 
Francis and the early brothers ‘followed the Gospel’ further obscures their social and religious innovation. 
They followed the forma vitae or vita which is frequently alluded to in the early writings. This way of Gospel 
living was both a determined withdrawal from the dominant social systems and a specific ethical engagement 
with labour, such that they refused payment in coin and promotion into social and economic hierarchies. They 
worked to provide for their needs and the needs of those who were unable to provide for themselves. They 
understood work as a means of social justice or distributive justice. Cf. David Flood, Francis of Assisi’s Rule and 
Life, p. 20 and p. 4.   
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neither ‘expository’ or ‘narrational’, but ‘directional’, expressing a common way of life 
which has unfolded over time, in the course of a unique experiment in social, religious, and 
economic practice.942 
 
The Early Rule is a significant text since it can be read as an ‘ongoing event, an 
emergent manifesto’.943 By comparison with the juridically refined Later Rule of 1223, it 
bears witness to the accumulated wisdom of the brothers as they formed their way of life 
under the guidance of the Holy Spirit.944   
 
The Early Franciscan Life: Indications from the Early Rule and Early Franciscan Writings  
 
The Early Rule, Chapter VII has specific indications on the manner of Franciscan working:  
 
None of the brothers may be treasurers or overseers in any of those places where they 
are staying to serve or work among others. They may not be in charge in the houses in 
which they serve nor accept any office which would generate scandal or be harmful to 
their souls. Let them instead, be the lesser ones and be subject to all in the same 
house.945  
 
Chapter VII effectively prohibits the seeking or acceptance of promotion to higher status 
work within the local economy.946  Roles of responsibility within the local economy, served 
to subvert the Franciscan view of work as service, in favour of work as a means of entry to 
social and economic hierarchies. According to Flood, the labouring friars ‘worked to produce 
 
942 Cf. Flood, Francis of Assisi’s Rule and Life, p. 8, note 9. 
943 Ibid, p. 12. 
944 The Early Rule with its emphasis on daily work took on a more juridical character in its 1223 form. Flood 
argues that the voice of Francis on work appears forcefully in chapter VI of the Later Rule, and this chapter can 
be best understood as a continuation of the Early Rule work ethic, cf. Flood, Francis of Assisi’s Rule and Life, p. 
17. In the Testament (1226), Francis takes the opportunity to address the inconsistencies of the 1223 Rule, 
arising out of its ambiguous message on work. In forceful terms work is presented as constitutive of the 
Franciscan way of life: ‘And I worked with my hands, and I still desire to work; and I earnestly desire all 
brothers to give themselves to honest work. Let those who do not know how to work learn […]’ Units 20-21 of 
the Testament became increasingly problematic for the clerical friars who by 1226 were redefining the role of 
the movement and were no longer engaged in manual labour. It fell to Pope Gregory IX (who had helped draft 
the Rule of 1223) to ease their consciences. He declared that Saint Francis had no authority in the Testament 
to impose on the friars anything in addition to the Rule: ‘Quod omnes tangit ab omnibus tractari et approbari 
debet’ (‘What touches all must be dealt with and approved by all’). (Gregory IX, Quo elongati, 1230). Cf. 
Desbonnets, pp. 110-11. 
945 Early Rule, VII, FA:ED (Vol 1) p. 68. 
946 Flood notes the roles of camerarius, cancellarius, praefectus, are rejected in the Early Rule, since they are 
‘roles of responsibility and social consequence’ incompatible with the forma vitae. Flood, ‘Franciscans at 
Work’, p. 31. 
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the common product, without claiming any share thereof’.947 Flood understands the term 
subditi omnibus, as signifying the friar’s entire economic outlook. Work was directed 
towards a just distribution of the material goods produced by labour, and the friars 
renounced all claim on the goods themselves, since to do so would be to re-enter the 
systems of ownership and appropriation. This renunciation reframes labour as an essential 
social activity, but not essentially linked to acquisition or appropriation. In Chapter VII of the 
Early Rule the paradox of the early Franciscan economy comes into focus; ‘For their work 
they can receive whatever is necessary, excepting money […] And it is lawful for them to 
have the tools and instruments suitable for their trades’.948  
 
The Prohibition of Coin and ‘Referring all good to God Most High’ 
 
The friar’s economic agency is affirmed in the local labour market (tools and instruments 
are explicitly permitted) but they refuse incorporation into the systems of appropriation 
(coin is prohibited) which have hitherto determined how the economy develops and 
excludes. Todeschini’s view, noted in chapter five, is that the prohibition of coin is more 
than a form of spiritual asceticism for Francis. Narrative accounts of an extreme rejection of 
coin indicate for Todeschini Francis’s visceral recognition of the role of coin in the systems 
of exclusion.949 Physical separation from money was more important than using it in 
acceptable ways.950 It is worth repeating here Todeschini’s view that Francis’s rejection of 
the coin economy was part of a much wider project of inclusion and reintegration of those 
parts of society which were socially, religiously and economically marginalised: 
 
Some fundamental ideas strongly emerged: the refusal to touch money, the refusal to 
consider property as the fundamental condition for belonging to the human family, the 
importance attributed to alms and work as ways to earn a living, the search for contact 
with those usually considered outside of the sphere of human society, i.e., animals, lepers, 
wanderers, criminals, mendicants, the poor and farmers.951 
 
 
947 Flood, Francis of Assisi’s Life and Rule, p. 37. 
948 Early Rule VII, FA:ED (Vol 1) p. 69 
949 Cf. Celano, First Life, FA:ED (Vol 1) p. 190. 
950 Cf. note 808, above. 
951 Note 809, above. 
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From the time of the First Rule (1209-1221) a Franciscan friar was recognizable by an 
itinerant life, ‘ragged appearance and clothes, manual work as scullery-man and mason, and 
begging without shame’.952 Flood adds to this description, insisting that the brothers 
‘worked according to their notion of work as service. They did not simply add to the sum of 
the social product and take their wages; they had the welfare of others foremost in mind’.953 
The early brothers modelled a fraternal, non-acquisitive, non-competitive work ethic, which 
kept them outside the social systems of competition and exclusion. Todeschini credits 
Francis and the early brothers with the creation of an ‘elsewhere’ where money didn’t 
provide the means of communication and did not ‘explain or schematize reality’.954 The 
renunciation of coin created an immediate relationship with the goods of the earth: 
Todeschini notes that 19th-20th century romantic characterizations of nature, projected onto 
Saint Francis and the friars are ‘improbable’ and ‘anachronistic’. Creation was always 
associated with the elements necessary for living, especially in the context of labour outside 
a coin economy.955  
 
In Chapter XVII of the Early Rule the brothers are encouraged to ‘refer all good to 
the Lord, God Almighty and Most High’ (bona Deo reddere).956 Flood reads this chapter as 
programmatic of the Franciscan movement, since it deals with ‘good works and deeds’ 
being ‘returned’ or ‘referred’ to God, the source of all good things. This ‘return’ is made 
primarily by undertaking work as service. ‘Servi’ and ‘servire’ are key words in the early 
Franciscan vocabulary which Flood reads in opposition to officium, the service which 
operated in the feudal system and was characterised by explicit and implicit obligations. 957  
 
952 Todeschini, pp. 61-62. 
953 Flood, Francis of Assisi’s Life and Rule, p. 39. 
954 Todeschini, p. 64. 
955 Ibid, p. 66. 
956 The verb reddere occurs eighteen times in the writings of Saint Francis. It is used by Saint Francis in the 
context of giving back objects or goods received and to give back or return/render praise to God. The use of 
reddere (tibi reddamus, reddant, etc.) in connection with restoring praise and honour to God is not found in 
the New Testament and is considered an innovation of Saint Francis. God is not understood to be the recipient 
in relation to human agency, nor does God lose God’s honour or glory. God has first bestowed respect and 
honour on human beings, ‘giving them many good things and allowing them to say many good words and do 
many good deeds.’ Cf. Edith van den Goorbergh, O.S.C. and Theodore Zweerman, O.F.M., Respectfully Yours: 
Signed and Sealed, Francis of Assisi: Aspects of His Authorship and Focuses of His Spirituality, edited by Elise 
Saggau, O.S.F., and Paul Sansone (New York: St. Bonaventure University, 2001). P. 117. For an evaluation of 
Saint Francis’s use of reddere, cf van den Goorbergh and Zweerman pp. 114-126. 
957 Cf. Flood, ‘The Early Franciscan Penitents’, The Cord, (2016), 64, 4. 313-330. 
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By becoming servi inutile (‘useless’ in terms of the systems of appropriation and status) the 
early Franciscans were committed to labour as a means of reordering social relations and 
redistributing the goods of creation. Work, defined as servus/servire became a constitutive 
form of Franciscan social and political action. Wealth, represented in coin, was directed 
towards hoarding and appropriation and thus ‘opposed to the common welfare, which was 
understood as the perpetual redistribution of resources or, rather, as a continuous and 
reciprocal exchange of favours, donations and alms’.958 The renunciation of coin and the 
social advantages of promotion (contra, ‘subditi omnibus’) necessitated a continuous 
reflection, by the friars, upon the valid use of goods and required the establishing of 
networks of social support among workers, friars, and those in need of alms. Taken 
together, this was the Franciscan economic programme. 
 
Sharing in common the ‘intelligence of the victim’, the voluntarily poor friars 
‘approached the wealthy world they had previously abandoned and saw it again with the 
eyes of poor people, as a world of objects, materials and activities whose overall social 
functionality was important to understand’.959 Todeschini describes the early Franciscan 
economy as a critique on the fixed and involuntary nature of wealth in society. Wealth, like 
poverty had to be voluntary in order to be good. Riches required a ‘flexible intentionality’ 
which saw goods distributed according to need and changing circumstances. From this 
perspective every ‘automatic patrimonial holding on to goods, starting with monetary 
hoarding, appeared illegal, sinful and, at the same time, senseless’.960 While the prohibition 
on coin exchange was a determined strategy of the early Franciscan ‘exodus’, it was already 
intuited in other religious movements. 961 Ironically, by imposing a strict prohibition of the 
handling of coin, Francis had invested coin with the fascinating status of the sacred. 
Evidently, in frequently comparing coin to dung, dust, flies and stones Francis and the 
 
958 Todeschini, p. 73. 
959 Ibid, p. 90. 
960 Ibid. 
961 Cf. Peter Damian in his Epistola a Cadalo, Letter 89 in Todeschini, pp. 62-63. ‘You have fortified towns 
behind you, armed with gold rather than with steel, and thus money pours forth from your purses like swords 
drawn from their scabbards. […] For with a golden fist, the farmers say, you can break through a wall of iron. 
[…] but your money serves to destroy the foundation of the Christian faith and of the Holy Church entirely’. 
Todeschini observes that the danger of coin, in the religious perspective of the late Middle Ages, ‘consisted of 
the total absorption of a system of social and religious values […] into the metallic nature of money, 
understood as a destructive war arsenal’. Cf. Todeschini, pp. 62-63.  
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brothers sought to empty coin of any such fascination.962 Nevertheless, being something 
prohibited, coin itself became not merely a token of the useless and excluding social 
systems abandoned by the friars. It was treated as something fascinating, ‘sacred’ even, 
only be accessed through intermediaries.963  
 
The Early Rule, according to Flood’s analysis, is only superficially a traditional 
religious rule. It represents the early Franciscan covenant or manifesto, grounded in their 
daily experience of work. Since it represents the complex coordinates of an exodus from 
systems defined by rivalry and exclusion, the terms used in the Early Rule invite, at a 
minimum, a realignment proximate to the movement’s core values and aims. It is prudent, 
given Flood’s analysis, to extend to such terms as ‘fleshly’ or ‘spiritual’ (carnaliter and 
spiritualiter) a meaning which reflects not ascetic concerns of monastic piety, but the social 
and religious concerns of Christian workers in a rapidly changing economy. Those who live 
in and by the systems of competition, appropriation, and rivalry are living carnaliter; and 
those who have fled the dominant economic systems to live and work fraternally, are living 
spiritualiter. Those who have been led by the Spirit out of the systems of rivalry and 
exclusion ‘refer all good to God’. Living spiritualiter indicates a social order emerging from 
the ‘intelligence of the victim’. To live carnally is to continue forming identities over and 
against others competitively and antagonistically.  
 
Flood maintains that a distinct vocabulary is the product of a social group articulating 
the insights of their shared conversion experiences, in the context of daily work, not simply 
restating traditional terms from within the seclusion of enclosed religious life. In the 
Admonitions, specifically Admonition V, Francis describes the excellence in which human 
beings were formed, with respect to other creatures.964 However, ‘possessing all 
knowledge’, interpreting ‘every kind of language’, securitizing ‘heavenly matters with skill’, 
wealth and handsome appearance, when employed for one’s own advancement and not 
referred to God, are the basis of a life of the flesh. These goods become the source of boasts, 
envy and conflict. Goods which are not ‘referred back to God’, through a continuous 
 
962 Cf. Early Rule, FA:ED, (Vol 1) p. 70. 
963 Cf. Todeschini, pp. 117-120. 
964 Admonition V, FA:ED (Vol 1) p. 131. 
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economy of service and gift, are appropriated, hoarded, and becomes the source of rivalry 
and conflict. 
 
Pauperes or Fratres? Franciscan Social Self-understanding 
 
Chapters IX and XVII of the Early Rule indicate the role of distributive justice within the 
brotherhood. When the brothers cannot secure by labour their needs (either because their 
fellow workers/employers refuse to offer them just payment, or because their work is 
among lepers and the poor who cannot reimburse them) they are instructed to beg alms. 
Flood insists that the early friars were not pauperes (indigent, beggars) and referred to 
themselves not as pauperes but as fratres. In Chapter VII of the Early Rule, Francis instructs 
the brothers in cases of necessity to beg alms as do other brothers. Flood takes issue with 
Esser for translating the text “alii pauperes”, rather than “alii fratres”. Flood argues for a 
manuscript tradition which designates fratres. Flood insists that, from the beginning, the 
movement’s self-understanding was not as pauperes but as worker-brothers, economic 
agents.965  
 
The early Franciscans did not merely join the ranks of the involuntary poor, a group 
who were, in Flood’s estimation socially invisible. Instead of disappearing into the ranks of 
the pauperes, they took on economic agency in a manner which questioned the acquisitive 
and exclusive economies of the late Middle Ages. They provided a positive social and 
political alternative to systems of exclusion. The brothers who begged were those whose 
work of service was in poorhouses ‘eleemosynae’ (Early Rule VIII) and among lepers. By 
seeking alms these brothers were not claiming charity but including the marginalised and 
the leper in their wider economic activity and insisting that the economic systems which 
had excluded them were duty bound to contribute to their needs. The brothers worked on 
behalf of the community among those who were effectively excluded by the community’s 
systems, economic and political.966  
 
 
965 Cf. Flood, ‘Poverty and Gospel’ in Franciscan Studies, 64, Vita Evangelica: Essays in Honor of Margaret 
Carney, O.S.F., (2006)  https://www.jstor.org/stable/i40092595  1-15 (p. 2). 
966 Cf. Flood, ‘Franciscans at Work’, p. 38. 
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Flood makes the counterintuitive claim that Francis and the early brothers were not 
poor. Francis and the brothers regularly fasted (Early Rule III), which indicates the 
community were not in a constant state of want. As workers they benefited from the local 
economy, within the boundaries of their forma vitae. By refusing to receive payment in coin 
and refusing to take promotion, they avoided two routes back into the systems of rivalry 
and exclusion. Their work was rewarded by a share in the material goods produced, which 
they willingly distributed among themselves and among the poor whom they served. Flood 
asserts that the brothers enjoyed both material sufficiency and meaningful association, 
assets which the poor do not enjoy.967 If the materially poor (pauperes) were socially 
invisible and marginalised, the early Franciscan communities were creatively present in the 
social and economic reality of Assisi and their solidarity with the labouring people produced 
much goodwill.968  
 
Living subditi omnibus, spiritualiter, sine proprio, and as fratres, the early friars 
marked out an alternative, non-rivalrous, social and political reality. This way of life was 
consciously non-confrontational: The brothers were reminded not to say or do evil to 
another, not to exert power or to control one another; (Early Rule V), to revile no one, nor 
grumble or detract from another, nor judge or condemn another; (Early Rule XI). Their 
forma vitae was not a competing value within the social systems of power and exclusion, 




Superficially, a negative programme of withdrawal and abnegation, the early Franciscan 
forma vitae represents a coherent, non-violent ethic, ‘taking collective and political form’. 
The abnegation was motivated by Christ’s example and was directed towards peaceful 
 
967 Ibid, p. 9. 
968 Jordan of Giano’s Chronicle describes the remarkable support the friars received from the people of Assisi 
when they held the ‘Chapter of Mats’ in 1221: ‘I have never seen a chapter in the order like that one, both as 
to the numbers of brothers present and the distinction of those who ministered to them. And, though there 
was such a great number of brothers there, the people supplied all things so cheerfully that after seven days of 
chapter the brothers had to close the door and receive nothing further’. The brothers were compelled to 
remain a further two days to consume ‘what had been offered and accepted’. XIII Century Chronicles, trans. 
Placid Hermann O.F.M., (Chicago: Franciscan Herald Press, 1961) p. 32. 
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coexistence and mutual, positive reciprocity. Since their way of life was directed towards 
positive reciprocity, not antagonism, the friars were cautioned ‘not to appear outwardly as 
sad and gloomy hypocrites but show themselves joyful, cheerful and consistently gracious 
in the Lord’.969  The Franciscan withdrawal from the dominant social and ecclesial structures 
was not a withdrawal from wider society: early Franciscan writings are frequently addressed 
to the whole society, to ‘all the peoples, all created beings’ (‘omnes homines, omnes 
creaturae’). Thus, the early Franciscan writings employ a wide variety of social categories, 
though often in a new or inverted combination.970 As Agamben, Le Goff and Flood 
demonstrate, the movement is characterized by its own experimental and specific idiom; a 
hybrid of religious, economic and political languages. The dynamic social and political form 
of the movement becomes distinct as the hagiographic and romantic Francis recedes, and 
as the role of labour is recovered.    
 
The Francis that emerges is not the romantic hero, but the foremost representative 
of a unique, collective, non-violent practice of the early thirteenth century. Francis of Assisi 
traditionally speaks to us from the hagiographer’s ‘timeless topos’, or from the romantic’s 
equally anachronistic perspective of heroic authenticity. Rarely has Francis spoken as a 
brother among brothers, or as a worker, attempting to live and work peacefully and 
collaboratively a shared Gospel ethic.  
 
Dalarun has stated that the ‘key to the Franciscan legends, when we reach their 
essence, is not so much the dialectic between oral tradition and written version, as Raoul 
Manselli once believed. It is another dialectic, one that is irreconcilable, between facts and 
the remembrance of facts.’971 Thomas of Celano could describe the Edenic moment of the 
early Franciscan community in Chapter XV of the First Life, but, Dalarun asserts, Celano 
didn’t experience this ‘sacred exchange’, the ‘solidarity and transparency between ideal and 
practice’. He came, not too late, but rather with a different ‘intelligence’.972 While the 
 
969 Early Rule VII, FA:ED (Vol 1) p. 69. 
970 Treating the realm of work in the Admonition and Exhortation, ‘laboratores – which could mean either 
“ploughman”, the rural elite or urban workers – agricolae, servi are mentioned before lords’. Le Goff, p. 77. 
971 Dalarun, pp. 116-7. 
972 Celano’s First Life, 56-7 records the admission of some literate and noble men into the Order. It occurs after 
the meeting of Saint Francis and the Sultan (1 Celano 55 and 57). ‘The mention of the new brothers who are 
literate and noble betrays a certain self-satisfaction on the part of the learned hagiographer. It betrays the fact 
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critical study of the writings of Saint Francis cannot hope to uncover the ‘true’ Francis, 
Flood’s critical interpretation provides a contextualising of Francis in a manner which is both 
historically responsible and socially significant. Both Dalarun and Flood point to an 
‘intelligence’ which is barely visible, through layers of romantic and hagiographic 
interpretation.  
 
In light of Flood’s thesis, it may be asked for how long did the founding ‘intelligence’ 
define the early Franciscan movement? At what point did the form of life based around a 
particular, historical ‘intelligence of the victim’ collapse back into the dominant social and 
ecclesial systems? Flood has asserted that early ‘Franciscan history […] began in 1209 and 
ended in 1239’.973 1239 was the year in which the chapter of friars ruled that no further 
workers be admitted into the order. The neglect of daily labour changed the direction and 
character of the early Franciscan movement, and dissolved the subversive potential of the 
emerging Franciscan vocabulary. However, a Franciscan economic outlook, albeit one 
divorced from daily labour, endured after the first generation of Franciscan brothers. The 
core of the early Franciscan economic vision, as it developed, was ‘the usefulness and 
ethical nature of wealth in movement’.974  
 
Flood’s analysis of the early Franciscan movement does much to uncover a social 
history obscured by romance and hagiography. What emerges is the outline of an audacious 
social and political enterprise, oriented towards a peaceful and inclusive economy. Flood 
avoids basing his analysis on the early narratives. While Flood’s reasons for doing so are 
justified, the use of early lives, along with a critical reading of the writings of Saint Francis, 
can support Flood’s retrieval of a rich social history. Both Flood’s history of early Franciscan 
labour and a mimetic reading of the early Franciscan movement indicate a number of core 
values, which may be epitomized in Alison’s phrase, the ‘intelligence of the victim’. This 
‘intelligence’ was the engine of an original, non-violent social and political reality, the forma 
vitae.    
 
that when Thomas arrived, the time of the first fraternity had ended and that the Order had begun’. Dalarun, 
p. 115. 
973 Flood, Work for Justice, p. 52. 




Medieval hagiography and romantic interpretations over several centuries have typically 
framed the discourse around Francis of Assisi and the early Franciscan movement. I have 
argued that these interpretations have obscured, rather than revealed the dynamics of the 
Saint and the movement to which he gave his name.  Apart from hagiography and 
romanticism, the spiritual and ascetical insights of Francis of Assisi and the early Franciscan 
movement achieved a particular philosophical and theological expression in scholasticism.975 
According to Lydia Schumacher, the early Franciscan practitioners of scholastic theology did 
not make explicit connections between their theological work and the Franciscan forma 
vitae.976 Nevertheless, Schumacher argues that Franciscan theologians of the 1230s and 
1240s were not merely systematizing Augustine, as has been generally said, but purposefully 
laying down ‘a Franciscan intellectual tradition for the very first time’.977 Schumacher agrees 
with Scott Matthews that the early Franciscan theologians were ‘thinking like a community, 
not merely as a group of scholars who happened to be working at the same institution’.978 
Schumacher’s argument tends to emphasize the innovation, creativity and fittingness of such 
an intellectual project, and its essential congruence with the values of Francis.979 However, 
the scholastic appropriation of early Franciscan experience, while enduring, is not definitive. 
Elements of the early Franciscan culture which were not immediately congruent with 
scholastic categories were eclipsed. While the spiritual genius of Francis of Assisi and the 
values of the early Franciscan movement clearly resonated with some of the major cultural 
and intellectual trends of the day, the importance of the early Franciscan experience exceeds 
the late-medieval moment. I have attempted to demonstrate that reading the early 
Franciscan sources through a post-critical lens produces a compelling narrative which avoids 
historical anachronism and is relevant to contemporary concerns. 
 
975 Cf. Lydia Schumacher, Early Franciscan Theology: Between Authority and Innovation (Cambridge: Cambridge 
University Press, 2019). The Franciscan, Alexander of Hales and his collaborators produced the first great 
Summa of the scholastic period. p. 18.  
976 It may be noted, however, that Bonaventure’s Itinerarium Mentis in Deum, a work of mystical theology, is 
explicitly modelled on Francis’s life.   
977 Ibid, p. 29. 
978 Ibid.  
979 Cf. Ibid, pp. 30-54. 
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In the course of this thesis, I have attempted to structure a dialogue between the early 
Franciscan movement and René Girard. I have attempted to structure Girard’s insights so that 
they dovetail and illuminate key aspects of the early Franciscan movement. This has involved 
‘shuttling back and forth’ between texts, contexts, ideas, intuitions, and shared concerns. I 
concur with Cynthia Haven that the problem with all attempts to explain or describe mimetic 
theory (including my own) is that they are ‘less rhetorically commanding and confident, less 
elegantly pugnacious and provocative, less witty and wise than Girard’s own writing’.980 It is 
equally true, however, that Girard was not ‘naturally a system-builder; there are gaps, missing 
correlations, flaws of cross-referencing and consolidation in his immensely suggestive body 
of work’.981 I have attempted to demonstrate that, through this dialogue, mimetic theory 
finds an expression, not equal to Girard’s rendering, yet still provocative, compelling and 
worthwhile.  
 
Adopting (and adapting) a well-established tripartite structure, this thesis has first 
explored core insights of mimetic theory, and then applied these insights to the early 
Franciscan movement. The pairing of mimetic theory and the early Franciscan movement has 
both strengths and weaknesses:  
 
With respect to the early Franciscan movement, mimetic theory foregrounds the core 
values of peace-making and a non-rivalrous ethic of living, labouring, and evangelizing. 
Drawing attention to the social dynamics which both create and contain mimetic conflict, 
Girard’s work provides us with tools to describe and understand the early Franciscans and 
their aims. Through the lens of mimetic theory, it is possible to describe Francis and the early 
friars in terms of a shared ‘conversion intelligence’, an intelligence which required new social, 
ascetical, religious and economic forms. Mimetic theory explains how periods of rapid social 
change can produce not only social undifferentiation, persecution and violence, but also a 
deeper insight into the dynamics of mediated desire and an aspiration to found new, non-
rivalrous social realities, in response to conflict. 
 
980 Haven, p. 90. 
981 Paul Gifford, ‘Responses to Jean-Pierre Dupuy’ in Can We Survive Our Origins? pp. 279-68. (p. 279). 
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Girard’s theoretical work is compelling, as description, if not always convincing as 
explanation. Having a certain distance from the pre-critical world of the early Franciscans, 
mimetic theory acts as a companion to, or a reader of, the early Franciscan texts. It draws our 
attention to what those texts say about the perennial questions of imitation, desire, envy, 
acquisition, violence, social order, creation, and God. Like Girard, the early Franciscan 
theologians were ‘readers of texts’ and in this respect they offer an example. According to 
Mary Carruthers, the scholastic theologians located authority in texts rather than authors, 
and therefore texts awaited further interpretation and elaboration: ‘it is precisely the fact 
that the text generates further texts that renders it authoritative’.982 The scholastics were not 
mere compliers, neither did they limit themselves to a recapitulation of earlier authorities, 
rather from the patristic texts they attempted a new synthesis, necessarily encompassing 
their own concerns and perspectives. It is, therefore, appropriate to revisit the early 
Franciscan movement and the texts associated with it and to read the texts through a 
different lens, testing the sources for shared concerns and points of convergence.  
 
Evidence of the dynamics of mediated desire and of mimetic conversion justifies a 
reframing of the early Franciscan narrative along Girardian lines. A determined form of life, 
indeed, a specific Franciscan idiom points to the formation of a new social reality with its own 
self-awareness and distinct principles. In Girardian terms we may describe the early 
Franciscan movement as an effort to withdraw peacefully from the sacrificial systems that 
comprise the social order. This exodus was ultimately short lived and its legacy contentious 
and ambiguous. The gradual disappearance of daily labour, as understood in the Early Rule, 
was an important element in the failure of the exodus. The social and ecclesial utility of the 
Order, the privileges the friars accrued, and the admission of learned doctors such as 
Alexander of Hales, imposed on the forma vitae contradictions and tensions too much to bear. 
The learned friars, referred to variously as fratres sapientes, scientati and clerici, increasingly 
came to prominence within the Order.983 Typically, these friars valued the practices of 
monastic life and were formed outside the context of daily labour, itinerant preaching and 
 
982 Cf. Ibid, p. 24. 
983 Cf. Lazaro Iriarte, Franciscan History, The Three Orders of St. Francis of Assisi, trans. Patricia Ross. (Chicago: 
Franciscan Herald Press, 1983) pp. 15-25. 
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that peculiar asceticism which was aligned to the ‘intelligence of the victim’. No longer sharing 
the ‘intelligence of the victim’ and no longer understanding the forma vitae from that 
perspective, the early Franciscans continued to regard voluntary poverty as emblematic and 
entered on decades of debate as to its role and observance in the Order.984 The near 
obsession of later generations of Franciscans with voluntary poverty is startling, since the 
choice to live among the dispossessed and to develop social realities which included and 
incorporated the dispossessed was, in fact, the chief characteristic of Francis’ converted 
life.985 
 
This thesis has attempted to read early Franciscanism as a shared project of mimetic 
conversion; an experiment in positive, non-rivalrous reciprocity. It is evident that the social 
and political form which embodied this shared ‘intelligence’ had begun to collapse during the 
lifetime of Saint Francis. In the decades following this collapse, the Founder was removed 
from his brothers and sisters, becoming the exemplary (and inimitable) saint of hagiography, 
and the romantic hero of the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries. The limits of this work do 
not permit further exploration of the failed exodus. It may be noted, in passing, that the early 
Franciscan movement produced its own scapegoat, upon whose shoulders the burden of 
charismatic betrayal was almost uniquely placed. The ‘scapegoat friar’ was Elias of Assisi 
(1180-1253).986 A remarkable consensus, a virtual unanimity, from both the clericalist and 
‘Spiritual’ wings of the Order single out Elias for unforgiving rebuke in the decades after the 
death of Francis.  
 
 
984 Cf. Thompson pp. 245-46. During the lifetime of Francis, the crisis in the Order’s identity was not due to 
poverty. The datable writings of Saint Francis, specifically his nine letters offer no evidence of a struggle over 
poverty during the crisis period in the Order. Later narratives, such as the Assisi Compilation give an account of 
this period which is not recognizable in the writings of Francis, at this time. Thompson notes that the word 
‘poverty’ as well as ‘anything like the later concept is virtually absent from Francis’s writing of this period’. Ibid, 
p. 246. 
985 Desbonnets (citing Giovannai Micoli) asserts that Saint Francis linked his conversion with the decision to live 
with lepers. This was a specific symbol of ‘doing penance’. Voluntary poverty was indicated by this choice, 
however, more significantly, in ‘medieval society, the leper represented the element that was alien, 
irretrievable and repugnant, the physical projection, so to speak, of all the ills that society wanted to push 
away from itself’ and Saint Francis’s choice to live among the lepers is ‘above all the rejection of the society’s 
current values and of its criteria of judgement’. Desbonnets, p. 11.   
986  Fourteenth-century Franciscan authors styled Elias of Assisi (also known as Elias of Cortona) as ‘alter Iudas’ 
in contrast to St. Francis, the ‘alter Christus’. Cf. Austin Powell, ‘Writing Polemic as History: The Apocalyptic 
Implications of Elias of Cortona, and Gerardo Segeralli in Salimbene’s Cronica, Franciscan Studies, 75, (2017) 
pp. 343-84. (p. 343) <http://doi.org/10.1353/frc.2017.0013>  
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The continuing appeal of Saint Francis notwithstanding, his importance exceeds 
simple characterizations of romantic hero or medieval saint. His association with a dynamic 
movement, as a practitioner and advocate of a shared way of life, indicate his relevance for 
contemporary concerns. These concerns include the question of exclusion within and outside 
of Church structures, questions of imitation, reciprocity and desire, the possibility of an 
authentic witness to peace, the possibilities of holding in a creative tension the valid 
assertions of hierarchical and horizontal structures in Church and society. Loosed from its 
moorings to the single question of voluntary poverty, the early Franciscan movement 
emerges as a more complex and creative social and religious phenomenon. Both in its initial 
exodus, and in the lesson of its ultimate collapse back into excluding and sacrificial systems, 
the early Franciscan movement represents a paradigm of mimetic conversion. Through a 
Girardian lens, Saint Francis and the brothers and sisters of the movement return, no longer 
quaint, or tragic, or inimitable. Rather they resemble us, in our contemporary struggles to co-
exist within a variety of social, ecclesial and economic contexts, which continue to create 
stability through violence and exclusion. The mimetic reading provides the early Franciscan 
movement with a contemporary voice and a new idiom from which to speak about its mission: 
To embody the ‘intelligence of the victim’; a common witnessing to the graced encounters 
with those who are habitually excluded. ‘To heal the wounded, bind up the broken, and recall 
the erring’.987  
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